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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
‘The modern super-corporations ...wields immense, virtually 
unchecked power, some say they are ‘private governments’, whose 
decisions affect the lives of us all. The philosophy of our times, I 
think requires that such enterprises be held to a higher standard 
than that of the ‘morals of the market place’ which exalts a single-
minded myopic determination to maximise profits’1 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, a catalogue of high-profile 
disasters and controversies has drawn attention to the changing nature of relationship 
between large corporations and society. The list would include, the Shell Brent Spar 
incident2, the Shell crisis in Nigeria3, the Bhopal chemical spill4, the Exxon Valdez 
Oil spill5, the use of slave labour in Burma and the controversial working conditions 
                                                 
1 Justice Douglas dissenting, SEC v Medical Committee for Human Rights (1972) 404 U.S. 403, 409-
410; also cited in Lord Wedderburn ‘Legal Development of Corporate Responsibility: For Whom will 
Corporate Managers be Trustees’ in K J Hopt and G Teubner,  Corporate Governance and Directors 
Liabilities: Legal, Economic and Sociological Analyses of Corporate Social Responsibility (De 
Gruyter, Berlin 1984) 3-54 
2 In 1995 Greenpeace controversially stopped the dumping of the Brent Spar (North Sea) oil storage 
facility in the ocean. See G Jordan, Shell, Greenpeace and the Brent Spar ( Palgrave, Basingstoke 
2001) 
3 Shell’s alleged complicity in the deaths of Ogoni human rights activists in 1995 and other human 
rights violations. See D Wheeler H Fabig R Boele, ‘Paradoxes and Dilemmas for stakeholder 
responsive firms in the extractive sector: lessons from the case of Shell and the Ogoni’ (2002) 39(3) 
Journal of Business Ethics 297-318 and B Manby, Shell in Nigeria: Corporate Social Responsibility 
and the Ogoni Crisis (Carnegie Council case study series, Case Study ≠ 20 2000) 
4 In 1984 this was a chemical leak from a storage facility in Bhopal, India that resulted in the death of 
thousands. See RAG Monks and  N Minow, Corporate Governance (3rd ed. Blackwell, Oxford 2004) 
18-19 
5 In 1989 an oil tanker accident resulting in one of the largest oil spills. This occurred in a region of 
Alaska which is a habitat for different sea creatures and fishes. The livelihood of the local fishing 
population was also adversely affected see M Baker Companies in crisis: what not to do when it all 
goes wrong Exxon Mobil and Exxon Valdez <http://www.mallenbaker.net/csr/crisis03.html> 
accessed 17 September 2011 
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in Asian factories6, the baby milk scandals7, the conflicts between indigenous 
peoples, mining communities and mining companies in South American countries, 
West Papua and other areas8, the pharmaceutical industry and the anti-retroviral 
drugs crisis9, the Enron collapse10, the banking crisis of 200811 and the BP- Gulf of 
Mexico oil spill12, to mention but a few. These incidents and crisis have thrown open 
questions of the impact of corporations especially multinational corporations on 
various aspects and actors within society. Freeland observes that: 
 ‘the Gulf oil spill and the financial crisis have taught us, rather 
brutally, that the heart of the relationship between business and 
society doesn’t lie with the charitable deeds companies do in their 
off-hours but whether they are doing their day jobs in ways that help 
– or hurt   the rest of us.’13 
 
Therefore this changing nature of the relationship between large corporations and 
society in this period has become the driving force for demands that corporations 
become ‘socially responsible’. These demands have come from several sectors of 
society including non-governmental organisations, local communities and academics 
                                                 
6 A Ramasastry, ‘Corporate Complicity: From Nuremburg to Rangoon, an examination of forced 
labour cases and their impact on the liability of MNC’ (2002) 20  Berkeley Journal of International 
Law 91-137 
7 Nestle as the largest artificial baby milk producer had been implicated in allegations of scandalous 
marketing practices especially in developing countries. The Business and Human Rights websites 
details various baby food and baby milk controversies: <http://www.business-
humanrights.org/Categories/Sectors/Agriculturefoodbeveragetobaccofishing/Babyfoodbabymilk >  
accessed 17 September 2011 
8 N Yakovleva, CSR in the mining industries (Ashgate, Hampshire 2005); T E Downing and others 
Indigenous peoples and mining encounters: strategies and tactics April 2002 Report no. 57 (MMSD) 
(IIED/WBCSD, 2002) 
9 World Bank Development Report 2006 Equity and Development (Washington, IBRD/WB/OUP, 
2005) 215 
10 The sudden collapse of a large energy corporation, Enron opened up questions on the ethical aspect 
of such corporations. Buhr & Grafstrom remark that ‘ the collapse of ENRON in the autumn of 2001 
marked a watershed in the discussion of CSR’ See H Buhr & M Grafstrom, ‘The making of meaning 
in the media, the case of CSR in the FT’ in F Den Hond and others, Managing CSR in action: talking, 
doing and measuring (Ashgate, Hampshire 2007) 15-32, 26 
11 S Decker C Sale, ‘An analysis of CSR, Trust and Reputation in the Banking Profession’ in S O  
Idowu W L Filho(eds.),  Professionals’ Perspectives of  CSR (Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 2009) 135-156 
12 C. Freeland ‘What’s BP’s social responsibility?’ 19 July 2010 Reuters online 
<http://blogs.reuters.com/chrystia-freeland/2010/07/19/whats-bps-social-responsibility/> accessed 17 
September 2011 
13 Ibid 
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amongst others.14 This is because of perceptions of a sustained shift towards private 
corporate interests through privatisation and the consequential involvement of these 
private corporate interests in many aspects of public societal life.15  
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has arisen as a concept that attempts to 
encapsulate these demands for social responsibility. It is therefore a concept which 
could have significant implications for corporations and society. Yet at heart of CSR 
is the debate about its meaning and contestations about the role and relevance of law. 
CSR definitions are therefore contested and this contestation has had the effect of 
limiting the efficacy of CSR as there is uncertainty as to what it means and its 
ultimate goal. In some sense, this contestation can be partially attributed to the 
fluidity inherent to CSR as it seeks to capture evolving and developing demands 
from society but it is necessary that at CSR’s conceptual core, it addresses a central 
theme.  In addition several definitions purport to exclude law by the use of terms 
such as ‘beyond the law’, ‘voluntary’ and ‘beyond legal requirements’.16 
This suggests that legal inquiry into CSR is an anomaly but it is impossible to 
propose that CSR occurs outside the law or is illegal. When one examines the 
relationship between corporations and society then law is a fundamental aspect of 
such relationship. Nevertheless the law’s relevance to contemporary concepts is 
contested because the law is seen as inflexible and mandatory. This is not reflective 
                                                 
14 M Haigh M T Jones, ‘The Drivers of CSR: a critical review’ (2006) 5(2) The Business Review 245-
251; J Moon D Vogel ‘CSR, Government and Civil Society’ in A Crane and others  Oxford 
Handbook on CSR (Oxford University Press (OUP), Oxford 2008) 303-326; G Eweje ‘Multinational 
Oil company initiatives in Nigeria: The scepticism of stakeholders in host communities’ (2007) 
49(5/6) International Journal of Law and Management 218-235; W. Visser ‘CSR in Developing 
Countries’ in A Crane and others  Oxford Handbook on CSR ( OUP, Oxford 2008) 473-502 
15 This shift is new and recreated rather than a direct transfer as Ruggie asserts that there has been no 
actual shift instead that firms have created new transnational world of transnational flows that did not 
previously exist. The crux issue on which there is consensus is the significant impact this is having on 
the lives of individuals in society. J G Ruggie, ‘Reconstituting the Global Public Domain- Issues, 
Actors and Practices’ 10(4) European Journal of International Relations 499-531, 503 
16 See a good summary in S B Banerjee Corporate Social Responsibility The good, the bad and the 
ugly (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2007)16 -18 
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of contemporary perspectives of law as concepts such CSR can be seen as parallel to 
newer legal concepts that need to retain some flexibility in definition. 
 The objective of this thesis is to reveal that CSR has a central theme and that this 
permits the examination of legal perspectives. This central theme is proposed to be 
the legitimacy of corporate power and this permits the exploration of chosen legal 
perspectives with the potential to structure and influence the external use of power in 
the interactive relationship between corporation and society.   
This introductory chapter will outline this hypothesis in more detail. Firstly it sets 
out the context and background to the thesis.  Then it identifies the research 
questions that drive the thesis. In the next section, the chapter provides justification 
for the thesis. Furthermore it will point out the scope and limitations within the 
thesis. The penultimate section specifies the methodology of the thesis and the last 
section provides an overview of other chapters within the thesis.   
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1.2 Context of the thesis 
 
This changing relationship between corporations and society which has been 
introduced in this chapter must be placed against the context of globalisation.17 
Globalisation places emphasis on a world without borders, with the aim of achieving 
record levels of global ‘interconnectedness’.18 The emphasis has been on persuading 
more states to pursue ‘good’19 economic governance, ‘based on the precepts of 
macroeconomic stability, liberalization of markets and privatization of economic 
activity.’20  This represents a capitalist approach and has resulted in the expansion of 
markets and the private sector. The focus has been on the protection of foreign 
investment through principles such as the principle of national treatment. This 
principle creates the ability for corporations to be able to establish business in almost 
any state without hindrance, unless similar restrictions are imposed on a host 
country’s corporations.21 Cutler points out that ‘forces of globalisation and the 
                                                 
17 A G Scherer G Palazzo, ‘Globalisation and Corporate social responsibility’ in A Crane and others 
(eds.) The Oxford Handbook of CSR (New York, OUP, 2008) 413-431 Where they point out that with 
globalisation there should be a paradigm shift in the CSR debate as a different scenario applies. A 
global framework that is fragile and incomplete. 
18 A good definition describes globalisation as ‘the intensification of worldwide social relations, 
which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many 
miles away and vice- versa’ A Giddens The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford University Press 
1991) 64 There is a dialectic nature to globalisation that involves both simultaneous and contradictory 
effects. An indicative list on the topic includes: D Held and A McGrew(eds.), The Global 
Transformations Reader (2nd ed. Polity Press, Cambridge 2003); D. Held and A. McGrew, Governing 
Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance (Polity Press, Cambridge 2002); J A 
Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction (2nd ed. Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); JH Dunning (ed.), 
Government, Globalisation and International Business (OUP, Oxford 1997); AM Taylor and JG 
Williamson (eds.), Globalisation in Historical Perspective (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
2003) 
19 ‘Good’  refers to the successful adoption of  market economy as an economic model. 
20 UNDP Human Development Report (HDR) 2003 Millennium Development goals, a compact to end 
world poverty (OUP, Oxford 2003) 16 
21 Corporate Social Responsibility and Development: Towards a New Agenda? Report of the 
UNRISD Conference 17-18 November 2003, Geneva at 19 
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privatisation and deregulation of industries, sectors, commodities and services are 
transforming authority relations locally and globally’.22 
This trend of global integration and opening up of markets has been of immense 
benefit to multinational corporations (MNC).23 MNC can be defined as large 
corporations which control operations or income-generating assets in more than one 
country.24This control and the resulting revenues for the corporate group has led to 
claims that they possess more economic power than certain states.25  This has also 
meant that the private decisions of business regarding questions of investment can 
affect whole communities as well as states.  This ‘ability to affect’ has resulted in 
countervailing demands for corporations to take on social responsibility. Lydenberg 
proposes the current dilemma as follows 
‘Assets and power around the world have shifted from 
governments to private sector on a tremendous scale, with this shift 
has come expectations of great benefits to society. But 
simultaneously business scandals, financial meltdowns, global 
environmental and health care crises and persistent poverty casts 
doubt on business ability to deliver on its promises in meaningful 
ways. It can be legitimately asked : are corporations really serving 
a public good, or are they robbing the public blind.’26  
 
This current contextual setting for CSR discourse must also be set against CSR 
literature which has much older discourse centred on crucial questions about the role 
of corporation in society. The historical academic origins of CSR as a concept can be 
traced to the early debates between Berle and Dodd in the 1930s on corporate powers 
                                                 
22 A C Cutler  Private Power and Global Authority- Transnational Merchant Law in the Global 
Political Economy  (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2003) 19-20 
23 Jones a leading business historian points out that multinationals became the leading driver of the 
integration of the global economy. See G Jones, Multinationals and Global Capitalism-from the 
nineteenth to the twenty-first century (Oxford, OUP 2005) at 38 
24 Ibid at 5 
25 The UNDP Human Development Report (HDR) 1999 Globalisation with a human face (OUP, 
Oxford 1999) 32 
26 S Lyndenberg,  Corporations and the Public Interest: Guiding the Invisible Hand (Berrett-Koehler 
Publishers, San Francisco 2005) 9 
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as powers in trust27 and specifically the question of, ‘for whom are corporate 
managers’ trustees?’  This debate pointed to the potential change in the role of large 
business at that time. This was a time of public questioning about the contribution of 
capitalism and the limits of the profit-maximisation ideology in the face of the great 
depression.28  Dodd pointed out during this debate in the 1930s’, that business 
corporations are an economic institution which have a social service as well as a 
profit-making function and therefore they are permitted and encouraged by law 
because of its service to community rather than because it is a source of profit for its 
owners.29 However this is not a perspective which draws universal appeal as Berle’s 
original proposition draws on conventional notions of private ownership and 
freedom of contract and positions the director as an agent for his principal: the 
corporation and its members, urging firmly that ‘he is a fiduciary, who must loyally 
serve his principal’s interest.’30 
Nevertheless the dissatisfaction with the inability of global spread of capitalism to 
present an adequate social response to effects of misuse of corporate power 
continues to drive questions of social responsibility of corporations. This is reflected 
in Dean Donham’s telling statement reported in the Dodd article. He points out that 
‘the only way to defend capitalism is through leadership that accepts social 
responsibility and meets the sound needs of the great majority of our people’.31While 
his concern then was for the American people, it is now a global concern with the 
                                                 
27 A A Berle Jr., ‘Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust’ (1931) 44 Harvard Law Review1049-1074 ; E 
M Dodd, ’For whom are corporate managers trustees?’ (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review  1145-1163;   
A A  Berle Jr.,, ‘For whom Corporate managers are Trustees: A Note’ (1932) 45 Harvard Law 
Review 1365- 1372 
28 B. Horrigan, Corporate Social Responsibility in the 21st Century: Debates, Models and Practices 
Across Government, Law and Business (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2010) 89; W Bratton M Wachter 
‘Shareholder’s Primacy’s Corporatist Origins Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation’ University of 
Pennsylvania Institute for law and Economics research Paper No. 07-24; Georgetown Law and 
economics Research paper No.1021273 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1021273 > 17 September 2011 
29 Dodd (n 27) 1149 
30 Berle 1931 (n 27) 
31 Dodd (n 27) 1155-1156 
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spread of global capitalism. The changing nature of the relationship hinges on 
increasing corporate power and its ability to significantly affect society. The 
disasters and incidents also draw attention to the inter-linkages that exist in modern 
society, inter-linkages fostered by globalisation. While some writers argue that 
corporate power is rather perceived than real and that measurement of revenues of 
MNC against gross domestic product  of states are inadequate32, it is rather difficult 
to deny that states are at worst, unable and at best, unwilling to strictly regulate  the 
large multinational corporations.33This leaves a vacuum in the responsibility of 
corporations for its impact or negative effect on society. 
 After the landmark debate of the 1930s’ Bowen in 1953 in his book, ‘Social 
Responsibilities of the Businessman’ began a more popular starting point in CSR 
history34 He pointed out that by social responsibilities of the businessman, he 
referred to ‘the obligations of businessmen to pursue those policies, to make those 
decisions or to follow those lines of action which are desirable in terms of the 
objectives and values of our society.’35This begins the shift of emphasis to ‘what’ 
business can do. This also partially explains how CSR has now come to symbolise 
an all-encompassing term for all questions of the nature of the relationship between 
corporations and society as business points out various lines of action of their own 
accord which they propose are desirable for society.  Yet through this also CSR has 
provided fertile ground for debates on the nature of the relationship between 
                                                 
32 J Tullberg “Illusions of Corporate Power: Revisiting the Relative Power of Corporations and 
Governments.” (2004) 52 Journal of Business Ethics 325-333, 325 
33 This is exemplified more recently in the failure of the UN Human Rights Commission in 2004 to 
pass the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprise 
with regard to Human rights (The Draft Norms). This would have been a unique instrument because it 
would have extended international regulation to non-state actors and framed the responsibilities in 
mandatory terms with mechanisms for implementation and enforcement. E/CN.4/SUB.2/2003/12 
(2003) See also A De Jonge, Transnational Corporations and International Law: Accountability in 
the Global Business Environment (Edward Elgar, UK 2011) 34-37 
34 H R Bowen,  Social responsibilities of a Businessman (Harper & Row, New York 1953) 
35 Ibid at 44 
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corporations and society and all issues that have arisen from this.36 This relationship 
between corporations and society is a multifaceted one, with several dimensions and 
the potential to change over time.   
The relative nature of the relationships within CSR has also resulted in other 
attempts to define CSR so as to satisfy the various objectives of a particular 
viewpoint within distinct fields in society such as management studies, economics, 
political science or law. Along these lines, Windsor defines CSR as ‘any concept 
concerning how managers should handle public policy and social issues’37 while 
Werther Jr. and Chandler contend that the significance of CSR is directly related to 
the value of the firm’s global brand38, therefore making it a remarkable marketing 
issue. Marrewijk indicates that CSR has been adapted to management studies, 
marketing, reporting, accounting, each aligning CSR to its specific situations and 
challenges.39  
The popularity of CSR is also driven to a large extent by the changes in the 
dynamics of societal relations, through globalisation of markets, globalisation of 
communications technology through mobile communication and the internet and 
global exchange of knowledge, information and ideology.40 In spite of this flexibility 
within CSR, it is has resulted in a situation where CSR is quickly becoming all 
things to all men.  While the flexibility within CSR is necessary because it addresses 
                                                 
36 This is also because there were no direct channels of communication between corporations and its 
contextual society except through the state, its laws and regulation. 
37 D Windsor, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility – three key approaches’ (2006) 43(1) Journal of 
Management Studies  93-114, 93 
38 W B Werther Jr D Chandler ‘Strategic CSR as a global brand insurance’ (2005) 48(4) Business 
Horizons 317 -324 
39 M V Marrewijk ‘Concepts and Definitions of CSR and Corporate Sustainability: Between Agency 
and Communion’ (2003) 44 Journal of Business Ethics 95-105,96 
40 M McIntosh and others  Living Corporate Citizenship  (Pearson Education Ltd Great Britain, 2003) 
15 
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the relationship between two dynamic groups (society and corporation), the lack of a 
fundamental definition or central theme hampers progress.  
Progress in this sense refers to the difficulty in identifying and achieving purposes 
that triggered CSR in the first place. MNC who make claims of adopting CSR 
practice are however accused of abuses of human rights, environmental rights, 
labour rights or complicity in corruption.41 In one sense it has been identified that the 
lack of a definition and the ‘subsequent diversity and overlap in terminology, 
definitions and conceptual models hampers academic debate and on-going 
research.’42 In another sense this prolonged battle to find expression for several 
viewpoints and issues within one concept has resulted in a contested concept with 
doubtful practical value.  Yet CSR may not be amenable to a ‘fixed universal 
definition’43 as it has been asserted that the notion of what is socially responsible is 
driven by contemporary needs and concerns which cannot be pinned down in precise 
unchanging terms.44  
What is important is to identify a central theme within CSR. This is because CSR 
attempts to grapple with many important and crucial issues in today’s society. 
Frederick points to the some ideas seeking recognition through the CSR doctrine. 
They include questions about the corporate managers’ role in society, the challenge 
                                                 
41 C Villiers, ‘Corporate law, corporate power and corporate social responsibility’ in N Boeger, R 
Murray and C Villiers (eds.), Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham 2008) 85- 112, 86 N Klien, No Logo (Knopf, Toronto 2000) D Korten, When 
Corporations rule the world (Berret-Koehler Publishers Inc., San Francisco, 2000) J Bakan, The 
Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power (Constable, London 2005) N Hertz, The Silent Takeover: 
Global Capitalism and the Death of Democracy  (Arrow books, UK 2001) Lydenberg (n 26) Even in 
terms of proactive use of MNC capacity in the area of development, the utility of CSR is doubtful: see 
J. G. Frynas,‘The false developmental promise of CSR: evidence of multinational oil 
companies’81(3) International Affairs 581-598  
42 Marrewijk (n 39) 
43 M Kerr, R Janda and C Pitts Corporate Social Responsibility –A Legal Analysis (LexisNexis, 
Canada, 2009) 5 
44  Ibid 
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of balancing competing claims to corporate resources and philanthropy.45In addition 
to this are calls for social justice represented in appeals for a human face to global 
markets46 and the re-examination of the business role in the face of sustainable 
development as well as the problems of ‘financial scandals, human rights violations, 
environmental side-effects, collaboration with repressive regimes...’47  
It is in view of the fundamental nature of the issues which CSR is attempting to 
grapple with, that it is important to establish a core meaning or exemplar around 
which these debates centre.  As Horrigan points out: 
‘deep divisions amongst CSR advocates and critics combined with 
multiple competing theories and models of corporate social 
responsibility and governance, sometimes distract attention away 
from the remarkable degree of common ground that exist on most 
sides of the CSR debate.’48 
  
On contextual examination it can be deduced that the central theme emerging is that 
of demands for the legitimacy of this enhanced corporate power and impact. 
Legitimacy as a concept can be defined in a number of ways49, but a crucial element 
is the accountability of the exercise of corporate power based on accepted normative 
standards.  
                                                 
45 W C Frederick, Corporation, Be Good! The Story of Corporate Social Responsibility (Dog Ear 
Publishing, Indianapolis 2006) 
46 Famous phrase from Kofi Annan’s World Economic Forum, Davos Speech 1999 cited in M. 
McIntosh and others, Living Corporate Citizenship (Financial Times (FT)/Prentice Hall, London 
2003) 131 
47 G Palazzo A G Scherer, ‘Corporate Legitimacy as Deliberation: A Communicative Framework’ 
(2006) 66 Journal of Business Ethics 71-88, 71 
48 B. Horrigan, Corporate Social Responsibility in the 21st Century: Debates, Models and Practices 
Across Government, Law and Business (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2010) 7 
49 Debates about legitimacy abound in Politics, constitutional law and International law, often linked 
to other debates about constitutions, democracy, governance and authority. For example: see: M C 
Suchman, ‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches’ (1995) 20(3) The Academy 
of Management Review 571-610, 574; R H Fallon, ‘Legitimacy and the Constitution’ (2005) 118(6) 
HLR 1787-1853. With regard to the corporation, legitimacy debates are often found in the debates 
about corporate governance: see: P Ireland, ‘ Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder ownership’ 
62(1) The Modern Law Review (MLR) 32-57; E W Orts, ‘The Complexity and Legitimacy of 
Corporate Law’ (1993) 50 Washington and Lee Law Review 1565-1623 
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Fallon points out that legitimacy can be measured against three kinds of standards: 
legal, sociological and moral. 50  Legal legitimacy focuses on the legality of action. 
Such legality is adjudged both from procedural sense and a substantive sense.  
Therefore its focus is on conformity to a law that has been properly made. For 
example government actions can be viewed as legally legitimate when they conform 
to a constitution properly made.51 Sociological legitimacy focuses on popular 
consent.52 Weber as the foremost proponent focused on the active belief of citizens. 
He stated that ‘every system of authority, attempts to establish or to cultivate the 
belief in its legitimacy’. 53 And moral legitimacy addresses legitimacy through moral 
justification; justification based on norms or accepted external social standards such 
as human rights, democratic principles and so on.54  While these are regarded as 
different concepts of legitimacy they are inter-connected.55 
The inter-connected nature of these aspects of legitimacy can be seen in the work of 
Beetham. He points out that ‘a given power relationship is not legitimate because 
people believe in its legitimacy, but because it can be justified in terms of their 
beliefs’56 and these beliefs are often based on normative standards. In his view 
legitimacy will depend on conformity with the rule of law, the justification of those 
rules by reference to congruent beliefs of the state and its citizenry and the evidence 
of consent by citizenry.  Within this context Beetham demonstrates the necessity for 
legitimacy to include justification and accountability. In line with this inter-
connectedness, Jones defines legitimacy as referring to ‘a system of widely accepted 
                                                 
50 R Fallon ‘Legitimacy and the Constitution’ (2005) 118 HLR 1787-1835, He analyses debates about 
the legitimacy of the constitution. 
51 Ibid at 1806 
52 Fallon (n 50) 
53 M Weber, Economy and Society (Vol.2, 1st pub. 1968, University of California Press 1978) 213 
54 J Doak D O’Mahony ‘In search of Legitimacy…’ (2011) 31(2) Legal Studies 305-325, 307 
55 Fallon (n 50) 
56 D Beetham The Legitimation of Power’ (Palgrave, Hampshire, 1991) 11 For critique of his 
position: see R H T O’Kane ‘Against Legitimacy’ (1993) 41 Political Studies 471-487 
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rules and standards governing the way in which power is achieved and exercised’57, 
Mitchell asserts that legitimacy refers to ‘the belief among groups within the affected 
population, workers, consumers and managers themselves that the exercise of power 
is justified.’58and Suchman defines legitimacy as ‘a generalised perception or 
assumption that actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions.’59 The various 
authors outline belief and justification but also belief based on justification.  
Therefore in this CSR context legitimacy not only refers to the cultivation of belief 
that corporate power and its uses are legitimate, (that is, through the use of public 
relation, marketing and the use of corporate policies on social responsibility) but 
more fundamentally it refers to rules, standards and processes that govern the 
exercise of corporate power in a way that affects society.  This perspective asserts 
that legitimate power is limited power and the limitations may be largely 
conventional or legally defined.60  
This central theme of CSR is also important because of the insistence of some users 
of CSR on placing law outside the parameters of CSR or giving it a very limited role. 
The very nature of CSR as seeking legitimacy for corporate power and thereby re-
examining questions of the corporation’s role in society pushes to the fore the 
question of what role law can play. Law is an essential and important aspect of 
                                                 
57 R H Jones, ‘The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation’ 1977 20(4) Business Horizons 5-9, 6. 
Jones was the Chairman and Chief Executive of the General Electric Company 
58 N. Mitchell ‘Corporate Power, Legitimacy and Social Policy’ (1986)  39(2) The Western Political 
Quarterly 197-212, 202 
59 M C Suchman, ‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches’ (1995) 20(3) The 
Academy of Management Review 571-610, 574 
60 Beetham (n 56), 35; This succinctly stated in this quote “Who selected these men, if not to rule over 
us, at least to exercise vast authority and to whom are they responsible? The answer to the first 
question is quite clearly: they selected themselves. The answer to the second is at best nebulous. This 
in a nutshell constitutes the problem of legitimacy.” L Rayman-Bacchus ‘Reflecting in Corporate 
Legitimacy’ (2006) 17 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 323-335,324 citing E S Mason The 
Corporation in Modern Society  ( Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1959); B Sutton (ed.) The 
Legitimate Corporation (Basil Blackwell,  Bodmin 1993) 
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legitimacy and it also frames and empowers corporations. Law is capable of being 
utilised as an instrument for societal organisation and expression. Law can be 
pluralistic embracing more contemporary global concepts such as CSR. The 
exploration of other conceptions of law applied to CSR will reveal more of the law’s 
ability to drive progress towards CSR’s legitimacy core. 
Yet for the most part, the role of law within CSR is at worst contested61 and at best, 
minimal62, therefore it is important to explore law and  legal theory to re-emphasise 
the role of law as expressive (regulatory) facilitative, and stimulative.63 Law can be 
used as framework that governs the relationship between groups within society and 
makes it possible to create frameworks that may facilitate and stimulate the 
achievement of certain objectives.   The contribution of law and legal perspectives 
within CSR has been limited by the lack of CSR definition and the obvious attempt 
to exclude the law from the purview of CSR through a plethora of definition that 
define CSR actions as actions beyond the law.64 
This limitation may also be self-imposed as the law has been slow to develop general 
jurisprudence applicable to concepts such as CSR driven by globalisation. This is 
why Kerr points out that although law may first appear uncomfortable within the 
CSR sphere, it increasingly has to deal with other flexible legal concepts which may 
not have fixed definitions.65 Therefore in examining legal perspectives of CSR to 
                                                 
61 S B Banerjee Corporate Social Responsibility The good, the bad and the ugly (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, 2007)16 -18 
62 One of the best examples of definitions that include law is that of A B Carroll but this identifies law 
only in its traditional state law form as one of the factors relevant to CSR see A B Carroll ‘Corporate 
Social Responsibility – Evolution of a Definitional Construct’ (1999) 38(3) Business and Society 268-
295 
63 G Teubner ‘Corporate Fiduciary Duties and their beneficiaries: A Functional Approach to the Legal 
Institutionalisation of Corporate Responsibility in  K J Hopt and G Teubner (eds.)  Corporate 
Governance and Directors Liabilities: Legal, Economic and Sociological Analyses of Corporate 
Social Responsibility (De Gruyter, Berlin 1984)149-177, 165 
64 Banerjee (n 61) 
65 Kerr (n 43) This will include sustainable development, precautionary principle, corporate 
governance, ‘best interests of the child’. 
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deal with CSR’s central theme, it is important to examine the law itself from both a 
traditional perspective and an emerging non-traditional perspective. 
 Twinning suggests that one of the primary tasks of such analytical general 
jurisprudence arising from globalisation is the elucidation and construction of 
concepts that can be used to transcend legal traditions and cultures.66 When applied 
to CSR this approach will not focus on prescribing substantive targets to be achieved 
by CSR in a specific manner rather it ensures that procedures and mechanisms are 
installed addressing vital jobs or functions focused towards the central CSR 
objective. 67  These mechanisms can then utilise a number of traditional and non-
traditional law tools and also be responsive to the changing societal needs and 
claims. 
  It is in this vein that Krause suggests that: 
‘There is reason to believe that the principle of social responsibility 
operates effectively mainly by providing for principles and 
mechanisms of social exchange or more generally of social 
regulation or guidance...in short social responsibility proves to be 
substantially a problem of principles and means i.e. mechanisms 
and institutions required to build up and to guide social interactions 
within society.’68 
 
The context reveals the lack of an accepted definition of CSR and contestations 
about the role of law. This reveals a gap which the thesis attempts to address. It 
intends to show that CSR has a central theme and that this central theme allows for 
legal perspectives to contribute to CSR.  Consequently the purpose of the study is to 
indicate that chosen legal perspectives of CSR can contribute to the central theme of 
the CSR concept. 
                                                 
66 W Twining, General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective (CUP, 
Cambridge 2009) xix 
67 Problems visible in corporate law, International law and other substantive law analysis for several 
reasons.  
68 D Krause ‘Corporate Social responsibility: Interests and Goals’ in K J Hopt and G Teubner  
Corporate Governance and Directors Liabilities: Legal, Economic and Sociological Analyses of 
Corporate Social Responsibility (De Gruyter, Berlin, 1984) 95-121,96 
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1.3 Research Questions 
 
The main research question which the thesis sets out to address is: redefining CSR as 
a legitimizing force for corporate power: to what extent can law and the law-jobs 
theory contribute to the concept of CSR?  However in order to effectively examine 
this question, the thesis will focus on two sub-questions. Firstly can CSR be re-
defined to reveal a central theme? Secondly what can chosen legal perspectives 
contribute to CSR’s central theme? 
 
1.3.1 CSR’s central theme: 
Expressions of how to tackle the question of CSR’s definition has taken many forms 
within the literature.69  Various definitions of CSR from subjective view-points 
abound.70 Yet it is apparent that the drivers for CSR stem from the discontent with 
the status quo in the relationship between corporation and society.71 This contention 
                                                 
69 For an overview of several approaches E Garriga and D Mêlé, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility 
theories: Mapping the territory’ (2004) 53(1-2) Journal of Business Ethics 51-71 
70 For some CSR is synonymous with virtue. The Economist cites CSR as ‘the tribute that capitalism 
everywhere pays to virtue.’ ‘The Good Company’ Economist January 22, 2005, 3 and  D Vogel, The 
Market for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility (Brookings Institution 
Washington DC 2005) 3 ; These ties in with a philanthropic view of CSR which endorses the 
voluntary adoption of good business practice. It is in this sense that it appears to be the push for 
adoption of best practice or morally acceptable behaviour and advocates for a voluntary aspirational 
adoption of CSR beyond the law. This is a critique raised by C. Villiers, ‘Corporate law, corporate 
power and corporate social responsibility’ in N Boeger, R Murray and C Villiers (eds.), Perspectives 
on Corporate Social Responsibility (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2008) 85- 112, 86; These 
practitioners define CSR as ‘the continuing commitment by business to behave ethically and 
contribute to economic development, while improving the quality of life of the work force and their 
families as well as of the local community and society at large.’ WBCSD ‘CSR: Meeting changing 
expectations’ (March 1999) cited in A Crane and others (eds.) Readings and cases in a global context  
Routledge-Cavendish ,Oxford 2008) 6; ‘a concept whereby companies integrate social and 
environmental concerns in their business operations and their interaction with stakeholders on a 
voluntary basis’ Commission of the European Communities, Green paper: Promoting a European 
Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility Brussels 18th July 2001 COM(2001) 366 Final 
71 A situation where some of the corporations with strong CSR claims are nonetheless accused of 
committing abuses in areas of human rights, environment, labour rights, issues of corruption and other 
social issues. See Villiers (n 4) N Klien, No Logo (Knopf, Toronto 2000) D Korten, When 
Corporations rule the world (Berret-Koehler Publishers Inc., San Francisco, 2000) J Bakan, The 
Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power (Constable, London 2005) N Hertz, The Silent Takeover: 
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over definitions of CSR and the consequential insistence of many users on the 
exclusion of law and binding principles has detracted from progress on the issue of 
CSR.72 Therefore the thesis in its initial analysis acknowledges this contested nature 
of CSR, by treating CSR as an essentially contested concept (ECC) and applies 
Gallie’s ECC thesis73 to derive an exemplar or central theme for CSR as a concept. 
Gallie proposed the foremost thesis on contested concepts. He points out that there 
are concepts ‘the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their 
proper uses on the parts of their users.’74 These concepts are referred to as ECC. 
Nevertheless they derive from an exemplar or central theme which allows an 
acknowledgement that contestation proceeds on the same subject. The necessity 
within CSR is to address the crucial challenges that prompted its emergence in the 
first instance and this thesis proposes that this can be done by re-connecting to its 
central discourse which is about power and its accountability and that this is an area 
where law has significant relevance.  
This aim of this analysis is to establish that although CSR meaning is contested, 
there is a central theme which triggers the demands for social responsibility. The 
                                                                                                                                          
Global Capitalism and the Death of Democracy  (Arrow books, UK 2001) S Lydenberg, 
Corporations and the Public interest: Guiding the Invisible Hand (Berret-Koehler Publishers Inc., 
San Francisco 2005) 
72 Campbell notes that ‘ assessing the legitimacy of CSR is seriously hampered by the tangle of 
overlapping and conflicting terminology within the literature and the many different understanding of 
the concept among practitioners’ T Campbell, ‘The normative grounding of corporate social 
responsibility: a human rights approach’ in D McBarnet A Voiculescu & T Campbell (eds.) The new 
corporate accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the law (Cambridge University Press 
(CUP), Cambridge 2007)529-564, 534; Whitehouse also proposes that ‘the apparent failure of CSR to 
fulfil its potential in remedying the adverse impact of corporate activity is due in part to the failure on 
the part of its advocates to establish a universally accepted definition of the term and the normative 
grounding necessary for effective regulation…’ see L Whitehouse, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility, 
Corporate Citizenship and the Global Compact: A new Approach to regulating corporate social 
power’ (2003) 3 Global Social Policy 299-318,300 
73 Gallie proposed the foremost thesis for contested concepts common to the social sciences. He 
defined such concepts as a concept ‘the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes 
about their proper uses on the parts of their users’ See: W B Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’ 
(1958) 56 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 167-198 reprinted in M. Black(ed.), The 
Importance of Language (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs 1962) 121- 146 
74 Ibid  
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analysis will suggest that this central theme can be found in the impact of corporate 
power and questions over the legitimacy of such power. The examination of power 
and its legitimacy as a central theme for CSR forms the basis to which the chosen 
legal analysis can then be applied. The approach is especially important as achieving 
desired socially responsible behaviour has been described as one of the greatest 
global challenges of the 21st century.75 This is because it raises questions about the 
role of corporation in society at a time when corporate power has a significant 
impact on global issues.  
                                                 
75 B. Horrigan, Corporate Social Responsibility in the 21st Century: Debates, Models and Practices 
Across Government, Law and Business (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2010) 3 CSR is a concept but in 
line with such emerging concepts from the social sciences it is also a field of study and can be spoken 
of, in terms of value achievements as well. S B Banerjee Corporate Social Responsibility the Good, 
the Bad and the Ugly (Edward Elgar, England, 2007) Banerjee points to it as a field of study in 
management (p.5) and as a mini-industry in academia and the business world (p.1). Jones also agrees 
when he states that ‘the field of corporate responsibility has come a long way in a few years. (in D 
Leipziger, The Corporate responsibility code book ( Greenleaf Sheffield 2003) 13 This is also 
demonstrated when examining issues of achieving CSR objectives. See J Peloza L Falkenberg, ‘The 
Role of Collaboration in achieving CSR objectives’ (2009) 51(3) California Management Review  95-
114  
 
 27 
 
1.3.2 To what extent can law and a law-jobs theory contribute to CSR? 
 
 
For the second aspect, the thesis then proposes that this central theme of legitimacy 
of corporate power will serve as an ideal basis for re-examining law’s role within 
CSR. This is because law not only frames the corporation and its powers internally 
but can also structure and influence its external use of power as well. The thesis in 
this aspect focuses on two key legal perspectives to examine how the law approaches 
concepts of this nature. It identifies that law can be approached from a traditional 
state law centralist perspective or from a more flexible pluralistic perspective. The 
thesis then exemplifies these contrasted approaches by examining the traditional 
corporate law perspective and the non-traditional, pluralistic law-jobs perspective.  
By doing this it seeks to contrast traditional perspectives with non-traditional 
perspectives to reveal the potential and limitations of law to structure, influence and 
legitimise the external use of power in the interactive relationship between 
corporation and society under the CSR theme. The corporation is a creation of the 
law and its limitations as a corporation are set out in corporate laws. The corporate 
form is now common to most legal systems of the world.76 There are long-standing 
debates about corporate law’s tackling of issues of large corporations and their role 
in society.77 Questions linked to debates on corporate theory and which influence its 
                                                 
76 ‘The comparative analysis of the domestic law of states belonging to different legal systems shows 
that individuals may combine their efforts by establishing entities enjoying rights and duties of their 
own and that such entities may have a separate legal personality’ I Seidl-Hohenveldern, Corporations 
in and under International law (Grotius Publications Limited Cambridge 1987) 1 
77 ‘A corporate enterprise does not exist simply as a self-serving and self –realizing institution for the 
unique benefits of its shareholders and workers but rather exists above all, to fulfil a broader role in 
society.’ G Teubner ‘Corporate Fiduciary Duties and their beneficiaries: A Functional Approach to 
the Legal Institutionalisation of Corporate Responsibility in  K J Hopt and G Teubner (eds.)  
Corporate Governance and Directors Liabilities: Legal, Economic and Sociological Analyses of 
Corporate Social Responsibility (De Gruyter, Berlin 1984)149-177, 157 
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engagement with CSR. Corporate law covers the inward aspects of corporate power 
through governance of managers/ directors who run the company.78 The pressure on 
corporate law is also to formulate an external facing aspect which deals with other 
affected constituencies. 79  
This is not simply a case of identifying mechanisms for allocating decision-making 
to more constituencies as this is self-limiting because of the indefinite nature of 
affected constituencies that may arise in society but law can facilitate and stimulate 
procedures that allow for meaningful social relationship and utility between 
corporation and society. Teubner highlights this functional approach, when  pointing 
out that in corporate law,  ‘all three questions- the identification of beneficiaries, the 
available mechanisms, the role of law-led to the same need for identifying the social 
functions of CSR in a broader context.’80 He makes the essential point that CSR 
serves as a ‘decentralised integrative device’81 and therefore it should draw on the 
stimulative role of law to design legal structures which strengthen reflexive 
mechanisms or responsive mechanism.82  
Therefore, these external aspects of law will not only necessarily be prescriptive or 
definitive substantive rules, rather it could also be functional: highlighting jobs/ roles 
which the law can stimulate. 83 Yet as corporate law has inherent limitations in its 
format, especially its attachment in most Anglo-American and commonwealth 
countries to fundamental objective of profit for the success of the company 
(shareholders) through strong adherence to utilitarian principles of corporate 
                                                 
78 J E Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: issues in the theory of company law (Claredon 
Press, Oxford 1995) 
79 H Ward ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in Law and Policy’ in N Boeger, R Murray and C Villiers 
Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2008) 8-38 
80 Teubner (n 77). Teubner stresses that ‘to be sure, this functional conception of CSR needs no a-
priori-definition of the substantive goals to be achieved.’ (p.166) 
81 Ibid at 162 
82 Teubner  (n 77) 165 
83 Teubner stresses that ‘to be sure, this functional conception of CSR needs no a-priori-definition of 
the substantive goals to be achieved.’ Teubner (n 77)  at 166 
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personality and limited liability,84 this may mean that external mechanisms will need 
to be developed outside of corporate law. Furthermore while several authors have 
also explored the utility of various ‘add-on’ areas of responsibility within 
International law, contract law, and competition law to CSR85, they face similar 
limitations in applying prescriptive substantive laws within CSR because of the 
fluidity of the concept.  
Therefore this thesis proposes that an effective way of analysing and capturing the 
potential role of law would be to re-examine a conceptual, theoretical approach that 
can then be applied in context. Each context could then build into this approach, its 
own choice of substantive rules. For that reason the thesis draws on an effective way 
of spelling out the relevant role of law in this (corporate- society) relationship 
highlighted through the legal theoretical perspective of law-jobs and applies this to 
CSR. This represents a non-traditional analytical view of law’s potential role in 
CSR. It also represents a shift from questions of ‘form’ to ‘role’. 
This approach is drawn from Karl Llewellyn’s law-jobs theory.86 This theory 
identifies law from a functional perspective and perceives roles for law around the 
doing of five law-jobs. These are the disposition of trouble cases; the preventative 
channelling and the re-orientation of conduct and expectations so as to avoid trouble; 
the allocation of authority and the arrangement of procedures which legitimise action 
as authoritative; the net organisation of the group or society as a whole so as to 
provide direction and incentive and the use of the juristic method. 87. Twining argues 
                                                 
84 P Ireland, ‘Limited liability, shareholder rights and the problem of corporate irresponsibility’ 
(2010) 34 Cambridge Journal of Economics 837-856,838-839 
85 These include: J A Zerk,  Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility- Limitations and 
Opportunities in International Law  (CUP, Cambridge 2006); D McBarnet, A. Voiculescu and T 
Campbell (eds.), The New Corporate Accountability- Corporate Social Responsibility and Law (CUP, 
Cambridge 2007) 
86 K Llewellyn, ‘The Normative, the Legal and the Law Jobs: The Problem of the Juristic Method 
(1940) 49 Yale Law Journal 1355-1400 
87 Ibid at 1392 It must be noted that the juristic method is not a law-job per se but an advocated 
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for the possibility of transforming this law-jobs theory into a general jurisprudence.88  
This will have possible application to fluid contemporary concepts such as CSR 
arising in an era of increasing globalisation.  
This perspective proposes the framing of the external aspect of law and CSR through 
the analysis of key issues such as dispute resolution, allocation of authority, 
orientation and channelling of conduct, net organisation and juristic method. The 
thesis suggests that such frameworks geared at the doing of the law-jobs between 
corporations and society will have the potential to increase accountability and 
legitimacy within CSR.  Overall the thesis therefore explores the potential of law not 
yet utilised by corporate law to legitimise corporate power by framing jobs for law 
within CSR. The overarching aim of the thesis is to gain new insights into the 
relationship between CSR and law. The rest of the introductory chapter will outline 
the justification, the scope and limitations, methodology as well as the outline of 
further chapters. 
                                                                                                                                          
method for the evaluation, reform and upkeep of the law-jobs. It therefore in essence goes to the 
doing of the law-jobs 
88 Twining 2009 (n 66) 
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1.4   Justification of the Thesis 
 
 
The significance of this thesis is that it examines crucial unsettled areas within CSR 
literature and in so doing makes an original and novel contribution. Firstly it 
addresses CSR’s meaning as a concept. This is one of the major problems with CSR 
which is encapsulated in Votaw’s statement that ‘CSR means something but not 
always the same thing to everybody’.89 This means that establishing a central theme 
of CSR is a pre-cursor to any significant CSR analysis.  Establishing such a core is 
also important because the CSR concept and achieving CSR objectives have been 
termed ‘one of the greatest global challenges of the 21st century.’90 
 This is because there is a fundamental reassessment of the way in which society 
relates to corporations taking place in the difficult context of unprecedented global 
relations.91 The complexity of analysis within CSR runs throughout the social 
sciences and occurs at International, cross-national, national and local levels. The 
practical drivers of the debate are real-world problems and critical incidents which 
fuel the questioning about the role of corporations in society.92 These questions 
come from various sectors of society: civil society, consumers, investors, 
government, and academia and occur at various levels: international, national and 
                                                 
89 D Votaw, ‘Genius becomes rare: A comment on the Doctrine of Social responsibility Pt.1’ (1972) 
15(2) California Management Review  25-31, 25 
90 Horrigan (n 75).ix 
91 Ibid 
92 I Vaaland and M Heide, ‘Managing Corporate Social responsibility: Lessons from the oil industry’ 
(2008) 13(2) Corporate Communications: An International Journal 212-225 .They point out that the 
role of critical incidents as crucial to corporation’s response to CSR. Yet these incidents are 
symptomatic of corporation’s power to affect and impact lives. 
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local.93  
The second important aspect of the thesis is demonstrating the relevance of legal 
perspectives because one of the common denominators of defining CSR has been to 
exclude or limit the relevance of law within such an important context.94  Ward 
points out her frustration at the definitional insistence that CSR is only about 
voluntary action over and above legally defined minimum standards as she points 
out that this ‘consequent separation of ‘CSR’ and corporate accountability serves no 
one well’.95 This is also ironic in view of the historical academic roots of CSR as 
found in a debate between two corporate law professors.96   
However the problem may also be that law has so far been slow to show its 
relevance to concepts emerging from the globalisation. A major reason for this has 
been the form of law emerging within such contemporary global concepts as CSR. 
CSR is predominated by emerging rules which often occur in loose and ‘soft’ forms 
and law at least in its traditional sense, is seen as defined precise and linked to the 
state. In light of this, Kerr and others point out that at first glance, CSR does not 
appear to fit comfortably within the traditional legal setting because of its constant 
state of evolution as it tries to remain responsive to contemporary needs and 
concerns.97 
 Nonetheless law even in its most traditional form, still has an impact on CSR. For 
example: Ward remarks that company law will necessarily have a very basic impact 
on CSR as it is the law that frames and forms the corporation. 98 There are also a 
                                                 
93 The complexity of analysis is seen as CSR’s capability to be discussed from any angle.  
94 Banerjee (n 61) 
95 H Ward ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in Law and Policy’ in N Boeger, R Murray and C Villiers 
Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2008) 8-38 
96 Berle-Dodd debate  (n 27) 
97 Kerr (n 43) 
98 N Boeger, R Murray and C Villiers (eds.), Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility 
(Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2008) 2 This was cited in the introduction. 
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significant range of traditional legal aspects which hold implications for CSR and 
this would include torts, contract, criminal international law, human rights, trade law, 
tax, accounting environmental law and so on.99 Yet law itself embraces more than its 
traditional form especially when related to cosmopolitan concepts arising as a result 
of globalisation, the way in which law is defined captures its role. What is required is 
a conception of law which is responsive dynamic and manifests in pluralistic forms. 
This wider conception may allow for the framing of a legal framework more relevant 
to CSR in context. Therefore a key contention in this thesis is that the way in which 
law is defined will spell out its role and relevance to important concepts such as 
CSR. Twinning proposes that:  
‘A reasonably inclusive cosmopolitan discipline of law needs to 
encompass all levels of relations and of ordering relations, relations 
between these levels and all important forms of law including 
supra-state (e.g. international, regional) and non-state law (e.g. 
religious law, transnational law, chthonic i.e. tradition/custom) and 
various forms of ‘soft law’ 100 
 
 
This is one of the key areas which will be explored in seeking insights into CSR 
concept and its relationship with law. The possibility of extending the role of law 
with a view of law which projects the broader perspective of law as it governs social 
relations. Selznick points out that: 
‘To extend the rule of law is to build firmly into the life of society, 
to make the master ideal of legality a true governor of official 
conduct. If this is to come about political and legal theory must 
lend a hand. It can do so by fashioning concepts and doctrines to 
bridge the gap between the new social realities and the received 
legal tradition.’101 
 
So when exploring law’s role within CSR, some exploration and use of legal theory 
is relevant if the aim is to gain insights into newer concepts which may help achieve 
                                                 
99 D McBarnet A Voiculescu & T Campbell (eds.) The new corporate accountability: Corporate 
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the objective. The chosen conception in this thesis is that of Llewellyn’s law-jobs 
theory which defines law in given relationship from the view-point of its role or jobs. 
It identifies five jobs the law can do in group relationships. These jobs are dispute 
resolution and grievance handling, channelling and re-channelling of conduct, 
allocating authority, net organisation and the use of the juristic method.102 This 
theory is already applied in some analytical public law literature103 but is not 
uniquely public law oriented. It can be applied to any legal analysis because it adopts 
a generalist perspective on the role of law for collective activity in societies. This 
may be why it has been referred to as ‘one of the most comprehensive and rational 
considerations of the role of law.’104  
A perceived advantage of this type of analytical application is the ability to move 
beyond a traditional definition of law to a broader definition that takes cognisance of 
the changing terrain such as that necessitated by globalisation.  Feintuck and Varney 
point out that ‘law-jobs’ move beyond a narrow technical definition of law into a 
broader, socially grounded model’105 They also add that the kinds of powers and 
function envisaged by law-jobs can be found outside the scope of hard law 
encompassing practices identifying themselves as legal despite the absence of the 
trappings of formal legal form.106  
Another major advantage is the transferability of the law jobs because it emphasises 
the ‘legal quality’ on basis of role and not form, therefore diversity of regimes is still 
possible. McCoubrey highlights this perspective by pointing out that:  
                                                 
102 Llewellyn (n 86) 
103 For example I Harden N Lewis, The Noble Lie: The British Constitution and the Rule of Law 
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‘...granted the diversity of municipal societies, such a functional 
criterion seems far more soundly based than a demand for 
institutional convergence with particular forms of Western Urban 
Industrial societies...’107 
 
 There may be pitfalls in pursuing a somewhat functionalist approach because 
questions of function are relative108 but law-jobs does not assert that only law can do 
these jobs or that law does them best. It just crucially identifies that law can do this 
in society and opens up room for analytical debate and re-evaluation. This is very 
necessary when examining the law and CSR relationship in the current global 
context. 
 Nevertheless some suggest that CSR itself is just corporate response and therefore 
corporations by design have dominated the discourse of CSR and by choice excluded 
law. This is the sense in which Shamir speaks of the ‘de-radicalisation of CSR’109. 
He analyses various strategic moves of corporations towards shaping the meaning of 
social responsibility in ways that do not threaten entrenched commercial interests 
and in ways that invest the term with voluntary and self-regulatory meaning.110 
However it is important that law as part of CSR is re-emphasised in a way that 
allows for space, structure, contestation and limitations. This is why in response, 
Rajagopal points out the inability to avoid the use of law in a counter position 
because it also provides ‘space for resistance’.111   
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He points out that ‘there is an increasing sensibility that law is a terrain of 
contestation between different actors including social movements and states and that 
a theory of law or adjudication that ignores this fact is inadequate.’112It is therefore 
important to project the conception of law that is capable of being used in counter –
position. This conception must involve a broader pluralistic perspective.113 Therefore 
law remains essential in this contested arena of CSR, as on the one hand, it can frame 
and empower corporations and yet on the other hand, it is also important when 
seeking to constrain or render such power accountable or legitimate. These 
arguments provide reasons for a demand of CSR literature to examine such legal 
aspects of CSR. This is an area where there is still limited literature, although some 
notable CSR legal literature in books has arisen in the last five years.114 There are 
still insufficient books and articles that directly address the aspects of CSR and law 
highlighted in this thesis.   
This suggested law-jobs framework is important because it will recognise the 
relevance, flexibility and dynamism which is now required of law.  It will indicate 
the possibility of a universal CSR legal theoretical framework that can be adapted in 
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a localised context making it possible to give a tailored response. The thesis 
concludes on the basis of this suggestion. The aim is that insights gained through this 
analysis will leave room for further research. The desired outcome is that this 
analysis will give new insights into this fundamental area and that this will augment 
progress on the agenda of achieving greater social responsibility. 
 38 
 
 
1.5 Scope of the Thesis 
 
The research question is potentially a wide one so it is important that the scope of the 
thesis delimits its parameters and chooses specific examples to address. These key 
issues for scope include: corporations, CSR, legal perspectives, legal theory and the 
cut-off dates 
Firstly when examining corporations in CSR within this thesis, the focus is on large 
corporations specifically multinational corporations (MNC).115 CSR analysis can be 
applied to corporations of all sizes but the demands for responsibility have been 
mainly directed at MNC because of their size, structure and globalised nature. 
Multinational corporations are the largest corporations and they account for seventy 
percent of the world’s trade and trillions of dollars of foreign direct investment.116 In 
this vein, Hopkins points out that  
‘because of the often immense size of transnational corporations, 
decisions about the location of their investments, production and 
technology not only influence the distribution of factor 
endowments- notably capital, skilled labour and knowledge –
between countries in which they run activities, but they also 
assume a critical importance for their political and social 
consequences.’ 117 
 
The multinational or transnational corporations have been described by the Draft UN 
Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations as:  
‘an enterprise comprising entities in two or more countries 
regardless of legal form and field of activities of these entities, 
which operates under a system of decision-making permitting 
coherent policies and a common strategy through one or more 
decision-making centres, in which the entities are so linked by 
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ownership or otherwise that one or more may be able to exercise 
significant influence over the activities of others and in particular 
share knowledge, resources and responsibility with others’118   
 
The MNC is a unique business construct which is fairly modern in origin. However 
it shares common characteristics with earlier fore-runners, the chartered trading 
companies of the 16th-18th century.119 The factors common to most definition of 
MNCs are association and control. This implies that multinational corporations 
contain entities which are associated by ownership often evidenced through direct 
investment but in addition the main investing entity (that is, the parent corporation) 
should be able to exert a significant amount of influence or control on the 
management of the subsidiary corporation.  Wilkins in her work on MNC confirms 
that such multinational corporations operations often involve cross-border control; 
potential for control or at least influence120 The World Investment Report 2005 
defines the parent MNC as an enterprise that controls the assets of other entities in 
countries other than the home country usually owing a certain percentage of equity 
capital stake.121  
The uniqueness of MNC partially derives from their problematic nature in law. 
Although they are legal entities, they are not recognised in law as MNC rather in a 
strict legal sense; they are groups of corporations or companies. Muchlinski indicates 
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the nature of this problem, when he points out that:  
‘Indeed if one were to look at legal sources alone the multinational 
enterprises would not exist: all one would find is a series of 
national companies whose principal shareholder happens to be a 
foreign company and/or a network of interlocking contracts 
between entities of different nationalities. No hint of the complex 
systems of international managerial control, through which the 
operations of the multinational group are conducted, would be 
discovered.”122  
 
This is because corporations are often formed within a single legal system. Once 
formed and incorporated they gain separate legal personality, a legal feature common 
to most legal systems.123 This allows for groups of corporations incorporated in 
different states linked together by ownership and control, to retain distinct 
personality under legal rules. This legal ‘invisibility’124 has not prevented the 
corporations from exercising significant influence on society rather it may have 
aided the rise and influence of the MNC. This is because of the absence of an 
International legal framework for MNC.   Cioffi points out that ‘given the absence of 
a global regulatory framework, the relation of corporate governance to globalisation 
must be sought at the level of the national political economy and the degree and 
nature of change viewed cross-nationally.’125  
This cross-national perspective is endorsed within the thesis because it is also the 
universality of the corporate vehicle that enables the existence of MNC. Seidl-
Hohenveldern  in his book ‘Corporations in and under International law’ states that 
‘the comparative analysis of the domestic law of states belonging to different legal 
systems shows that individuals may combine their efforts by establishing entities 
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enjoying rights and duties of their own and that such entities may have a separate 
legal personality.’126 The notion of separate legal personality has become integral to 
laws around the world and therefore the relationship between MNC, CSR and law is 
a vital one for analysis. 
A further choice must be made when giving specific examples from multinational 
corporations. This is because there are an estimated 63,000 multinational 
corporations with about 800, 000 subsidiaries and numerous linkages of suppliers 
and distributors across the global value chain.127  Therefore within the thesis the 
choice has been made to give chosen examples of MNC taken from the oil industry. 
This choice of the oil MNC examples is influenced by the assertion that the large oil 
corporations have been judged as leaders in championing CSR.128  Utting and Ives, 
CSR scholars point out that this engagement of large oil corporations with CSR can 
be judged by their adoption of codes of conduct, reporting practice and interactions 
with leading CSR institutions.129  
Therefore the focus is on these corporations as a valid example for ascertaining 
reactions to the conceptions of CSR in a useful format. This also serves the practical 
purpose of providing a focused group of MNC to draw examples from. This choice 
is also underscored by the significant nature of this industry. The UNCTAD World 
Investment Report (WIR) 2007 points out those minerals (especially oil) are 
essential for all economies. It stresses that this industry provides basic, essential raw 
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materials which are essential to all modern economies.130 This is an industry which 
also best demonstrates some of the existing global inequalities. This is because the 
major producers are mainly from developing and transition economies and are net 
exporters while the major consumers are mainly from developed countries and rely 
heavily on imports.131 Therefore in this industry issues of ineffective management of 
social, environmental and other responsibilities are very vividly demonstrated. The 
capacity of these corporations juxtaposed with their responsibilities triggered 
significant CSR debate.132 
The second issue about the scope of the work is directed at the concept of CSR.  
From the onset the thesis will use Chapters two and three to outline in detail its 
concept of CSR. This will encompass a view of CSR that includes corporate 
accountability as essential and central to CSR. It adopts the use of the term ‘CSR’ 
rather than any of its complementary themes such as corporate accountability or 
corporate citizenship. It will however seek to show the nature of those related 
concepts as multiple interpretations of CSR.  The thesis adopts an inter-disciplinary 
approach as a necessity to this initial examination of CSR to highlight the variety of 
perspectives and the level of contestation within CSR. The aim is however to 
discover the core or central theme in CSR from which the perspectives arise.  
Thirdly the thesis concedes that it is not possible within the given scope to address 
all aspects of law that impinge upon corporations or CSR neither is it possible to 
address all legal theory.  So the thesis in chapter four proposes its conception of the 
relationship between law and regulation and examines them as crucial aspects of 
legitimacy. This is a prelude to Chapter five and six which focus on key aspects of 
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corporate law and legal theory respectively in order to further the arguments that 
CSR can be re-defined as legitimacy of corporate power with law playing a 
definitive role in achieving such legitimacy. 133 Therefore the thesis when examining 
legal perspectives relevant to CSR will focus on two main legal perspectives which 
are corporate law and legal theory. These aspects have been chosen because of their 
relevance to the central proposition of the thesis. 
 Within corporate law the main focus of analysis will be on issues of corporate 
theory, governance and fiduciary duties. This is because of the direct and 
foundational nature of corporate law to corporations and having direct relevance to 
CSR. The thesis examines the main corporate legal theories and corporate 
governance theories and models but it also adopts as its main exemplifying corporate 
law legislation the UK Companies Act 2006 because this is the result of one of the 
most recent and extensive reviews of corporate law.134  
In addition the focus on legal theory must be outlined because there is extensive 
general legal theory. Therefore the thesis does not examine all general theory of 
relevance because this is impractical for the given task. It sketches out and outlines 
legal theory in the ‘law and society’ field but it focuses on Llewellyn’s law jobs as a 
chosen model that is capable of application to newer concepts arising from 
globalisation such as CSR. It has also been singled out by some notable legal 
scholars as a legal theoretical concept capable of being adapted to address 
phenomena arising out of globalisation and its implication for law.135The skeletal 
nature of the theory lends it a flexibility and utility to most current phenomenon 
arising out of inter-relationships in society.136  
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Twining in this regards, points out that:  
‘The law-jobs theory is a valuable and underused tool...it can easily 
accommodate notions of normative and legal pluralism, non-state 
law and different levels of global, transnational and local relations 
and so can provide a basis for dealing with issues raised by 
globalisation and interdependence.’137 
 
The choice of Llewellyn’s law-jobs theory therefore represents an attempt to adopt 
Selznick’s earlier suggestion of political and legal theory lending a hand to bridge 
the gap between the current social realities within CSR and the received legal 
tradition.138 This theory stands out as the chosen proposition although there may also 
be other relevant theories. 
A final scoping issue is to give a date limitation for this work therefore the thesis 
will examine literature and CSR-related events that pre-date December 2011.  This is 
for practical reasons as CSR field is an active area with the potential for changes. 
This date will allow for the contextualisation of examples given in this thesis as valid 
in the time period. 
 The next section explains the methodology used within the thesis. 
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1.6 Methodology 
 
 
The legal methodology utilised within the thesis is analytical and qualitative 
therefore it is focused on literature, primary and secondary materials in the area of 
CSR, law, politics and sociology. This is because the thesis seeks to gain new 
insights into the concept of CSR and its relationship with law. The aim to re-define 
CSR in order to identify a core which then permits analysis of the potential of legal 
perspectives to contribute to that core.  The research therefore involved the study and 
examination of primary sources and materials, relevant legal cases as well as 
extensive review of secondary sources such as books, book chapters, journal articles 
within the legal, socio-legal, political, economic and sociology field. This is then 
structured towards answering the question: ‘to what extent can law and a law-jobs 
perspective contribute to CSR?’ 
 The thesis adopts an inter-disciplinary approach which is necessary because of the 
nature of CSR as a multi-disciplinary concept.  CSR analysis draws from literature in 
law, business, political science, economics and philosophy. This position is 
supported by scholars who assert that ‘CSR can be studied, regulated and practiced 
from many different angles.’139 This thesis will reflect this multi-disciplinary aspect 
whilst proposing a legal perspective. This is also important because the thesis 
analyses other multi-disciplinary concepts such as power and legitimacy 
The methodological objective is to address the research questions rigorously and 
fully within the limitations set by the thesis. The original articles and books 
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proposing some of the theories used and tested within this work were studied in great 
detail. The choice of theories analysed was made after extensive research into the 
applicability of such theory to the thesis chosen subject matter. 
 The chosen theoretical perspectives are analysed comprehensively within the thesis 
include Gallie’s theory on essentially contested concepts used as the key analytical 
tool to derive an exemplar or core for CSR.140  Then Lukes seminal theory on 
‘power’ is utilised in examining the notion of corporate power in order to examine 
the ‘core’ of CSR ‘exemplar’ revealed and re-defined as power.141 Next the thesis 
utilises the analysis of corporate legal theories to appreciate some constraints placed 
on corporate law itself that prevent full application to CSR. And then in suggesting 
and mapping out how an extension of legal theory to CSR may then manifest and  
contribute to the central research question the thesis proposes  an extension of 
Llewellyn’s law-jobs theory142as holding huge potential for the extension of law to 
CSR in order to render corporate power legitimate and accountable in that sphere. 
These theoretical perspectives and analysis are mainly used to resolve dilemmas 
presented by the research question within the scope of the thesis. 
 
The final section gives an overview of each chapter within the thesis 
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1.7 Overview of Chapters 
 
The thesis is arranged over seven chapters with chapter one as the introduction. 
Chapter two will examine the meaning of CSR. This is because it is the crucial 
starting point for this thesis on CSR and it provides essential analysis through which 
a central theme or core of CSR is revealed.  This chapter begins with the premise 
that CSR has been defined in a number of ways and with varied emphasis on various 
issues. The chapter offers up a historical overview of the development of CSR as 
well as an overview of current multiple interpretations of CSR that currently exist. 
Then the chapter uses the essentially contested concepts (ECC) theory set out by 
Gallie and applies this to CSR in order to discover an exemplar or a core which CSR 
analysis within the thesis will address.  This core is proposed as the legitimacy of 
corporate power. 
Chapter three follows on from this discovery of the central theme of CSR and 
examines corporate power in the context of this thesis. The aim of the analysis in this 
chapter is two-fold:  firstly to reveal the meaning of power as a concept, in this 
context and secondly, to examine evidence of corporate power. The analysis 
illustrates the meaning of corporate power from the perspective of MNC and 
identifies crucial areas of capacity and influence.  It then analyses some specific oil 
industry MNC examples to show the inter-related nature between power and the 
demands for CSR.  
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The fourth chapter continues by examining the second aspect of this core or central 
theme, which is the corresponding search for legitimacy of corporate power. It 
focuses on the notion of legitimacy and proposes law as a key aspect of legitimacy. 
Legitimacy in this sense involves accountability as a key aspect.  As a result this 
chapter examines law and regulation as key aspects of legitimacy. The chapter 
analyses law in its wider pluralistic sense. It examines the inter-relationship between 
law and regulation. It proposes that law’s role as legitimiser can be examined from 
two key perspectives, that is, the traditional or the non-traditional. From the 
traditional perspective, it can be based on state-centred laws within a legal system or 
in a non-traditional sense, it shifts focus from ‘form’ to a role-based perspective (as 
this allows for pluralistic forms of law towards identified roles) which would allow 
legal scholars to propose new roles and new law-tools for law when fulfilling the 
legitimacy role within CSR.  
The next two chapters then explore these two legal perspectives further. The fifth 
chapter examines the issue of the legitimacy of corporate power from a traditional 
legal perspective. The chosen legal perspective is from traditional law central to the 
existence of the corporation and that is corporate law.143 This is the law that frames 
and forms the corporation. It is also common to most legal systems of the world. It 
has become the main vehicle for enabling business enterprise. This chapter identifies 
that legitimacy of corporate power should be a core concern for corporate law. Yet 
corporate law manifests a utility and responsibility division within legitimacy and 
the focus on the utility aspect of legitimacy to the detriment of the responsibility 
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aspect has left little room in corporate law for issues of legitimacy of corporate 
power.144This chapter begins by examining existing corporate law theories to 
discover what dominant perspectives influence and shape corporate law. Then it 
examines notion of corporate governance within corporate law which directly 
addresses the issue of legitimacy of corporate power. The focus of corporate 
governance on the internal perspectives of the corporation will be addressed as a 
limiting factor when addressing debates on constraints and limitations to the exercise 
of corporate power.  It outlines the two main models of corporate governance in use 
globally and points to a potential convergence. It then uses the recent example of the 
UK reform to indicate the difficulties of trying to reconcile the ‘utility’ and 
‘responsibility’ elements of the legitimacy debate within corporate law. The notion 
of directors running the company successfully while taking into account internal and 
external factors has not been fully worked out even in this reform legislation 
heralded as a best example.  
This chapter highlights that there are significant limitations to the types of control 
and legitimating that may arise from such corporate law and governance theories 
because of the primarily internal focus. The focus of corporate law seems tilted to 
the internal utility question which centres on the success of the corporation and not 
the external question of legitimacy and accountability to society. It also displays the 
classic limitation of traditional law in being reactionary and limited in scope and 
jurisdiction. This also underlies the mismatch between MNC structure and state law 
in general.  
                                                 
144 This view is expounded in more detail in J W Hurst The Legitimacy of business in the Law of the 
United States 1780-1970 (University of Virginia Press Charlottesville 1970) 
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Yet there are novel ways of looking at law in global contexts emerging. This is what 
recommends a non-traditional pluralist law perspective for CSR. Therefore Chapter 
six proposes a move to such a non-traditional perspective within CSR. It proposes a 
more holistic way of addressing social responsibility through law that imbibes and 
addresses more aspects of the dynamic relationship between society and corporations 
existing within globalisation. This will come from a role-based perspective of law 
which addresses the role that law in its pluralistic forms can play within CSR.  
 The focus will be on re-interpreting Llewellyn’s law-jobs as applicable to CSR. This 
allows for the contemplation of various forms of law and regulation (hard, soft, state-
centred and private law) within CSR focused towards the doing of the law-jobs 
which are: dispute resolution and grievance handling, channelling and re-channelling 
of conduct, allocating authority, net organisation and the use of the juristic method. It 
will address the ‘capacity’ which law in the non-traditional sense affords corporate 
power not only to be restricted from doing wrong but also to stimulate doing right 
and to help with society’s social agenda.  
The aim here is to demonstrate that such a legal framework can be used to address 
the CSR relationship. It will permit the contextual flexibility necessary within CSR 
while addressing distinct jobs.145 It gives new insights to the role of law as 
legitimacy of corporate power and suggests the foundational framework for a legal 
perspective for CSR which can be further analysed in future research in diverse 
contexts. 
                                                 
145 It could be seen as neither endorsing universal substantive law which are open to criticisms of 
imposing the dominant or relativism which is open to criticism of inequality of treatment rather it 
proposes in line with Santos ‘Cosmopolitanism’ that there can be dialogue structured by procedural 
ideals which cultures and societies aspire to: for example: dispute resolution, channelling conduct, 
allocation of authority and net organisation. 
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Finally Chapter seven will form the conclusion. This chapter summarises the 
findings of the thesis from the above examination. It gives an overview of this 
exploration of CSR from the chosen legal perspectives and proposes that new 
insights can be gained by the extension of law-jobs theory to CSR. These insights 
might prompt one to examine the range of law tools applicable in context. In 
addition it could cause a re-evaluation of the centrality of law to the question of 
CSR, which is after all centred on the legitimacy of corporate power. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
DEFINING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
‘Corporate social responsibility means something, but not always 
the same thing to everybody. To some it conveys the idea of legal 
responsibility or liability; to others, it means social responsible 
behaviour in the ethical sense; to still others, the meaning 
transmitted is that of ‘responsible for’ in a causal mode; many 
simply equate it with a charitable contribution; some take it to 
mean socially conscious; many of those who embrace it most 
fervently see it as a mere synonym for legitimacy in the context of 
belonging or being proper or valid; a few see a sort of fiduciary 
duty imposing higher standards of behaviour on businessmen than 
on citizens at large’1 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter commences the analysis of identifying CSR’s central theme within the 
thesis by addressing the primary issue of what CSR means. It draws out the main 
issues and debates on CSR’s meanings. In other words, the nature of CSR as 
meaning ‘something’ but not always the same thing to different people as CSR has 
been defined in a variety of ways and with regard and focus given to diverse aspects 
of the concept. 
 In this sense, CSR can be seen as an essentially contested concept in the ‘Gallie’ 
sense, because it can be described as ‘a concept the proper use of which inevitably 
involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the parts of their users.’2 Within 
                                                 
1 D Votaw, ‘Genius becomes rare: A comment on the Doctrine of Social responsibility Pt.1’ (1972) 
15(2) California Management Review  25-31, 25 
2 W B Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’ (1958) 56 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
167-198 reprinted in M. Black(ed.), The Importance of Language (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs 
1962) 121- 146, 121 
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CSR a significant amount of the contestation goes to the core of the concept and this 
is why there is no universally settled definition of CSR. However Gallie in 
expounding essentially contested concepts pointed out that even those concepts must 
have a common basis  (an exemplar), if only to ensure that contestants refer to the 
same subject-matter.3 Gray supports this position by stating that ‘definitional 
contests have a point only if there is something not treated as contestable’.4 
Therefore the aim in this chapter is to identify the common basis or central theme 
which unifies CSR issues.   
Within CSR contestation about its meaning is having significant impact on the 
progress being made on the CSR agenda. This is because a fuzzy concept does not 
lend itself easily to defined agendas. Boeger and others point out that ‘where 
definitions are not settled, identifying aims and expectations also becomes 
difficult’.5The identification of the central theme or exemplar will also justify the 
ability to put forward another perspective of CSR that will be of relevance and 
enhance or advance the debate.  The identification of the central theme will therefore 
underscore the relevance of law and legal theory to CSR debates. In order to identify 
what CSR means and the complexity of approaches within CSR, the next section 
will examine the history of CSR movement and the competing ideologies that have 
sought to express themselves through CSR over the years. The following section 
analyses more specifically the problems of defining CSR and this include the various 
theories and approaches adopted to explain CSR action. 
                                                 
3 Ibid 
4 J N Gray, ‘On the contestability of social and political concepts’ (1977) 5(3) Political Theory 331-
348, 342 
5 N Boeger, R Murray and C Villiers (eds.), Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility (Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham 2008) 1 
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 However the problem of defining CSR is not exclusive as defining concepts in the 
social sciences are often subject to contest. It is for this reason that the fourth section, 
draws on the foremost theory on such contested concepts.  This section proposes the 
extension of the essentially contested concept (ECC) theoretical framework to CSR, 
to enable the discovery of a common basis or ‘original exemplar’ which can be 
utilised by this work.  
The seven criteria framework based upon Gallie’s ECC will form the analytical tool 
for contextualising the CSR debate and locating inherent conflicting positions. The 
fifth section will then outline the proposed central theme or exemplar of CSR and 
this will form the basis of our exploration of CSR within the thesis. Definitions of 
CSR cannot be incontrovertibly settled, as it is an essentially contested concept, 
however the chapter aims to indicate a central theme or exemplar that underpins 
CSR analysis and will also form the basis of analysis which is to follow within this 
thesis. 
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2.2 Historical Background of CSR 
 
 
In CSR history there are two discernible historical strands. The earlier normative 
strand is first enunciated in the early 1930s’ within the academic debates between 
Berle and Dodd in the Harvard Law Review on the role of corporate managers6 
while the second strand of CSR is vocalised in the 1950s’ writings in the field of 
management exemplified by Bowen’s book on the Social Responsibilities of a 
Businessman.7 Notwithstanding this it is settled that CSR in its modern form 
originated in the United States of America in association with the advent of large 
corporations and related significant social impact most visibly felt in the years of the 
Great Depression. However CSR as a concept spread out to other countries alongside 
concerns with the spread of globalisation and the impact of large multinational 
corporations.8  
The debate between Berle and Dodd dealt with the central question of responsibility 
and accountability for corporate power.   Berle in 1931 in his essay ‘Corporate 
Powers as Powers in Trust’ proposed that corporate managers exercised powers held 
in trust on behalf of the shareholders. This assertion adopts a traditional legal 
position which endorsed accountability and governance within the corporation of 
                                                 
6 M Hopkins, The Planetary Bargain: Corporate Social Responsibility Matters (Earthscan, London 
2003)  2; L Whitehouse, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Citizenship and the Global 
Compact: A new Approach to regulating corporate social power’ (2003) 3 Global Social Policy 299-
318, 301; A A Berle Jr., ‘Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust’ (1931) 44 Harvard Law Review1049-
1074 ; E M Dodd, ’For whom are corporate managers trustees?’ (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review  
1145-1163;   A A  Berle Jr.,, ‘For whom Corporate managers are Trustees: A Note’ (1932) 45 
Harvard Law Review 1365- 1372 
7 E Garriga and D Mêlé, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility theories: Mapping the territory’ (2004) 
53(1-2) Journal of Business Ethics 51-71; H R Bowen,  Social responsibilities of a Businessman 
(Harper & Row, New York 1953) 
8 Hopkins (n 6) 2-3 Others argue that this has been an American concern since the late 19th century 
see H  Wells ‘The Cycles of Corporate Social responsibility’ (2002)University of Kansas Law Review 
77-140, 77. See also J Llewellyn ‘Regulation: Government, Business and Self in the US’ in S K May 
G Cheney J Roper The Debate over Corporate Social Responsibility  (OUP, New York 2007) 177-
189. Blowfield and Murray point out that Adam Smith was concerned about the limited liability 
nature of the corporation and the potential for that nature to breed irresponsibility. M Blowfield A 
Murray Corporate Responsibility: A Critical Introduction (OUP, Oxford 2008) 41 -50 
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managers and directors to shareholders. 9 On the other hand, Dodd responded by re-
examining the issue from an essentially different perspective, he emphasised that 
‘business is permitted and encouraged by law because it is of service to the 
community rather than because it is a source of profit to its owners.’10This was a 
perspective indicating the ultimate responsibility of the corporation to society. He 
also pointed out that business leaders and students of business were not only 
expressing a growing feeling that the business had responsibility to the community 
but also voluntarily assuming them.11  
The beginnings of CSR can be found in this fundamental debate about the 
responsibilities of the corporate manager or director beyond the sphere of 
shareholders interests and strict profit-making. The company or corporate form of 
business is now common to most legal systems. It has been asserted from 
comparative analysis of domestic legal systems that ‘individuals may combine their 
efforts by establishing entities enjoying rights and duties of their own and that such 
entities may have a separate legal personality’,12  as a result the company or 
corporation emerges as different from its shareholders13 with managers or directors 
empowered by law to act on behalf of the company.14  
Dodd in his response broadened the scope by examining the role of the corporation 
in society. He pointed out that substantial strides were being made in ‘the direction 
of a view of the business corporation as an economic institution which has a social 
                                                 
9 Berle 1931 (n 6) 
10 Dodd (n 6) 
11 Ibid 
12 See the Case concerning the Barcelona Traction Light and Power Co. Belgium v Spain (1970) ICJ 
Rep. 4 Salomon v. Salomon (1897) 1897 AC 22 (HL) (United Kingdom) ; Santa Clara County v. 
Southern Pacific Railroad Company118 US 394 (1886) (United States) 
13 Shareholders acquire limited liability.  
14 Often couched as ‘in the interests of the company’ or ‘members as a whole’ In England the 
Companies Act 2006 now allows for enlightened share-holder value—s.172 Companies Act 2006 
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service as well as a profit-making function’15.  He asserted that business in the 
1930s’ in the US, were already contemplating and assuming some forms of social 
responsibility but more importantly affirmed that the law was a facilitator of such 
action and concluded that such action does not run counter to law, as the law will 
treat the directors as fiduciaries for the institution (not merely shareholders). This he 
felt should allow for flexibility and modifications of legal views on the role of the 
corporation in future.16 His work is an early indication of the fact that the voluntary 
assumption of social responsibilities is not an end in itself and can be facilitated by 
law. He suggests that the ‘principal object of legal compulsion might then be to keep 
those who failed to catch the new spirit up to standards which their more enlightened 
competitors would desire to adopt voluntarily’.17 
Berle in later research acceded to Dodd’s position but did so from a different point of 
view. 18 In his research with Means19, they analysed the internal position of the large 
corporations and found the managers/ directors devoid of control from the owners 
(shareholders). This was termed the separation of ‘ownership from control’ and on 
that basis Berle concluded that corporations could be called to account by society.20 
These debates nonetheless placed corporate theories, corporate governance and 
regulation at the heart of the CSR debate either as causation or consequence.  
                                                 
15 Dodd (n 6) 
16 Dodd (n 6) 1163. This is evidenced in the modification of UK company law to allow for director’s 
duty to promote the success of the company and to allow for that to include broader social and 
environmental considerations. 
17Dodd (n 6) 1153 
18 Berle stated that ‘the argument has been settled (at least for the time being) in favour of Professor 
Dodd’s contention’ A Berle cited in Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, ‘The Legal Development of 
Corporate Mangers: For whom will Corporate Managers be Trustees? K J Hopt and G Teubner  
Corporate Governance and Directors Liabilities: Legal, Economic and Sociological Analyses of 
Corporate Social Responsibility (De Gruyter, Berlin, 1984) 3-54, 3 
19 A A Berle G C Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property (with a new introduction by 
M. Weidenbaum & M. Jensen) (2nd ed. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick (USA), originally 
published.1968, 1991) 
20 Berle & Means Ibid His position remained essentially a contractarian one, as distinct from a 
concessionary or communitarian perspective 
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Nevertheless law has remained slow to react to these primary debates and therefore 
the second and most prolific strand of CSR emanated from the practitioner 
businessman’s point of view and  this has dominated CSR literature and history. This 
second strand is a follow-up on some of the issues highlighted in Dodd’s article with 
regard to the view that business executives were already expressing the notion of a 
social service function for large corporations.21 This assertion is also evidenced in 
journal articles written by business executives in the 1920s’.22 
 However in the 1950’s, there was an increase in the volume of writings that 
emerged on the issue of a social role for business.  This emerged from within the 
field of management but also included a diverse range of authors including 
‘theologians, philosophers, economists, business leaders and historians’23.  This was 
because of an increasing consciousness of the growth of corporate power and its 
need for justification. Frederick writing in 1960 pointed out that: 
‘The collapse of laissez faire posed a giant intellectual conundrum 
for social theorists: How could a society with democratic traditions 
and democratic aspirations rationalise the growing amount of 
power accruing to businessmen? And how could that power be 
channelled into socially useful functions without driving the 
populace into some Orwellian nightmare of 1984 proportions?’24 
 
Various writers from the 1950s’ had begun to address this task.  Abrams the 
president of Standard Oil of Jersey (now Exxon) pointed out that business 
management in the United States is acquiring more and more the characteristics of a 
                                                 
21 Dodd cites Mr Young, a business executive, President Swope of the General Electric Company and 
Dean Donham of the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration as business persons who 
had in different ways expressed this notion of a social service role for large business. Dodd (n 6) 
22 Dean Donham most notably had written in the Harvard Business Review (HBR) of the necessity for 
responsibility of businessmen towards other groups in the community as early as 1927 & 1929 W B 
Donham ‘Business Ethics – A General Survey’(1929) 7 HBR 385-394; ‘The Social Significance of 
Business’ (1927) 5 HBR 406-419 
23 S B Banerjee Corporate Social Responsibility The good, the bad and the ugly (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, 2007) 7 
24 W C Frederick ‘The growing problem of business responsibility’ (1960) 2(4) California 
Management Review 54-61 
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profession and as such the new job for professional management ‘is to conduct the 
affairs of the enterprise in its charge in such a way as to maintain an equitable and 
workable balance among the claims of various directly interested groups’.25 He 
defines these various interested groups to include: ‘the stockholders, employees, 
customers and the public at large’. His statement is very similar to the modern notion 
of ‘stakeholders’.26  
Bowen, the foremost CSR writer of the time, pointed out in 1953 that ‘social 
responsibility refers to the obligations of businessmen to pursue those policies, to 
make those decisions, or to follow those lines of action which are desirable in terms 
of the objectives and values of our society’27. Bowen is largely credited in CSR 
literature as ‘the father of CSR’28. His book is acknowledged in most CSR literature 
as a poignant point in CSR history and is perhaps responsible for the business focus 
of CSR.29 Yet Carroll points out that Bowen’s work emerged from a belief that these 
large businesses were vital centres of power and decision-making and that their 
actions affected lives of citizens at many points.30This is a fundamental observation 
that underlies CSR as a concept.  
Through the 1950’s to the 1970’s, the debate for the assumption of social obligations 
to society was significantly explored. Some of the notable debates can be found, in 
the writings of Johnson,31Davis32 and Carroll33.  This represented a strengthening of 
                                                 
25 F W Abrams, ‘Management’s Responsibilities in a Complex World’ (1951) 29(3) HBR  29-34,29 
26 Abrams  Ibid, 30; Although the modern notion of stakeholder theory is accredited to Freeman 
27 Bowen (n 7) 6 
28 A B Carroll ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a Definitional Construct’ (1999) 38(3) 
Business and Society 268-295, 270 
29  That is, examining CSR from the perspective of the businessman. 
30 Carroll 1999 (n 28),  269 
31 H L Johnson, ‘Can the businessman apply Christianity?’ (1957) 35(5) HBR 68-76 
32 K Davis ‘The case for and against the assumption of social responsibilities’ (1973)16(2) Academy 
of Management Journal 312-322; K Davis and others Business and Society: Concepts and Policy 
Issues (4th ed. McGraw-Hill, New York 1980) 50-57 
33 A Carroll ‘A three-dimensional conceptual model of corporate social performance’ (1979) 4(4) 
Academy of Management Review 497- 505 
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this management perspective of CSR and a shift of focus from normative debates.  
Nonetheless, they address several relevant aspects of CSR that have emerged in 
current analysis. 
 Johnson in his 1957 article ‘Can the businessman apply Christianity?’ used an 
analogy from the Christian doctrine to analyse the nature of the businessman, 
highlighting man, the angel and man, the devil. Within his analysis two relevant 
points stand out: Firstly that  
‘company executives may stress that their socially responsible 
philosophy works to the general benefit; yet basically such a 
philosophy may be a subtle device to maintain economic power in 
their own hands by extending their influence and decision-making 
power into so many non-business areas that they become 
benevolent dictators’34 
 
 and secondly  that ‘corporations may give funds to charitable or educational 
institutions and may argue for them as great humanitarian deeds, when in fact they 
are simply trying to buy community good will.’35 These issues are still echoed by 
sceptics of CSR even in this era. Shamir in 2005 points to the continued fuzzy nature 
of the concept as in part precipitated by corporate power and business desire to 
dictate the agenda on this issue.36 
In 1973, Davis wrote an important article examining the case for and against the 
business assumption of social responsibilities. His focus was not wholly on the 
businessman but on the business as a whole. The first important element within his 
article is his definition of social responsibility as ‘the firm’s consideration of, and 
response to, issues beyond the narrow economic, technical and legal requirements of 
the firm.’ In giving this definition, he can be credited with the introduction of the 
                                                 
34 Johnson (n 31) 
35 Johnson  (n 31) 
36 R Shamir ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: A case of hegemony and counter-hegemony’ in B De 
Sousa Santos C A Rodriguez-Garavito (eds.), Law and Globalisation from below – towards a 
cosmopolitan legality (CUP, Cambridge 2005) 92-117,95 
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CSR as ‘beyond the law’ notion. He even specifically mentions that ‘it is a firm’s 
acceptance of a social obligation beyond the requirements of the law’37.  There are 
several problems with such narrow definition but it suffices to mention at this point 
that Carroll in 1979 improved upon Davis’ definition and crucially pointed out  that 
‘for a definition of social responsibility to fully address the entire range of 
obligations business has to society, it must embody the economic, legal, ethical and 
discretionary categories of business performance’38. Therefore reinstating the role of 
law and allowing for the possibility of legal considerations as a substantial part of 
CSR. 
Nonetheless the Davis article makes other substantial contributions to CSR history 
by including a concise summary of most of the contemporary arguments for and 
against social responsibility. In the first category, arguments for: he points several 
cogent points which include the following:  Firstly the pursuit of long-run self-
interest of the corporation which can best be understood as carrying out social 
activity compatible with and beneficial to the long term interest of the company.39 In 
light of this several studies have attempted to examine whether CSR activities pay in 
the long term, but this is a question which has so far failed to elicit incontrovertible 
answers40 Vogel in 2005 examines the evidence analysing the business case for CSR 
and finds this inconclusive.41 
                                                 
37 Davis 1973 (n 32)  312 
38 Carroll 1979 (n 33) 499 
39 Such an enlightened self-interest model is more eloquently advocated in Jensen’s article, where he 
proposes that maximisation of the long term value of the corporation, should be the objective and 
criteria for any trade-offs to be made among stakeholders or decisions about which CSR action the 
corporation should pursue. M Jensen ‘Value Maximisation, Stakeholder theory and the Corporate 
Objective Function’ (2002) Business Ethics Quarterly 12(2) 235-256 
40 PL Cochran RA Wood ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Performance’ (1984) 27 
Academy of Management Journal 42-56; KE Aupperle AB Carroll JD Hartfield ‘An empirical 
examination of the relationship between corporate social responsibility and profitability?’ (1985) 28 
Academy of Management Journal 446-463; J D Margolis J P Walsh ‘Misery Loves Companies: 
Rethinking Social Initiatives by Business’ (2003) 48 Administrative Science Quarterly 268-305  
41 D Vogel, The Market for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility 
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Davis also raises the possibility that CSR enhances the corporation’s public image; 
this is closely associated with notions of corporate reputation and image. This 
follows up on the notion that the popularisation of CSR is closely associated to the 
bad image of certain large corporations brought to the attention of society through 
public campaigns and scandals; public campaigns by non-governmental 
organisations against large multinational corporations for human rights, 
environmental and labour rights violations in various parts of the world.  A modern 
example would be the Brent Spar & Ogoni campaigns against Shell.42 Publicity of 
wrongful corporate actions and the threats to corporate reputation has been a potent 
force in the adoption of CSR;43 however the vulnerability of corporations to 
reputational risk will differ from sector to sector. Therefore this may only result in 
limited social responsibility geared towards good public relations. It is also possible 
that CSR as response lasts only as long as such publicity focuses on it. 
Next, Davis points out two original ideas on this issue of CSR’s relevance to the 
viability of business; firstly that ‘society gave business its charter to exist, and that 
charter could be amended or revoked at any time that business fails to live up to 
society’s expectations’,44 an idea which ties in with the social contract theory45 and 
the concession corporate theory46and secondly that ‘if business wishes to retain its 
present social role and social power, it must respond to society’s needs and give 
society what it wants’47.  
                                                                                                                                          
(Brookings Institution Washington DC 2005) 
42 S Liversey ‘Eco Identity as  Discursive Struggle: Royal Dutch/Shell, Brent Spar and Nigeria’ 
(2001) 38(1) Journal of Business Communications 58-91 
43 J V Mitchell Companies in a World of Conflict (London, Earthscan/RIIA, 1998) 
44 Davis 1973 (n 32) 314 
45 T Donaldson T Dunfee Ties that Bind: A Social Contract Approach to Business Ethics (Boston, 
Harvard Business School Press, 1999) 
46 K Iwai ‘Persons, things and corporations, the corporate personality controversy and comparative 
corporate governance’(1999) 47 American Journal of Comparative law 538-632  
47 Davis 1973 (n 32) 314 
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This is referred to in CSR literature as Davis Iron law of responsibility asserting that, 
“in the long run those who do not use power in a manner which society considers 
responsible will tend to lose it.”48 . This is another crucial observation on the 
centrality to CSR of notions of corporate power within the corporation and society 
relationship. 
Within the article, he points to a further interesting argument which is that CSR can 
be used as a tool in avoidance of governmental regulation; as such regulation is 
costly to business and restricts its flexibility in decision-making. This argument has 
been termed, ‘rational’ or ‘strategic’ in CSR literature. Werther and Chandler 
suggest as a rational argument for CSR that it may be more cost-effective to address 
issues voluntarily rather than wait for the legally mandated requirements and react to 
them.49 
 The CBI points out that ‘many companies prefer to be one step ahead of 
governmental legislation or intervention, to anticipate social pressures themselves 
and hence be able to develop their own policies in response to them’.50 Such pre-
emptive action may however be motivated by self-interest as the main objective may 
simply be to dictate the agenda on the relevant issue in a manner compatible or 
conducive to their business, economic or personal interests. 
It is also important to add that the avoidance of litigation is also a possible motive 
for CSR practice as demonstrated by class action suits filed in the USA under the 
Aliens Torts Statutes. Aggrieved parties are often prepared to seek out available 
forum for redress even in foreign countries.  
                                                 
48 This idea is further developed in Davis 1980 (n 32) 50-57 
49 W B Werther (JR) D Chandler Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility (California, Sage 
Publications, 2006) 17 
50 J Moon D Vogel ‘Corporate Social Responsibility, Government and Civil Society’ in A Crane and 
others (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of CSR (New  York, OUP, 2008) 308 
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To appreciate the scale of this threat, analysts point out that  
‘Firms such as Citibank, Coca-Cola, IBM, JC Penny, Levi-Strauss, 
Pfizer, Gap, Limited, Texaco and Unocal have all faced possible 
suits under this same law, which may extend to hundreds of other 
national and international firms.’51 
 
In spite of the lack of complete success of these suits, these types of litigation still 
remain a powerful motive for CSR adoption. Where corporations or business set the 
agenda or as CBI argues define CSR, this may result in a lack of clarity over what 
CSR means and to whom. For CSR to fulfil this potential it must have objectives that 
are clearly identifiable and address the relevant issues in context but it cannot be 
fuzzy or woolly or restricted to public relations alone. 
Davis in the article also highlights other issues in support of CSR including: socio-
cultural norms reflecting that businessmen as individuals operate from a set of 
cultural norms derived from society; the possibility that CSR could be in stockholder 
interest indicating that such activities could open up new opportunities for profit; 
allowing business an attempt to deal with social issues where the government may 
have failed. This latter argument reflects the notion that people may be frustrated 
with the failure of other social institutions. This is an action that could be 
demonstrated by the privatisation of public utilities and the new sense of business 
provision of ‘public goods’. It acknowledges that business may have relevant 
resources: reflecting not only the notion of resources as money but also the 
management talent, functional expertise and capital resources. This is also the 
reasoning behind the adoption of business ideology and management strategy into 
public institutions, as demonstrated by the recommended use of best value strategy 
by local authorities in assessing contracting and other activity.52  
                                                 
51Werther and Chandler (n 49) 12 
52 Best value with the central principle that local authorities are to secure continuous improvement of 
functions having regard to a combination of ‘economy, efficiency and effectiveness’- M Elliot (ed.) 
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Davis also points to the argument that CSR may be capable of turning problems into 
profits as many social problems can be handled profitably according to traditional 
business concepts. This can be linked to the earlier business case for CSR argument. 
This is an argument echoed by Prahalad and Hammond in their notable article 
‘Serving the World’s Poor, Profitably’53where they posit that: 
‘by stimulating commerce and development at the bottom of the 
economic pyramid, MNCs could radically improve the lives of 
billions of people and help bring into being a more stable , less 
dangerous world’54.  
 
Notwithstanding this vision, there has also been literature citing the limitations of 
pursuing a strictly economic or profitable CSR and applying that to development.55 
It is also important to address CSR’s capability to deliver development in view of 
CSR’s nebulous nature and the inherent nature of development as a concept which 
must be dictated from the developing societies themselves.  
Finally, Davis applies the adage that ‘prevention is better than curing’ as he points 
out the possibility that ‘if business delays dealing with a social problem now, it may 
find itself constantly occupied with putting out social fires so that it has no time to 
accomplish its primary goal of producing goods and services’56. This is reminiscent 
of issues arising from the late adoption of CSR by oil industries in Nigeria as a 
delayed response to social and environmental issues of oil pollution and degradation 
of the delta region.57 
                                                                                                                                          
Beatson, Matthew and Elliot’s Administrative Law – Text and Materials (3rd ed. OUP, Oxford, 2005) 
28 
53 (2002) 80(9) Harvard Business Review 48-57 
54 Ibid at 48 
55 J G Frynas Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility: Oil Multinationals and Social Challenges 
(CUP, Cambridge, 2009) 
56 Davis (n 32) 
57 B Manby The price of Oil (Human Rights Watch New York 1999) 
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On the other hand Davis in analysing the arguments against CSR, Davis firstly 
points to the traditional notion of profit maximisation as the main responsibility of 
the corporation. This is encapsulated by Friedman who states that:  
‘In a free enterprise, private property system, a corporate executive 
is an employee of the owners of the business...and his 
responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with their 
desires, which generally will be to make as much money as 
possible...’ 58 
 
He therefore observes that social involvement incur costs which may not necessarily 
make economic sense, ‘many social goals do not pay their own way in an economic 
sense’. This is similar to Vogel’s findings which point out an end result where 
several empirical studies ‘report a positive relationship between ethics (CSR) and 
profits, some find a negative relationship and still others find the relationship to be 
either neutral or mixed’.59This is also the sense in which some CSR advocates 
propose a shift from a simple economic bottom-line to a triple bottom line of people, 
planet and profits because this will permit more than an economic justification for 
socially responsible action by corporations.60 
Davis also adds that businessmen may lack the necessary skills in dealing with social 
problems and this could lead to the dilution of business primary purpose which may 
lead to business performing poorly both in its economic and its social roles.61 
Furthermore he points out that business may already have enough power and 
therefore the adoption of social responsibility may threaten the pluralistic division of 
                                                 
58 M Friedman Capitalism and Freedom (University of Chicago Press Chicago 1962) 12-16; M 
Friedman (1970) ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to increase its profits’ The New York 
Magazine, 13 September 1970  
59 Vogel (n 41) 16-45 
60 J Elkington, Cannibals with Forks: The Triple Bottom –Line of the 21st Century  (Capstone 
Publishing, Oxford,1997) 
61 He points out a more localised argument that where US firms adopt CSR as against other firms it 
may create a disadvantage, which could lead to a weakened international balance of payments. This is 
no longer valid as CSR in one form or another is a global phenomenon both for developed and 
developing country business. 
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powers and reduce viability of our free society thus indicating a lack of 
accountability because accountability should always go with responsibility. 
Davis suggests the possibility that ‘until society can develop mechanisms which 
would establish direct lines of social accountability from business to public, business 
should stand clear of social activities.’62 The fear is that this could become a 
subversive doctrine where business men become ‘benevolent paternalistic rulers’. 
This was an issue earlier addressed by Levitt in 1958, when he pointed out  
‘the frightening spectacle of a powerful economic functional group 
whose future and perception are shaped in a tight materialistic 
context of money and things that impose its narrow ideas about a 
broad spectrum of unrelated non-economic subjects on the mass of 
man and society’. 63   
This underlies the integral nature of accountability to the CSR agenda. This is a 
fundamental observation that goes to the heart of CSR, the question of legitimacy 
and accountability. The Davis article is pivotal in CSR history as it highlights several 
significant debates within CSR.   
Unwittingly it highlights the arguments that lend credence to the calls for 
development of the normative aspects of CSR and attempts to reconnect CSR with 
its first strand.  In line with the first normative strand Lord Wedderburn in 1986 
affirmed that the celebrated exchange between Professors Adolf Berle and E Merrick 
Dodd is central to the modern problem of corporate responsibility.64Nonetheless in 
his analysis he points out:  
‘the need is for mechanisms both internal and external to the 
enterprise through which social responsibility can emerge-
procedures which will inevitably modify the objective of 
maximising profits without attempting to replace it at a stroke by 
some other substantive formula.’65   
 
 
                                                 
62 Davis 1979 (n 32) 320 
63 T Levitt ‘The Dangers of corporate social responsibility’ (1958) 36(5) HBR 41-50 
64 Lord Wedderburn (n 18).3 
65 Ibid at 44 
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In addition, Teubner in examining the lessons learnt in the intervening years from the 
Berle-Dodd debate  points out that the central issue remained that ‘a corporate 
enterprise does not exist simply as a self-serving and self-realising institution for the 
unique benefit of its shareholders and workers but rather exists above all to fulfil a 
broader role in society.’66 
Therefore the role of law in shaping the corporate enterprise is significant and 
important and this is why Parkinson in 1993 surmised the overall question in relation 
to law as follows:  
‘Identifying appropriate modes of control over management 
demands we first decide what the objectives of the company should 
be. The questions of means and ends form the subject matter of 
other disciplines...They are also part of the subject-matter of law. 
Whether one emphasises the role of state or of contract in 
corporate existence, companies are creations of law, their 
objectives are defined by law and the law is a major source of the 
practical constraints on management behaviour.’67 
 
The necessity for a more holistic approach towards CSR is strengthened by its 
linkage with globalisation. Although CSR history is traced to the USA in the 1930s’; 
it has become a more global concept. This is as a result of globalisation and its link 
to the spread of the capitalist ideology.68This has also resulted in the growth and 
spread of multinational corporations.  
                                                 
66 G Teubner ‘Corporate Fiduciary Duties and their beneficiaries: A Functional Approach to the Legal 
Institutionalisation of Corporate Responsibility in  K J Hopt and G Teubner (eds.)  Corporate 
Governance and Directors Liabilities: Legal, Economic and Sociological Analyses of Corporate 
Social Responsibility (De Gruyter, Berlin 1984)149-177,  157 
67 J E Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: issues in the theory of company law (Claredon 
Press, Oxford 1995) viii 
68 Dodd points out a comment by Dean Donham that ‘the only way to defend capitalism is through 
leadership which accepts social responsibility.’ (Dodd n 6) 1155 
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Globalisation can be understood as involving stretched social relations, 
intensification of flows, increasing interpenetration and global infrastructure.69 
‘Stretched social relations’ in the sense that the effect of action in one part of the 
world affects the others; ‘intensification of flows’ synonymous with the 
interconnectedness and interaction of a heightened nature ; ‘increasing 
interpenetration’ which involve a cross- cultural and economic effect, not only in the 
transfer of cultures and people but in the relocation of business production sites as 
distinct from its markets and finally ‘global infrastructure’ where ‘interconnections 
that cross nation state boundaries operate outside the systems of regulation and 
control of individual nations and are not only global in their operation but also in 
their institutional infrastructure.’70 
Therefore an examination of recent CSR literature reveals a variety of issues 
covering different geographic regions including CSR in developing countries, CSR 
in various continents and CSR in several industry sectors.71 Scherer and Palazzo 
point to the importance of large corporations in the global sphere, they state that:  
‘The world’s biggest corporations have revenues that equal or 
exceed the gross domestic product of some developed states… 
(and this is further enhanced) by their mobility and capacity to shift 
resources to locations where they can be used more profitably and 
to choose among suppliers, applying a criteria of efficiency.’72 
                                                 
69 A Cochrane K Pain ‘A globalising society’ in D Held(ed.) A Globalizing world, culture, economics, 
politics(2nd ed. Routledge, London 2004) 5-45,15-17 
70 Ibid 
71 An illustrative list includes: K Fukukawa J Moon ‘A Japanese model of Corporate Social 
Responsibility? A study of website reporting’ (2004)16 Journal of Corporate Citizenship 45-49; O 
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Management 1-11;S Fritsch The ‘UN Global Compact and the global governance of CSR: complex 
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72 A G Scherer G Palazzo ‘Globalisation and Corporate social responsibility’ in A Crane and others 
(eds.) The Oxford Handbook of CSR (OUP, New York 2008) 413-431, 418 see also A D Chandler B 
Mazlish Leviathans: Multinational Corporations and the New Global History (CUP, Cambridge 
2005) 
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 This has re-ignited core questions about the role of these corporations but on a 
global scale translating questions raised in the 1930s’ to the global scale with the 
multiplier effect.  
In the 70s’ Davis landmark analysis in 1973 and Carroll’s re-definition of CSR in 
1979 stand-out as central analytical points but the 80s’ and 90s’ resulted in an 
explosion of writing on alternatives and complementary themes such as Corporate 
social performance, Corporate social responsiveness, Corporate citizenship, 
stakeholder theory and business ethics.73 However Carroll observes that ‘very few 
unique contributions to the concept of CSR occurred in the 1990s.’74 It seems that in 
that time there was a micro-focus on highlighted aspects of CSR debates and the 
development of complementary themes.  
By 2000 significant focus was being given to CSR research into the impact of 
globalisation and to complementary aspects such as corporate citizenship, corporate 
social performance, corporate accountability and business ethics. The normative 
debates also continued and several theories began to emerge. The overall picture 
emerges more clearly in the next section which examines the problems with 
definition analysing the various theoretical basis and more specifically its link with 
the complementary themes. 
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2.3 Multiple CSR Theories and Complementary Themes 
 
There is no unified theory of CSR, rather there are several theories reflecting the 
complex and dynamic CSR landscape. As a general guide, theories may be 
descriptive or normative. They could be descriptive in the sense that they describe 
what CSR practice is or could be for corporations or normative in the sense that they 
examine the rationale for corporations to adopt CSR. Normative theories therefore 
examine answers to questions about why corporations should pursue CSR thereby 
signifying what such corporations ought or ought not to be doing.  
Mele points out that ‘a good normative theory needs a good philosophical foundation 
which has to include a correct view of human nature, business and society and the 
relationship between business and society.’75 The lack of a normative grounding for 
CSR is central to the inability to set clear and defined agendas for achievement in the 
CSR field.  Campbell points out that this lack of grounding of CSR, ‘threatens the 
credibility of CSR programmes and impedes the articulation and implementation of 
CSR policies within business, government and civil society.’76 
The landscape of various theories and alternate themes makes it very difficult to 
identify the core issues within CSR. This is why the aim of the chapter is to address 
CSR as an essentially contested concept, in order to identify a common core from 
which contestation emerges. However this section will attempt to map out CSR 
                                                 
75 D Mele ‘Corporate social responsibility theories’ in A Crane and others (ed.) The Oxford Handbook 
of CSR (New  York, OUP, 2008) 47 -82, 76 
76 T Campbell, ‘The normative grounding of corporate social responsibility: a human rights approach’ 
in D McBarnet A Voiculescu & T Campbell (eds.) The new corporate accountability: Corporate 
Social Responsibility and the law (Cambridge University Press (CUP), Cambridge 2007)529-564, 530 
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theories and identify the role of complementary themes. The landscape of CSR 
theories is complex and tangled but certain authors have attempted to map out the 
theories involved. They include Windsor77, Klonoski78, Garriga and Mele79 and 
more recently Mele80.  
Windsor addressed three key approaches to CSR: ethical responsibility theory, 
economic responsibility theory and corporate citizenship. These approaches stem 
from ethical duties, economic responsibilities and political positions respectively. 
The ethical approach proposes the social advantage of morally sensitive business 
practices and policy using a range of moral frameworks. The economic approach 
argues that no costly responsibility action should be undertaken voluntarily. Windsor 
points out that this perspective also has a moral core based in utilitarianism as a 
variant of consequentialism with an outcomes orientation. Finally Windsor sees the 
corporate citizenship approach, as political metaphor which falls between the earlier 
two approaches unsatisfactorily.  
Klonoski for his part, distinguished between ‘fundamentalism’ where the corporation 
dealt strictly with profit-making within the law, theories implying moral 
responsibility and theories that focused on the social dimension of the corporation.81 
However, one of the most accepted classifications is that offered by Garriga and 
Mele in their essay on mapping out the territory of CSR theories. Other scholars 
point out that this attempt to map CSR theories is successful and presents a brilliant 
account of the foremost academic debate on CSR. 82  
                                                 
77 D Windsor ‘Corporate social responsibility: Three key approaches’ (2006) 43(1) Journal of 
management studies 93-114 
78 R J Klonoski ‘Foundational considerations in the corporate social responsibility debate’ (1991) 
34(4) Business Horizons 9-18 
79 Garriga & Mêlé (n 7) 
80  Mêlé (n 75) 
81 Klonoski (n 78) 
82 A Crane, D Matten and L J Spence Corporate Social Responsibility: Readings and cases in a 
global context (Oxford, Routledge, 2008) 58 
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Garriga and Mele identify four main types of CSR theories and they are: 
Instrumental theories advancing economic objectives through social activities; 
Political theories advocating corporate power and its responsible use; Integrative 
theories expressing the necessity for corporations to integrate social demands; 
Ethical theories examining the morality and rightness of corporate social action.  
These theories will be examined briefly below but this will be studied in further 
detail later in the chapter as exemplifying multiple interpretations that have 
developed within CSR. 
Instrumental theories are traditionally accepted theories on the role of the 
corporation as an instrument of wealth creation. They cover theories which advocate 
maximisation of shareholder value. Friedman advocated that ‘the only one 
responsibility of business towards society is the maximisation of profits to the 
shareholder within the legal framework and ethical custom of the country’83 and in 
line with this modern theorists advocate an ‘enlightened value maximisation’84 
accepting that certain social activities may contribute to the long-term shareholder 
value of the corporation. This group will also include theories that express corporate 
social activities in terms of gaining a competitive advantage either within a 
competitive context85 or to generate new untapped markets such as in developing 
countries.86 An example is the growth of telecommunications corporations in 
developing countries such as India and Nigeria87. It will also cover theories which 
place CSR as marketing and the building of a reputation and brand which adds to the 
                                                 
83 M Friedman ‘The Social responsibility of business is to increase profits’ 13th September 1970, New 
York Times Magazine 32-33 
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bottom line of profit. This can be demonstrated by the adoption of fair-trade 
standards and then placing the logos on products. McWilliams and Siegel point out 
this link by stating that ‘support for cause related marketing creates a reputation that 
a firm is reliable and honest (and) consumers typically assume that the products of a 
reliable and honest firm will be of a high quality.’88 The focus is on CSR as an 
instrument of long-term wealth creation. 
Political theories highlight the notion of corporate power and its relationship with 
responsibility within the society. They cover theories by Davis mentioned above89 , 
such as, the social power equation and the iron law of responsibility, which fault the 
classical economic theory of the notion of perfect competition by exposing the power 
roles of the corporate party and the ability to influence the market. However this also 
covers newer perspectives such as corporate citizenship.  
Corporate citizenship is a term sometimes used synonymously with CSR and 
therefore has taken on various meanings. However at its root is the notion of the 
corporation as a citizen in society with rights and responsibilities.90 Presently three 
views of corporate citizenship can be identified.91 Firstly a limited view which 
equates corporate citizenship with corporate philanthropy92, an equivalent view 
which equates corporate citizenship with CSR93 and an extended conceptualisation 
which defines corporate citizenship as describing the role of the corporation in 
administering citizenship rights for individuals. 94There has been severe criticism of 
                                                 
88 A McWilliams and D Siegel ‘Corporate social responsibility: a theory of the firm perspective’ 
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the extended conceptualisation as ‘an idea whose time has not yet come’95 especially 
in the absence of credible accountability mechanisms for the increase of corporate 
power which this could entail. 
 Integrative theories examine how business integrate social demands into its business 
operations, this is embodied in the analysis by Preston and Post on public 
responsibility96 as well as the more popular theories of corporate social performance 
and of stakeholder management. It has significant descriptive theories focused on 
corporate response to CSR. Stakeholder management publicized in the works of 
Freeman97 and others98 advocates an approach where management takes into 
cognizance stakeholders or people who affect or are affected by corporate policies 
and practices.99 This management theory is however underscored by an ethical 
theory that embraces a modified property rights position that requires the 
corporations to be run on behalf of stakeholders instead of its shareholders.  
Corporate social performance involves an integrated theory that adopts the principles 
of CSR, processes of corporate social responsiveness and outcomes of corporate 
behaviour100Integrative theories therefore represent a synthesis of other categories of 
theories to provide frameworks for gauging corporate response, analysis and 
developing corporate policy.  
                                                                                                                                          
face of corporate citizenship’ (2003) 45(1-2) Journal of Business Ethics 109-120 
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Finally ethical theories focus on ethics and in this sense doing what is right for a 
good society. These ethical theories are often contested hence it is susceptible to 
varied interpretation. These theories include stakeholder theory, universal rights 
based on human rights, sustainable development and common good approach.101 
Stakeholder theory has used a number of ethical theories to base the requirement of 
the corporation to take into consideration other persons that affect or may be affected 
by corporate actions.  
They include normative moral theory based on Kantian theory102, Rawls theory of 
Justice103, and other theories of property and distributive justice.104 These varied 
theoretical stances are because of the necessity to justify the stand-point that the 
corporation can be run in the interests of stakeholders. This stakeholder perspective 
will also require a fundamental reform in the role of the corporation. For example 
from a Kantian perspective, it requires the balancing of the property rights of the 
corporation as a legal person with Kant’s principle for respect of a person.105  
Garriga and Mele’s attempt at to map CSR theories is exemplary but it is 
immediately obvious that the boundaries are not clear-cut and there is a tendency for 
overlap within the theories and a mixed use of descriptive and normative within the 
theories.  In arriving at a workable definition of CSR, a pragmatic approach is 
                                                 
101 See Garriga & Mêlé (n 7) 60-61 
102 W M Evan and R E Freeman ‘A stakeholder theory of the modern corporation: Kantian capitalism’ 
in T Beauchamp and N Bowie(eds.) Ethical Theory and Business (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 
1988) 75-93 
103 R A Phillips ‘Stakeholder theory and a principle of fairness’ (1997) 7(1) Business Ethics Quarterly 
51-66 
104 T Donaldson and L E Preston ‘The stakeholder theory of the corporation: concepts, evidence and 
implications’ (1995) 20(1) Academy of Management Review 65-91 
105 In this regard, such a perspective applies Kant’s practical imperative which requires that one ‘act 
as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end 
withal, never as a means only ‘and re-interprets this to mean that the business as a person should 
consider the interests of all affected stakeholders in any decision it takes. See: I Kant Fundamental 
Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, re-printed in L Dennis (ed.) Groundwork for the 
Metaphysisc of Morals –Immanuel Kant (Broadview Press, Canada, 2005)88; see also N E Bowie ‘A 
Kantian Approach to Business Ethics’ in R E Frederick (ed.) A Companion to Business Ethics 
(Blackwell , Oxford, 1999) 1-16, 10 
 77 
advisable. Beesley and Evans point out that although CSR has suffered from a lack 
of definition as an issue and as a consequence discussion has been amorphous and 
ill-focussed, it may still be an effective way of dealing with outstanding social 
problems irrespective of whichever of the dominant ideologies is being asserted.106 
There is significant overlap between the theories and the complementary themes and 
titles that have developed in association with CSR.   
Mele in his 2008 study107 further re-aligns his earlier model of theories with 
complementary themes or multiple interpretations of CSR that have developed. He 
analyses four contemporary mainstream theories: corporate social performance, 
shareholder value theory, stakeholder theory and corporate citizenship theory as 
exemplifying the integrative, instrumental, ethical and political theories respectively.  
Therefore the next section follows this pattern when examining the theories further. 
This will mean that the complementary themes are examined in more detail as 
exemplifying the theories and multiple interpretations of CSR.108   
The first three themes: corporate social performance, shareholder value theory and 
stakeholder theory draw from the dominant debates in management discourse 
representing justification and arguments for CSR from within. They will represent 
integrative, instrumental and ethical theories respectively. The fourth theory, 
corporate citizenship begins to introduce language from political science but also 
represents attempts from practitioners to justify good behaviour in society. This will 
examined as an example of political theories.  
                                                 
106 M Beesley and T Evans CSR: a reassessment (Croom Helm, London 1978) 9-10 
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108 Amaeshi & Adi demonstrate that this is not an exhaustive list as they identify other multiple 
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In addition a fifth complementary theme of corporate accountability is added. This 
sits outside of the Garriga & Mele categorisation but it draws from normative 
debates on the role of the corporation and addresses those theories of CSR that have 
emanated from outside the management and social science fields. It dwells on the 
external aspects of CSR questioning how society holds corporations to account. Each 
of these complementary themes as multiple interpretations of CSR will be analysed 
in more detail in the following section. 
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2.3.1 Corporate Social Performance (CSP) as Integrative Theory 
 
The key proponents of the CSP theory include Carroll109, Wartick and Cochran110, 
Wood111 and Swanson112.  Wood in 1991 defines CSP as: 
 ‘the configuration in the business organisation of principles of 
social responsibility, processes of response to social requirements, 
and policies , programs and tangible results that reflect the 
company’s relations with society.’113  
 
The emphasis is on the corporation or business organisation and its response to 
society hence it is an integrative theory. The rationale is to demonstrate inter-
relationship among diverse topics and provide unifying themes.114 Its history as a 
concept lies in the 70s, with ‘corporate responsiveness and the writings of 
Ackerman115 and Sethi116.  
These writings were focused on corporation behaviour in response to changing 
societal demands. Sethi in 1975 addressed a model that included social obligations, 
societal responsibility and social responsiveness.  Carroll in 1979 formally 
introduced the term ‘corporate social performance’ and suggested that corporate 
response or obligations to society must include the economic, legal, ethical and 
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discretionary aspects.117Wartick and Cochran in 1985 addressed corporate response 
based on principles of social responsibility, the process of social responsiveness and 
the policy of issues management.118  
Wood developed this model further and created a CSP model based on three aspects 
principles of CSR expressed at institutional, organisational and individual levels as 
well as the processes of corporate social response and outcomes of corporate 
behaviour. In outlining this model, the principles of CSR include a drive for 
legitimacy at the institutional level119, ‘public responsibility’ at an organisational 
level , implying that business is responsible for outcomes related to its primary and 
secondary areas of involvement with society,120and managerial discretion at the 
individual level appealing to principles of moral action. The processes of corporate 
social responsiveness include environmental assessment, stakeholder management 
and issues management and the outcomes of corporate behaviour include social 
impacts, social programs and social policies.  
 This theory provides an adequate strategy for business when faced with responding 
to societal pressures and demands for change, it also provides a structure for 
corporate response to the society but it does not provide a rationale for CSR. It also 
acts like an integrated systemic response that business can produce in response to 
calls for CSR. When addressing responsibility, it addresses and draws from existing 
literature that merely identifies that corporations should be responsible. Nevertheless 
it focuses from a historical point on corporate response and involves arguments for 
CSR addressing its response from within the corporation. 
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2.3.2 Shareholder Value Theory (SVT) as Instrumental Theory 
 
This is a theory of CSR which is largely in line with the traditional view of the role 
of the corporation as maximising the profit of its shareholders.121 It developed 
largely to re-align responsibility with profit-making. The theory attempts to 
demonstrate that CSR is instrumental to shareholder value. Friedman encapsulated 
the original approach in his saying that ‘the one and only responsibility of business 
towards the society is the maximisation of profits to the shareholders within the legal 
framework and the ethical custom of the country.’122 This therefore meant that those 
who adhere to this view had to demonstrate that CSR could be profitable and was in 
the interest of business. They seek a justification that harmonises CSR with profit-
making. 123 
This has led to the notions of ‘enlightened self-interest’, which gives rise to 
consequential giving and actions aligned to long run interests of the corporation.124 
Also notions of ‘strategic CSR’ which refers to policies, programmes and processes 
which yield benefits to the firm, in particular by supporting core business activities 
and thus contributing to the firm’s effectiveness in accomplishing its mission.’125  
This is also the main source theory for notions of ‘enlightened shareholder value’ 
which Jensen describes as long-term value maximisation allowing trade-offs with 
stakeholders.126  
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122 Friedman (n 83) 
123 Encapsulated in notions of a business case for CSR, or quotes like ‘being good is good for 
business’ 
124 G D Keim ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: an assessment of the enlightened self-interest model’ 
(1978) 3(1) Academy of Management Review 32-39 
125 L Burke J M Logsdon ‘How Corporate Social responsibility Pays Off’  (1996) 29(4) Long Range 
Planning 495-502, 496 
126 M C Jensen ‘Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate Objective Function’ 
(2001) 14(3) Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 8- 21 
 82 
The economist in 2008 pointed out that:  
‘One way of looking at CSR is that it is part of what businesses 
need to do to keep up with (or, if possible, stay slightly ahead of) 
society's fast-changing expectations. It is an aspect of taking care 
of a company's reputation, managing its risks and gaining a 
competitive.... So paying attention to CSR can amount to 
enlightened self-interest, something that over time will help to 
sustain profits for shareholders. The truly responsible business 
never loses sight of the commercial imperative.’127 
 
 
 In spite of this, it is however doubtful that all CSR practices can be profitable.128 
Vogel points out that an extensive body of academic research on the link between 
CSR and profitability is at best inconclusive.129 The grounding for CSR must be 
beyond self-interest as the problems that CSR seeks to address are serious and do not 
rely on a narrow self-interested corporate philanthropy vision.  
It is significant that in espousing, what has eventually become strategic CSR, Porter 
and Kramer refer to ‘strategic corporate philanthropy’ and point out  that the ‘acid 
test of good corporate philanthropy is whether the desired social change is so 
beneficial to the company that the organisation would pursue the change even if no 
one ever knew about it.’130  It may be that the history of this theory which lies in 
philanthropy, seeks to extend some of its justification to the much more foundational 
concept of CSR which has arisen from debates about the role of the corporation in 
society. Yet this theory draws from one of the central debates about the origin and 
role of the corporation. It relies heavily on a contractual view of the corporation and 
                                                 
127 The Economist ‘Do it right: Corporate Responsibility is a matter of enlightened self-interest.’ 17 
January 2008 < http://www.economist.com/node/10491124> accessed 19 March 2011  
128 Vogel  (n 41) 
129 D Vogel ‘Is there a market for virtue? The business case for Corporate Social Responsibility’ 
(2005) 47(4) California Management Review 19-45 
130 M Porter and M Kramer ‘The Competitive advantage of corporate philanthropy’ (2002) 80(12) 
HBR  67 
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draws on the notion of property rights that stresses the shareholders as owners of the 
business and the managers as their employees.131  
Therefore it inadvertently highlights that true fundamental change to grounding CSR 
must come from an examination of the role of the corporation in law. The heart of 
the matter revolves around the role of the corporation in and to society. One of the 
indications of this is that the notion of ‘enlightened shareholder value’ has been at 
the heart of the reform of the company’s director’s duties in the UK.132 It links and 
contrasts with the next theory which seeks to demonstrate that there are other 
constituents within the corporation.133 
 
                                                 
131 Mêlé (n 75)  see also P Ireland ‘Property and Contract in Contemporary Corporate Theory’ (2003) 
23 Legal Studies 453-493 
132 See Ministerial Statements, DTI, June 2007 ‘Companies Act 2006, Duties of Company Directors’ 
<http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file40139.pdf> accessed 19 March 2011 ; A Keay ‘Enlightened 
Shareholder value, the reform of director’s duties and the corporate objective’ (2006) 3 Lloyds 
Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 335- 361 
133 This is demonstrated in the changes following the ESV principle that allowed for balancing of 
interests in s.172 of the Companies Act 2006. See L Cerioni ‘The success of the company in s.172(1) 
of the UK Companies Act 2006: Towards the Enlightened Directors’ primacy’ (2008)  4(1) Original 
Law Review 1-31 
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2.3.3 Stakeholder Theory (ST) as Ethical Theory 
 
This theory also analyses CSR from within the corporation and addresses how the 
corporation should be managed. However in one sense, it is a counter argument to 
the SVT, because it seeks to demonstrate that management in running the company 
should ‘balance the multiple claims of conflicting stakeholders’.134 The stated 
objective of the stakeholder theory is to replace the duty to shareholders with a duty 
to ‘stakeholders’135. The central concern is to address the question: ‘for whose 
benefit and at whose expense should the firm be managed’?136 The theory addresses 
two aspects, the descriptive aspect used to describe the interests that the manager 
should take into account in running the corporation and the normative aspects, which 
involve attempts to justify the adoption of these interests through various ethical 
theories adapted for business. . These theories have developed as a branch of 
business ethics promoting ethical behaviour of business.   
This concept was originally introduced by Freeman in 1984 as a strategic 
management principle on how the corporation should be managed.137 Evans and 
Freeman in 1988 gave the following ‘stakeholder management principles’: 
‘The corporation ought to be managed for the benefit of its 
stakeholders: its customers, suppliers, owners, employees and 
local communities....Management bears a fiduciary relationship to 
stakeholders and to the corporation as an abstract entity. It must 
act in the interest of stakeholders as their agent, and it must act in 
the interest of the corporation to ensure the survival of the firm, 
safeguarding the long-term stakes of these groups.’138 
 
 
                                                 
134 R E Freeman ‘A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation’  in T L Beauchamp and N E 
Bowie (eds) Ethical Theory and Business ( 5th ed. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. 1997) 66-76 
135 Ibid 
136 Freeman 1997 (n 134) 
137 R E Freeman Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach  (Boston, Pitman, 1984) 
138 W.M. Evan R E Freeman ‘A Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation’ in T L Beauchamp and N E 
Bowie (eds) Ethical Theory and Business  (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. 1988) 75-93 
 85 
These principles were based on Kantian ethics and the respect for persons139, 
However others in trying to justify the stakeholder theory position have based their 
arguments on several normative ethical positions: Donaldson and Dunfee’s 
integrative social contracts140, utilises notions of social contract as found in Locke 
and Rawls to derive  hypothetical ‘macro’ contract and extant ‘micro’ contracts for 
business, Argandona proposes an extension of  the common good theory as a basis 
for the stakeholder theory141, Wicks and others extend feminist ethics and find a 
theoretical basis for stakeholder theory which is relational and caring142 and Phillips 
who extends principles of fairness to stakeholder theory143.  
In failing to identify a strong ethical or normative basis, stakeholder theory does not 
provide a wholesome justification for its version of CSR but it does add to the debate 
on the role of the corporation in society.   Yet Freeman endorses this plurality of 
theories as central to the stakeholder theory, citing that ‘the stakeholder theory can 
be unpacked into a number of stakeholder theories, each of which has a ‘normative 
core’144. The related nature of shareholder and stakeholders can be seen in Jensen’s 
enlightened shareholder value theory which sought to distinguish itself from 
stakeholder theory and provided justification for considering other interests in the 
form of trade-offs. Stakeholder theory has been crucial in highlighting that the stake 
and interest in the corporations is not exclusive to shareholders. However this is a 
                                                 
139 Ibid 
140 T Donaldson T W Dunfee Ties that Bind: A Social Contracts Approach to Business Ethics 
(Boston, Harvard Business School Press, 1999) 
141 A Argandona ‘ the Stakeholder Theory and the Common good’ (1998) 17(9-10) Journal of 
Business Ethics 1093-1102 
142Structuring value-creating activity along principles of caring and connection: A C Wicks D R 
Gilbert and R E Freeman ‘A feminist re-interpretation of the Stakeholder Concept’ (1994) 4(4) 
Business Ethics Quaterly 475-497 
143 R A Phillips ‘Stakeholder Theory and a Principle of Fairness’ (1997) 7(1) Business Ethics 
Quarterly 51-66 
144 Freeman 1997 (n 134) 
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theory emerging from within the corporation (management), justifying its actions or 
non-action as response or balancing.   
In addition, the practical question of how these interests are to be balanced has also 
plagued practitioners. This has led to suggestions such as the team production theory 
which suggest a re-orientation of the corporation towards all stakeholders who 
contribute firm-specific resources towards corporate production.145 Yet the search 
for a workable alternative model of managing the corporation’s interests from within 
goes on because it is important that solutions are practical as well as theoretically 
sound. This is why stakeholder theory can be criticised as potentially self-serving. 
Sternberg proposes that a business that is accountable to all is actually accountable to 
none.’146 This is suggested against the backdrop that the manager may attempt to 
justify self-serving behaviour by reference to considerations of one or more of the 
stakeholder groups. 
Another limitation of this approach is that it focuses attention on a narrow aspect of 
the question, which is to determine which groups can be regarded as having a stake, 
but what is required is a functional basis of responsibility, as it is possible that the 
groups to whom responsibility is owed may vary from setting to setting.147  CSR 
must also deal with the external question of its significant effect on society and 
responsibility for that effect. Therefore to a large extent, the stakeholder theory still 
informs an internal management perspective.  
                                                 
145 M M Blair L A Stout ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’ 85(2) Virginia Law Review 
247-328 
146 E. Sternberg Just Business: Business Ethics in action  (2nd ed. OUP, Oxford 2000) 51 
147 Teubner (n 66) 
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2.3.4 Corporate Citizenship as Political Theory 
 
Corporate citizenship has at its root the notion of the corporation as a citizen in 
society with rights and responsibilities.148 This is a term drawn from the political 
sciences. Presently three views of corporate citizenship can be identified.149 Firstly a 
limited view which equates corporate citizenship with corporate philanthropy150, an 
equivalent view which equates corporate citizenship with CSR151 and an extended 
conceptualisation which defines corporate citizenship as describing the role of the 
corporation in administering citizenship rights for individuals. 152  
The term ‘corporate citizenship’, has developed from a practitioner perspective 
reflecting on the notion of participation in society and being a good corporate citizen. 
In 1951 Abrams in analysing management responsibility in a complex world pointed 
out that management as a ‘good citizen’153  and because it cannot function properly 
in an acrimonious and contentious atmosphere has the positive duty to work for 
peaceful relations and understanding among men. He proposes management 
balancing claims of various interested groups, similar to the basis of stakeholder 
theory. 154 
For some, corporate citizenship is seen as an extension to CSR, that reflects how 
business should act towards stakeholders but there are severe limitations to this 
extension, as it is basically analysing and considering the same questions as CSR, 
question about the role of the corporation in society. The notion of a good citizen and 
socially responsible corporation are not radically different.   
                                                 
148 See J Andriof M McIntosh (eds.) Perspectives of corporate citizenship (Greenleaf, Sheffield 2001) 
149 Matten and Crane  (n 91) 
150 D J Wood  J M Lodgson Business citizenship: From Individuals to organisations (2003) Business 
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153 F W Abrams, ‘Management’s Responsibilities in a Complex World’ 29(3) HBR 1951 29-34,30 
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Wood and Logsdon propose a view of citizenship of business that is amenable to 
universal rights.155 However this does not advocate that the corporation is compelled 
by universal rights but that good behaviour via processes and practices that abide 
with these universal ethical standards is desirable.  This results in: 
 ‘a set of policies and practices that allow a business organisation 
to abide by a limited number of universal ethical standards (called 
hyper norms), to respect local cultural variations that are consistent 
with hyper norms, to experiment with ways to recon ciliate local 
practices with hyper norms when they are not consistent and to 
implement systematic learning processes for the benefit of the 
organisation, local stakeholders and the larger global 
community.’156  
 
 
This Global business citizenship model outlines practical steps of corporate 
behaviour by appealing to respect of universal rights of citizens.  The extended 
conceptualisation of corporate citizenship mentioned earlier even goes a step further 
in assigning a role for the corporation in administering citizen rights157 although this 
view is quite problematic in the absence of political electoral processes for 
corporations similar to those of governments’.158 
Windsor puts forward a severe criticism of citizenship as an attempt to escape from 
the debate between the economic (SVT) and the ethical (ST) positions.159 He points 
out that citizenship as a metaphor separates into two kinds: instrumental citizenship, 
which for him is economics in disguise and idealised citizenship which simply 
reflects ethics in disguise. Wood and Logsdon’s view of corporate citizenship would 
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be an idealised view of corporate citizenship, while the instrumental view is aligned 
with notions of obtaining a social licence to operate, which exploits an essentially 
economic position of strategic self –interest. Corporate citizenship represents an 
attempt to frame several aspects of the CSR debate from a political perspective and 
there is a lot of room for developing some of the ideas. 
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2.3.5 Corporate Accountability 
 
Corporate accountability can be identified as either synonymous with CSR or in 
opposition to it. However most importantly it re-aligns CSR with its history and 
drivers.  The drive for corporations to become responsible has not only occurred 
from within the corporation. Corporate responses from within have been in reaction 
to other aspects of society pushing for change.160 In a sense the corporate position of 
strict self-interest became untenable because there are many drivers of CSR 
practice161. They include civil society, communities, consumers, government and 
employees.162  
One of the most important drivers is civil society and this can be defined as ‘an area 
of association and action independent of the state and the market in which citizens 
can organise to pursue purposes that are important to them individually or 
collectively.’163 Civil society including non-governments organisations and 
communities highlighted the critical incidents that occurred in several parts of the 
world and began to draw attention to the negative aspects of corporate power. These 
would include: the Shell Brent Spar incident164, the Shell crisis in Nigeria165, the 
                                                 
160 D L Owen T A Swift C Humphrey M C Bowerman ‘ The new social audits: accountability, 
managerial capture or the agenda of social champions’ (2000) 9(1) European Accounting Review 81-
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Bhopal chemical spill166, the Exxon Valdez Oil spill167, the use of slave labour in 
Burma and the controversial working conditions in Asian factories168, the baby milk 
scandals169, the conflicts between indigenous peoples, mining communities and 
mining companies in South American countries, West Papua and other areas170, the 
pharmaceutical industry and the anti-retroviral drugs crisis171, the Enron collapse172 
among others. 
 It gave rise to anti- globalisation feelings expressed vividly in the 1999 Seattle 
protests against WTO and at large global or business meetings since then.173 It is in 
this sense that scholars conclude that ‘the emergence of organised civil society and 
                                                                                                                                          
in the ocean. See G Jordan Shell, Greenpeace and the Brent Spar (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001) 
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of NGOs as an organisational manifestation of broader social movements has 
dramatically altered the global-political-economic landscape.’174 
The large corporation is viewed as an archetype of globalisation and its actions 
symptomatic of growing power and effect on society. Various aspects of civil society 
decidedly focused the issue of change onto the agenda and this occurred against a 
background of weak instruments and failed initiatives at the international level that 
NGOs have begun to target multinational corporations with increasing frequency and 
vigour in recent years.175 They excelled in the use of media to disseminate 
information especially through the internet. This is demonstrated by the Greenpeace 
and Brent Spar campaign which galvanised media and consumer focus on Shell and 
prompted a change of tactics by the oil corporation.176 These NGOs began to attack 
corporations directly because of the perception of an inability to govern 
multinational corporate conduct at an international level. At the International level 
states are deemed the only direct addresses of International law and attempts to 
directly regulate non-state actors such as multinational corporations have proved 
unsuccessful so far.177 
The effectiveness of the NGO attack on transnational corporations was greatly 
assisted by the speedy and widely available communication networks that now exist 
under globalisation. An example is given is given as follows: 
 ‘a developing country protester with a digital video camera( 
perhaps provided by a developed country NGO) can film an 
indiscretion of oil company security forces and send the clip by e-
mail instantly to influence media and developed country decision-
                                                 
174 H Teegen, J P Doh S Vachani ‘ The importance of non-governmental organisations in global 
governance and value creation: an international business agenda (2004) 35(6) Journal of International 
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makers) The internet essentially provides a big floodlight for 
NGOs the shine on the overseas operations of multinational 
corporations.’178 
 
 
As CSR discourse emerged Bendell points to a critical point in 2002 when a key 
divide emerged between those who regarded corporate power as a problem and those 
who either accepted it or considered it as an opportunity, if engaged appropriately.179  
He referred to the first group as ‘corporate accountability’ and the second group as 
‘corporate responsibility’. This distinction is nevertheless an artificial one, as this 
may be said to represent varying levels of critique of corporate power and the 
corporation’s role in society.180 
Corporate accountability is therefore an integral part of CSR. As Kerr and others181 
point out that the relevant aspects of accountability are complementary to CSR. 
These include: giving justification or account of actions, receiving rewards or 
punishments for those actions and achieving results in line with stated business 
goals, legal requirements and social expectations. This area has also re-vitalised the 
interface between CSR and the law. It highlights law as an important aspect of CSR 
toolkit.182.  
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2.4 Extending essentially contested concepts (ECC) as an analytical tool to 
CSR 
 
In view of the multiple interpretations and theories of CSR as well as the level of 
contestations, it is quite difficult to decipher a single definition of CSR. Nevertheless 
this section will apply Gallie’s ECC theory as an analytical tool and examine CSR as 
an essentially contested concept. The aim is to propose a common core in the contest 
that unites themes of CSR. Therefore this section will explain the ECC theory and 
then apply it to CSR 
 
2.4.1 Explaining ECC  
 
Gallie in 1956 proposed a ‘single explanatory hypothesis calling for some fairly 
rigid schematization’183 which he had hoped would give us enlightenment of a much 
needed kind, with regard to concepts which perpetually engender disputes.   Gallie 
pointed out that ‘there are concepts which are essentially contested concepts, the 
proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on 
the part of their users.’ 184  
Gallie in setting out his theory of ECC laid out seven important criteria, which are as 
follows:185 
1. An ECC must be appraisive in the sense that it signifies or accredits some 
kind of valued achievement. 
2. This achievement must be of an internally complex character; for all that its 
worth is attributed to it as a whole. 
3. Any explanation of its worth must therefore include reference to the 
respective contributions of its various parts and features 
4. The accredited achievement must be of a kind that admits of considerable 
modification in the light of changing circumstances. 
                                                 
183 W B Gallie Essentially Contested Concepts (1958) 56 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 167-
198 reprinted in M. Black(ed.) The Importance of Language (Englewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall 1962) 
121- 146,122 
184 Ibid at 123 
185 Gallie (n 183) 125 & 136 
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5. To use an essentially contested concept means to use it both aggressively and 
defensively. 
6. The derivation of any such concept from an original exemplar whose 
authority is acknowledged by all the contestant users of the concept. 
7. The probability or plausibility of the claim that the continuous competition 
between contestant users of the concept enables the original exemplar’s 
achievement to be developed in optimum fashion.   
 
 
Fortunately, Gallie in setting out these conditions also used examples to further our 
understanding of what he meant. For our purposes, one of the most appropriate is 
that of the political concept of democracy. For Gallie, democracy is appraisive or 
evaluative because a primary question in major policy decisions, has come to be is it 
democratic?186 And the response signifies a valued achievement. This valued 
achievement is however dependent on other value judgements that may be made to 
assess if democracy is of good value. 
 In this vein Connolly points out that there is an inherent value judgement in 
assessing such concepts, therefore ‘if we say a society is undemocratic or that a 
practice does not meet democratic standards...we are describing it from the vantage 
point of accepted standards of political participation, debate and accountability’.187 
For Connolly therefore, this relationship between the criteria of a concept and its 
purpose is what makes notions such as democracy subject of intense disputes.  This 
may be the sense in which ‘the evaluative nature’ is the criterion and not the 
response as it may equally apply to concepts which may signify ‘disapproved or 
denigrated phenomena’.188 Therefore for ECC the evaluative or appraisive nature is a 
multi-layered one, firstly because we assess for valued achievement or disapproved 
phenomena and also because this assessment is based on inherent value judgements.  
 
                                                 
186 Gallie (n 183)  135 
187 W E Connolly The Terms of Political discourse (3rd ed.) (Blackwell, Oxford 1993) 29 
188 M Freeden Ideologies and Political Theory – a conceptual approach (OUP, Oxford 1998) 56 
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 For Gallie, the second and third conditions are linked, he points out that democracy 
is internally complex and therefore admits to a variety of descriptions in which its 
different aspects are graded in different orders of importance. For by his example 
democracy could mean power of majority of citizens to choose or remove 
government; or equality of all citizens irrespective of race, sex etc to lead politically 
or; the continuous active participation of citizens in political life at all levels. In 
different political traditions, western or otherwise, the aspects of democracy 
emphasised vary to a greater or lesser degree on the relevance to that tradition.189 
This nature of an ECC is occasionally referred to as ‘diverse describability’ because 
an ECC can be described in a variety of ways. It has also been highlighted that 
‘diverse describability’ may involve an exclusive emphasis on one or more facets of 
the concept.190 
The fourth criterion which specifies the accredited achievement must be of a kind 
that admits of considerable modification in the light of changing circumstances, is 
usually surmised as rendering such a concept to be ‘open in character’191. For Gallie, 
democratic targets will be raised or lowered as circumstances alter and democratic 
achievements judged in light of those changing circumstances.192 This is another key 
factor which creates essential contestability; as such modification may create new 
facets previously unattributed to the original concept. 
To satisfy the fifth requirement, democracy in his example can also be used 
aggressively and defensively hinging on a general use of it.193 In this sense, it is used 
against other uses and recognised that it is to be maintained against other uses. Some 
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analysts query this criteria pointing out that some proponents of an ECC, use a 
concept in such a way as to differ from other usages194; however aggressive and 
defensive use of concepts always exist within the contested uses of the ECC as a 
whole, although perhaps not within each individual work. 
The sixth criterion has been the most controversial; as it points to an incontrovertible 
issue which is that there is the need for an ‘exemplar’ i.e. common basis.  He 
elucidates on this point thus: ‘This exemplar’s way of playing must be recognised by 
all contesting teams... as the way the game is to be played, yet because of the 
internally complex and variously describable character of the exemplar’s play, it is 
natural that different features in it should be weighted differently by different 
appraisers, and hence that our different teams should have come to hold different 
conceptions of how the game should be played.’195 It is in light of this that other 
philosophers have chosen a concept /conceptions distinction196; correctly pointing 
out that there is a core notion and multiple interpretations.  
 It is in this sense of the ‘exemplar’ that Rawls in his book the Theory of Justice 
points to a distinction between a concept and its conceptions; when with regard to 
the concept and conceptions of Justice he writes that: 
 ‘… those who hold different conceptions of justice can then still 
agree that institutions are just when no arbitrary distinctions are 
made between persons in the assigning of basic rights and duties 
and when the rules determine the proper balance between 
competing claims to the advantages of social life. Man can agree to 
this description of just institutions since the notion of an arbitrary 
distinction are left open for each to interpret according to the 
principles of justice that he accepts…197’ 
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In relation to our chosen example, democracy, Gallie points to an exemplar of ‘a 
long tradition...of demands, aspirations, revolts and reforms of a common anti-
inegalitarian character’.198 For the final criterion, Gallie prescribes that continuous 
competition between contestant users enables the exemplar to develop in optimum 
fashion but he concedes that within democracy it may rather fan flames of 
conflict.199 He suggests some mitigation may be possible if the essentially contested 
nature of the concept is accepted. Still the additional point recognised at this juncture 
is that continuous competition can be beneficial or harmful to the development of an 
ECC. 
Gallie’s hypothesis has provoked a huge response 200  because a conflict resides 
within it, that is replicated in many concepts of social sciences. The reality that even 
where we accept the essentially contested nature of a concept, there is a need to 
identify something in common if contestants are to claim that they partake in the 
same contest. As Gray points out: 
 ‘Unless divergent theories or world-views have something in 
common, their constituent concepts cannot be “contested” even 
though their proponents are in conflict. References to definitional 
“contests” have a point only if there is something which is not 
treated as “contestable”.201  
 
If from the following analysis CSR proves to be an ECC, this is also an inherent 
conflict which must be resolved. 
                                                 
198 Gallie (n 183) 136 
199 Gallie (n 183)  137 
200 J Waldron ‘Is the Rule of Law an essentially contested concept (in Florida)?’ (2002) 21(2) Law 
and Philosophy 137-164,149 
201 J N Gray ‘On the contestability of social and political concepts’ (1977) 5(3) Political theory 331-
348, 342 
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2.4.2 CSR as ECC 
 
To fit into Gallie’s theory of essentially contested concepts, CSR will have to satisfy 
seven conditions already highlighted above. Gray points out more generally that 
‘essentially contested concepts occur characteristically in social contexts which are 
recognizably those of an ideological dispute’.202 CSR is undoubtedly a social 
phenomenon which not only questions what sort of relationship business should have 
with society but if business should have any relationship with society and what form 
this relationship should take. 
Firstly, CSR can be perceived as appraisive or evaluative, in the sense that it is seen 
as accrediting a vital element to corporations. Therefore for CSR similar to Gallie’s 
example on democracy: the question has come to be is the corporation socially 
responsible? And the response often signifies or accredits a kind of valued 
achievement. Social responsibility is seen as a valued achievement, valued by 
management, civil society and other stakeholders. 
Websites of companies upload reports to affirm CSR activity and corporate reporting 
of CSR is now firmly established as desirable activity.203 Non-governmental 
organisations keep a firm watch for corporate behaviour to highlight irresponsibility. 
Connolly correctly points out that the value of the response will depend on the 
inherent value judgements to the questioner, in the same way that there are 
proponents for and against CSR in business, who still question whether CSR is a 
‘good’ or a ‘bad’ thing although there is more consensus that CSR is desirable. 
 
                                                 
202 Ibid at 333 
203 J Allouche(ed.) CSR: Concepts, Accountability and Reporting (Palgrave Macmillan, London 2006) 
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 Next CSR can be shown to be internally complex as it admits ‘a variety of 
descriptions in which its different aspects are graded in different orders of 
importance’204. The complexity of CSR reveals itself in the multiple interpretations 
and dimensions that have so far been analysed by several writers. Dimensions 
identified from CSR definitions include the economic, legal, ethical and 
discretionary dimensions or the human rights, environment and labour angles.205 The 
emphasis placed on each of these dimensions depends on motivation, interest or 
objective of the writer. The importance given to each of these different aspects has 
varied across different proponents.  
Therefore a business definition of CSR will give credence to the economic and 
perhaps seek to prove that CSR is subsumed under a profit objective, an example is 
the Confederation of Business Industry (CBI) definition ‘CSR requires companies to 
acknowledge that they are publicly accountable not only for financial performance, 
but also for their social and environmental record...’206; whereas the non-
governmental organisation would seek to emphasise the legal and ethical angles. 
Dahlsrud in his recent article identifies environmental, social, economic, stakeholder 
and voluntariness dimensions from the frequency of words used in a ‘google’ search 
on the internet.207 
Another indication of the internal complexity can be exemplified by attempts to map 
CSR scope, theories and approaches. This has been done in diverse ways.  Lantos by 
distinguishing between ethical, altruistic and strategic CSR208; Garriga and Mele by 
identifying four groups of CSR approaches: instrumental, political, integrative and 
                                                 
204 Gallie (n 183) 
205 A Dahlsrud ‘How CSR is defined’ (2008) 15 CSR and Environmental Management 1-13 
206 C A Hemingway An exploratory analysis of CSR: definitions, motives and values (2002) Research 
Memorandum 34 University of Hull Business School 
207 Dahlsrud (n 205) 
208 G Lantos ‘The boundaries of strategic CSR’ (2001)18(7) Journal of Consumer Marketing 595-630 
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ethical.209For Garriga and Mele, instrumental theories perceive CSR as mere means 
to the ends of profits, while the political theories emphasise the social power of the 
corporation in relations to society and its responsibility. The integrative group 
consider that business ought to integrate social demands as it depends on society for 
continuity and growth, while ethical theories entrench this in ethical views pointing 
out that firms ought to accept social responsibility as ethical obligation. For instance 
ethical theories and approach cover the use of sustainable development, human rights 
and the stakeholder theory. However there are no clear-cut maps and overlaps occur 
in the use of theories and approaches. 
 Additionally there has been use of differing terminology to emphasise and attempt 
to distinguish certain aspects of CSR. One of the best examples is the attempt to 
apply the political concept of citizenship to CSR. Yet corporate citizenship is not 
defined very differently to CSR, ‘good corporate citizenship ...can be defined as 
understanding and managing a company’s wider influences on society for the benefit 
of the company and society as a whole’210  A survey of competing terminology 211 
reveals other terminology which include corporate sustainability212, corporate social 
performance213 and corporate accountability214 among others. These terms are often 
defined in similar terms and used interchangeably with CSR. 
Well-founded CSR debates refer to the different features ascribed to the term and 
these considerable features of CSR have changed over time. This diverse 
describability is the sense in which several CSR writers focus on specific features of 
                                                 
209 Garriga & Mêlé (n 7) 
210 M McIntosh and others Living corporate citizenship (Financial Times/ Prentice-Hall, London, 
2002); C. Marsden and J Andriof ‘Towards an understanding of corporate citizenship and how to 
influence it’ (1998) 2(2) Citizenship studies 329-352 
211 Amaeshi and Adi (n 108) 
212 M Van Marrewijk  ‘Concepts and definitions of CSR and corporate sustainability: between agency 
and communion’ (2003) 44(2-3) Journal of Business Ethics 95-105 
213 Wood  (n 111) 
214 Bendell  (n 173) 
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CSR aligning it to their own situations and challenges and in the process, the content 
of CSR practice has varied over time to reflect the needs of the particular participants 
in the relationship. An example would be the inclusion of anti-corruption as the 10th 
principle in the UN Global Compact with the earlier nine principles drawn from 
human rights, labour standards and environmental principles.215 
 In addition it should be possible to assert that the concept of CSR is used both 
aggressively and defensively, perhaps a good illustration is in the sense of non-
governmental organisations (NGO) campaign for Multinational corporations to adopt 
CSR contrasted with the multinational corporations’ defensive claims of CSR 
practice.216 
The most significant criteria, is whether discussions of CSR should claim authority 
from an original exemplar whose authority is acknowledged by all the contestant 
users of the concept. Perhaps the solution may be that while there can be varied 
conceptions; there is a core that links these debates. In Gallie’s example of 
democracy he speaks of ‘a long tradition of demands, aspirations, revolts and 
reforms of a common anti-inegalitarian character…’217 and perhaps, in relation to 
CSR it would be the long tradition of societal demands for control of corporate 
power.  
In a more generalised way, CSR is about the changing relationship and expectations 
between corporations and society yet the debates are triggered by the increasing 
corporate power and the drive to make it legitimate in today’s society. For example 
Carroll in charting the modern era of CSR points out that ‘Bowen’s work in 1953 
                                                 
215 The UN Global Compact is an International CSR Initiative aimed at creating voluntary global 
networks to enhance CSR practice. It draws on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Labour Organisation’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and the UN Convention against Corruption. 
See D Leipziger The Corporate Responsibility code book (2nd ed. Greenleaf, Sheffield 2010) 
216 A Dahlsrud ‘How CSR is defined’ (2008) 15 CSR and Environmental Management 1-13 
217 Gallie (n 183) 
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proceeded from the belief that the several hundred largest businesses were vital 
centres of power and decision-making and that the actions of these firms touched the 
lives of citizens at many points’.218 This statement on power and its effect on the 
lives of citizens in society is even more so today. Donaldson points out that power 
are a morally neutral concept, capable of being used for good or evil.219 It is that 
capability and use that is in contention. 
Therefore some of the resulting ideas include capability for good use such as 
questions about the corporate managers’ role in society, the challenge of balancing 
competing claims to corporate resources and philanthropy220 calls for social justice 
represented by appeals for a human face to global markets221  and the business role 
in sustainable development.222 While demanding responsibility for some wrongful 
use which would include ‘financial scandals, human rights violations, environmental 
side-effects, collaboration with repressive regimes...’223 These issues demonstrate the 
increased impact of corporate power and society’s need to constrain the ability to 
misuse such power. CSR also extends to channelling such power for constructive 
uses beneficial to society.  
The final criteria is that the continuous competition by the contestant users of CSR 
sustain the development of CSR in optimum fashion. It could perhaps be argued that 
it is this contentious nature of CSR that has seen CSR develop into a distinct field. 
However such a contentious nature can also be harmful. Gallie with his example, 
democracy questions if contention within democracy is not rather more likely to fan 
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the flames of conflict. He resolves this by proposing the possibility that an 
acceptance of the essentially contested nature of such concept might affect such 
conflict. However for CSR, contention about its appropriate meaning has been 
detrimental to establishing and assessing CSR achievement. Van marrewijk points 
out that the ‘subsequent diversity and overlap in terminology, definitions and 
conceptual models hampers academic debate and on-going research.’224 While 
Whitehouse comments that as a consequence ‘the whirlwind of debate over the last 
75years has consumed substantial energy while ultimately going around in 
circles.’225  
 Perhaps the view of CSR as ECC will serve a purpose if other participants in the 
contest will take more time to get a wholesome view of the various conceptions 
before adding theirs. However within this thesis this view will help in deriving an 
exemplar for CSR whilst leaving room for contextual interpretations of CSR. 
                                                 
224 Van Marrewijk (n 212) 
225 L Whitehouse ‘CSR as regulation: the argument from democracy ’ in J O’Brien (ed) Governing the 
corporation (London, Wiley, 2005) 141-162  
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2.5. Deriving a CSR Exemplar 
 
From the analysis, it is evident that on a general level CSR focuses on the 
relationship between corporations (business and society). This relationship has many 
variables and the tendency to change over time. On the one hand is the nature of this 
corporation, questions of its ownership, structure and role and on the other is the 
impact on society.  However at the onset of CSR, the triggers were questions which 
are all predicated on notions of corporate power and with time have spread to 
concerns of the social impact of such use or misuse of power. 
Kercher in his work on CSR draws a contextual historical timeline from the 1930s to 
current, emphasising that traditionally CSR debates have been focused on power but 
that this has evolved over time to consider social impacts of such corporate power.226 
This links in with the growing concern with social, labour, human rights, 
environmental degradation, community rights, and corruption issues as social 
impacts of corporate misuse of power as well as questions of how corporations can 
rightly use their power to contribute to global development. These concerns and 
issues are symptomatic of the social impact of corporate power and capacity. 
Therefore crucial questions within CSR are questions of corporate power:  its use by 
management, responsibility for its use, accountability for its use or non-use and the 
capabilities which such powers provide. This is why CSR has become more 
important as perceptions of increasing corporate power have developed.  
                                                 
226 K Kercher ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: Impact of globalisation and international business’ 
(2007) Corporate Governance e-journal (Bond University) <http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgej/4> 
accessed 10 December 2011  
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Therefore the exemplar or central theme of CSR is the drive for legitimacy of 
corporate power.   
The drive for such legitimacy has come from several perspectives. The traditional 
instrumental perspective sees corporate power within the law and posits that it 
should have an economic area of competence which is profits and thereby contribute 
to society through payment of taxes and relevant levies. The ethical perspective 
which highlights that corporate power implies responsibility to society but fails to 
fully demonstrate a universal basis of responsibility because there may be no such 
universal basis.  
At best what must be found is a functional basis that takes context into account, 
identifying above all the objectives which such responsibility seeks to achieve at that 
point in time. Yet still there is the political citizenship perspective which focuses on 
rights and obligations that flow from existence in a societal context and therefore 
views corporate power in the context of citizenship rights and responsibilities. Or the 
perspective of corporate accountability which demands a more explicit focus on 
accountability for such power.  
Applying Gallie’s ECC analysis, it becomes evident that the core or central theme of 
these CSR debates is based on questions of corporate power in the business and 
society relationship. It reveal conceptions based on varying aspects of corporate 
power and its impact on society prompting questions and re-evaluation of its proper 
role in today’s society. The core can then be outlined as the legitimacy of corporate 
power. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter establishes that CSR can be seen as an essentially contested concept.  
Therefore the level of contention and variety within CSR begins to make sense as 
one understands that the possibility of a uniform interpretation of such a concept is a 
difficult one. Essentially contested concepts (ECC) are concepts open to continuous 
contestations yet Gallie provides a framework that allows for an exemplar or a 
central idea. This result in contestation can be fashioned in a constructive direction. 
 It has also been pointed out that the level of reflection that contestation provokes is 
deepened when participants understand the implications of essential contested-
ness.227This is because it allows parties to gain a sense of lack of exclusivity of 
definition or issues and to garner an understanding of other aspects of such 
contestations surrounding the central idea of the concept. 
CSR embodies issues regarding the relationship of the corporate form to society.  
These are issues which provoke extensive debate as a result of the theoretical 
viewpoints of the parties to this debate. There are theories with regards to 
corporation which privilege contract over community or vice-versa. There are also 
theories about the role of corporations within society and these theories are also 
constantly being reviewed in the light of changing circumstances. An illustration 
would be the impact of multinational oil corporations on areas of human rights, 
environment, labour and anti-corruption which has shifted CSR in those practical 
directions.  
                                                 
227 Waldron (n 200) 
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However the anchor for those issues has been the changing perception and questions 
of corporate power in the corporate-society relationship. The perception of power 
and its perceived impact in the hands of these corporations has also meant that there 
has been a corresponding increase in the responsibility demanded of these 
corporations. This chapter therefore reveals that a core or central theme of CSR is 
focused on the legitimacy of corporate power. Therefore CSR is about debates on 
issues arising from the relationship between corporation and society which are 
centred on the impact of corporate power. The central theme or exemplar for CSR is 
that corporate power possessed within society should be subject to suitable 
constraints that allow for its legitimate exercise 
 To fully explore and understand this central theme or exemplar of CSR, the next 
chapter will continue with the exploration this core notion of power. While Chapter 
four will examine the link between law and legitimacy in order to introduce the legal 
perspectives.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
POWER AS EXEMPLAR: AN EXAMINATION OF CSR IN CONTEXT 
 
‘The issue of power is central for the normative discussion about 
CSR.’1 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 
The preceding chapter examines CSR definition and meaning and discovers the 
centrality of questions of corporate power. This chapter goes further to examine 
power as a concept which is central to CSR.  It examines power as a concept and 
then applies this to corporations in order to broaden our understanding of what 
corporate power means within CSR. Power in itself is a contested concept but it is 
perceived both as an ability and capability to affect the relationship between 
corporations and society.  
Therefore in line with Gallie’s examination of the ECC exemplar, where the core 
question is ‘why CSR?’ the answer would indicate that demands for CSR have been 
primarily driven by perceptions of power in the hands of large corporations and the 
need to justify such power.  The analysis within this chapter examines what ‘power’ 
means both as a theoretical concept and within CSR. The chapter then contextualises 
the analysis within CSR, by using examples from one of the foremost CSR 
industries, the oil industry.  
                                                 
1 J Tullberg ‘Illusions of Corporate Power: Revisiting the Relative Power of Corporations and 
Governments.’ (2004) 52 Journal of Business Ethics 325-333, 325 
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3.2 The exemplar nature of Power 
 
 
While there is some agreement as to the centrality of power2there are two further 
issues which arise: firstly the notion of some distinction between power and 
perceptions of power and secondly the division between those who regard power as 
an issue or problem and others who regard power as an opportunity.3 Thus it is 
essential to explore what is meant by power and this section in doing so addresses 
three sub-questions: Firstly why define power, secondly what does power mean and 
thirdly are there different modes of power? 
The existence of power can only be established when some understanding of the 
concept is acquired. This is because it is a complex and dynamic concept which does 
not lend itself to exact scientific and verifiable measurement.4  This will also clarify 
its centrality to CSR. This will set in place the context for examining the 
corresponding requirement that such power should be subject to limitations that 
render them accountable. The necessity for justification or legitimising exercise or 
possession of power is a task that corporations face and CSR has developed as a 
result of this. 5   
 
                                                 
2 Ibid 
3 J  Bendell  Barricades and Boardrooms: A contemporary history of the Corporate Accountability 
Movement (Paper 13: UNRISD, Geneva 2004) 18 
4 R A Dahl ‘Power as the control of behaviour’ in S Lukes(ed.) Power (Readings in Social and 
Political Theory (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1986) 37-58  indicates the problems that exist with any 
attempt to empirically measure power. Although looking at political systems, this is applicable as he 
notes that  ‘attempts to arrive at a better understanding of the more concrete phenomena of political 
life and institutions often sacrifice a good deal in the rigor of logic and verification in order to provide 
more useful and reliable guides to the real world” He also further notes that ‘at a very general level, 
attempts to analyze power share with many- perhaps most- other inquiries in the social sciences the 
familiar dilemma of rigor versus relevance’. 
5 N Mitchell ‘Corporate Power, Legitimacy and Social Policy’  (1986) 39(2) The Western Political 
Quarterly 197-212, 199-200 
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3.2.1 Why define Power? 
 
 
Power is an extremely common word yet its meaning as a concept is highly 
contested. Nevertheless it is irreplaceable as a notion which assists with the 
assigning of authority or responsibility in social relations. The importance of 
defining power is primarily to be able to identify this concept in given situations. 
Therefore if the notion of power is central to CSR defining power helps the 
identification of this concept as trigger for CSR demands. However such 
identification cannot be just for its own sake. There are a number of reasons why it is 
necessary to identify power. It may have an allocation role, in the sense of allocating 
responsibility for action but it is also essential for identifying persons of authority. 
The reasons for identifying power must be seen in context.  
Moriss in his important work on Power identifies three contexts within which we 
talk of power. They are the practical, moral and evaluative contexts.6 The practical 
context involves knowing ‘the power of others’. That is, identifying and knowing 
those who can get things done. They are the ones with the ‘capacity to affect 
outcomes’. The second context is the moral context and this involves allocating 
responsibility. And the third context is the evaluative context, in the sense of 
evaluating social systems to locate power distribution. 7 
These contexts can be identified in everyday life. For instance the practical context is 
used when governments are said to be in power, having control over certain aspects 
of public life. However it is also used to call upon the power of the MNC to get 
things done. Donaldson speaks of great power enhancing the possibility of effecting 
great good. He points out that ‘attributing power to multinational corporations is not 
                                                 
6 P Moriss Power: A Philosophical Analysis (2nd ed.)(Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2002) 
37-42 
7 Ibid 
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the same as attributing morality. Power is seen as morally neutral. Great power 
enhances the possibility of effecting great evil but similarly the possibility of 
effecting great good.’8 
In the moral context, power and responsibility have a corresponding relationship. 
Davis within his power responsibility model points out that the greater the power of 
the firm, the greater the firm’s social responsibility and concludes whoever does not 
use its social power responsibly will lose it.9 This context is very important to the 
focus of the work however it is modified by the view that such power and 
responsibility is not only important for social status but also for accountability and 
legitimacy in society. This is also linked with the evaluative context which evaluates 
power within social systems, because it is through such evaluation that reform of 
laws and administrative responsibility occurs.  This is similar to the assertion that 
power must be legitimately accountable within liberal society. Power within social 
systems can be analysed with the aim of assessing legitimacy for such power.10  
The moral and evaluative contexts are crucial to our analysis. This is because 
although distinct they are related. It is possible to find that those who have acquired 
power in society are not fully accepting of consequential responsibility, this could 
prompt a re-evaluation of the social system where power use within that society is 
judged as falling short of the required legitimate standards. This can lead a push for 
changes in social systems.  
                                                 
8 T Donaldson; The Ethics of International Business  (OUP, Oxford 1989) 32 
9 K Davis ‘The case for and against the assumption of social responsibilities’ (1973)16(2) Academy 
of Management Journal 312-322 
10 M Stokes ‘Company Law and Legal Theory’ in W Twining(ed) Legal theory and Common law 
(Basil Blackwell Oxford 1986) 155-183  
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The relationship between power and responsibility is a complex one. The initial 
presumption is as Moriss points out that ‘you are not usually considered responsible 
for something if you did not do it’11 However he concedes that you can fail to do 
something for two reasons ‘disinclination’ or ‘inability’ and that the first is more 
blameworthy. To this regard responsibility can be for action or omission, especially 
where omission is as a result of ‘disinclination’ within a sphere where there lies the 
ability.  For our purposes it is important to identify multinational corporations as one 
of the powerful global actors and then assign responsibility falling squarely within 
the sphere of such power and influence.  This will include responsibility for their 
direct acts but also responsibility for the failure to act in certain circumstances. This 
is the crux issue of CSR. For as Ball states: 
 ‘When we say that someone has power or is powerful we 
are...assigning responsibility to a human agent or agency for 
bringing (or failing to bring) about certain outcomes that impinge 
upon the interests of other human beings’.12  
 
Lukes in his seminal work on power agrees that the second context is not only moral 
but political as well. He notes that ‘the powerful are those whom we judge or can 
hold to be responsible for significant outcomes’13 In other words, ‘the point of 
locating power is to fix responsibility for consequences held to flow from the action, 
inaction of certain specifiable agents’.14 This is the difference that strengthens a 
power legitimacy relationship. The fact that it is not only important that power be 
responsible but also that power can be held responsible.  As a result it is essential 
                                                 
11 Moriss (n 6) 38 
12 T Ball ‘Review of S. Lukes, Power and J. Nagel, The Descriptive Analysis of Power’ (1976) 4 
Political Theory 246-249, 249 
13 S Lukes Power: A Radical View (2nd ed. Palgrave Macmillan, Great Britain 2005) 66 
14  S Lukes  Power: A Radical View (1st ed. Macmillan, London 1974)  56 
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that ‘power must be defined prior to locating responsibility for its exercise’.15 Thus 
in this examination of CSR, the initial task is to lay a foundation for defining power 
of the corporation in relation to society. This is to further justify the position that 
power is central to the discussion of CSR. 
It is also important at this point to note that the general notion of responsibility is a 
variable concept. There are different levels of responsibility therefore one could be 
fully responsible or partially responsible16. Responsibility as a concept can be 
classified into different types for instance. Whitehouse17 identifies three categories. 
They are personal, obligatory and causal responsibility. Personal responsibility in 
this sense refers to a qualitative judgement that an individual or person is 
responsible; Obligatory responsibility invokes a sense of compulsion while causal 
responsibility denotes responsibility for a certain situation arising but these 
categories are not rigid.  
In applying responsibility to individuals it becomes important to apply moral or legal 
rules. Moral rules have a significant link with causal responsibility to the extent that 
moral responsibility has been described as: 
‘responsibility for a given harm or defect if the person’s conduct 
played a significant causal role in that harm or defect, the person’s 
conduct was blameworthy or it was morally faulty in some other 
way and the aspect of the act that was faulty was also one of the 
aspects in virtue of which it was a cause of the harm’.18  
 
                                                 
15 A Kernohan ‘Social power and Human Agency’ (1989) 86 (12) The Journal of Philosophy 712-726, 
722  
16 Kernohan  ibid ‘Responsibility comes in degrees ranging from full through partial to none and this 
is relevant to identifying power.’ 723 
17 L A Whitehouse ‘The company: property, power and responsibility’ in A Hudson (ed.) New 
Perspectives on Property Law, Obligations and Restitutions’  (Cavendish, 2004) 331-344 
18 G F Mellema, Collective Responsibility (Rodopi, Georgia 1997)  7 
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Legal responsibility is based on legal rules which may not always be based on causal 
responsibility in the direct sense but does infer compulsion and obligation as 
Whitehouse puts it this way:  
‘Although both legal and moral responsibilities are only attributed 
to those who are causally responsible for the outcome in question 
either by act or omission, it is possible to impose responsibility on 
an individual when they are not directly responsible for the 
harm’.19  
 
Within CSR responsibility hinges on both moral and legal rules. Even where one is 
interested in legal responsibility, it is important to establish moral responsibility as it 
is a good starting point.20  Power has a role in finding out who is morally or causally 
responsible by act or omission. Power’s role in this detection may sometimes be 
theoretical because a corporation’s responsibility for its actions stem from the power 
that endures to the corporation as a whole giving it capacity to achieve great good or 
evil. Nevertheless in practical terms, this can also be given effect by the actions or 
inactions of its employees.   
Yet studies of power become practical when it is linked with the law’s prospective 
regulatory role of assigning responsibility that is, duties and liabilities. Therefore law 
may look to the power of an entity and then prescribe duties and responsibilities.  In 
light of this, the political theorist Connolly correctly points out that:  
‘To acknowledge power over others is to implicate oneself in 
responsibility for certain events and to put oneself in a position 
where justification for the limits placed on others is expected. To 
attribute power to another, then is not simply  to describe his role 
in some perfectly neutral sense but is more like accusing him of 
something, which is then denied or justified’21 
 
                                                 
19 Whitehouse  (n 17) 
20 J  Feinberg ‘Problematic Responsibility in Law and Morals (1962)  71 (3) The Philosophical 
Review 340-351, 344  
21 W Connolly The Terms of Political Discourse (Heath,  Boston 1974) 97 ; also Kernohan (n 15) 
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This assertion is strengthened by the lengths which corporate groups would go to 
deny possession of power in past times.22  However power in itself is just a 
dispositional concept indicating ability or capacity.23 The possession of power 
therefore points to possession of capacity.  Power is linked to responsible and 
legitimate use of such capacity.  
Where significant power over others is established then it implies responsibility for 
the exercise of such power. This is inclusive of both moral responsibility in the sense 
of taking care but also responsibility that can be held to account within legitimate 
frameworks. This is why it is necessary to define power and apply it to our context 
as this will determine the importance of the drive for accountable and legitimate 
frameworks for such power. 
                                                 
22 It obviously matters that they have such power. ‘There must be some misuse of power when those 
who obviously possess it are so at pains to deny having it’ J K Galbraith The Anatomy of Power 
(Houghton Mifflin, 1983) 142  
23 Lukes 2005 (n 13) 63 
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3.2.2 Meaning of Power 
 
The task then is to define what power means.24 This is not an uncomplicated task but 
it is important to outline what it means within the context of this thesis. In the texts 
there is a distinction between ‘power to’ and ‘power over’. Where the former refers 
to ability as evidenced by Hobbes definition involving the power of man (to take it 
universally) in his present means to obtain some future end.25 While in the latter 
sense ‘power over’, turns over our attention to those on the giving and receiving end 
of the relationship.26Yet they are closely related as Lukes views power over 
‘protestas’ as a sub-concept of power to ‘potentia’.27  
The meaning of power as a concept is not settled and there are different views of 
power resulting from disparate focus on certain aspects of power.28 However one of 
the most comprehensive and persuasive definition of power is that given by Lukes. 
In his assessment of the concept of power, he considers three views of power. He 
accepts that the views of power considered can be seen as alternative interpretations 
and applications of one and the same underlying concept of power, according to 
which A exercises power over B when A affects B contrary to B’s interests.29   He 
later amends this definition in 2005 to reflect power as capacity, not just exercise.30 
                                                 
24 ‘Few words are used so frequently with so little seeming need to reflect on their meaning as power’ 
J K Galbraith ‘Power and Organization’ in S Lukes (ed.) Power – Readings in Social and Political 
Theory (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1986)  211 -228, 211 
25 T Hobbes Leviathan  (Oxford World Classics, re-issue 2008) Chapter X 
26 Connolly (n 21), 87. Lukes 2005 (n 13) at 69 proposes “ that there is , indeed , a single generic 
concept of power common to all cases and that , in application to human agents [ individual and 
collective]  it exhibits two distinct variants (which we can provisionally, but misleadingly label as 
concepts of ‘power to’ and ‘ power over’) where the latter is a sub species of the former and that 
alternative ways of conceiving a version of the latter exhibit what has been called ‘essential 
contestedness’ with significant consequences for our understanding of social life’ 
27 Power over reflects for him the ability to have another or others in your power, by constraining their 
choices, thereby securing compliance. 
28 Connolly (n 21)  86-88 
29 Lukes 1974 (n 14) 27 
30 This is his opinion 30 years after in his second edition, see Lukes 2005(n 13) at 109. Still standing 
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Beyond this he identifies three views or conceptions of power in the one 
dimensional, two dimensional and three-dimensional modes.   
In the one dimensional view category, Lukes points to Dahl, who describes his 
intuitive idea of power as ‘A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do 
something that B would not otherwise do’31 and in addition his intuitive view of the 
power relations as to involve a successful attempt by A to get a to do something he 
would not otherwise do.  Polsby another proponent of this view points out that ‘ one 
can conceive of power… as the capacity of one actor to do something affecting 
another actor, which changes the probable pattern of specified future events…’32 
This view focuses on behaviour in making decisions over key or important issues as 
involved in actual observable conflict.  
In the second category, the two-dimensional view accepts this first view but only as 
one part of power, they raise a second role observing that ‘to the extent that a person 
or a group –consciously or unconsciously- creates or reinforces barriers to the 
public airing of policy conflicts, that person or group has power’33Therefore power 
may involve initiating, deciding and vetoing but it also could be exercised by 
confining or limiting the scope of decision making to relatively “safe” issues.   
 
                                                                                                                                          
by his work on power, he however finds the definition unsatisfactory for the following reasons. “ 
Firstly it focuses on the exercise of power committing the exercise fallacy; power is a dispositional 
concept, identifying an ability or capacity, which may or may not be exercised. Secondly it focuses 
entirely on the exercise of ‘power over’…thirdly it equates over with domination …thereby 
neglecting the manifold ways in which power can be productive, transformative, authoritative and 
comparable with dignity, fourthly, assuming that power thus defined…offers no more than a 
perfunctory and questionable account of what those interests are and finally it operates with a 
reductive and simplistic picture of binary power relations.” 
31 R A Dahl, ‘The Concept of Power’ (1957) 2 Behavioural science 201-210;  Lukes 1974 (n 14)  11 
32 N W Polsby, Community Power and Political theory (New haven and London: Yale University 
Press) 3-4; see also Lukes 1974 (n 391)  12 
33 This view is expounded by Bachrach and Baratz . See P Bacharach M S Baratz Power and Poverty. 
Theory and Practice  (OUP, New York 1970)  8. They importantly bring the idea of ‘mobilisation of 
bias’ into the discussion of power. This is ‘ a set of pre dominant values, beliefs, rituals and 
institutional procedures that operate systematically and consistently to benefit certain persons and 
groups at the expense of others..’ See p.43-44; see also Lukes 1974 (n 14) 16-17 
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Finally Lukes himself proposes a three-dimensional view, which is rather a critique 
of the behavioural focus of the first two views.  
He writes that: 
‘the first two views… allow for consideration of the many ways in 
which potential issues are kept out of politics whether through the 
operation of social forces and institutional practices or through 
individual decisions. This can moreover occur in the absence of 
actual observable conflict, which may be successfully averted – 
though there remains here an implicit reference to potential 
conflict. The potential may never be actualised. What one may 
have here is a latent conflict between the interest of those 
exercising the power and the real interests of those they exclude. 
The latter may not express or even be conscious of their 
interests…’34  
 
The third radical view despite its difficulties in application allows the language of 
power to be applied to certain relevant situations where power is more pervasive and 
less easily identifiable. Broadly speaking he points out that:  
 ‘A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does 
not want to do , but he also exercises over him by influencing, 
shaping or determining his very wants. Indeed is it not the 
supreme exercise of power to get another or other to have the 
desires you want them to have- that is to secure compliance by 
controlling their thoughts and desires.’35   
 
Therefore for Lukes actions as well as inactions show power. He highlights certain 
examples such as where the consequence of inaction may lead to a further non-event 
of a political issue. He cites the case of Crenson’s analysis of US Steel. 
 Crenson in his case study concluded that US Steel which had built Gary and was 
responsible for its prosperity had for a long time effectively prevented the issue of 
pollution from even being raised through its power reputation operating on 
anticipated reactions and then for a number of years thwarted attempts to raise the 
                                                 
34 Lukes 1974 (n 14) 24 
35 Lukes 1974 (n 14) 23 
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issue and finally decisively influenced the content of the anti-pollution ordinance 
enacted. Crenson pointed out that: 
‘US Steel exercised influence from outside the range of observable 
political … behaviour though the corporation seldom directly 
intervened directly in the deliberations of the town’s air pollution 
policymakers, it was nevertheless able to affect their scope and 
direction.’36  
This analysis also answered questions for him about why many cities and towns in 
the United States delayed or failed to make a pollution issue of their air pollution 
problems. This third view also affirms that ‘unconsciousness’, disinclination or 
omission can be another variant of inaction. 37 
In this category, a relevant example is that of a drug company which markets a 
dangerous drug. Lukes points out that the allegation that power is being exercised 
cannot be refuted by merely showing  that the company’s scientists and managers 
did not know the drug’s effects were dangerous where they could have taken steps to 
find out.’38 Power therefore can manifest in many forms. While it is not always 
important that the powerful actor intend the consequences of his action, they need to 
be aware of their power.  
This may seem a far-fetched notion of power but it is decidedly relevant to the 
relationship between society and large corporations, as it is undeniable that these 
corporations have become very essential to our everyday life and thinking. As 
Monks and Minnow highlight, corporations are such a pervasive element in everyday 
life that it is difficult to step back far enough to see them clearly.39It is perhaps best 
                                                 
36 Lukes  1974 (n 14) 42 & 51 
37 He deals with a three-way split [a] one may be unaware of what is held to be the ‘real’ motive or 
meaning of one’s action or [b] one may be unaware of the consequences of one’s action or [c] one 
may be unaware of how others interpret one’s action. The example highlighted deals with scenarios 
from the third group. 
38 Lukes  1974 (n 14)  52 
39  R A G Monks and N Minow Corporate Governance (3rd ed. Blackwell, Oxford 2004)  14 
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described by Hertz in her use of the apt title ‘the silent takeover’, when analysing the 
new global relations involving multinational corporations.40 
 This also ties in with the Galbraith classification of power into three types: condign, 
compensatory and conditioned power.41 The first two types, condign power and 
compensatory power are visible and objective. Condign power involves the use of 
physical force and sanction while compensatory power involves the use of 
inducement and incentive. However he describes the third type conditioned power as 
follows: 
 ‘Conditioned power, in contrast, is exercised by changing belief. 
Persuasion, education, or the social commitment to what seems 
natural, proper or right causes the individual to submit to the will 
of another or of others. The submission reflects the preferred 
course; the fact of submission is not recognised.’’42  
 
This implies that this type of power can be applied in a very subtle sense to 
manipulate and create preferences. Again these preferences are not necessarily 
wrong or evil but the capacity to influence is in itself power. In this sense, the media 
can be referred to as powerful in so much as they can change public opinion. Perhaps 
this view of power becomes less radical in view of examples that follow on modes of 
power.  Nonetheless it can be deduced that power is a capacity which may be overt 
or covert, exercised or unexercised, evidenced by action or omission. This capacity 
to affect others will include influence as well as compulsion. 
                                                 
40 N Hertz The Silent Takeover: Global Capitalism and the death of democracy ( Heinemann  London 
2001) 
41 J K Galbraith ‘Power and Organisation’ in S. Lukes [ed.] Power - Readings in Political Philosophy 
(1986, Basil Blackwell, Oxford)  211-228 see also See J K Galbraith The Anatomy of Power 
(Houghton Miflin, Boston 1983) 24  
42 Ibid at 214 
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3.2.3 Modes of Power 
 
 
Power is often classified in different modes or types.  However the most important 
classification of modes of power when dealing with MNC can be found in the works 
from the International Political Economy (IPE) field. Strange who is one of the 
foremost writers on this issue in this field refers to the two modes of power as: 
relational or agency power and structural power. According to Strange: 
‘The concept of relational power is clear and consists in the ability 
of A to get B by coercion or persuasion to do what B would not 
otherwise do. The concept of structural power is less clear and 
requires some definition. It consists in the ability of A to determine 
the way in which certain basic social needs are provided.’43  
 
She cites four basic societal needs, that is, security, knowledge, production and credit 
with production as the fundamental essential.44 Production has a vital role for credit, 
knowledge and even security. Beyond provision of basic societal needs structural 
power reveals an indirect and subtle way of influencing the structural system of 
society. She points out the link between the dominant position of the US in world 
affairs and the desire of multinational corporations to invest and trade in the US 
economy.45 Indeed the most interesting analogy she makes is about the use of 
knowledge as structural power. In her opinion: 
 ‘the acceptance by intellectuals in the ex-socialist countries of 
central Europe, for instance, of the idea that the less the state 
intervenes in the market economy the better, that protection of 
local firms is always against national interest, and that keeping 
inflation to a minimum is always the first priority of the central 
                                                 
43 S Strange ‘ Towards a Theory of a Transnational empire’ (1989) in R Tooze C May (eds.) Authority 
and Markets Susan Strange’s writings on International Political Economy (Palgrave Macmillan, 
Basingstoke 2002) 141-156 
44 There is considerable agreement on this; Although it has its roots as a Marxist concept 
45 Strange (n 43)  147 
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bank, is all a classic instance of power exercised through the 
knowledge structure.’46 
 
These examples of knowledge power are replicated in several countries, through the 
new and dominant ideology within foreign investment which is promoted by world 
financial institutions and these large corporations and as a result has opened access 
and afforded protection to huge markets globally.47 This not simply  a question about 
value judgements on whether this wholesale export of an ideology has been a good 
choice rather an acceptance of the fact that it  undoubtedly affords these corporations 
and institutions, power.  
Farnsworth pinpoints another method of addressing the agency-structural power 
classification.48 He points out that agency power has been employed at an 
International level to guard against the adoption or implementing of international 
policies contrary to business interests and conversely this has helped protect 
structural power which allows corporations to play states off against each other. In 
addition, agency power is played out through lobbying, institutional participation, 
sponsorship and funding of political parties as well as direct corporate social 
provision. While on the other hand, structural power is used in the control over 
investment, labour and state revenue dependency. While his focus was on the British 
                                                 
46 S Strange ‘Who governs? Networks of Power in World Society’ (1994) in R Tooze and C May(eds) 
Authority and Markets Susan Strange’s writings on International Political Economy (Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke 2002) 171-184, 176  
47 This echoes modified replication of ideas that are attributable to Gramsci’s theory of securing 
consent for hegemony. See Antonio Gramsci Selections from the Prison Notebooks (International 
Publishers, New York 1971). In one interpretation: Gramsci’s view was  that in the West it was 
ideology that constituted the mode of class rule secured by consent by means of bourgeoisie’s 
monopoly over ideological apparatuses See Lukes 2005 (n 390) at 7-9. For Analysis of Gramsci’s 
works in relation to the International Political Economy see: R W Cox ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and 
International Relations: An Essay in Method’ (1991)12 (2) Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies 162-175; J Femia ‘Gramsci’ Machiavelli and International relations’ (July 2005) 76(3) The 
Political Quarterly 341-349 
48 K Farnsworth Corporate Power and Social Policy –British welfare under the influence  (Bristol, 
Policy Press, Bristol  2004) 
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welfare economy, it holds out very vital points for our analysis for power of 
multinational corporations on the International sphere.  
These views also highlight the inter-dependency of power and structures.49 Power 
takes place within structural limits which expand and contract over time and while 
those structures determine who exercises power and how power can be exercised, yet 
the powerful can through action and influences re-shape those structures.50  Indeed 
power relations are fluid in nature and may vary over time but within the context of 
globalisation and its resulting global market economy, business interests are set to 
remain powerful for quite some time.  
To speak of Multinational corporate power is not to assume that all these 
corporations think and act in the same way but rather that there is oneness of purpose 
which is easier to identify at an international level. Farnsworth finds that ‘in some 
ways, cooperation between various business groups at an international level has 
facilitated a greater degree of cohesion than that which often emerges at the level of 
the nation state’.51 With this background on power and its manifestations, the next 
section then specifically addresses the modes of power of large oil multinational 
corporations as exemplar or central theme for CSR. 
                                                 
49 S Lukes states in his analysis of power and structure in Essays in Social Theory (London, 
Macmillan, 1977) 29 that ‘Social life can only be properly understood as a dialectic of power and 
structure, a web of possibilities for agents , whose nature is both active and structured, to make 
choices and pursue strategy within given limits that expand and contract over time.’ 
50 Farnsworth (n 48) 22 
51 Ibid at 81 
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3.3  Large MNC and Power 
 
The next step is to exemplify power by the actions or inactions of multinational 
corporations. Perceptions of power and the evidence of its significant effects on 
society has been the main trigger for calls for CSR.  The aim within this section is to 
attempt to demonstrate this power. Coleman suggests that ‘one may measure the 
power either by measuring the investments which show the power thus collected or 
by measuring the outcomes of transactions which show power in use’.52This use of 
multinational corporate power in practical terms can be classified into agency and 
structural power.  Where agency power involves the exercise of direct power and 
influence over the policy process, and structural power is more pervasive, as it 
involves ‘power to influence without taking direct action’.53  
The analysis will show the use of structural power on the one hand, for controlling 
foreign direct investment, trade and its influence in dealings with the state and on the 
other hand, the use of agency power for participation, lobbying and funding.  
Farnsworth points out that business does not always desire to influence all forms of 
policy-making and that where and how such corporations act depends on policy 
areas and the prevailing political context54, but the crucial issue for multinational 
corporations is that they demonstrate a capacity to exercise significant power. In 
several instances this capacity is reflected in actual exercise of power which can be 
detrimental or beneficial. 
                                                 
52 J S Coleman  ‘Reply to Hayduk’ (1976) 41(6) American Sociological Review 1080-1082, 1081 
53 Farnsworth (n 48) 1-8, 6 
54 Farnsworth (n 48) 
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Indeed the evidence suggests a significant capacity to make decisions in private with 
substantial public effects.55 This may be one reason for the substantial catalogue of 
abuses of power by multinational corporations especially in the oil and natural 
resources industry, from the involvement of ITT in US plans to overthrow the 
government of Salvador, Allende in Chile to the Bhopal tragedy, the antics of Shell 
in Nigeria, and the Enron crisis, extending to the use of slave labour in Burma, 
repression of opposition groups in Nigeria or Colombia, dangerous working 
conditions in the toy factories of Asia, intimidation of trade unionists on banana 
plantations in Costa Rica, the rights of indigenous communities threatened by a 
mining company in West Papua, to consumer’s rights abuses by manufacturers of 
baby milk and cigarettes.56  
Possession of such strategic power can be found in large multinational corporations 
and blurs the distinction between private property and public entity. This is akin to 
the assertion that ‘the attack on the public/private distinction was the result of 
widespread perception that the so-called private institutions were acquiring coercive 
power that had been formerly reserved to governments’.57 In this sense power 
acquisition, its exercise and the control of its exercise in the relationship between 
corporation and society at different levels becomes the key issue for CSR. 
                                                 
55 J E Parkinson Corporate Power and Responsibility (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993) 10 
56 See J Woodroffe, ‘Regulating Multinational Corporations in a World of Nation States’ in M K 
Addo (ed.) Human Rights Standards and the responsibility of Transnationals (Kluwer 
International,1999) 131-140, 131 
57 A Mills ‘The Private history of International Law’ (2006) 55 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 1- 50 
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The following sections will take an in-depth look at factual evidence of ‘power-in-
use’ by the large MNCs. This examination will be classed under structural power and 
agency power. Yet as we have seen these modes of power are intertwined. The 
singular most important factor, attributable to these corporations is that they make 
decisions that can significantly affect not only related parties like investors and 
employees but society and in this case global trends. Therefore as Parkinson states: 
‘the scope of significant choice open to [an actor]… his power over others is the 
power scope of his choices which affect them significantly’.58 He notes that the two 
key elements are discretion and significant effects.  Therefore these ‘companies are 
able to make choices which have important social consequences: they make private 
decisions with public results’59 
 
 The World Bank Institute (WBI) demonstrates this capacity in a significant way, 
when it posits that: 
 ‘in the era of economic globalisation, political transition and 
technological transformation, rapid changes are taking place which 
are bringing more than three billion people into economies 
operating on market principles. The private sector is the main 
engine of growth and development something which has raised a 
number of new and fundamental questions about the role of the 
private sector in sustainable development, in particular for 
multinational companies….’60 
 
Indeed the bottom-line in global affairs is that large multinational corporations 
possess significant power. 
                                                 
58 Parkinson (n 55) quoting C Kaysen, ‘The Corporation: How Much Power? What Scope?’ in E. S. 
Mason (ed.), The Corporation In Modern Society (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1959) at 85 
59  Parkinson (n 55) 10 
60 See document: CSR Main concepts World Bank Institute Section on CSR 
 <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/corpgov/csr/pdf/csr_mainconcepts.pdf> accessed 10 December 
2008          
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3.3.1 MNC and Structural Power 
 
The context of globalisation is where the large multinational corporations have 
become structurally powerful.  Globalisation is the process of opening up of states 
and national markets to create more global interaction and inter-dependency. This 
process began with the gradual global adoption of the market economy as the 
successful economic model and then subsequent global integration as a consequence 
of a major ideological shift among states towards capitalism.61  
‘National and international economic policies shifted sharply in the 1970s and 1980s 
towards more reliance on the market—diminishing the role of the state.’62This was 
further facilitated by the end of the cold war between 1989-1991 with the fall of the 
Berlin wall and the collapse of the Soviet republic. Since this time, huge merit has 
been placed on the opening up of national markets of goods and services to foreign 
investment by multinational corporations through liberalisation and privatisation.63 
Dunning points out that: 
 ‘the current round of globalisation,…can be traced back to the fall 
of the Berlin wall in 1989; to the renaissance of market economies, 
spearheaded by Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom and 
Ronald Reagan in the United States.  Also to the emergence of new 
wave technological advances that culminated in the global embrace 
of e-commerce in the late 1990’s; inter-alia it has been fashioned 
by a widening and deepening of all forms of international business 
                                                 
61 The ideological perspective of states before this time could easily be categorised into eastern bloc 
with its socialism ideas and the western bloc with capitalist ideas. 
62 This was ‘ driven by technocrats [and] the changes were strongly supported by the International 
Monetary Fund [IMF] and World Bank financing as part of comprehensive economic reform and 
liberalisation packages. Conditions of membership in the WTO and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development [OECD] were important incentives.’ See The UNDP Human 
Development Report (HDR) 1999 Globalisation with a human face (OUP, 1999) 29 
63 ‘Growing cross-border inter-connectivity of economic activity’ J H. Dunning ‘More and yet more- 
on globalisation’ (2005) 14(2) Transnational Corporations 159 - 168 He relevantly comments that, 
‘As a result, for good (or bad), what, 60 years ago, were a collection of economically protected  states 
are now, for the most part, better regarded as inter-related parts of a global village’ 160 
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activity, especially of foreign direct investment (FDI)” (by 
multinational corporations)64.  
 
MNCs have benefited immensely from this process of globalisation.  They have 
continued to grow even bigger as a result of the increase in foreign direct investment 
and global inter-connectivity to become substantial and very powerful global 
actors.65 The UNDP Human Development Report 1999 surmises that, this trend of 
global integration and opening up of markets has been of immense benefit to 
Multinational Corporations giving them more economic power than certain states.66 
The Multinational Corporation has therefore acquired the capacity to influence the 
society through its actions in ways which affect how the society provides its basic 
needs.  
The emergence of a strong global economy had been heralded as the cure to most of 
the ills in society so emphasis was placed on states rolling back from the creation of 
a welfare state to embrace liberalisation of markets, privatisation of economic 
activity and even public services. However the success of globalisation has been 
limited in dealing with society and its problems, The effect of globalisation has left 
unevenness in its success, there are core areas of human rights, labour standards, 
environmental practices that are unsatisfactory, furthermore public services are 
failing and do not work for the world’s poor.67  This has created the necessity to hold 
                                                 
64 Ibid (words in italics are mine.) 
65. In January 2006 for example: Exxon Mobil & Shell announced record profits of £18 and £12.9 
billion respectively.  In spite of this, the state is still the only primary subject of International law 
although it is acknowledged that ultimately international rules affect the behaviour of human beings 
and may impose direct obligations such as in compliance with the International humanitarian law 
rules applicable in International armed conflict or may grant direct rights such as access to 
International adjudicatory organs without support from any home state. The situation for 
multinational enterprises under International law is unclear and therefore in need of review, they are 
aptly referred to as ‘controversial candidatures’ . See I Brownlie Principles of International Law (6th 
ed.) ( OUP, 2003)  65. 
66 See UNDP HDR 1999 (n 62) 1 
67 The World Bank (WB) in its World Development Report (WDR) 2004 admits that ‘the private 
sector if left to its devices will not achieve the level of health and education the society desires. See 
World Bank WDR 2004 Making services work for poor people (OUP/ WB, New York, 2004) 3 (Box 
2-services- a public responsibility). 
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all global actors accountable, that is, to set limits and define responsibilities for all 
actors through legitimate frameworks. To outline the structural power of large 
MNCs, the following issues will be examined: Control of foreign direct investment; 
control of trade; influence over the state; ideological control.68  
 
 
i. Foreign Direct Investment69 
Multinational Corporations (MNC) finance foreign direct investment through equity 
capital, intra-company loans and re-invested earnings.70 MNCs are sometimes 
defined in terms of foreign direct investment, Therefore a multinational or 
transnational enterprise can be defined as an ‘enterprise that engages in foreign direct 
investment and owns and controls value-adding activities in more than one 
country.’71 Whereas this may not be a wholly satisfactory definition, it highlights 
one of the most important activities of multinational corporations.72  
                                                 
68 Farnsworth concludes that the structural power of capital rests on its control over investment; the 
dependency of the state on economic success for its revenue; the asymmetrical power over labour and 
its hegemonic power. Farnsworth (n 48) 
69 In spite of the inability to conclude a multilateral agreement on investment, the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD] World Investment Report 2000 estimates that the 
number of Bilateral Investment Treaties has risen to 1,856 at the end of 1999 and these all contain 
varied levels of investor protection. (now estimated by UNCTAD as over 2000 by 2005- see N Gal-
Or ‘NAFTA chapter eleven and the implications for the FTAA: the institutionalisation of the investor 
status in public international law’ (2005) 14 (2) Transnational Corporations 129- 158.   
Newfound rights have been accorded to investors under the North American Free Trade Agreement 
Chapter 11 and the Energy Charter Treaty [both multilateral investment treaties], which permit 
investors to sue the state for violations of the treaty standards of investor protection. Liberalisation of 
Foreign Direct Investment Policy is also often conditionality in the IMF and World Bank adjustment 
programmes for developing countries, further guaranteeing open doors for MNC investment. See also 
H Ward, ‘ Corporate citizenship: International perspectives on the emerging agenda’ Conference 
Report Royal Institute of International Affairs Energy and Environment Programme June 2000 
70 See UNCTAD World Investment Report (WIR) 2005 Transnational Corporations and 
Internalization of R&D [UN, New York & Geneva,2005) p.10 
71 J H Dunning Multinational Enterprises and the global economy (Addison-Wesley Publishing Ltd, 
England 1993) 3 He also notes two distinctive features of the multinational enterprise, first that it 
organises and co-ordinates multiple value-adding activities across national boundaries and second it 
internalises the cross-border market  for the intermediate products arsing from  these activities, see p.4 
72 The relationship between multinational corporations and foreign direct investment is important but 
is not synonymous. Mira Wilkins puts it best, when she states that ‘multinational enterprises make 
foreign direct investment and carry on other tasks as well. The investment of capital flows are only 
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Foreign direct investment can be defined as: 
‘an investment involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a 
lasting interest and control by a resident entity in one economy 
(foreign direct investor or parent enterprise) in an enterprise 
resident in an economy other than that of the foreign direct investor 
(FDI enterprise or affiliate enterprise or foreign affiliate) FDI has 
three components:  Equity capital is the foreign direct investor’s 
purchase of shares of an enterprise in a country other than its own; 
Reinvested earnings comprise the direct investor’s share (in 
proportion to direct equity participation) of earnings not distributed 
as dividends by affiliates or earnings not remitted to the direct 
investor. Such retained profits are re-invested; Intra-company loans 
or intra company debt refer to short or long term borrowing and 
lending of funds between direct investors (parent enterprises) and 
affiliate enterprises.’73  
 
Foreign direct investment seen in global terms has made huge leaps, outpacing world 
output as the stock of outward FDI grew from $1.7 trillion in 1990 to $ 6.6 trillion in 
2001.74 The UNCTAD World Investment Report 2005 considers that “the universe 
of transnational corporations is large, diverse and expanding… (and) the role of 
transnational corporations in the world economy has thus continued to grow as 
reflected in the expansion of FDI stock and in the operations of affiliates.”75 
By 2011, the World Investment Report points out that  these ‘transnational 
corporations worldwide in their operations both home and abroad, generated value-
                                                                                                                                          
part of the activities of a multinational enterprise. These companies must have a business association 
with foreign operations.’ This is because there are different multinational corporations but in spite of 
the differences there is congruence in the behaviour of multinationals from different countries. See M 
Wilkins ‘European and North American Multinationals  1870-1914: Comparisms and Contrasts’ in M 
Casson Multinational Corporations (Edward Elgar, England, 1990) 541 
73 See UNCTAD WIR 2005 (n 446) 297 Dunning perceives foreign direct investment as ‘(1) The 
investment is made outside the home country of the investing country of the investing company, but 
inside the investing company. Control over the use of resources transferred remain with the investor; 
(2) It consists of a package of assets and intermediate products such as capital, technology, 
management skills, access to markets and entrepreneurship.’ This is contrasted with Portfolio or 
contractual transfer of resources as (1) Specific assets and intermediate products (e.g. capital, debt or 
equity, technology) are separately transferred between two independent economic agents through the 
modality of the market. Control over resources is relinquished by the seller to the buyer; (2) Only 
these resources are transferred. See J H Dunning (n 447) 5 
74 UNCTAD WIR 2002, TNC and Export Competitiveness (UNCTAD, Geneva, 2002) 
75 UNCTAD WIR 2005 (n 73) 13 
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added  of about $16 trillion in 2010- about a quarter of total world GDP.’76 This 
major growth in the significance of foreign direct investment can be mainly 
attributed to globalisation. The decision to invest is a private decision but with very 
important consequences.  
Przeworski and Wallerstein confirm that ‘investment decisions have public and long-
lasting consequences, they determine the future possibilities of production, 
employment and consumption for all, yet they are private decisions.’77 Several states 
in today’s global economy are without strong domestic investment as important 
markets have been opened up to foreign direct investment, therefore lending power 
to the investors. A case in point are the developing countries that have borrowed 
from the IMF and bought into the whole package of structural adjustment policies 
which include privatisation, removal of restrictions on foreign investment and trade 
barriers78 The sectors of the economy now open to business stretch from traditional 
industries such as manufacturing, financial services, commodities to former public 
services such as telecommunications, water provision, energy, hospital services and 
so on. The old narrow confine of responsibility to shareholders does not begin to 
comprehend the sphere of influence currently bestowed on business and MNC in 
particular by society.  
                                                 
76 UNCTAD WIR 2011  Non- Equity Modes of International Production and Development 
(UNCTAD, Geneva, 2011) 4 
77 A Przeworski M Wallerstein,  ‘Structural Dependence of the state on Capital’ (1988) 82(1) 
American Political Science Review 11-29, 12 
78 J Stigilitz, Globalisation and its Discontents  (London, Allen Lane, 2002) on the impact of World 
Bank and IMF on Globalisation. 
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ii. Trade 
 
 
Another aspect that demonstrates the significant corporate power is trade. 
Multinational corporations also account for an important and growing proportion of 
world trade. For instance, Dunning and Sauvant surmised that  
‘The production of the affiliates [of transnational corporations 
(TNC)] exceeds world exports; For most of the past three decades , 
FDI flows have been increasing at a higher rate than both the 
world’s gross national product and world’s exports; TNC account 
for between 25 per cent to 30 percent of the world’s gross national 
product, about three-fifths of non-agricultural trade and about 
three-quarters of the world’s stock of privately generated 
innovatory capacity; TNC employ directly some 73 million people 
or 10 percent of employment in non-agricultural activities world-
wide.’ 79 
 
They conclude that as wealth-producing institutions multinational corporations have 
played a critical role in shaping the international allocation of economic activity, the 
pace and structure of development, the ownership of resources and the capabilities 
and the distribution of income between countries.80  
Cowling and Tomlinson point to evidence of more concentration in the international 
market for commodities citing that a significant proportion of commodity market 
trade of special significance to domestic countries rests with a few large 
multinational corporations.81 They confirm that between three to six of the largest 
MNC have the following proportions of commodity trade: 85-90% for coffee; 85%-
90% for Jute, 75-80% for tin.82 Interestingly they point out that the: 
                                                 
79 J H Dunning K P Sauvant, “Transnational Corporations in the world economy” in Transnational 
Corporations and World Development (ITBP/UNCTAD publications,  1996) p. xi 
80 See ibid 
81 K. Cowling and P.R. Tomlinson, ‘Globalisation and Corporate Power’   (2005) 24(1) Contributions 
to Political Economy 33-51, 35   
82 Ibid 
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 ‘Dominant position of a few transnationals is rarely pointed out in 
the debates that revolve around access to markets in the developed 
world by the developing world. It is the governments who are 
generally seen as the villain of the piece, when it is likely that the 
power of corporate giants in commodity markets is likely to be of 
similar significance in determining export earnings, and thus 
development strategies, in the developing world.’83  
 
 
If a comprehensive look is taken at the position of multinational corporations in the 
trade market, it reveals a very potent and dominant force, where generally these 
corporations account for two-thirds of world exports and approximately one-third of 
world exports intra-firm, notwithstanding sub-contracted relationships.84 This can be 
seen as cornering the market.  It is indeed ironical that in this aspect, the law will 
regard the market as competitive as long as each single unit of the corporation is 
separately incorporated or registered as a different legal person. 
The 2011 World Investment report also points out a middle ground and growing area 
of influence in the area of International Production, which is neither FDI nor trade. 
This area is referred to as ‘non-equity modes’ of production and includes newer 
forms of contractual relationships which MNC now enter for influencing production. 
This will cover contract manufacturing, services outsourcing, contract farming, 
franchising, licensing, management contracts and so on. The report points out that 
through these relationships, MNCs co-ordinate activity in their global value chains 
and influence the management of host country firms without owing equity stake in it. 
85These activities have been estimated to generate $2 trillion in sales in 2010.86 
 
                                                 
83 Cowling & Tomlinson (n 81) 
84 Ibid 
85 UNCTAD WIR 2011  (n 76) 16 
86 UNCTAD WIR 2011  (n 76) 15 
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iii. State Dependence 
 
The influence of corporations over the state in the light of globalisation is in line 
with the status as a significant economic power.87 This is important because states 
remain the only full-fledged recognised actor in International law. Traditionally the 
state depends on taxation for revenues. Taxation of business is supposed to be a 
major income earner. There is disputed evidence to show lower taxation in light of 
globalisation and the competition to create adequate and attractive investment 
climates. 88 
Problems also arise when the bargaining power of these corporations are enhanced 
by the competition between states for foreign investment89 These corporations have 
an integrated structure of business activities with reach beyond state borders but in 
spite of the strong activity of multinational corporations on the International plane, 
they are regarded as entirely private bodies subject to the jurisdiction of the states in 
which they are located. What this does in effect is to give these corporations 
protections of a private person and the powers of a significant public international 
actor. As Muchlinski puts it there is a mismatch between, on the one hand, integrated 
character of business activities with its managerial and operational reach and the 
jurisdictional reach of the state that seeks to regulate the MNE resulting in situations 
where such regulation may be ineffective.90   
States often will not pursue policies contrary to business interests. This in itself may 
imply coercive power and when it affects policies which may be in the wider public 
                                                 
87 “The growing influence of corporate power over the state should be seen in the context of 
globalisation and as going hand-in hand with the emergence of the transnational corporation as the 
dominant business entity” See Cowling & Tomlinson (n 81) 44  
88 Farnsworth (n 48) 44; see also P Genschel, ‘Globalisation, tax competition and the state’  (2002) 30 
(2) Politics and Society 245-275; M P Deveraux, R Griffith and A Klemm ‘Corporate income tax 
reforms and international tax competition’ (2002) 17(35) Economic Policy 449-495 
89 P J Buckley M Casson  The Future of the Multinational Enterprise (Palgrave Macmillan, New York 
2002) 
90 P T  Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Blackwell, Oxford 1999) 108 
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interest. This may be perceived as regulatory capture,91but it is  best described as a 
form of conditioned power where business would like to see society make its 
decisions within a business friendly framework. Reagan puts forward the argument 
that in essence: 
 ‘corporations are not only much concerned to protect their own 
immediate legislative interests but are reaching  out in an attempt 
to create a business-orientated political and social framework 
within which all public decision-making would be constrained. 
Instead of the society channelling business decisions within the 
bounds of public interest, the corporation seek to channel public-
interest decisions within business-interest bounds.’92 
 
In this vein, Cowling and Tomlinson conclude from their research that the 
transnational base of the corporation provides it with significant leverage in 
bargaining situations.93 Such leverage can be applied against nation states since it is 
often the case that these corporations bargain with governments over measures that 
enable them to increase profits. Such measures may include the introduction and 
maintenance of favourable investment subsidies, infrastructural support, employment 
legislation and tax regimes. Since there are political rewards in attracting and 
retaining such investment, governments are often compelled to accommodate such 
measures.94 This has a spiral effect as such corporations will use this influence to 
deter policies that are detrimental to their interests; Apart from this, these 
corporations in taking decisions on the conduct of their business, can in some very 
dependent countries influence decisions on employment, revenue, production and 
this in turn instantly affect social life.  
                                                 
91 Cowling & Tomlinson (n 81) 
92 M D Reagan, The Managed Economy (New York, 1963)  129-130 cited in Parkinson  (n 55) at 21 
93 Cowling & Tomlinson (n 81) at 44 
94 Ibid Another interesting example which they raise is the reversal of US policy to ratify the 
International Kyoto protocol agreement after the election of the Bush Administration, which may be 
attributable to the fact that the Bush campaign was largely funded by the oil industry. 
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Leonard finds that MNCs in developing countries by virtue of their normal conduct 
of business, can help shape the broader social forces that influence how a 
government relates to its constituents, social forces that influence how a government 
relates to its constituents, the relationship between the elite groups, the relationships 
between the urban and rural sectors and the ability of a developing country to pursue 
autonomous development strategies.95  He accepts that one need not take a cynical 
view of corporate intentions or fall back on past legacies of sinister corporate 
conduct to conclude that multinationals have power, rather he points out that 
 ‘–by affecting a society’s capacity to control the rate, direction and 
beneficiaries of change –are a significant force in a country’s 
political development and that whether intentionally or not, the 
multinational corporation is a distinct political actor in the 
domestic politics of any state within which it operates.’96  
 
 
This power of the MNC as a significant force may be more observable in developing 
countries but it is not restricted to developing countries as for example the decision 
to outsource jobs from communities in the US to India has had a huge impact on the 
social lives of such communities both in the US and in India.97 This issue is often 
that the influence or impact though easily felt is very difficult to describe in tangible 
terms. In addition, the problem with the use of such power over the state lies not 
only in its effect but in the lack of such power being called to account.  
                                                 
95 H J Leonard ‘Multinational Corporations and Politics in Developing Countries’ (1980) 32(3) World 
Politics 454-483, 457 
96 Ibid 
97 To read an emotional account of the situation in West Virginia, USA; read the Shell-economist 
prize-winning essay by Claudia O’Keefe ‘The Travelling Bra Salesman’s Lesson’  
www.shelleconomistprize.com (published The Economist 17th November, 2004) 
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iv. Ideological Influence 
 
A final aspect of the evidence of structural power can be found in the subtle use of 
ideological influence. This is sometimes referred to as hegemonial power and can be 
traced to the writings of Marxists and Lindblom. An Italian Marxist, Gramsci 
brought this aspect of power to the fore in his writings.98 In one preferred 
interpretation of his work, he sees culture and ideology as means of class rule 
secured by consent. The issues he points out at that time are particularly relevant 
today.  
Our society reinforces our view of business with pro-business ideology and this 
strengthens the power of business. Then business through advertising and marketing 
can shape consumer preferences. In the context of globalisation, business has been 
nominated as the vehicle of choice for greater prosperity. Conventional wisdom in 
society teaches that business is the best way. This in turn makes us turn to business 
for advice and solution.  
Lindblom sees it this way; ‘businessmen achieve indoctrination of citizens so that 
citizens serve not their own interests but the interests of businessmen. Citizens 
become allies of businessmen’.99 However this is not a brain-washing process, 
individuals give tacit consent because there is no viable alternative. Indeed to 
become independent of the influence of MNC in daily life is very difficult in most 
                                                 
98 A Gramsci Selections from the Prison Notebooks  (International Publishers, New York 1971). In 
one interpretation: Gramsci’s view was  that in the West it was ideology that constituted the mode of 
class rule secured by consent by means of bourgeoisie’s monopoly over ideological apparatuses See 
Lukes 2005 (n 390) at 7-9. For Analysis of Gramsci’s works in relation to the International Political 
Economy see: R W Cox ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method’ 
(1991) 12 (2) Millennium: Journal of International Studies 162-175; J Femia ‘Gramsci’ Machiavelli 
and International relations’ (July 2005) 76(3) The Political Quarterly 341-349 There are many 
interpretations of Gramsci’s work. 
99C E Lindblom  Politics and Markets (Basic Books, New York 1977) 202 
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countries of the world. They have a stake in your energy supply, food, household 
goods and so on. Galbraith in his work puts forward a probable picture of a corporate 
system that is able to create demand for particular goods and also shape prevailing 
social values.100  
Strange also points out that production is the basic and fundamental essential 
requirement of society because she makes the point that ‘who or what provides for 
these needs in society enjoys structural power through the capacity to determine the 
terms on which those needs are satisfied and to whom they are made available.’101 
MNCs through foreign direct investment, trade and even new non-equity modes of 
International production have a substantial say in determining the production needs 
of society. The section on trade has demonstrated that these corporations control a 
huge proportion of production directly. Production and its link to finance has become 
a driving force in most economies in the world. It determines the sort of knowledge 
the population can acquire by advertising and marketing but especially through 
funding in research and development of newer technologies or sciences such as in 
pharmaceutical drugs. It also has strong links with credit.   
Interestingly, the IMF World Economic Outlook in 2006102 after examining a trend 
pointed out that the corporate sector of the G-7 countries has moved from being a net 
borrower to a substantial net saver and that this coupled with the earlier move by 
emerging market countries to a net saver status following the financial crisis of the 
late 1990s’, have substantially altered the financial landscape of the global economy 
concluding that ‘these changes in behaviour are one factor behind the relatively low 
                                                 
100 J K Galbraith, The New Industrial State (2ed. Harmondsworth, 1972) 217 cited in Parkinson (n 55)  
15 
101 Strange (n 43) 145 
102 IMF, World Economic and Financial surveys , World Economic Outlook, 2006, Globalisation & 
Inflation (IMF, Washington 2006)  153 
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level of global long-term interest rates at present’.103 This statement substantiates the 
view that the behaviour of these corporations affects global saving significantly and 
in turn affects society, in this case with relatively low level interest rates. There is 
also a link between finance and security. Funding and capital generation is often 
necessary for security.104 
This is further evidenced by the 2008 financial crisis and the drive for restored 
capital generation.105 Questions raised by the crisis have not forced a re-think on the 
role of global business rather it appears to have reinforced the idea of business and 
capital generation as key to development and success. There is a perception of the 
lack of ideological options. The MNC ability to influence is strong enough to 
significantly affect the society or state within which it is located by virtue of its 
unique multinational position and economic strength therefore it should be regarded 
as having substantial structural power. 106 
                                                 
103 Ibid 
104  However there is a converse side to this, as insecurity breeds unproductiveness, which cripples 
economies and breeds yet more instability. 
105 J Reed ‘Corporate Governance: Lessons from the Financial Crisis’ OECD Observer No. 273 June 
2009 
106 Parkinson (n 55)  defines this as the ability to influence governmental policy and law-making see 
p.19 
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3.3.2 MNCs and Agency Power 
 
 
Another mode of power is Agency power. This refers to more direct forms of power 
and will fall within the earlier two views of power in Lukes’ model. Agency power 
in this section examines ways in which multinational corporations directly 
participate in the affairs of the state. This type of power is less obvious at a national 
level in view of the substantial structural power in the corporations favour but it can 
be better demonstrated at the International level.107The issues that will be analysed 
include direct participation in International affairs, lobbying and sponsorship 
/funding. 
 
i. Direct Participation and Action in International Affairs 
 
 
In spite of the fact that International law has little or no recognition of non-state 
actors,108especially as MNCs do not have a single international legal personality but 
they are nevertheless active at the International level. Some of the key organisations 
who represent strategic business interests, such as the International chamber of 
commerce (ICC), the World Economic Forum (WEF) and the World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) have consultative status with the 
UN Economic and Social Council.109In the case of the ICC, this status was gained in 
                                                 
107  Farnsworth (n 48) 59 
108 The focus is on states but the Reparations case showed UN as International organisation with 
limited recognition, the International Criminal courts, do deal with individuals and there is a 
recognition of the rights of peoples to self-determination  
109 List of non-governmental organisations with consultative status with the Economic and Social 
Council as of 18th September 2008 E/2008/INF/5 
< http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/pdf/INF_List.pdf> accessed 10 March 2011  
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1946.110The notion of the consultative status has its foundation in Article 71of 
Chapter X of the UN charter, which permits engagement of the ECOSOC with non-
governmental organisations.111This is however not contentious involvement as the 
ECOSOC engagement with non-governmental organisations is wide-ranging 
involving other types of non-governmental organisation  
However the specific impact of corporate power on the International level has 
prompted the drive to assign formal responsibilities, a drive which the corporations 
have so far successfully opposed. This is mirrored by the failure of the Draft UN 
code of conduct for Transnational Corporations which had been drafted by the then 
UN Commission on Transnational Corporations in 1982112 and the vehement 
opposition to the Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations 
and other Business Enterprises with regard to Human rights as this was intended to 
be a set of binding principles drafted in 2004 by the sub-commission of the then UN 
Commission on Human Rights.113  
The MNCs were directly involved through the ICC in opposing the norms and its 
binding nature at the International Level.114 This failure resulted in the UN 
Secretary-General’s appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary 
General on human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises to make recommendations of a non-binding nature. 115 
                                                 
110 Ibid 
111 ‘The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-
governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such 
arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national 
organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned.’ 
112 Muchlinski (n 90) 
113 T Sorrell ‘UN Norms’ in J Dine A Fagan Human Rights and Capitalism: A Multidisciplinary 
Perspective on Globalisation  (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2006) 284-299 
114 Ibid 
115 UN, The UN ‘Protect, Remedy and Respect Framework for Business and Human Rights- 
Background’ September 2010 <http://198.170.85.29/Ruggie-protect-respect-remedy-framework.pdf> 
accessed 10 March 2011 
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The evidence of impact and power can also be demonstrated in the key areas of 
global governance of trade and investment. This impact is visible in the privileging 
of private interests on a global level on in these key areas. This can be seen in the use 
of WTO law by the US and the EU through s. 301 of the Trade Act and the EC under 
the trade barrier regulation to permit some private entities to invoke WTO law at the 
national level.116On this issue Shaffer speaks of the blurring of public and private 
interests pointing out that ‘...private firms collate with governmental authorities in 
the US and the EU to challenge foreign trade barriers before the WTO legal system 
and within its shadow.’117 
 In the area of specific investment, the investment agreements give MNCs in their 
role as investors’ access to arbitration for the defence of their protected rights of non-
discrimination or other relevant aspects of the treaty. This thereby enables them to 
use the procedure of arbitration to override state law.118 This is driven by a dominant 
philosophy which sees the corporate instrument as overwhelmingly useful. Hurst 
points out that: ‘we treated the corporate instrument as so useful for desired 
economic growth as to warrant using law to make it available on terms responsive to 
the businessman’s needs and wishes.’119  
These tri-lateral and bi-lateral investment agreements are signed by states to attract 
foreign investment and there has been a huge surge in the numbers signed. 
                                                                                                                                          
 
116 G C Shaffer Defending Interests: Public-private partnerships in WTO litigation  (Brookings 
Washington 2003) 3 
117 Ibid at 5 He also notes that ‘...the reaction of private parties throughout the world in opposition to 
or support of the WTO system and its stream of legal complaints and verdicts is just one indication of 
WTO law’s relevance to the states and its constituents.’ 4 
118 G Van Harten  Investment Treaty Obligations and Public law (OUP, Oxford 2007) 
119 J W Hurst The Legitimacy of business in the Law of the United States 1780-1970 (University of 
Virginia Press Charlottesville 1970) 62 
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  Newcombe and Paradell in their study of investment treaties give the following 
estimation: 
‘By the end of 2006, this network comprised of some 2573 
bilateral investment treaties and 241 bi-lateral and trilateral free 
trade and investment agreements. The network also includes a 
number of regional and sectoral agreements that include 
investment protection provision notably NAFTA, The ECT and 
Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment area. In 
addition there is a network of 2,651 double taxation treaties.’ 120 
 
The driving force behind this is corporate power both from an ideological stand point 
and from the capability perspective. It ties in with the global trends where 
governments are committed to ideals of liberalisation and enhancing international 
flow of goods, services and investment therefore making foreign investment a key 
resource for state funds.121 
A further indication of corporate power and the influence is the existence of tax 
havens which create a bargaining environment for MNC. These tax havens can be 
viewed as jurisdictions which minimise taxes and reduce or eliminate other 
restriction on business operations.122 The desire to offer privileges and to make your 
jurisdiction attractive to foreign investment can lead to commercialisation of 
sovereignty.123Palan points out that corporation were given the opportunity to spread 
themselves to different localities and they went shopping for the jurisdictions that 
offered the best arrangement and through this commercial sovereignty has spread.124  
This highlights the strength and bargaining position of corporations in global affairs.  
                                                 
120 A Newcombe L Paradell Law and Practice of Investment Treaties (Kluwer Law International, 
Netherlands 2009) 57-58; In 2011 the UNCTAD WIR (n 76) point out that this regime of 
International Investment Agreements is now close to 6,000 treaties with many on-going negotiations 
and multiple dispute-settlement mechanisms p ix 
121 Ibid at 48 
122 R Palan ‘Tax havens and the Commercialisation of State Sovereignty’ (2002) 51(1) International 
Organisations 151-176, 154 
123 Ibid 
124 Palan (n 122) 172 
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 This has also resulted in a different drive to engage with the corporations on their 
own voluntary terms. A good example of this is the UN Global Compact (UNGC) 
which was suggested at the World Economic Forum, Davos in 1999.125 The UNGC 
is a drive for these corporations to join UN agencies, labour and civil society in the 
promotion of ten core principles of human rights, labour, the environment and anti-
corruption. It demonstrates the current indispensability of multinational corporations 
from the success of any global agenda. 
The former Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan pointed out that: 
‘we have to choose between a global market driven only by 
calculations of short-term profit and one which has a human face; 
between a world which condemns a quarter of the human race to 
starvation and squalor and one which offers everyone at least a 
chance of prosperity, in a healthy environment; between a selfish 
free-for-all in which we ignore the fate of the losers and a future in 
which the strong and successful accept their responsibilities 
showing global vision and leadership’126  
 
Therefore depicting that in this huge global developmental challenge, multinational 
corporations must lend their power to the endeavour.  
The question remains that for issues so fundamental should international society 
continue to cajole corporations or device productive frameworks and systems for 
legitimating such power towards CSR goals. UNCTAD in its 2011 report helpfully 
suggests that governments can maximise developments benefits deriving from CSR 
standards though appropriate policy that harmonises corporate reporting regulations, 
provides for capacity-building programmes and integrates CSR standards into 
Investment regimes.127 This suggestion can also be acted upon by other actors in 
                                                 
125 It appears to be an acknowledgement of business power; accepting that corporations cannot be 
compelled to observe fundamental rules of society and thus pleading with them at their own forum to 
re-consider. see the website: www.unglobalcompact.org  
126 Kofi Annan’s World Economic Forum, Davos Speech UN Press Release SG/SM/6881 1February 
1999 
127 UNCTAD WIR 2011 (n 76) 14-15 
 146 
society in constructively fashioning their engagement with corporations within the 
CSR agenda towards legitimacy objectives.128 
 
ii. Lobbying and Funding 
 
Research suggests that large corporations often have access to political platforms at 
national and international level to significantly influence policy. Sklair points out 
that ‘corporations work quite deliberately and often rather covertly as political actors 
and often have access to those at the highest levels of formal political and 
administrative power with considerable success.’129 Farnsworth indicates that large 
corporations and organisations play a major role as lobbyists and participants in the 
IMF, World Bank and WTO.130 This is also supported by the research by 
Braithwaite and Drahos showing evidence of lobbying for favourable rules on the 
international scene.131  
This could be due in part to informal links within both organisations as Stigilitz 
draws attention to the fact that the governing committee of these institutions tend to 
be finance ministers and central bankers with former links with the business 
community.132The business organisations are increasingly vocal on its policy 
preferences over certain issues: for example the Business Industry Advice Council 
(BIAC) insists that the OECD Guidelines for multinational enterprises must remain 
voluntary.133  
                                                 
128 It has been pointed out that the actualities have changed and the law is changing  See E Duruigbo 
‘Corporate Accountability and liability for International human rights abuses: recent changes and 
recurring challenges’(2008) 6(2) North-western Journal of International Human Rights 223-261 
129 L Sklair ‘ Transnational Corporations as Political actors’ (1998) 3(2)  New Political Economy 284-
287, 286 
130 Farnsworth  (n 48) 65 
131 J Braithwaite, P.Drahos Global Business Regulation ( CUP, Cambridge 2000) 
132 Stigilitz (n 78) 
133 D Lewis and S MacLeod ‘Transnational Corporations –power, responsibility and influence’ 4 (1) 
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While it is undeniable that business has a right to be heard, the underlying issue is 
that it is a powerful bloc which participates on its own terms and dictates the agenda. 
Korten in this vein, points out that ‘the corporate interest rather than the human 
interest defines the policy agendas of states and international bodies.’134Large 
business can ultimately lobby governments to influence policy. Schepers therefore 
suggests that: 
 ‘fundamental questions remain about the objectives and methods 
of business-government relations or lobbying, not least about the 
lack of coherence between CSR and lobbying, about compromise 
building between private and public interests or about innovative, 
responsible value based business-government cooperation, beyond 
the present lobbying’135 
 
 Lobbying seems stronger when teamed up with funding for example Cowling and 
Tomlinson point to the reversal of US policy to ratify the International Kyoto 
protocol agreement after the election of the Bush Administration, as a fact which 
may be attributable to the fact that the Bush campaign was largely funded by the oil 
industry.136Funding to think-tanks and research institutes is used to bolster its way of 
thinking and foist that onto the political arena.  
The work of the Institute of Economic Affairs and the Centre for Policy Studies are 
given as examples for developing and fostering neo-liberal ideas in the 1980s.137 
Shamir in his work, also points to the establishment of corporate-sponsored and 
corporate-oriented NGOs as a form of hegemony (corporate power) in the CSR 
field.138  
                                                                                                                                          
Global Social Policy 77-98, 81 
134 D Korten When Corporations rule the world (Kumarian, London 1995) 54 
135 S Schepers ‘Business-government relations: beyond lobbying’ (2008) 10(4)Corporate Governance 
475-483, 478 
136 Cowling & Tomlinson ( n 81) 
137 R  Desai ‘Second-hand dealers in ideas: think-tanks and Thatcherite hegemony’ (Jan/Feb 1994) 
203 New Left Review 27-64 cited  in Farnsworth (n 48) at 12 
138 R Shamir ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: A case of hegemony and counter-hegemony’ in B De 
Sousa Santos C A Rodriguez-Garavito (eds.), Law and Globalisation from below – towards a 
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It is evident that in carrying out action at the International level, the large 
multinational corporations use a variety of tactics which add to our perception of its 
agency power. Sands’ confirms this position when he points out that: 
‘Deregulating international flows, promoting private investment 
overseas and increasing global trade have greatly extended the 
international role of private and corporate sectors. Not surprisingly, 
these players are not content with a backseat role in the making and 
applying of International law. They want to influence the content 
of the rules and contribute to its enforcement. They do so by 
pressuring governments and increasingly participating directly in 
International treaty negotiations.’139 
 
 The evidence in this section exemplifies corporate power of MNC in a generalised 
manner but the next section focuses on the specific example of oil industry 
multinationals to reveal the direct link between activities and incidents showing 
corporate power and the demands for CSR. 
                                                                                                                                          
cosmopolitan legality (CUP, Cambridge 2005) 92-117,95 
139 P Sands  Lawless World  (Penguin, London 2006) 19 
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3.4 Multinational Power and CSR Demands: The Oil Industry example 
 
3.4.1 The Context for Structural and Agency Power 
 
The large MNCs in the oil industry are a good basis for exemplifying the link 
between corporate power and CSR demands and response because they are typical 
examples of global international corporations who can be viewed cross-nationally 
and they are also significantly involved in documented incidents which have 
triggered CSR debates and response.140The oil industry context is also an ideal CSR 
example because of its social importance and interesting social history. 
This social importance is evidenced by the utilisation of the crude oil product as the 
main source of energy for the developed and developing world. The by-products of 
crude oil such as petrol, diesel,  Petrochemicals, lubricants, bitumen, liquefied 
petroleum gas (LPG) provide the backbone for modern life by enabling activities 
such as heating, lighting, transportation and even the making of perfumes and 
insecticides. The oil industry has been heavily associated with development and 
industrialisation. The World Energy Outlook 2007 concludes that oil is still the 
dominant source of energy and will remain so for the foreseeable future. 
 
                                                 
140 This response can be deduced from among other things the significant growth in corporate code of 
conduct and social reporting P Utting K Ives ‘the Politics of Corporate Responsibility and the Oil 
Industry’ (2006) 2 (1) St Anthony’s International Review (STAIR) 11-34, 12; However other 
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 The report states that ‘Fossil fuels (including oil) remain the dominant source of 
energy accounting for 84% of the overall increase in demand between 2005- 
2030’141 This increase in demand is  attributed mainly to the increasing development 
of hitherto developing countries such as China and India. While it may be desirable 
to develop other sources of energy such as solar, wind, hydro or other renewable, 
these alternative sources currently accounts for a very small percentage of overall 
energy generated globally and this is likely to remain the case for the foreseeable 
future.  When examining international trade in energy and energy demand, oil is the 
major product and this accounts for the sheer size of investments and profits made in 
this industry. This is indicative of the dominant structural power which foreign 
investment in this sector can have. 
The top 10 corporations in the world by profit142 include the large multinational oil 
corporations such as ExxonMobil, Shell, BP, Chevron and Total. They are 
consistently ranked in the top 100 multinational corporations and although there has 
been a slight upsurge in state-owned companies operating successfully in the oil 
industry, the biggest corporations are still the multinational oil corporations.   
However the oil industry is also an industry that has had a troubled social history and 
reputation especially because of perceived linkages with state and state dependence 
on oil investment. For as a historian notes ‘in the 20th century, battles and even 
whole wars have been fought over the ownership of oil, and have been won or lost 
through possession or lack of it.’143 This chequered social history is in part 
accountable to the variety of factors surrounding oil exploration and production. 
These factors often trigger tensions between society and producing corporation at 
                                                 
141 International Energy Agency  (IEA)World Energy Outlook (IEA, Paris 2007)  4 
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2000_Prof.html > assessed 14 March 2009 
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different levels. These underlying factors include questions of location and 
ownership of oil resources, the finiteness of oil as a natural resource and its 
relationship with demand, questions of energy security, problems with host 
communities, questions associated with oil development such as potential pollution 
of the environment and the industry’s complicity in human rights violations. These 
issues have direct bearing on CSR as they go to the core issue of the relationship 
between business and society at different levels: international, national and local.  
The nature of oil as a naturally occurring deposit means that it is unevenly 
distributed globally. Oil reserves are mostly located in developing countries and in 
some volatile parts of the world. 144 Large reserves exist within the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab 
Emirates, Iraq, Iran, Venezuela and Nigeria as well as non-members such as Russia, 
Canada, Mexico and USA; however the bulk of actual oil production is sourced from 
the OPEC countries and Russia.145  
This partially accounts for the overriding perception that demand is located in 
western developed countries and supply obtained from developing countries raising 
questions of exploitation especially as exploration occurs under underdeveloped 
legal regimes and frameworks of regulation which are open to exploitation by the oil 
corporations. The plausible defence being that one abides by the law yet not 
revealing whether there are any relevant or enforceable laws.  
This is in addition to the fact that the high demand makes questions of ownership of 
crude oil resources very vital, as ownership becomes a source of major revenues. 
                                                 
144 Although this volatility is often a result of the presence of oil; a commodity which is in high 
demand 
145 US Energy Information Administration 
 <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/reserves.html> assessed 31 March 2009.This accounts 
for the perceived leverage OPEC is assumed to have over oil prices. 
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146As a result within most oil producing states, the ownership of mineral resources 
including oil is often vested in the state. The notable exceptions are the USA and 
Canada, where there is substantial private, provincial and internal state ownership of 
mineral resources.147 For example: Article 27 of the Mexican constitution  states that 
the nation has direct ownership of all minerals or substances that constitute deposits 
whose character is distinct from the components of the soil...beds of precious stones, 
combustible solid minerals, petroleum and all solid, liquid and gaseous 
hydrocarbons.148 Section 1 of the Nigerian Petroleum Act 1969 vests the entire 
ownership and control of all petroleum in and under any lands in the state.149  
This is often problematic for federations of states or states with indigenous people. 
Where the land is inhabited by local communities or indigenous people and the land 
has to be compulsorily acquired by the state and compensation is paid. In this sense, 
there are issues with both the process and the substantive loss of land.  
This process raises several issues with regards to local communities, the consultative 
procedure and adequacy of compensation. Particularly for indigenous people there 
are additional issues to do with the substantive loss of ancestral land. In their case, 
there is often an irreplaceable attachment to land and a designated way of life. This is 
further exacerbated where the indigenous peoples and local communities do not have 
legal ownership. They are reliant on the state and the corporation for social 
responsibility in the development of the resources, peaceful co-existence and 
maintenance of the local environment. In this instance the corporation which seeks to 
obtain development rights will often deal directly with the state government with 
whom it may have significant influence. The state government then compulsorily 
                                                 
146 This includes questions of ownership of land and ownership of the resources underneath the land. 
147 E E Smith ‘Ownership of Mineral Rights’ in E E Smith  and others (eds.) International Petroleum 
Transactions (RMMLF, Denver, 2000) 203-337, 248 
148  Ibid at 270 
149 Chapter 350 Laws of the federation of Nigeria 1990 
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acquires the land and pays some form of compensation but the corporation must 
operate in the environment with the disenchanted local community. This gives rise to 
questions about a social ‘licence to operate’.150  
This disenchantment and dissatisfaction can give rise to social upheaval especially 
where the operations affect the way of life of the people. For example, dissatisfaction 
with compensation payments for the acquisition of oil fields has been cited as a 
contributory factor to the volatility within the Niger-Delta, oil producing regions of 
Nigeria.151 The host communities are often rural populations and the developmental 
impact of oil is most harshly felt. Often identified as a ‘resource curse’ the income 
from production of oil is diverted to an unaccountable government and a very 
profitable corporation and the resulting focus is on oil revenues for the corporation 
and state with little consideration for host community welfare.152In some countries, 
the state and corporations are alleged to be complicit in human rights violations in 
furtherance of the oil production objective.153 There is also evidence of the use of 
significantly lower standards of operation in developing countries which results in 
environmental pollution.154 
Nevertheless the search for more oil sources is almost inevitable as the finite nature 
of oil creates fear of the depletion of current stocks and demands a continued search 
for more resources, since it is vital to the functioning of many countries, any 
perceived threat to supply or increase in demand is often reflected in occasional oil 
price increases and this conversely drives the increased search for more oil sources 
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and production almost at all costs. New potential exploration sites include Tar Sands 
in Canada and further exploration in Alaska. Although these are often very fragile 
ecological systems and for the tar sands are home to an indigenous population, the 
necessity for the product is almost overriding.155   
Problems in the oil industry are long-standing but with the onset of globalisation, 
these problems plaguing the oil industry have been exacerbated by the widespread 
publicity. The effect of such publicity has been two-fold; firstly it has allowed 
several critical cases of misconduct in the industry to come to the attention of world-
wide audiences. This is exemplified by the publicity surrounding the Shell Brent 
Spar, the Shell Ogoni crisis, the oil spill of Exxon Valdez, the problems of BP in 
Colombia and Texaco in Ecuador156  
On the other hand, the corporations have been able to respond with use of same 
communicative and publicity medium and publicise responses in the form of reports 
as well as new remedial action in the form of codes and audits. However this action 
also indicates corporate ideological influence as the preponderance of corporate 
practice and activity has been geared towards propounding a CSR that is integrally 
‘voluntary, non-enforceable and self-regulatory’.157 This has left corporations open 
to the charge of de-radicalizing CSR. 158 
Since the events of the 1990s the oil industry has been proclaimed a forerunner in the 
CSR field however this has not always been the case.159 The industry had been 
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forced to confront CSR by a series of ‘critical incidents’160 that exposed the level of 
impact that the actions of oil MNC could have on society. This included impact on 
local communities, environment, issues of human rights, labour rights and so on. 
These critical incidents caused oil MNC to confront the public impact of their 
wrongful action or inaction and brought the issue of CSR to the fore.  
Therefore as Watts points out, the major challenges to the international petroleum 
industry come from fast and fundamental changes in the global economic, social and 
political arenas.161 In the 1990s, changing attitudes and expectations resulting from 
the evidence of the impact of corporate action spread around and publicised easily in 
the emerging era of unprecedented global mobile communications and the internet. 
This caused a focus on corporate impact and demand for CSR.  
In the oil industry some of the critical incidents that caused a focus on corporate 
impact include: The dual problems of Shell with the Brent Spar and Ogoni in 
Nigeria, the BP climate change campaign and safety incidents and the Exxon Valdez 
spill in 1989 which highlighted the environmental effect of oil spills.  Shell, Exxon-
Mobil and BP are ranked 2, 3 & 4 on the 2011 CNN Fortune 500 world’s largest 
corporations.162These critical incidents will be examined in some detail as they 
indicate examples of complicity in governance, state dependence, foreign 
investment, ideological influence, wrongful action and so on as indicators of 
structural and agency power.  
 
                                                 
160 T I Vaaland and M Heide ‘Managing Corporate Social responsibility: Lessons from the oil 
industry’(2008) 13(2) Corporate Communications: An International Journal 212-225 They point out 
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(e.g. actions to handles critical incidents) and resources (e.g. internal ethical reporting’) 
161 P Watts ‘The international petroleum industry: economic actor or social activist’ in J V Mitchell 
Companies in a World of Conflict (Earthscan /RIIA, 1998) 23-31, 23 
162 See <http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2011/index.html> accessed 10 
September 2011  
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3.4.2 SHELL 
 
 
Royal Dutch Shell had two major critical incidents that have significantly influenced 
the demand for CSR and Shell’s consequential response. These incidents are the 
Shell Nigeria crisis and the Shell Brent Spar incident. This is confirmed by Shell the 
first Shell Sustainability Report titled ‘Profits and Principles – Does there have to be 
a choice?’ in 1998.163 In this report, Shell states that:  
 ‘Multinationals have been criticised as being overly concerned 
with profit and failing to take their broader responsibilities 
seriously: to defend human rights, to protect the environment and 
to be a good corporate citizen...we were all shaken by the tragic 
execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight Ogonis by the Nigerian 
authorities; we were ill-prepared for the public reaction to plans to 
dispose of the Brent Spar off-shore storage buoy in deep water in 
the Atlantic’.164  
 
These critical incidents forced focus on corporate power and impact on society and 
environment and triggered a period of re-evaluation that resulted in increased CSR 
activity. The first incident involved the Brent Spar was a North Sea oil storage and 
tanker loading buoy operated by Shell. This facility was no longer in use and had to 
be decommissioned or disposed of. The options available to Shell were deep-sea 
disposal or on-shore dismantling. Shell proposed deep sea disposal and they had 
been granted the UK licence permitting such disposal.  This came to the attention of 
environmental activists, Greenpeace activists who saw this as wrongful impact on 
the environment. In 1995 they occupied this facility in protest and in a bid to stop 
such disposal. This intended action was then publicised and this sparked protests 
from the public against Shell across Europe and resulted in the decline of sales. Shell 
                                                 
163 Shell Sustainability Report 1998 Profits and Principles (Shell, 1998) 
 <http://sustainabilityreport.shell.com/2010/servicepages/previous/files/shell_report_1998.pdf> 
accessed 10 March 2010   
164 Ibid at 4 
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facing huge onslaught of public outcry, falling share price and consumer boycotts 
decided to dismantle onshore.165  
Also around the same period, Shell’s operations in Nigeria were embroiled in human 
rights and environmental controversy.166 Shell has been in Nigeria for over 70 
years.167 It first gained an oil exploration licence as Shell D’Arcy in 1938 and 
discovered a commercial well in Oloibiri in 1956.168  Shell was accused of 
complicity in human rights abuses, environmental pollution and severely criticised 
for its actions and inaction at crucial times during the crisis in the Niger-delta leading 
up to the trial and execution of the ‘Ogoni 9’169 under the then Military dictator and 
president of Nigeria.  
 Manby of the Human Rights Watch pointed out that international attention was 
centred on Shell Nigeria for three major reasons: It was the biggest and longest-
standing oil producer in Nigeria, Shell facilities were onshore and therefore directly 
exposed to community protests, It was the main target of Movement for the Survival 
of Ogoni People (MOSOP) which accused the company of complicity in the alleged 
genocide of the Ogoni people. 170Other non-governmental organisation point out that 
although Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa, 95% of the Nigerian oil and 
gas production is carried out by Shell, Exxon Mobil, Chevron, Agip and Total-Elf-
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Fina – The Big five MNC.171 This is done through joint ventures where they are 
operators although they hold minority shareholding.172 
Shell after these events commenced a review of its actions proposing the CSR 
question in its first report:  
‘Clearly the forces of globalisation, rapid improvements in 
technology and dramatic changes in world order have caused 
considerable confusion over exactly what is and is not – expected 
of business. Should it play a bigger role in society, by providing 
infrastructure and social services where government does not and 
the face accusations that it is interfering or buying influence? Or 
should it concentrate on what it does best: serving its customer and 
getting best return for shareholders?’173 
 
This affirms the core issue of CSR, which is that the significant increase in corporate 
power as a result of globalisation is prompting questions in different areas of the 
world about the role of the corporation and its legitimacy. Shell in response 
published its ‘General Business Principles’ where it accepted wider responsibilities 
to five areas which include shareholders, customers, employees, business partners 
and society.174 Since then it has embarked on several CSR initiatives and has been 
termed in some ways a government: ‘Shell Nigeria act in some ways like a 
government, spending over $50million dollars per year in infrastructure projects, 
consulting those affected by its activity in order to ensure if not its popularity, its 
acceptance.’175  
Later it was alleged that the figures given by Greenpeace on the amount of oil left on 
the spar were inaccurate but the non-governmental organisation maintained that ‘the 
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amount of oil left on the Brent spar was never central to the campaign’176  and Shell 
has since then successfully dismantled Brent spar onshore. Furthermore it is now UK 
government policy and OSPAR Commission regulation to prohibit offshore dumping 
of such installations.177 In spite of these publicised corporate responses, there is still 
evidence that Shell in its operations in Nigeria fails to comply with some of the basic 
areas of societal needs such as environmental pollution. This is evidenced by the 
continuation of the harmful disposal of petroleum drilling waste and gas flaring in 
the Niger delta area of Nigeria,178 as well as the damning 2011 UNEP scientific 
assessment of the Niger-delta (Ogoniland) environment indicating extensive 
pollution.179 
This context demonstrates the growing contradiction within CSR, where events that 
demonstrate corporate impact and power trigger a public response and drive the need 
for justification. The justification in terms of CSR remains at a level which perhaps 
well-intentioned however does not fully address the triggers. It also reveals a 
contextualisation where responses differ in different contexts: in this case the UK 
and Nigeria. This re-evaluation of the legitimacy or justification of power should 
extend to a creative role for law within CSR that has not been fully explored. This is 
the issue which will be examined further in the latter chapters. 
 The response of Shell has been focused on the areas of self-interest but the triggers 
go beyond self-interest demanding a public interest.  For instance Joseph points out 
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that Shell’s extraction in Ogoni-land in Nigeria caused grave environmental harm 
with consequent impacts on the rights to food and an adequate standard of living.180 
 Shell actions with regard the death of the ‘Ogoni 9’ had been the subject of litigation 
under the Aliens Torts Statutes before courts in the United States.181 The assumption 
of CSR in a non-economic role has therefore been triggered by an awareness of 
corporate power both on the side of the affected stakeholders and the corporation. 
This involves power both as capacity to affect as well as exercise or actions. 
However the dominance of these corporations and the setting of agendas which are 
non-binding have left open questions of accountability.  
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3.4.3 BP 
 
For BP the critical event was a change in direction on the issue of Climate change. 
This was a change instigated by the then Chief Executive, John Browne.  Vogel 
points out that their thinking was strongly influenced by memories of the public 
relations fiasco surrounding Shell’s efforts to dispose of the Brent spar.182 John 
Browne made a famous speech made in May 1997, where he pointed out that:  
‘There's a lot of noise in the data. It is hard to isolate cause and 
effect. But there is now an effective consensus among the world's 
leading scientists and serious and well informed people outside the 
scientific community that there is a discernible human influence on 
the climate, and a link between the concentration of carbon dioxide 
and the increase in temperature. The time to consider the policy 
dimensions of climate change is not when the link between 
greenhouse gases and climate change is conclusively proven but 
when the possibility cannot be discounted and is taken seriously by 
the society of which we are part. We in BP have reached that 
point.’ 183 
 
Browne promoted the philosophy that a good business could be a success and also ‘a 
force for good’, this led to the eventual re-branding of BP to beyond petroleum.184  
This was an action to take strategic advantage of this novel change as BP was the 
first multinational oil company to accept the possibility of climate change and adopt 
the policy of reducing green-house gases. It also began the process of investing in 
solar energy.  It sought to proactively highlight that it would use its corporate power 
for good purposes, through its own voluntary changes and response. Its action was 
therefore representative of pre-emptive CSR action. 
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BP nevertheless continues to have significant problems with its human rights, 
environment and safety records. A group of Colombian farmers are claiming 
compensation from BP for environmental damage allegedly caused by the 
construction of the Ocensa oil pipeline during the late 1990s in ongoing group 
litigation.185 Previously in 2006, BP had reached an out of court settlement for an 
English High Court case brought by another group of Colombian farmers affected by 
the construction of this oil pipeline which caused severe environmental damage to 
their lands186.  
In 2007, BP’s Alaskan subsidiary (BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc.) also pleaded guilty 
to criminal proceedings in respect of discharging oil from Alaskan Prudhoe bay 
pipelines in violation of the Clean Water Act and paid a fine of about $20 million 
dollars as part of the plea agreement.187  BP also had another significant incident, 
when massive blast and fire at the Texas City refinery in 2005 which caused 15 
deaths and over 170 injuries. BP has admitted falling short of standard safety 
requirements in that refinery.188The incident highlighted the lack of appropriate 
standards and the resulting impact on society. It seemed to fore-shadow the 2010 BP 
Gulf of Mexico oil spill189, which is one of the largest oil spills on record indicating 
that the disconnect between what is said and what is done as well as the lack of 
lessons learnt.  
The location of some of these incidents has also helped to highlight the differing 
responses that society applies to the MNC, as litigation and out of court settlements 
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as well as regulatory fines dominate the US approach to environmental pollution. 
Nevertheless, this approach is still largely reactionary and only highlights an aspect 
of the more significant question of social responsibility of corporations for their 
power and impact.  
3.4.4 EXXON  
 
In 1989 the Exxon Valdez (an Exxon MNC, oil tanker) spilled 11 million gallons of 
crude oil and contaminated 1,300 miles of coastline in Prince William Sound, 
Alaska.190 One of the worst oil spills on record. The accident was caused by the 
human error of an employee of the corporation but the corporation delayed in its 
admission of guilt and aggravated the situation by arguing over responsibility and 
delaying clean up.191  
However it became obvious in the following public furore that Exxon appeared 
‘arrogant...ruthlessly capitalistic... and cold and calculating’192because in addition to 
the environmental effect of the oil spill, the human impact was aggravated by the 
location of the oil spill which occurred in Alaska. Writers comments that: 
‘The Exxon Valdez limited access to wild life so the native 
Alaskan’s were unable to find food. Fears over contamination in 
the water and food supply heightened tensions in an isolated 
environment with minimal access to outside resources. Exxon’s 
attempts to limit responsibility created further distrust and concern 
as Alaskans began to doubt the effectiveness of the clean-up 
efforts.193 
 
The claims for compensation became the subject of a court case that has lingered on 
till 2008.194 
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 The punitive damages awarded for $5 billion dollars and then reduced to $2.5 
billion was finally reduced to $500 million dollars by the US Supreme court after 
acknowledging that Exxon had spent substantial money on the clean-up operations, 
however some issues remain outstanding and will have to be decided by the lower 
courts such as the question on interest payable on the punitive damages.195  
The ability of the oil MNC to drag out the legal process is evident in the delay 
between 1989 and 2008.196 Exxon was perceived as one of the most reluctant 
multinational corporation to embrace CSR and does not have a high CSR 
profile.197However its incident became the first indication of changing reactions 
from society to demand responsibility for wrongful corporate actions affecting local 
communities.198 
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3.5  Conclusion 
Demands for CSR arise in general from questions regarding the relationship between 
these corporations and society. These questions have been based on the impact of 
significant corporate power on society.  Power is a capacity therefore it includes 
action (exercise) and inaction (omissions) in relevant circumstances. In the case of 
multinational corporations, power is the capacity to significantly affect the interests 
of others. Power itself is a morally neutral concept therefore it can be used for right 
or wrong purposes.  
This chapter examined the existence of corporate power and its centrality to CSR 
demands. It revealed that MNC have significant power and capacity to affect and 
influence society. This power can be utilised in structural or agency modes. The 
specific examination of the oil industry shows how the incidents and inadequate 
corporate responses have changed perceptions of corporate responsibility and caused 
awareness of the impact of corporate action. This has driven society through its 
various actors to begin to demand legitimacy and accountability from corporations 
because corporations wield power that affect and impact significantly on societies 
interests.   
Yet these corporations have in response attempted to set the agenda within this area.  
These demands and responses are encapsulated within CSR. CSR is driven by 
demands in the communitarian spirit, demands adjusted to the present liberal society 
which require that power held within such society must be legitimate and yet it is 
also driven by the corporate response and the desire the respond from a basis of self-
interest. 
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The challenge is that corporate power demands legitimacy because of the significant 
impact which it is having on society. Dahl proposes that ‘every large corporation 
should be thought of as a social enterprise, that is, an entity whose existence and 
decisions can be justified only in so far as they serve public or social 
purposes.’199This also ties in with Dodd’s assertion in the classical CSR debate with 
Berle that business is permitted and encouraged by law because of it is of service to 
the community rather than because it is a source of profit to its owners.200 
The purpose of CSR is therefore to also present a platform for debates about 
legitimising corporate power.  These legitimacy debates have already taken various 
forms and perspectives in view of various demands and responses indicated within 
CSR debates.  Yet the overwhelming focus of CSR has been on corporate responses 
and voluntary undertakings.201  
Law has so far played a limited role focusing only on the traditional perspectives and 
highlighted in mainly reactionary circumstances, i.e. contravention of laws (if any) 
and litigation after the alleged wrong doing or wrongful use of power. However this 
thesis would like to focus on the potential contribution that newer perspectives of 
law could bring to the legitimacy debate.  Law does not claim to be the only aspect 
of legitimacy but it is a vital but yet neglected aspect. Therefore the next three 
chapters will form the second part of the work focusing on legitimacy and law’s role. 
The next chapter begins this second part to the examination with a general overview 
of the role of law and regulation within legitimacy. 
                                                 
199 R A Dahl ‘A Prelude to Corporate Reform’ (1972)  Business and Society Review 17-23 
200 E M Dodd, ’For whom are corporate managers trustees?’ (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review  1145-
1163 
201 Vogel (n 182); S B Banerjee Corporate Social Responsibility The good, the bad and the ugly 
(Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2007)16 -18; A Crane at al (eds.) Readings and cases in a global context  
Routledge-Cavendish, Oxon. 2008) 6-9 identifies six core characteristics of current CSR practice as 
voluntary, Internalizing and managing externalities, multiple stakeholder orientation, alignment of 
social and economic responsibilities, practices and values, beyond philanthropy  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
TOWARDS LEGITIMACY OF CORPORATE POWER: 
EXAMINING ROLE OF LAW & REGULATION 
 
‘That legitimacy means responsibility –that an institution with 
power must be accountable to some judgement other than that of 
the power holders – expresses the prime emphasis this culture puts 
on the individual as the ultimate measure of institutions.’1 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter begins the second aspect of our analysis which addresses what potential 
law and a law-jobs perspective may hold for the exemplar of CSR which is now 
established as the legitimacy of corporate power.  To do this the chapter will address 
the concept of legitimacy and its link with law, the meaning of law in this context, 
the relationship between law and regulation and finally law’s current manifestations 
within CSR. This chapter does this in order to point out perspectives of law which 
the thesis will analyse in detail for relevance to CSR’s core.  
Law can be perceived from a traditional state centred perspective or from a non-
traditional decentred pluralist perspective. It may also be classed as hard law and soft 
law. The analysis of these perspectives is important because it demonstrates the 
argument that how law is conceived will affect its relationship with contemporary 
concepts such as CSR. At the onset it is important to identify that legitimacy is used 
in the sense which implies accountability.   
                                                 
1 J W Hurst The Legitimacy of business in the Law of the United States 1780-1970 (University of 
Virginia Press Charlottesville 1970) 58 
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Within CSR it has been established that the existence of corporate power that 
significantly affects societal interests raises the issue of legitimacy for possession 
and the exercise of such power. Berle points out that ‘whenever there is a question of 
power, there is a question of legitimacy and this means that the power holder must 
find some claim of legitimacy which also means finding a field of responsibility and 
a field of accountability.’ 2 Consequently in view of the societal interest driving for 
corporate legitimacy compliance with ‘whatever ‘social responsibility’ demands’ is 
seen as a prerequisite, a defining condition for the possession of power.’3It has been 
demonstrated that corporations exert significant power and influence over people’s 
lives. 4 This concern with power perceived and expressed in varied ways is the core 
issue for the debates within CSR. This can be seen as the power-legitimacy exemplar 
within CSR. 5  
Therefore CSR discourse has arisen as a result of the crucial necessity to justify and 
constrain the possession and exercise of such corporate power.  When this issue of 
justification or constraints within legitimacy is raised then the role of law in 
facilitating this accountability can be explored. However in CSR discourse the role 
of law is largely contested.6 The stumbling block has been that CSR is often 
                                                 
2 A A Berle ‘Economic Power and the Free Society’ in A Hacker(ed.) The Corporation Takeover 
(Double Day, Anchor, 1965) 86,98-99, also cited in R Chen & J .Hanson ‘ The Illusion of Law: The 
legitimating schemas of modern policy and corporate law (2004) 103(1) Michigan Law Review 1-
149; 148-149 
3 J E Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the theory of Company Law (Claredon 
Press, Oxford 1995) 25 
4 This is illustrated in the last chapter through some of the critical incidents in the oil industry. See 
also L Rayman-Bacchus ‘Reflecting on Corporate Legitimacy’ (2006) 17 Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting 323-335 
5 M Stokes ‘Company Law and Legal theory’ in W Twining (ed.) Legal Theory and Common Law 
(Blackwell, Oxford 1986) 155-183; T F McMahon ‘Models of the Relationship of the Firm to 
Society’ (1986) 5 Journal of Business Ethics 181-191 details an overall analysis of the various models 
of relating corporations (firms) to society contrasting the rights approaches to the power models. 
6 D McBarnet ‘Corporate social responsibility beyond law, through law, for law: the new corporate 
accountability’ in D McBarnet  et al (eds.)The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social 
Responsibility and the Law ( Cambridge  CUP, 2007) 45- 56 
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portrayed as intrinsically voluntary while law is perceived as mandatory rules.7 
Though it is important to stress that such simple categorization is problematic at 
various levels, yet the way law is defined will influence the depth and intensity of 
relationship between the two concepts. Kerr and others point out that ‘at first glance 
the concept of CSR does not appear to fit comfortably within a traditional legal 
setting’.8 This is because CSR is in a constant state of evolution as the ‘notion of 
what is socially responsible is situated by contemporary needs and concerns and thus 
cannot be pinned down in precise and unchanging terms’.9 
 Yet it is accepted that there are other contemporary legal notions which embody this 
flexible nature.10 The law is an integral aspect of the drive for legitimacy and can 
fulfil the role of accountability. It frames legal action and can provide tools which 
enhance the corporate-society relationship. The challenge is to reveal the potential 
that law may hold for contemporary concepts such as CSR. In demonstrating such 
potential, theoretical conceptions of law allow us to indicate the potential of meeting 
contemporary challenges of legitimising concepts without inhibiting their natural 
growth and flexibility.   
This thesis aim is to discover what potential chosen legal perspectives can contribute 
to this fundamental aspect within CSR. This will be revealed through an analysis of 
                                                 
7 This is entrenched in the positivist view of law especially with regard to narrowing law to state law 
or regarding state law as central and core. See D  Galligan Law in Modern Society (Oxford, Claredon, 
2006) 177 -178 
8 M Kerr, R Janda and C Pitts Corporate Social Responsibility –A Legal Analysis (LexisNexis, 
Canada, 2009)5 
9 Ibid 
10 Kerr, Janda & Pitts (n 8) gives examples such as corporate governance, best interests of a child but 
other examples would include precautionary principle & sustainable development see T O’Riordan J 
Cameron Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (EarthScan, London 1994) Cameron, J and 
Abouchar, J ‘The Precautionary Principle: A Fundamental Principle of Law and Policy for the 
Protection of the Environment’(1991) 14(1) Boston College International and Comparative Law 
Review (Article 2) 1- 27 M Decleris The Law of Sustainable Development (A report produced for the 
EC, 2000) A Ross Sustainable Development Law in the UK: From Rhetoric to Reality? (Routledge, 
2011) 
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law itself and how law may choose to engage with CSR in traditional and non-
traditional ways.  
This chapter will therefore examine law and regulation as a key component of 
legitimacy in order to derive two chosen perspectives which will be examined in 
following chapters. Chapter five will then analyse traditional corporate law to 
indicate limitations which traditional conceptions of law such as corporate law now 
face in achieving this legitimising role and then in the sixth chapter the thesis will 
suggest a non-traditional law-jobs perspective which holds potential for viewing law 
within CSR through new lens.  
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4.2 Legitimacy and Law 
 
The assertion that law can contribute to the legitimacy of corporate power requires 
that the linkage between law and legitimacy is established. Legitimacy as a concept 
embraces three inter-related conceptions:  legal, sociological and moral.11 
Legitimacy encapsulates the notion of justification and accountability from these 
different conceptions. The legal conception of legitimacy is concerned with 
justification by reference to governing legal norms.12 In line with this, Jones defines 
legitimacy as referring to ‘a system of widely accepted rules and standards governing 
the way in which power is achieved and exercised.’13  
The sociological conception premises people’s obedience or respect. It adopts the 
Weberian view of legitimacy as deriving from people’s belief in its legitimacy.14In 
this sense the justificatory source is people’s beliefs. It is in line with this that 
Mitchell asserts that legitimacy refers to ‘the belief among groups within the affected 
population, workers, consumers and managers themselves that the exercise of power 
is justified.’15and Suchman defines legitimacy as ‘a generalised perception or 
assumption that actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions.’16 
 Lastly, the moral conception refers to ethics and therefore seeks a moral or ethical 
justification for exercise of such power. This is the sense in which one asserts that 
                                                 
11 R Fallon ‘Legitimacy and the constitution’ (2005) 118 HLR 1787- 1801 
12 Ibid 
13 R H Jones ‘The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation’ 1977 20(4) Business Horizons 5-9, 6 
Jones was the Chairman and Chief Executive of the General Electric Company 
14 M Weber Economy and Society (University of California Press 1968) 
15 N Mitchell ‘Corporate Power, Legitimacy and Social Policy’ (1986)  39(2) The Western Political 
Quarterly 197-212, 202 
16 M C Suchman, ‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches’ (1995) 20(3) The 
Academy of Management Review 571-610, 574 
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use of force should be morally legitimate. This conception of legitimacy derives 
from an ethical justificatory core. This could be exemplified by focus on ethical 
standards such as human rights and rights of participation.17Buchanan argues when 
speaking of moral legitimacy that ‘an entity that exercises political power is morally 
justified in doing so only if it meets a minimum standard of justice, understood as 
the protection of basic human rights’18.This categorisation assists in the use of 
standards in analysis or in the clarity of the conception that one adopts but these 
conceptions are also inter-related.19  
Beetham crucially points out that ‘a given power relationship is not legitimate 
because people believe in its legitimacy but because it can be justified in terms of 
their beliefs’ and these beliefs are often based on normative standards. 20  These 
normative standards are frequently embodied in laws in that given context. Often 
such normative standards must have a moral or ethical content, if it is to appeal to 
people’s obedience or beliefs. This can be appreciated in the light of longstanding 
debates within law on the role of morality or more recently the integral nature of 
fundamental human rights to law.21  This is why Doak and O’Mahony point out that 
legitimacy that rests purely on the legal nature of a particular action can provide a 
veneer of technical legality to practices that might be otherwise regarded as 
illegitimate especially where it does not depend on any external moral or normative 
values.22  
                                                 
17 J J Kirkpatrick Legitimacy and Force: Political and Moral Dimensions  (Transaction Inc, New 
Jersey1988) 10-11 
18 A Buchanan Justice, Legitimacy and Self-determination: Moral foundations for International law 
(OUP, New York 2004) 234; A Buchanan ‘Political Legitimacy and Democracy’ (2002) 112(4) 
Ethics 689-719 
19 A. Simmons Justification and Legitimacy (CUP, Cambridge 2001) 
20 D Beetham The Legitimation of Power’ (Palgrave, Hampshire 1991) 11 
21 T Bingham Rule of Law (Allen Lane, 2010) 
22 J Doak  D O’Mahony ‘In search of legitimacy: restorative youth conferencing in Northern Ireland’ 
(2011)  31(2) Legal Studies 305-325, 307 
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When this inter-connectedness of legitimacy perspectives is applied to CSR it 
becomes easy to see why there is an inter-play of marketing, public relations, 
reporting (all playing to people’s beliefs) and normative quasi-legal standards (codes 
and regulations) often derived from ethical standards and basis (such as human 
rights) driving towards creating legitimacy for corporate power. The problem 
however is that the sociological perspectives focusing on people’s beliefs have been 
dominant and to a large extent captured by the powerful corporations who seek to 
centre CSR on the notion of changing perceptions through appeals to normative 
ethical standards.23 Yet the veracity of legitimacy also lies primarily on legality, the 
ability to have a legal framework that encourages or induces corporate 
responsibility.24 
 Whilst legality is not the self-sufficient criteria of legitimacy, it is a primary 
criterion. It is a focal area of interest for legal scholars who seek to ensure that 
‘power is legitimate, where its acquisition and exercise conform to established 
law.’25 They also seek to examine the definition and interpretation of legal rules and 
examine how these can be initiated, revised and enforced.26 Nevertheless such 
scholars are not only pre-occupied with conformity to the ‘rule of law’, there is also 
a significant amount of legal literature which questions the legitimacy of law itself in 
particular contexts and accepts that procedures for forming the law, ethical content 
of the law and the subjection of laws to accountability is an integral part of 
legitimacy.27  
                                                 
23 B O’Dwyer ‘Conceptions of CSR: The nature of managerial capture’ (2003) 16(4) Accounting, 
Auditing and Accountability Journal 523-557; R Shamir ‘The De-radicalization of CSR’ (2004) 30(3) 
Critical Sociology 669-689 
24 Parkinson (n 3) 25 
25 Beetham  (n 20) 4 
26 Beetham (n 20) 4 
27 Fallon (n 11) 
 174 
 This is why Hart, the foremost legal scholar acknowledged that the legal order 
provided for law as a union of primary and secondary rules; with the secondary rules 
concerned with how the primary rules may be ‘conclusively ascertained, introduced, 
eliminated, varied and the fact of their violation conclusively determined.’28 This is 
necessary because on the one hand law can be used as an instrument for the 
powerful29 and therefore frames and enables power and organisations such as 
corporations but on the other hand it is also capable of providing limitations and 
giving valid expression to opponents of such power, providing room for contest and 
for change.30  
As a result of this juxtaposition legal scholars’ centre on analysis of the moral and 
sociological conceptions inter-twined with law. One recurrent theme is often whether 
the duty to obey the law requires a moral reason and whether legitimacy of law is 
drawn from this moral core.31 The focus could also be on procedures that allow for 
consent, participation and acquiesce of the people or on the fundamental nature of 
human rights to rules that make for such integral moral legitimacy32 This aim of such 
introspection is to avoid a situation where law is used exclusively as an instrument of 
power exclusively rather than as a limitation to power also.  
Within this thesis, the focus is primarily on the legal aspect of this interconnected 
conception of legitimacy of corporate power but it will also become apparent that 
law of the type suggested must also acknowledge the sociological and ethical 
perspective.  The aim is to suggest that law will need to develop flexibility to frame 
normative aspects of CSR and to fully perform its aspect of the legitimating 
                                                 
28 H L A Hart The Concept of Law (Claredon Oxford 1994) 94 
29 Beetham (n 20) 67 This is also a Marxist perspective of law 
30 B De Sousa Santos (ed.) Law and Globalisation From Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality 
(CUP, Cambridge 2005) 
31 J Raz The Authority of the Law: Essays on Law and Morality (OUP, Oxford, 1979, 2002). Raz 
defined power over others as authority over them see p.19 
32 A E Buchanan Human Rights Legitimacy and the Use  of Force (OUP Oxford 2010) 
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function.  The assertion is not that only law can help CSR achieve its legitimizing 
function but that it is a fundamental aspect of such legitimating agenda. Yet law has 
to appear in its fully dynamic guise to embrace and assist the complexity that is 
CSR.  
Within CSR the question of corporate legitimacy has often been put in this form: 
 ‘Who selected these men, if not to rule over us, at least to exercise 
vast authority and to whom are they responsible? The answer to the 
first question is quite clearly: they selected themselves. The answer 
to the second is at best nebulous. This in a nutshell constitutes the 
problem of legitimacy.’33  
 
When the question of legitimacy for corporations is analysed from a legal 
perspective, two aspects become visible: the internal aspects of how the corporation 
is run and the external aspect of responsibility for such running. Stanfield and Carroll 
outline what this may mean by stressing that ‘power is exercised legitimately when it 
is deployed within the bounds of dominant rules and norms, that is, when it is 
transparently deployed such that the information is available to those who must hold 
its use accountable’34  
Thus the question could be that where the legitimacy of government power is 
ensured through accountability processes to the electorate, sufficient accountability 
must be devised for such corporate power. Or in the alternative exercise of such 
power must be constrained and brought under the ambit of adequate democratic or 
representative control, yet the over-riding issue is that of transparent constraints. 
Therefore the link in this thesis is focused on accountability aspects of legitimacy 
and law’s ability to foster accountability. The nature of the corporation differs from 
                                                 
33 L Rayman-Bacchus ‘Reflecting on Corporate Legitimacy’ (2006) 17 Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting 323-335 at 324 citing E S Mason The Corporation in Modern Society  (Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 1959); B. Sutton (ed.) The Legitimate Corporation (Bodmin, Basil 
Blackwell, 1993) 
34 J R Stanfield M C Carroll, ‘Governance and the Legitimacy of Corporate Power: A Path for 
Convergence of Heterodox Economics?’ (2004)  38 (2)  Journal of Economic Issues 363-370 
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that of the government, so their accountability processes will not mirror each other, 
but this does not negate the need for visible constraints.  
Stokes in this vein stresses that: 
 ‘If private property is to be legitimate within the framework of 
liberal society, it is also necessary to show that there are constraints 
which prevent it from becoming a source of power which threatens 
the liberty of the individuals or rivals the power of the state.’35   
 
Law’s ability to frame or facilitate accountability frameworks is therefore the core 
issue however law itself in the globalised society has not remained unaffected. 
Therefore the following section will define perspectives of law in this context to 
capture a significant picture of law’s potential role and outline the emergence of 
traditional and non-traditional perspectives in this context. 
                                                 
35  M Stokes ‘Company Law and Legal Theory’ in W Twining (ed) Legal theory and Common law 
(Basil Blackwell Oxford 1986) 155-183  
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4.3  Perspectives of Law 
 
The concept of law is not easily defined but it is necessary to outline conceptions of 
law because the way law is defined spells out the role for law within contemporary 
debates. In other words the legal theoretical conception of law will dictate to a large 
extent the role of law in the task of legitimising corporate power. Hart reminds us 
that ‘few questions concerning human society have been asked with such persistence 
and answered by serious thinkers in so many diverse, strange and paradoxical ways 
as the question ‘what is law?’36. So within this section the aim is to address what is 
meant by law within this thesis to give a framework for the legal perspectives that 
will be analysed.  
Whilst CSR is a global phenomenon, the notions of law often do not travel well.37 
International law which has a fair claim to universality remains the primary preserve 
of state actors38 so the challenge becomes the ability of to frame a conception of law 
that can be viewed from a global perspective. This challenge is identified by Twining 
as suggesting a way of constructing one or more general conceptions of law that may 
be useful for looking at legal phenomena from a global perspective.39 
This necessity for a broad conception of law that is useful for examining legal 
phenomena from a global perspective is predicated on the novel nature of actors and 
actions within CSR.  This attempt to define our chosen conceptions of law will only 
                                                 
36 Hart (n 28) 1 
37 For example R Dworkin Laws Empire (Hart Publishing, Oxford 1998) at 102 points out that 
‘Interpretative theories are by their nature addressed to a particular legal culture, generally the culture 
to which the authors belong.’  
38 The ICJ point out that it is the fundamental principle of state sovereignty on which the whole of 
International law rests – Case concerning  military and para-military activities in and against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US) Merits (1986) ICJ Reps 14 at para.263 
39 W Twining, General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective (CUP, 
Cambridge 2009)  103 
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form a brief analysis of the much wider discourse about law’s nature. This wider 
discourse often termed ‘jurisprudence’ covers several theoretical questions ‘about 
the nature of laws and legal systems, about the relationship of law to justice and 
morality and about the social nature of law’.40The seminal debates on the 
relationship between natural law school and legal positivism between Hart41 and 
Fuller42 as well as the fundamental addition of Dworkin43 on rules and principles 
will not be covered in great detail. The interesting debates about the relationship of 
law to justice covered extensively by Nozick44 and Rawls45 as well as the issue of 
rights as expounded by Hohfield46 and Kant47 are of little relevance to this work.  
This analysis will dwell on nature of law in the much narrower sphere of ‘law and 
society’ and the attempt to derive a conception of law applicable to global concepts 
such as CSR. It will seek to draw out views on legal centralism and legal pluralism 
as well as debates on hard law and soft law. In other words, it raises the question:  is 
law limited in form to state made law conditional on certain key features or is law 
multifarious and of different kinds on different levels tied together by the role it 
performs? The aim is to discover conceptions of law that bear most relevance to 
globalisation and our analysis of legitimacy of corporate power within CSR. 
                                                 
40 M D A Freeman Lloyds Introduction to Jurisprudence  (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2008) 3 
41 H L A Hart ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71(4) HLR 593-629 
42 L L  Fuller ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law’ – A Reply to Professor Hart’ (1958) 71(4) HLR 630-
672 
43 R Dworkin Law’s Empire (Hart Publishing, Oxford 1998) 
44 R Nozick Anarchy State and Utopia (Wiley-Blackwell, 2001) 
45 J Rawls A Theory of Justice (Oxford, OUP, 1971) 5-6; S Lukes Power: a radical view (Macmillan, 
London 1974) 
46 W N Hohfield  Fundamental Legal conceptions as applied in judicial reasoning (Yale University 
Press, 1964) 
47 I Kant Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, re-printed in L Dennis (ed.) 
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals –Immanuel Kant (Broadview Press, Canada, 2005) 
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4.3.1 Traditional Legal Perspectives (Legal Centralism) 
 
 
One of the most influential definitions of law is given by HLA Hart in his book The 
Concept of Law.48  Hart sees law in a legal system as primarily a union of primary 
and secondary rules. This modifies the earlier theories of law which placed law in 
the realm of orders given by a sovereign and backed by threats.49 For Hart these 
rules derived their validity from the rule of recognition which itself is a social fact 
accepted by officials of the legal system.50 This definition has remained definitive in 
explaining legal systems and in explaining social structures of laws in many 
developed countries,51 but this definition is mainly concerned with municipal law in 
the modern state52  
Galligan outlines features of Hart’s definition of law that narrows it to the ‘modern 
legal order’ and a view which is centred on the state. The features are as follows53:  
primarily enacted law made by legislative bodies in their exercise of will, specialised 
organisations and institutions of officials with authority to make, apply and enforce 
that law, coercion as a central aspect, state law as final authority over other systems 
                                                 
48Tamanaha points out that John Austin and HLA Hart respectively, are the most influential early and 
current theorists of legal positivism. B Z Tamanaha A General Jurisprudence of Law and Society  
(OUP, Oxford 2001) 22 Tamanaha points out the problem of law’s definition and suggests  that ‘until 
this problem is resolved, however, the concept of legal pluralism will not have a sound foundation’. B 
Tamanaha ‘A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism’ (2000) 27(2) Journal of Law and Society 
296-321, 297 However it is doubtful that the question of law’s definition can ever be settled for it is 
an essentially contested concept but I do accept that each debate must be founded on an identified 
definition of law. In other words you must define ‘law’ in that context 
49 Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (ed. Hart, London, 1954) 
50 Hart (n 28) 79 
51 Tamanaha 2001 (n 48) at 133 notes that Hart’s core analysis has survived relatively unscathed 
following forty years of critique See also D Galligan Law in Modern Society (Claredon, Oxford 2006) 
7 
52 Twining notes that ‘with the exception of public international law as it was conceived in 1960, this 
model is confined to state or municipal law’. Twining 2009 (n 39) 89. However Hart acknowledges 
the existence of other ‘pre-legal’ norms 
53 Galligan (n 51) 21-22 
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of rule within jurisdiction, the regulatory aspect of law as facilitating and protecting 
social relations of citizens,  officials with extensive power constrained by sets of 
standards and this results in a distinctive normative stricture based on the idea of rule 
of law.  Griffiths calls this legal centralism and defines this as the view that ‘law is 
and should be law of the state uniform for all persons, exclusive of all other laws and 
administered by a single set of state institutions.’54  
This traditional definition is often the most recognisable form of law and ties in with 
the institutional nature of law identified by Raz as a component for the test for law’s 
existence and identity.55 Raz points out that: 
‘It is widely agreed ...that a system of norms is not a legal system 
unless it sets up adjudicative institutions charged with regulating 
disputes arising out of the applications of norms of the system. It is 
also generally agreed that such normative system is a legal system 
only if it claims to be authoritative and to occupy a position of 
supremacy within society that is: it claims the right to legitimise or 
outlaw all other social institutions.’56 
 
He therefore identifies the legal system as ‘a system of guidance and adjudication 
claiming supreme authority within a certain society and therefore where efficacious 
also enjoying effective authority’57. The consequence of such analysis has been to 
link law with state institutions such as courts. In this sense also Kelsen identifies law 
as norms addressed to court58, Hart points to laws as standards courts are bound to 
apply and use in adjudication59 
The advantage of this way of identifying law is that it becomes fairly distinctive 
from other forms of social rules and its enforceability is linked to the state 
                                                 
54 J Griffiths ‘What is Legal Pluralism?’ (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism 1-56, 3 
55 Raz points out that the test for the identity of a legal system involves 3 elements: efficacy, 
institutional character and sources J Raz The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (OUP, 
Oxford 2009) 42 
56 Ibid at 43 
57 Raz (n 55) at 43 
58 H Kelsen The General Theory of Law and State (New York, 1945) 29 
59 Hart (n 28) 89 
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institution. In this sense corporate laws can be derived from the body of rules 
enjoying effective legal authority from the state and regulating formation and 
running of the corporations. While this approach is desired for its simplicity, one 
finds that applying such traditional law to CSR is difficult as it is a concept that 
demonstrates some of the more significant effects of globalisation on law. It does not 
currently utilise forms of rules clearly linked to the traditional perspectives of state 
law and it is influenced by a variety of actors. Furthermore there are limitations 
within corporate law itself which will be demonstrated in the next chapter that 
require that law within CSR should be a broader concept than the traditional view 
permits. 
Barnet examining the role of traditional state law in CSR points out three general 
limitations. These are the effect of business lobbying, the lack of regulatory 
enforcement and creative compliance.60 The influence of business on the substance 
of law at national and international level is evident. This is done through lobbying 
and negotiation which is an aspect of agency power and this may result in 
backtracking on an agenda.61 State regulation has a cost attached and resources are 
limited, penalties may be weak and enforcement may not be effective.62 Finally 
compliance can be ‘creative’. Barnett speaks of complying with the letter of the law, 
not the spirit of the law. She gives examples of tax avoidance and creative 
accounting.63  
                                                 
60 D McBarnet ‘Corporate social responsibility beyond law, through law, for law: the new corporate 
accountability’ in D McBarnet  et al (eds.)The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social 
Responsibility and the Law ( Cambridge  CUP, 2007) 45- 56 
61 Ibid. The climb-down on initiatives such as the binding UK Operating and Financial Review (OFR) 
binding reporting requirement for companies are indicative of governments under pressure to favour 
business interests in decision-making. 
62 Ibid 
63 Ibid 
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Although these limitations are not exclusive to traditional law,64the key issue is that 
new ways of thinking are relevant within CSR and this will include new ways of 
thinking about law. The effect of globalisation on law has resulted in the search for 
definitions of law that is more reflective of global concepts.  Although it is important 
that law retains its distinctive nature, it also needs to retain relevance. This search for 
relevance is made more urgent by the inherent limitations of traditional state law in 
the context of global concepts like CSR.65  Nelson helpfully points out that ‘the core 
issue is about changing attitudes, values and approach. It is about thinking and acting 
in non-traditional ways. It is about a new way of governance- at both societal and 
corporate level.’ 66   This is what recommends the broader pluralist perspectives 
analysed in the next section. This will include perspectives which are more inclusive 
of rules emerging from various actors and which could be harnessed towards the 
goal of legitimacy of corporate power.      
                                                 
64 As questions of enforcement and compliance plague other non-formal ways of regulation as well 
65 Kerr (n 8) 
66 Jane Nelson  cited in J Elkington ‘the triple bottom line for twenty-first century business’ in JV 
Mitchell Companies in a World of Conflict (RIIA/ Earthscan  London 1998) 32-61, 63 
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4.3.2 Non-Traditional Legal Perspectives (Legal Pluralism) 
 
 
Long before notions of ‘globalisation’, legal scholars had an interest in law as a 
social phenomenon and this school was termed ‘sociological jurisprudence’. The 
influential thinkers in this group were scholars such as Durkheim who distinguished 
between formal laws and informal laws67 and Ehrlich who distinguished between the 
‘living law’ and state law administered by courts.68Ehrlich is most relevant for this 
analysis because he points to the reality of a ‘living law’ that underlies the formal 
rules of the legal system and suggests that the task of the judge or jurist is to 
integrate the two types of law.69 Ehrlich gives the example of commercial law which 
tries to keep up with commercial usage as an example that the ‘centre of gravity of 
legal development therefore from time immemorial has not lain in the activity of the 
state but in society itself.’ 70 
This analysis is subsequently highlighted in the work of Teubner who analyses the 
lex mercantoria – the transnational law of economic transactions as one of the most 
successful examples of global law without the state. He points out with regard to 
business that: ‘technical standardisation and professional self-regulation have tended 
towards world-wide co-ordination with minimal intervention of official international 
politics’.71Globalisation and its resulting complexities of relationships have re-
ignited and posed additional questions about the nature of law within global concepts 
such as CSR.  
                                                 
67 E Durkheim Division of Labour in Society (Macmillan, New York 1933) 
68 E Ehrlich Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law (Russell & Russell, 1936) 
69 Ibid  
70 Ehrlich (n 68) 390 
71 See in G Teubner ‘Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society in G Teubner (ed.) 
Global Law without the State  (Dartmouth, Aldershot 1997) 3-28 
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Therefore writers point out transnational law that is emerging under the processes of 
globalisation of the second half of the twentieth century.72 In the case of MNCs this 
is partially the result of inapplicability of International law to MNC as identified 
subjects and the resulting exploitation of ‘a vacuum between ineffective national 
laws’ as a result of the preservation of the corporate legal personality concept.73 This 
has been referred to as the invisibility of MNCs under International law but this has 
not prevented rule-making and normative activity globally because of the reality of 
MNC actions and impact on a global scale.74  It has led to the emergence of an 
enormous amount of non-state law and rules guiding conduct from various actors at 
various levels of global society.  
These non-state law and rules emanate from various bodies including trade 
associations, international institutions, corporations themselves and non-
governmental organisations. Jenkins identifies five types of codes of conduct in the 
CSR field: company codes, trade association codes, multi-stakeholder codes, model 
codes and inter-governmental codes.75 In addition to this a compendium on CSR 
instruments identifies reporting guidelines, state CSR laws and government 
initiatives, issue based principles, conventions and standards focused around 
environment and sustainable development, labour, human rights, gender, corporate 
governance, money-laundering and anti-corruption.76 
                                                 
72 K Von Benda-Beckmann ‘Globalisation and Legal Pluralism’ (2002) 4 International Law Forum 
du droit International 19 -25 
73 R Fowler ‘International Standards for Transnational Corporations’ (1995) 25 Environmental Law 1-
30, 3; P T Muchlinski Multinational Enterprises and the Law (2nd ed. OUP, Oxford 2007); C D 
Wallace The Multinational Enterprise and Legal Control: Host State Sovereignty in an era of 
economic globalisation (Martinus Nijhoff, the Hague 2002); O Amao ‘Mandating Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Trends in Nigeria’ (2008) 6(1) Journal of Commonwealth Law and Legal education 
75-95, 75 
74 See A C Cutler Private Power and Global Authority –transnational merchant law in the global 
political economy (Cambridge, CUP 2003) 196 
75 R Jenkins ‘Corporate Codes of Conduct: Self-Regulation in a Global Economy’ Technology, 
Business and Society Programme Paper No. 2 (UNRISD, 2001) 
76 Compendium of Ethics Codes and Instruments of Corporate Responsibility (compiled as a 
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 Santos captures something of this diversity in his work where he discusses the 
globalisation of legal relations and depicts the contrary tensions that all work the 
legal field: lex mecantoria, law of regional integration, transnational factors causing 
changes in state law, migration laws, laws of groups within the state (indigenous 
peoples, grass-root movements, NGOs and so on), cosmopolitan law.77 
The challenge has been the ways of conceiving and addressing these emerging non-
state law and regulation.78 These attempts to conceive of law at a pluralistic and 
broad level have been termed ‘legal pluralism’79 and draws upon previous traditions 
from legal anthropology which examined customary laws, religious law and local 
laws.80 Scholars point out that ‘transnational law’ in itself does not create legal 
pluralism but add to already existing constellations of legal pluralism.81  
These theories and debates which were founded on issues arising from legal 
anthropology have moved to debates about the pluralistic nature of law in modern 
societies.82 Legal pluralism stands in contradiction to legal centralism, it disputes the 
focus on state law stressing that law is itself constituted by virtue of social 
relations.83  
                                                                                                                                          
companion to W Cragg (ed.) Ethics Codes, Corporation and the Challenge of Globalisation (Edward 
Elgar, 2005) 
77 B De Sousa Santos Towards a new legal common sense: Law, Science and Politics in paradigmatic 
transition  (Routledge, New York 1995) Chapter Five 
78 See Twining 2009 (n 39) for a discussion of the implications of globalisation on legal theory. See 
also Tamanaha 2001 (n 48). G Teubner(ed.) 1997 (n 71) B De Sousa Santos (ed.) Law and 
Globalisation From Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality (CUP, Cambridge 2005) 
79 This has been described as a ‘central theme in the re-conceptualisation of the law/society relation.’ 
S E Merry ‘Legal Pluralism’ (1988) 22(5) Law and Society Review 869-896,869. This is often 
contrasted with Legal centralism see Gilligan (n 51) 
80 Benda-Beckmann (n 72) 19; Llewellyn would be placed in the earlier era of legal anthropology. 
81 Ibid 
82 S E Merry ‘Culture, Power and the Discourse of Law’ (1992) 37 New York Law School Law Review 
209-226 
83 Merry ibid at 209  See also Griffiths (n 54) 
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 Within this field, several theorists have raised debates specifically relevant to the 
applicability of law to global concepts. Teubner examines the ‘Global Bukowina’.84 
He analyses the possibility of the emergence of global law without the state by 
pointing out that ‘it is not only the economy, but various sectors of the world society 
that are developing global law of their own.’85He puts forward his view of legal 
pluralism as involving ‘a multiplicity of diverse communicative processes that 
observe social action under the binary code of legal/illegal.’86 This perspective leads 
on to a broader conception of law delinked from the state.  
In line with this delinked or de-centred perspective, De Sousa Santos defines law as 
‘a body of regularised procedures and normative standards, considered justiciable in 
any given group, which contributes to the creation and prevention of disputes and to 
their settlement through an argumentative discourse, coupled with threat of force.’87 
This would allow for a pluralistic application of law which does not exclude the state 
but includes other groups. 88   
Therefore law within CSR is more readily identifiable when linked with pluralistic 
perspectives of law amenable to globalisation. This perspective can operate at 
different levels: local, national and multi or transnational. It is more readily 
identifiable with pluralistic examples of law. Therefore the conceptions of law that 
are relevant are conceptions which examine law from a more flexible perspective.  
The focus is on how law can be conceived from a global standpoint while allowing 
the flexibility for to engage actively with both state and non-state law. 
                                                 
84 Teubner 1997 (n 71 ) 
85 Ibid at 3 
86 Teubner 1997 (n 71)  14-15 
87 B De Sousa Santos Towards a new legal common sense: Law, Science and Politics in paradigmatic 
transition  (Routledge, New York 1995) 428-429 
88 Another such analysis is carried out by Muchlinski, where he examines particular ‘proto-legal’ 
phenomena exploring the possibility of viewing the multinational enterprises as producers of a kind of 
transnational law. P T Muchlinski ‘Global Bukowina’ Examined: Viewing the Multinational 
Enterprise as a transnational law-making community’ in G Teubner Global Law without a State 
(Dartmouth, Aldershot 1997) 79-108 
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The question is therefore one of legal conceptions relevant to global concepts like 
CSR. Twining in his work on general jurisprudence points out three conceptions of 
law which may have relevance to globalisation and these are conceptions of law by 
Hart, Tamanaha and Llewellyn.89  
Twining finds that Hart’s conception of law through Tamanaha’s modification can 
accommodate other forms of law outside of state law.  Tamanaha modifies Hart 
conception stated earlier by re-stating law as ‘whatever people identify and treat 
through their social practices as law (or reicht or droit etc)’.90 Therefore for 
Tamanaha a state of legal pluralism exists whenever more than one kind of law is 
recognised through the social practices of a group in a given social arena...’91 This 
re-statement emphasises Hart’s rule of recognition but it does not provide a useful 
outline or criteria for examining such legal perspectives in context.  CSR in different 
contexts within globalisation is giving rise to rules, procedures and mechanisms 
which may not yet be recognised as law in the social practices of group but may 
however be performing law- like functions and fulfilling law roles.  
Therefore what is relevant in such a scenario is a definition that can present a 
working framework of enquiry in order to discover what the law is, how it is 
performed or carried out and whether it could be carried out differently.  In this 
manner the questions of legal format are less relevant rather the answers being 
sought are for those problems posed by emerging from global perspectives, where 
the ‘living law’ scenario is evident.92The issue is not really one of ‘form’ rather it is 
                                                 
89 Twining 2009 (n 39) Chapter 4 
90 Tamanaha 2001 (n 48)  194 
91 Ibid; There is a similarity in logic between this assertion and Gilligan’s defence of legal centralism 
where he states that independence and autonomy of rule-based associations occur within the 
jurisdiction of state law and in relationship with it’ therefore basing the recognition in state law  
Galligan (n 51)  177 
92 Living law from the perspective of E Ehrlich ‘Montesquieu and Sociological Jurisprudence’ 29 
Harvard Law Review 582-600, 584; law in practice, where the rules that matter may not be the 
formalised rules or even where no formalised rules exist.  
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one of fulfilling vital roles. This is what recommends the examination of Llewellyn’s 
law –jobs because it provides such a working framework of inquiry. It could outline 
roles that are geared towards frameworks for accountability and legitimacy within 
CSR. 
Llewellyn developed the law-jobs theory to solve his particular research problem 
which was to enable him study the law of the indigenous Indian groups, 93but in 
doing so developed a law-jobs theory which could therefore provide a working 
framework of enquiry, applicable to the discovery of law’s role in contemporary 
group scenarios. This could be intra-group94 or inter-group95. It is a flexible theory 
which does not have its own content but rather can be applied to various groupings, 
group rules and inter-relationships emerging even on a global scale. 
 This law-jobs perspective asks for the identification of the doing of the five law jobs 
and shifts the question of law from ‘format’ to ‘role’. The five law-jobs are the 
disposition of trouble cases; the preventative channelling and the re-orientation of 
conduct and expectations so as to avoid trouble; the allocation of authority and the 
arrangement of procedures which legitimise action as authoritative; the net 
organisation of the group or society as a whole so as to provide direction and 
incentive and the use of the juristic method.96  
In this thesis this will serve as an analytical tool that redefines our approach to what 
is termed as law within CSR and thus broadens the basis of engagement of law with 
                                                 
93 Twining 2009 (n 39) 106 
94 For example: In examining the use of contractual control in global supply chains See D McBarnet 
and M Kurkchiyan ‘Corporate Social Responsibility through contractual control? Global supply 
chains and ‘other regulation’ in D McBarnet  and others (eds.)The New Corporate Accountability: 
Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law  (CUP, Cambridge 2007)  at 59-92 
95 For example when examining interactions between transnational corporations and society through 
regulation especially codes of conduct and reporting. A Wawryk ‘Regulating Transnational 
Corporations through Corporate Codes of Conduct’ in J G Frynas S Pegg Transnational Corporations 
and Human Rights (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) 53-78 
96 K N Llewellyn ‘The Normative, the Legal and the Law Jobs: The Problem of the Juristic Method 
(1940) 49 Yale Law Journal 1355-1400, 
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CSR. The aim is to highlight in Chapter six, the potential of taking a ‘law-jobs’ legal 
perspectives within the field of CSR.  
Twining affirms the utility of Llewellyn’s law job theory when he states that ‘as a 
heuristic device it provides a useable framework and a set of questions that can be 
asked.’97 Furthermore Harden and Lewis point out that the law-jobs theory will 
allow for the identification of various mechanisms as legal and this will serve as a 
pre-cursor to questions of effectiveness and accountability. So in advocating the 
utility of the law-jobs theory, they point out that ‘questions of how well they 
function, how publicly visible they are and whose interests they serve are of course 
crucial questions of legitimacy – but unless we identify such mechanisms as ‘legal’ 
we have no initial purchase even to raise questions of legitimacy’98This will mean 
that for CSR unless its mechanisms are identified as valid legal subjects as well, 
there may be no basis on which legal scholars can raise questions of legitimacy and 
accountability. In a practical sense a CSR instrument such as a code should firstly be 
highlighted as fulfilling a law-job role and then it can be assessed for its adequacy in 
achieving such a role and so on.  
Another major advantage of the law-jobs approach is the transferability of the 
framework because it emphasises the ‘legal quality’ on basis of role and not form. 
Therefore diversity of regimes is still possible as McCoubrey highlights when she 
states that ‘...granted the diversity of municipal societies, such a functional criterion 
seems far more soundly based than a demand for institutional convergence with 
particular forms of Western Urban Industrial societies...’99  
                                                 
97Twining  2009 (n 39) 104; footnote 75 
98 I Harden, N Lewis The Noble Lie: The British Constitution and the Rule of Law (Routledge, 1988) 
67 
99 H McCoubrey ‘Natural Law, Religion and the Development of International Law’ in M W Janis  C 
Evans (eds) Religion and International Law (Kluwer (Martinus Nijhoff), Netherlands 1999) 177-190, 
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 In this thesis this will allow for an analysis of the law-jobs theory to CSR as a non-
traditional approach contrasted with traditional legal perspectives in corporate law. 
This is to discover potential roles that the law can play in augmenting CSR’s 
legitimizing function. In one sense, the situation with global concepts such as CSR 
can be likened to a situation where law and governance of several issues is at an 
embryonic stage because authority over decision-making and rule-making are not 
clearly allocated, therefore to identify law or law-like in this most basic form serves 
a very useful function because it forces us to examine actions within concepts such 
as CSR for developments and for novel ways of handling issues which are 
encountered in inter-group societal relationships.  
Llewellyn reiterates this position (in relation to one of the law-jobs- allocating the 
‘say’) when he states that ‘the case is clearest when no one has any idea whose say is 
to go and both what we think of as law and what we think of as governance is only in 
embryo (in our case, it is rather inapplicable)…’100 Although Llewellyn speaks of 
primitive societies101 in this phrase, he could actually be describing modern global 
society where there are vacuums especially in International governance of MNC in 
the CSR area. Therefore the theory becomes a heuristic device for the analysis of the 
ability of law within CSR to do certain functions necessary for the accountable co-
existence of business and society. This will also allow for the suggestion of a 
diversity of formats for doing the law-jobs within the CSR arena. 
                                                 
100 Llewellyn (n 96) 1384 
101 Ibid at 1360 states that by primitive he means ‘without need for organs of expression or for careful 
deliberation (not) ...outmoded or displaced in any modern or sophisticated culture.’ 
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It is important that law retains a dynamic and relevant nature in the CSR discourse to 
engage with the legitimacy exemplar. Twining in this vein points out that:  
‘the law-jobs theory is a valuable and underused tool as a starting- 
point for analysing and comparing the internal ordering of groups 
and organisations...it can easily accommodate notions of normative 
and legal pluralism, non-state law and different levels of global, 
transnational and local relations and so can provide a basis for 
dealing with issues raised by globalisation and interdependence’102.  
 
These contemporary issues within CSR have made it untenable for solely traditional 
perspectives of law to remain entirely relevant to newer phenomena such as CSR 
without the inclusion of broader visions of law. The argument is that contemporary 
issues have opened up novel analysis about the way law is conceived and therefore 
the law must now be conceived through this pluralistic lens. 
                                                 
102  Twining 2009 (n 39) 115;However Twining also points out that this inter-dependence is a relative 
matter  W Twining Globalisation and Legal Scholarship Montesquieu Lecture Tilburg University 
2009 
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4.3.3 Hard and Soft Laws 
 
 
This section deals with another relevant distinction of type of laws found in legal 
literature. This is the distinction between ‘hard laws’ and ‘soft laws’. This is also 
linked to questions of format and the new constellations of law which is found in 
global affairs. This distinction is also a subject of major interest in European 
community law and International law because the rise in soft law is linked to the 
context of globalisation and is increasing utilised in transnational and regional 
law.103  
In this context Kirton and Trebilcock suggest that ‘it is thus hardly surprising that the 
world has increasing turned to soft law as solutions for the hard choices it 
confronts’104 because at the globalised level legal relations are flexible and less rigid 
and this has given rise to a variety of powerful actors and institutions which have 
rule-making capability in response to challenges which they face.105 Furthermore in 
the face of global challenges such as those posed by the misuse of corporate power, 
the legal response from international law has been rather muted reflecting the high 
level of compromise now present at that level.106  
This situation must also be coupled with the point that responsibility for hard 
legalisation at an international level is still in the hands of state governments and 
there has been an increasing reluctance to adopt a hard legalistic approach because of 
                                                 
103 S Piccioto Regulating Global Corporate Capitalism (CUP, 2011) 
104 J J Kirton M J Trebilcock ‘Hard choices and soft law in sustainable global governance’ in  J J 
Kirton M J Trebilcock (eds) Hard choices, Soft Law: Voluntary Standards in Global Trade, 
Environment and Social Governance (England, Ashgate, 2004) 3-32, 4 
105 K W Abbot D Snidal ‘Hard and Soft law in International Governance’ (2000) 54(3) International 
Organisations 421-456, 423 
106 C May Global Corporate Power (Lynne Rienner, 2006) 
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the ideological move towards capitalism and a free market in many states.107 This 
‘liberal international order’ has driven the adoption of different approaches to 
governance by states. 108  
‘Hard laws’ can be defined as ‘legally binding obligations that are precise (or can be 
made precise through adjudication or the issuance of detailed regulations) and that 
delegate authority for interpreting and implementing that law’109 This is similar to 
the traditional view of law expressed earlier and are easily identifiable in the 
traditional sense as laws. On the other hand, soft law can be defined as ‘rules of 
conduct which in principle have no legally binding force but which nevertheless may 
have practical effects.’110 Soft law has therefore be viewed as a practical response to 
hard choices faced by real-life actors111  
Alternatively it can be viewed more cynically as playing into the hands of capitalist 
power, because its non-binding nature can be exploited.112 Nevertheless there is a 
sense that these views may be focusing on the wrong issues: laws whether soft or 
hard are made in reaction to a problem or an issue and therefore it is made to fulfil a 
role. The crucial question should be: does the given law fulfil that role? 
                                                 
107 C Brummer Soft Law and the Global Financial System  (Cambridge, CUP 2011); C Redgwell 
‘International Soft law and Globalisation’ in B Barton and others (eds.) regulating Energy and 
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global political economy (Cambridge, CUP 2003) 23 
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There are two key instruments of soft law. They are voluntary standards and 
informal institutions at different levels of orderings which include international, 
transnational and national levels.113 This also raises questions of whether soft laws 
are a developmental stage before hard laws can be introduced or whether they are 
laws in their own right. This is because soft laws often lack the binding force or 
enforcement of hard law. There is no definitive answer to this question rather it is 
apparent that soft law is more reactive when dealing with the uncertainty of societal 
problems. This is ‘especially when it initiates processes that allow actors to learn 
about the impact of agreements over time’114and when it facilitates dialogue, 
compromise and mutually beneficial co-operation between actors with different 
degrees of power.115  
Soft law can be adequately characterised as laws when linked to notions of legal 
pluralism and decentred perspectives of laws. Robillant agrees with this view and 
identifies that the genealogies of soft law lie in the notions of social law and legal 
pluralism that has come to pervade debates over globalisation of law and 
harmonisation of European law. 116 It is a way of reconceptualising law to recognise 
rule-making activity with significant impact which does not fall within the traditional 
view of law. These are attempts to reconceptualise law in a way that is relevant to 
the issues and concepts emerging or gaining ground as a result of globalisation. 
Yet soft law faces some genuine challenges which include a lack of accountability, 
strong surveillance and enforcement.117 It also introduces uncertainty because there 
                                                 
113 Kirton & Trebilcock (n 104) at 4 
114 Abbot & Snidal (n 105) 423 
115 Ibid 
116 A D Robillant ‘Genealogies of Soft Law’ (2006) 54(3) The American Journal of Comparative Law 
499-554, 501 
117 Kirton & Trebilcock (n 104) at 6 
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are often various voluntary standards. 118This is what strengthens calls for hard laws 
to complement soft laws.119  Nevertheless the characterisation of laws as ‘soft’ or 
‘hard’ represents an attempt to capture the variety of rule-making that is taking place 
in global affairs. These soft law rules are often introduced in response to urgent 
social action. As De Sousa Santos concludes the ‘differences in labelling and content 
notwithstanding, these studies broadly share a diagnosis and a proposal for the 
solution of the regulatory dilemmas posed by globalisation’.120 He fundamentally 
identifies three different legal spaces and their correspondent legality ‘local, national 
and world’ but he sounds a note of warning that it is futile to attempt to distinguish 
these spaces by what they regulate, ‘as they regulate or seem to regulate the same 
social action’121.   
 It is therefore possible to perceive law not just from its labelling or content (that is 
it’s ‘form’) but rather from its role in society: for example its role in regulating and 
attempting to control a given behaviour. Picciotto points out that ‘the question is not 
whether hard and soft law are mutually exclusive but how they can best be combined 
to produce effective regulations.’122 In this manner it is possible to apply all relevant 
kinds of rules towards the achieving of the given role and then to modify the rules 
where the role is not being effectively carried out. The next section will examine the 
linkage between law and regulation as relevant to this perspective. 
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4.4  Law and Regulation 
 
The reference to law and regulation is often extensively made in legal literature. This 
section indicates how this applies in this thesis to our legal analysis.  This is because 
yet again the relationship between these two concepts ‘law’ and ‘regulation’ will 
depend on the definition applied to each. 123 Black points out that ‘decentred analysis 
of regulation will have clear similarities with decentred or pluralistic conceptions of 
law than with centred conceptions’124  
Regulation can be viewed in several senses.  Baldwin and Cave gives a list which 
includes firstly regulation in a narrow sense, as a specific set of commands involving 
binding rules given for a specific purpose and applied by a given body.125 In this first 
sense it is similar to Selznick definition of Regulation as ‘sustained and focused 
control exercised by a public agency over activities valued by a community ...’126 In 
this vein regulation is perceived as an instrument of traditional prescriptive law and 
one of the means through which law can achieve its objectives. 
The second sense of regulation given by Baldwin and Cave involves that of 
deliberate state influence where regulation refers to the variant forms of regulation 
that the state may use to influence and control social behaviour. This is a slightly 
wider term of regulation as it covers state action that may be command-based or 
                                                 
123 J Black ‘Critical Reflections on Regulation’ Discussion Paper 4 January 2002 Centre for Analysis 
of Risk and Regulation, London School of Economics 
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124 Ibid at 22 
125 R Baldwin M Cave Understanding Regulation Theory, Strategy and Practice (OUP, Oxford, 1999) 
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economic-based. Here command-based is used in reference to the use of binding 
rules or economic-based in the use of economic incentives or measures. 
However this definition could also be read to include perceptions of state regulation 
from subject-specific aspects. For example regulation as seen from an economist’s 
perspective could emphasise rules relevant to the correction of market failure. 127In 
relation to this Ogus points out that economic analysis attempts to identify the failure 
of the market which justifies intervention and select the method of intervention that 
would correct the failure at least cost.128 These theories collectively referred to as 
‘economic theory of regulation’ utilise different perspectives and tools for justifying 
regulation and its implications. These theories include Public Interest theories and 
Private Interest theories.129  
Law in this arena of economic theory may at first sight appear limited especially if it 
is merely perceived as an instrument of regulation but this is not the case as it can 
also be re-conceived as creating a facilitative framework which allows for the use of 
economic incentives.130This perception is compatible with the idea of meta-
regulation where law would allow for the recognition of ‘some governance 
mechanisms that we might not have traditionally thought of as law, could in fact be 
thought of as law in an extended sense and evaluated according to criteria of 
legality’.131 Morgan and Yeung also highlight the law’s instrumental role in shaping 
social behaviour as well as the way in which the law may give expression to 
particular values.’132  
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They point out that law in regulation may have two roles: facilitative and expressive. 
Their given example is that of a community that decides to maintain the quality of its 
water-ways. It may do so through prohibitory orders or through tradeable permits for 
dumping. In their opinion the law is involved in both: in one sense as threat and in 
the other, in facilitating the interaction between state and the market.133This can be 
exemplified through some emerging CSR practice like in Denmark, where 
legislation has been passed mandating the publication of CSR policies where the 
corporation has one.134 The choice to have a policy remains voluntary but once that 
decision is made, then publication of this policy is mandatory.  
Finally regulation in the third sense, involves a broad conception of regulation to 
include all forms of social control or influence.135 This would include regulation at 
an international, national or local level as well as regulation by the state or other 
actors. This would also include self-regulation.136 Self-regulation embraces a wide 
range within regulation and may apply to a range of institutional arrangements.137  
Ogus points out that such arrangements may vary in the degree of autonomy, degree 
of legal force and degree of monopolistic power138. Black examines four types of 
self-regulation which include139: mandated self-regulation, sanctioned self-
regulation, coerced self-regulation and voluntary self-regulation. She defines self-
regulation as ‘the situation of a group of persons or bodies, acting together, 
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139 J Black ‘Constitutionalising Self-regulation’ (1996) 59(1) Modern Law Review 24-55, 27 
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performing a regulatory function in respect of themselves and others who accept 
their authority’140.  
This third sense of regulation is the most relevant for this thesis and our contextual 
definition of law from a law-jobs problem solving perspective because this will refer 
to all forms of instruments that can be harnessed to achieve the law-jobs. In this 
sense ‘regulation can be described to include all forms of social control available to 
harness a wide range of actors in addressing a particular set of problems.141 This 
third definition of regulation can therefore be referred to as ‘decentred regulation’ 
and therefore non-specific as to the position of state actors as drivers of regulation. It 
has been noted that this resonates with issues arising from globalisation. Black has 
further refined this definition of regulation in an essentialist sense to mean:  
‘the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others 
according to defined standards or purposes with the intention of 
producing a broadly identified outcome or outcomes, which may 
involve mechanisms of standard-setting, information-gathering and 
behaviour-modification’142.  
 
Defined in this way regulation becomes the means of achieving the law-job 
outcomes through a variety of identified mechanisms which could include variant 
regulatory instruments, soft laws and hard laws. In other words regulation is a ‘law-
tool’ in the Llewellyn sense. Such dynamism is necessary for an extended and 
relevant role for law within CSR regulation and globalisation. It opens up the 
possibility for various permutations of law, regulation and CSR. The next section 
will analyse contestations of law within the current CSR context to indicate how 
these debates about law feed into its role within the CSR concept. 
                                                 
140 Ibid 
141 N Gunnigham and P Grabovsky Smart Regulation (OUP, Oxford 1999) 4 
142 Black (n 123) 20 
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4.5  Law within the CSR Context 
 
This section outlines the current perceptions and contestations about law in the CSR 
context. The current CSR context is dominated by norms, codes, standards and 
guidelines. These include general global initiatives like the UN Global Compact, the 
ISO 26000, and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Other global 
initiatives focused on specific aspects of CSR such as Human Rights: Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights, Voluntary principles on Security and Human rights; 
Labour: International Labour Organisation Tripartite Declaration on Multinational 
Enterprises; Environment: Rio Declaration on Environment and Environment; Anti-
corruption: UN Convention against corruption and the Extractive Industries 
Transparencies Initiative. There are also various company codes, framework 
agreements and reporting standards created by a variety of actors. 143 
Yet the starting point when examining a plethora of popular definitions of CSR is 
often that they appear to exclude law from the purview of CSR purporting that CSR 
is either beyond law or voluntary.144 In spite of this it is certain that CSR at its core 
addresses issues arising from the relationship between corporations and society and 
                                                 
143 For a comprehensive list see D Leipziger The Corporate Responsibility code book (2nd ed. 
Greenleaf, Sheffield  2010) 
144 Some examples include: CSR defined as ‘the firm’s consideration of and response to, issues 
beyond the narrow economic and technical and legal requirements of the firm to accomplish social 
benefits …’ K C Davis  ‘The case for and against  business assumption of social responsibilities’ 
(1973) Academy of Management Journal 312-322, 312; ‘Actions that appear to further some social 
good beyond the interests of the interests of the firm and that which is required by law’ A 
McWilliams D Siegel ‘Corporate social responsibility: A theory of Firm Perspective’ (2001) 26(1) 
Academy of Management Review 117 -127, 117;‘A concept whereby companies integrate social and 
environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interactions with their stakeholders 
on a voluntary basis’ European Commission Green Paper 2001 Promoting a European Framework 
for Corporate Social responsibility. The EC has redefined this in 2011 to accept that CSR is the 
‘responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society.’ EC A Renewed Strategy 2011-14 for CSR 
Brussels Com (2011) 681 Final 
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that law is undeniably important in this sphere.145 Sabapathy in this regard, points 
out that ‘irrespective of the explicit interest of law in framing corporate 
responsibility, the two are always and necessarily intertwined...’146 The stumbling 
block has been that CSR is occasionally perceived as intrinsically voluntary, while 
law has been perceived as mandatory rules,147 though it is important to stress that 
such simple categorization is problematic at various levels. The way law is defined 
will influence the perception of the intensity of relationship between the two 
concepts but even at the most superficial level where law is viewed in terms of 
formal state law backed by state authority, there is still a relationship.  
Firstly, because CSR is not inextricably linked to voluntary formats, the choice of a 
voluntary instrument as a means of achieving CSR objectives is not intrinsic to CSR 
as a concept. This is because on the one hand, several aspects of CSR are not 
voluntary, as one writer put it, “many CSR-related issues are already closely 
regulated”148; this will include health, safety and environmental regulations which 
are subject to differing levels of regulation across different countries and then on the 
other hand, it is important that the concept of CSR should be divorced from the 
means of regulating to achieve it.  
The choice of voluntary instruments for regulation to achieve CSR should not be 
seen either as a defining feature of CSR or a defining feature of law’s relationship 
with CSR. Within this area of regulation, one agrees with Zerk when she points out 
                                                 
145 H Ward ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in Law and Policy’ in N Boeger et al (eds.) Perspectives 
of Corporate Social Responsibility, (Edward Elgar, 2008); see also the influential definition of CSR 
by Carroll  pointing out that the legal is an aspect of CSR: A Carroll ‘Corporate Social Responsibility 
– Evolution of a Definitional Construct’ (1999) 38(3) Business and Society 268-295 
146 J Sabapathy, ‘In the dark all cats are grey: corporate responsibility and legal responsibility’ in S 
Tully (ed) Research Handbook on Corporate Legal Responsibility  (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2007) 
235-253.  
147 This is entrenched in the positivist view of law especially with regard to narrowing law to state law 
or regarding state law as central and core. See Galligan (n 51) 177 -178 
148 J A Zerk Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility Limitations and Opportunities in 
International Law (CUP, Cambridge 2006) 34 
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that the ‘voluntary versus mandatory debate reflects an overly simplistic view of 
what law is and how it guides human behaviour’149Rather it is preferable to 
acknowledge that changing priorities and demands in society may lead to certain 
CSR issues and concerns being regulated in a voluntary, mandatory or hybrid 
regulatory fashion. A good example would be the environmental and social issues 
which may impact on climate change such as air pollution from vehicles where  a 
range of measures are used as regulation across different countries.150 
Werther and Chandler assert that this on-going redefinition and evolution of societal 
expectation causes the CSR response to evolve and in time, these expectations may 
evolve from a discretionary to a mandatory requirement.151 There is also the distinct 
possibility that a hybrid system of regulation may emerge where voluntary action is 
carried out within an enabling framework. This does not define law’s relationship 
with CSR; it only reflects the chosen methods of demanding social responsibility. 
Secondly, even where the choice of CSR regulation remains to use voluntary 
instruments, that is not tantamount to excluding law. The law can and should be 
more broadly defined to include not only mandatory legal rules but rules more 
generally. This is especially relevant in a transnational context. Rules in this sense 
will cover ‘general norms mandating or guiding conduct or action in a given type of 
situation’. 152This would include soft laws described earlier. 
 Although Law will not cover every rule as moral rules do not always coincide with 
legal rules, it has a paramount role in the creation of specific legal regulatory rules or 
broader facilitative framework for other forms of regulation.153 This perspective 
                                                 
149 Ibid at  34-35 
150 W B Werther and D B Chandler Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility: Stakeholders in a 
Global Environment (Sage, 2006) 13 
151 Ibid 
152 W Twining D Miers How to do things with rules(CUP, Cambridge 1999)  123 
153 Morgan & Yeung (n 130) 
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entails examining legal theory for a broad conception of law that captures this 
broader role of law. This conception would provide for the dynamism of law and its 
applicability to contemporary phenomena like CSR. Twining, points out that: 
‘a broad vision of legal theory helps us see our subject whole, to 
locate law in a map of all learning to spot gaps, biases and 
imbalances in contemporary treatments, and to identify questions 
or lines of enquiry that have been more or less marginalized in our 
legal culture’.154  
 
He also aptly surmises the challenge that faces law as one of adaptability and 
relevance to issues on a transnational level.155 These features of adaptability and 
relevance are most pertinent for our purposes because of the complexity of action 
taking place in the transnational arena 
Finally, where CSR is proclaimed as actions taken beyond the law, the relationship 
between law and CSR has then been referred to as ‘paradoxical’156.  ‘This is referred 
to as ‘paradoxical’ because even where CSR is seen as beyond the law, it does not 
operate outside the law. In one sense Parker poses the question: ‘how is it possible 
for the law to make companies accountable for going beyond the law?’157 In the way 
already described, it is questionable that CSR is going ‘beyond the law’ but even 
where this is accepted the answer depends on how law is conceived. Law which is 
broadly conceived appears most relevant in this category.  Parker in response to this 
question suggests the potential of ‘meta-regulation’ reflecting – law which seeks:  
‘to hold businesses accountable for taking their responsibilities 
seriously by using various mechanisms to encourage or enforce 
businesses to put in place internal governance structures, 
management practices and corporate cultures aimed at achieving 
responsible outcome.’158 
                                                 
154 W Twining (ed.)  Legal Theory and Common Law (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1986)  6 
155 Twining  2009 (n 39) 117 
156 C Parker, ‘Meta-regulation: Legal accountability for CSR’ in D. McBarnet  et al (eds.)The New 
Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 
207-240 
157 Ibid 
158 Parker (n 156) 
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This is a response which mirrors the practical aspect of a wider conception of law’s 
role.  This is because it echoes law’s wider role in creating facilitative framework for 
other types of normative activity. Yet it is still focused on form rather our suggested 
approach will involve a redefining how law is conceived. This conception draws 
attention to the cognizance of law’s potential role in a changing world.159 A 
conception of law which would be focused on the doing of the relevant jobs which 
law can perform within CSR.  
Therefore despite the contestations on the role of law within CSR, it is possible for 
law to respond from traditional perspective that is state law centred and hard law 
based or it can respond from a pluralistic perspective geared towards the doing of the 
law –jobs and the next two chapters examine these perspectives to show the potential 
contribution law can make to the core of CSR. 
 
                                                 
159 For support for this perspective, see Twining 2009 (n 39) 
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4.6  Conclusion 
 
 
The chapter explores what law could mean in the context of legitimacy and the drive 
for CSR. It identifies a traditional perspective which is state-centred and non-
traditional perspective which includes pluralistic sources. It argues that to capture the 
potential role of law there is the need for a pluralistic view of law amenable to 
concepts arising under globalisation. This view of law is capable of identifying the 
wider role for law but also capable of stimulating and framing law roles. This is 
necessary because at the core of CSR is the drive for legitimacy of corporate power. 
This is an area where law both in its traditional and non-traditional sense has a major 
role to play.  
The complexity of the area of CSR entails demands from different levels and over 
varying issues requires flexibility and dynamism. Therefore when examining global 
concepts such as CSR, the role of law and regulation should be viewed from a 
perspective that is able to capture broader aspects of what the law can do.  A 
conception of law would allow for the inclusion of both state law and non-state law 
and the evolution of new legal tools and mechanisms as well as the application of old 
ones where necessary.  
The task identified within this thesis of legitimating corporate power within CSR 
through legal perspectives can now be examined through the traditional and the non-
traditional lens. The next two chapters will juxtapose attempts to respond to these 
demands from a traditional law perspective (corporate law) with the new proposal to 
examine a broader perspective of law’s role through legal theory (Llewellyn’s law-
jobs). These are not mutually exclusive but the newer approach will allow for 
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framing of law within CSR under a broad view that will allow the use of varied law 
tools (traditional and non-traditional).  
These perspectives are therefore continued in the next two chapters examining the 
corporate law perspective as traditional state law approach and the law-jobs 
perspective as non-traditional perspective. This allows the thesis to explore the 
potential and limitations that such legal perspectives can bring to the identified core 
of CSR which is legitimacy of corporate power. 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
LEGITIMACY ISSUES I: CONSTRAINTS ON CORPORATE 
POWER WITHIN TRADITIONAL CORPORATE LAW 
 
‘...Different theoretical conceptions of the company have been intimately 
embroiled in the effort of company law to justify the vesting of substantial 
power in corporate management’1 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter examines how corporate law as an example of the traditional state-
centred legal perspective addresses the legitimacy challenge posed by CSR. 
Corporate law as the law of corporations is often seen as the natural home for 
addressing questions of the relationship between law and CSR. This is why scholars 
have advocated that it would have been desirable to have CSR issues integrated into 
this basic state legal framework therefore creating an identifiable framework from 
which CSR initiatives would flow.  
Ward puts it thus:  
‘The argument here would be that sustainable development (and/or 
other values associated with CSR) should be integrated within the 
basic legal framework, governing the formation and functioning of 
business enterprises – not exclusively as an ‘add-on’ in the form of 
environmental, labour or anti-corruption legislation- to name a few 
examples.’2  
                                                 
1 M Stokes ‘Company Law and Legal theory’ in W Twining (ed.) Legal Theory and Common Law 
(Blackwell, Oxford 1986) 155-183,161 
2 H Ward ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in Law and Policy’ in N Boeger, R Murray and C Villiers 
Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2008) 8-38, 21 
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Frynas also suggests that: 
‘Policy makers should make a concerted effort to re-write company 
law and other regulatory instruments to increase the power of ‘non-
traditional stakeholders’ and to require companies to become more 
transparent about all of their activities. Corporate governance 
reforms will help companies to make better social and 
environmental choices in front of shareholders.’3 
 
Furthermore corporate law represents a peculiar platform because it is the 
identifiable state legal framework that is common to most states in the world.4   
This chapter therefore examines corporate law and more specifically the potential of 
attempts to drive the legitimacy agenda within corporate law. It demonstrates that 
although corporate law as a traditional view of law can handle the issue of corporate 
legitimacy within CSR, it chooses to only partially address this issue. This may be 
because over time corporate law has developed a focus on utility. Utility interpreted 
narrowly as profit-maximisation.  
Hurst points out this two-fold division of the drive for legitimacy within corporate 
law, the division between the drive for utility and responsibility.5 In the US historical 
corporate context, he remarks that ‘utility and responsibility as legitimizers were 
ideas which materially affected our public policy...yet utility tended to become an 
end in itself.’6  This emphasis on utility within corporate law underscored law’s role 
in entrenching legally protected corporate power and offering a structure for the 
aggregation of power but failing to respond to problems of the responsibility aspect 
of corporate legitimacy, with the result that this has had to develop outside the 
context of corporate law. He therefore concludes that ‘so long as dominant opinion 
                                                 
3 J G Frynas Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility (CUP, Cambridge, 2009) 175-176 
4 I Seidl-Hohenveldern, Corporations in and under International law (Grotius Publications Limited 
Cambridge 1987) 1 
5 J W Hurst The Legitimacy of business in the Law of the United States 1780-1970 (University of 
Virginia Press Charlottesville 1970) 
6 Hurst (n 5) 58 - ‘What the law permits, what it enforces or compels, should be socially useful and 
socially responsible’ 
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continues to accept the large business as a legitimate constituent element in social 
power, the division of function between corporation law and regulatory law bearing 
on corporation’s behaviour and impact rather than on their internal governance 
seems likely to remain’7 
Yet it must be stated that it is not corporate law which is intrinsically unable to 
reform itself, it is the nature of corporate law as location for power contests (hence 
political nature) that detracts from the willingness for reform. Ireland instructively 
points out that: 
‘the corporate legal form as presently constituted is not an 
economic necessity but a political construct developed to further 
the interests of particular groups...as political constructs, the 
corporate legal from and its constituent elements- separate legal 
personality, limited liability and so on –should be subjected to 
critical analysis.’8 
 
This chapter engages in this analysis of corporate law as potential legitimiser of 
corporate power by initially examining corporate legal theory and corporate 
governance theory. This is because corporate theories have been influential in the 
attitude of law towards the corporation. It has also been crucial in the attempt by law 
to create legitimacy for corporate power by ensuring that there is an adequate 
framework of checks and balances.9  
 The focus on utility has emerged from the choice of corporate legal theory that 
privileges private ownership in furtherance of a contractual vision of the corporation. 
The chapter also addresses the issue of corporate governance theories and models 
                                                 
7 Hurst (n 5) 111 
8 P Ireland ‘Limited liability, shareholder rights and the problem of corporate irresponsibility’ (2010) 
34 Cambridge Journal of Economics 837-856,838-839 
9 D Millon “Theories of Corporation” (1990) Duke Law Journal 201- 262 ‘at any point in time 
particular theories are perceived to justify particular legal rules or at a more general level, a particular 
approach to the regulation of business activity’ 204 see also M J  Horwitz “Santa Clara Revisited: the 
Development of Corporate Theory’ (1985-1986) 88 West Virginia Law Review 173 -224 at 175-176 
reprinted in WJ Samuels A S Miller Corporations and Society: Power and Responsibility 13- 64 
Horwitz argues that the natural entity theory for instance has had a major influence in legitimising big 
business 
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within corporate law because this is the specific part within corporate law which can 
be used to discuss both the organisation of the corporation’s affairs and the 
relationship of the corporation to society.10  
The next section will then analyse an example of state corporate law reform.  The 
chosen example is UK Company law because it has gone through what has been 
described as a ‘landmark review of corporate law’11 It engaged in a long review and 
reform process.  The UK example is seen as the best demonstration of corporate 
law’s response to pressures for change.12 As Horrigan points out that ‘corporate 
law’s conception of corporate responsibility and governance is also facing 21st 
century pressures (from within and without) to re-fashion itself, in ways that extend 
beyond simple perfecting the alignment between company, board and share-holder 
interests.’13 This examination will look at the issues of shareholder primacy and 
director’s duties, effective monitoring structure (corporate governance) and the 
limitations of this substantive approach to broader issues of CSR. 
The chapter indicates that corporate law in this traditional form has the potential to 
contribute to the legitimacy of power but limitations in the substance, framing and 
focus mean that the utility element of legitimacy is emphasised rather than the 
responsibility element and as the UK corporate reform indicates the potential for this 
focus to change is minimal therefore law’s response will need to come from outside 
                                                 
10 See S Bottomley, ‘From Contractualism to Constitutionalism: A Framework for Corporate 
Governance’ (1997) 19 Sydney Law Review 277- 313 also cited in B. Sheehy ‘Scrooge--The 
Reluctant Stakeholder: Theoretical Problems in the shareholder-stakeholder debate’ (2005) 14 Miami 
Business Law Review 193- 241 Sheehy ibid, surmising that essentially 4 questions have been 
addressed under corporate governance- what is the entity being governed? By whom should the entity 
be governed? What is the best way to govern the entity? And in whose interests should the entity be 
governed? 
11 B Horrigan, Corporate Social Responsibility in the 21st Century: Debates, Models and Practices 
Across Government, Law and Business (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2010) 141 
12 Ward (n 2). Ward points out that in the UK, ‘the discussion on the proper conceptual framework for 
linking company law with the pursuit of corporate responsibility took place between 998 and 2006 in 
the context of the UK Company Law Reform Process.’ P.21 
13 Horrigan (n 11) 10 
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corporate law. This leaves room for an alternative view from the non-traditional 
perspective of the law-jobs which will avoid issues of form altogether. 
 
5.2  Corporate Legal theory 
 
Corporate legal theory has a history that is mingled with the history of the 
corporations and questions of their true nature. It is important to note that there has 
been extensive literature on the theories covered in this chapter.14 Nevertheless the 
issues involved are still far from settled and the actions of corporations trigger fresh 
arguments always.  
 This could be simply because the nature of corporations is contestable or because 
we need to continuously re-examine these theories as we apply them to a changing 
and dynamic world. Sommer suggests that ‘our complicated political and economic 
society is constantly compelling us to re-examine the assumptions and the rules that 
guided us in the past to determine their relevance to what we confront 
today.’15Therefore as newer and wider forms of corporate power emerge under 
globalisation the debates are renewed afresh hopefully with new insights and 
solutions relevant for the age.  
                                                 
14 Millon (n 9);F Hallis, Corporate Personality: A study of jurisprudence (OUP,  Oxford 1930) F M 
Maitland Introduction to Gierke’s Political Theories in the Middle Ages (CUP ,1900), A. Machen Jr. 
‘Corporate Personality (1911) 24 Harvard Law Review 253 -267, P Vinogrdoff, ‘Juridical Persons’ 
(1924) 24 Columbia Law Review 594 -604, J. Dewey, The historic background of Corporate Legal 
personality (1926) 35 Yale Law Journal 655 - 673, S A. Schane, ‘the corporation is a person: the 
language of a legal fiction’ (1987) 61 Tulane Law Review 563- 609, K Iwai ‘Persons, things and 
corporations, the corporate personality controversy and comparative corporate governance’ (1999) 47 
American Journal of Comparative law 538-632; For corporate governance theories –the literature is 
listed within but an essential starting point remains A.A. Berle & G. C. Means The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property (with a new introduction by M. Weidenbaum & M. Jensen) 
(Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick [USA originally published:1968, 1991) 
15 A A Sommer, Jr. ‘Whom should the corporation serve? The Berle-Dodd debate re-visited sixty 
years later’  (1991)16 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 33- 53 
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There is a specific body of legal and economic theory built around arguments of the 
corporation’s nature which influence the direction of analysis about the manner of 
control of corporations and corporate power. Horrigan affirms that ‘corporate 
theorizing is the bedrock of normative justifications that inform corporate law 
making, law reform and practice.’16 Recurring through the body of legal theory 
within corporate law is the question of who is the corporation for and by implication, 
how it should be controlled? As explained the answers are never static, as these 
theories must be re-examined and applied to changes in political and economic 
realities.   
The aim of such re-examination is to prompt new perspectives and solutions. The 
manner in which such theories are interpreted and adapted inadvertently affects the 
approach adopted to deal with corporations if only to be able to exclude certain 
solutions as tried and tested or irrelevant. Also the corporation itself by its actions 
affects and causes us to review our views and interpretations of it.17 For instance this 
basis allows for the argument that where it is found that the corporations are entirely 
private of origin and consistent with principles of contract and private property, then 
the focus must be inwards at internal regulatory measures and governance that 
satisfy ‘the private owners’.  
However one must bear in mind that this analysis is taking place against a 
background established in the previous chapter of the immense power of 
multinational corporations to affect societal interests. It seeks redress for the exercise 
of observable or potential corporate power in today’s globalised society.  This is a 
wider perspective relevant to a global but uneven world. Multinational corporations 
                                                 
16  Horrigan (n 11) 76 
17 Sommer (n 15) - where he surmises that legal theory shapes social practice and practice informs 
theory at the same time. 
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do not have legal status in and of themselves as ‘multinational corporations’18, 
therefore this study of corporate governance must begin with an examination of the 
legal theory behind the formation of the simple corporation. 
 The most common form of medium for large business such as multinational 
corporations is the public corporation (or company) limited by shares. This is 
because it offers the four most attractive features19, that is, (a) legal personality; (b) 
limited liability for investors and (c) centralised management, (d) free transferability 
of interests.  The corporation therefore may offer shares to the public and may then 
register to be quoted on the stock exchange market.20 The latter three attributes are 
derived from the first attribute, which is corporate personality. 
 An understanding of corporate personality as it has evolved is central to 
comprehension of why the corporate form can give rise to such power as it possesses 
today and how its governance models have evolved. The origin and nature of the 
corporation has been a source of seemingly endless dispute.21 There is an astonishing 
wealth of material on this controversy of the exact jurisprudential nature and origin 
of the corporation.22  
The source of this dispute on the role of corporations can even be traced further back 
to two competing notions about the human individual or as Allen put it, ‘what it 
                                                 
18 This was discussed in the earlier chapter: See also P T Muchlinski Multinational Enterprises and 
the Law (Blackwell Publishing, Oxford 1999)  111. 
19 This is as listed by Dean Robert Clark of the Harvard Law School in RAG Monks and  N Minow, 
Corporate Governance (3rd ed. Blackwell, Oxford 2004) 11 
20 Hansmaan and Kraakman list five essential features of business corporations in major commercial 
jurisdictions as separate legal personality, limited liability, shared corporate ownership, delegated 
management under a board structure and transferability of shares. H Hansmann R H Kraakman ‘The 
End of the History of Corporate Law’ in J Gordon M Roe (eds.) Convergence and Persistence in 
Corporate Governance (CUP, Cambridge 2004) 33-68, 34 
21  M Radin ‘The endless problem of corporate personality’ (1932) 32 Columbia Law Review 643-667  
22 A  sample can be found in the works of Hallis (n 14), Dewey (n 14), Iwai (n 14) & G Teubner 
‘Enterprise corporatism, New Industrial policy and the “essence” of the legal person’ (1988) 36 
American Journal of Comparative Law 130 - 155 
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means to be human being in society’;23 Are men individual beings or are they social 
beings? Allen finds that the first view of men as individuals beings with individual 
rights, has roots in the works of Hobbes, Locke and Smith, further shaped by 
Bentham and Mills and then developed in Herbert Spencer’s work.24 This view is of 
‘the social world populated by individuals rationally…pursuing their own vision of 
the good life’25 Hence in this view which he refers to as the liberal-utilitarian model, 
property law and contracts law are of greatest importance for human welfare.  
However the second view, which designates men as social beings, is aptly called the 
social model. This model perceives the world as ‘populated by persons of limited 
rationality who lead lives embedded in a social context in a community.’ 26This 
model perceives only limited usefulness in contract and property law re-asserting 
that their utility rests on the basis of shared norms including fairness and trust. They 
are prepared to tolerate vagueness in rules in order to achieve a fair outcome. This 
debate follow through into disputes about the personality of the corporation.  
                                                 
23  W  T Allen ‘Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law’ (1993) 50 Washington & Lee  Law 
Review 1395 - 1407 
24 Ibid; sometimes referred to as social contractarians, Hobbes and Locke believed in a social 
contract- ‘the idea that only with his consent can a person be subjected to the political power of 
another’. See R  Wacks Understanding Jurisprudence (OUP, New York 2005) 20. Hobbes (1651) 
describing life as ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’ and advocated  that persons will only pursue 
their  own self –interests. For his most popular work see: T Hobbes, Leviathan, M Oakeshott(ed.) 
(Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1960) Locke (1689) though influenced by Hobbes, rejected the nasty, 
brutish and short premise and promotes the right of oppressed people to resist tyranny and a man’s 
right to property. For his work read: J. Locke, Two treatises of Government,  P Laslett(ed.) (CUP, 
Cambridge 1964). Adam Smith (1776) economist (in line with Locke) viewed property as a natural 
right and its protection as a law of nature. See A Smith  An Inquiry inot the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations M Cannan (ed.) (5th ed. Metheun & Co. Ltd., London 1904) Book I, Chapter X, Pt. 
II. Bentham and Mills are both Utilitarians which are concerned are concerned with [among other 
things] the impact of judges actions, laws and institutions on individuals.  For a helpful discussion on 
this subject see N E Simmonds Central Issues in Jurisprudence –justice, law and rights (3rd ed. Sweet 
& Maxwell, 2008) Herbert Spencer, a social Darwinist, was also of the view that the society was 
evolving to increase the freedom of individuals so that government intervention ought to be minimal 
in social and political life. See H Spencer ‘Progress: Its Law & Causes’  (1857) 67 The Westminister 
Review 445-465,  
25 Allen (n 23) 1396.  
26 Allen (n 23) 1397; This model is championed by Emile Durkheim;  For Durkheim’s work see E 
Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society, translated by George Simpson, (Collier-Macmillan, 
London 1964) 
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Corporate personality is an attribute of corporation common to most legal systems of 
the world.27 The International Court of Justice in the case of Barcelona Traction, 
Light and Power Company Ltd., observed that: 
 ‘seen in historical perspective, the corporate personality represents 
a development brought about by new and expanding requirements 
in the economic field, an entity which in particular allows of 
operation in circumstances which exceed the normal capacity of 
individuals. As such it has become a powerful factor in the 
economic life of nations. Of this, municipal law has had to take due 
account, hence the increasing volume of rules governing the 
creation and operation of corporate entities, endowed with a 
specific status. These entities have rights and obligations peculiar 
to themselves’28. 
 
Nevertheless the exact meaning of the nature of corporate personality and its 
consequential implications remain the source of incessant contention. The basic 
contention has been: does the personality of the corporation arise simply because 
individuals exercise their fundamental contractual rights or is it because society 
permits this socially desirable form of business?  
It now appears settled that the corporation is recognised as a separate legal 
personality,29 and that as a consequence of such separate legal personality, it is 
possible to have corporations with limited liability. This limited liability in the case 
of multinational corporations or ’groups’ of companies’, implies that the liability of 
the parent corporation is just as that of a ‘person’ investing limited to the amount left 
unpaid on the shares.30  The interpretation of the exact nature of the concept of 
                                                 
27 Seidl-Hohenveldern (n 4)1 
28  I C J  Reports 1970 3 at p.40, para.39 
29 The ‘corporate personality’ or ‘separate legal personality’ as it is called, is one of the few legal 
concepts common to most countries of the world.  
30 In Re Southard Ltd. Per Templeman LJ ‘ (1979) 3 All ER 556, (1979) 1 WLR 1198 ‘English 
company law possesses some curious features, which may generate curious results. A parent company 
may spawn a number of subsidiary companies, all controlled directly or indirectly by the shareholders 
of the parent company. If one of the subsidiary companies, to change the metaphor, turns out to be the 
runt of the litter and declines into solvency to the dismay of its creditors, the parent company and the 
other subsidiary companies may prosper to the joy of the shareholders without any liability for the 
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separate legal personality is at the root of problems regarding how the law views 
controls of corporate power.  The disputes put in a different guise have been simply 
about what is a corporation? Is it really a group of individuals taking on a fictional 
personality or is it a group of individuals forming a thing that takes on its own 
realness, distinct from the creators? These are questions about the nature. There are 
also questions about the origin, is it formed just because individuals get together and 
draw up a contract or is it formed only by government recognition or concession? .  
Each of these answers has a defining role in what the purpose of the corporation is 
for. If the corporation is merely a group of individuals contracting together then it 
follows that there it exists just for their own interests; but if it needs recognition from 
the society, then it exists for societal interests as well.  
The next section will attempt to describe the theories that have arisen in answer to 
these questions but an important caveat must be added, theories tend to be absolute 
which in practice is never the case, still inherent in these theories are the 
fundamental principles which will help us unravel particular issues and adopt 
applicable and appropriate answers. 
                                                                                                                                          
debts of the insolvent subsidiary.  It is not surprising that when a subsidiary collapses, the unsecured 
creditors wish the finances of the company and its relationship with other members of the group to be 
so narrowly examined to ensure no assets of the subsidiary company have leaked away, that no 
liability of the subsidiary company ought to be laid at the door of other members of the group and that 
no indemnity from or right of action against any other company or against any individual is by some 
mischance overlooked’ 
Pettet notes that not all countries follow this approach notably Germany—West Germany since 1965 
has had special rules governing groups of companies the ‘korzernrecht’ in which parent company may 
become liable for the losses of the subsidiary in certain circumstances.’ B Pettet Company Law (2nd 
ed. Pearson Education Limited  2005) See also C Alting  ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil in American 
and German Law-Liability of Individuals and Entities; a comparative view’, (1994-1995) 2 Tulsa 
Journal of Comparative & Internationall Law 187 states that ‘the United States legal doctrine of 
corporate veil refers to the common concept of limited corporate liability under which the 
shareholders of a corporate entity are not personally liable for the entity’s debts and obligations. See 
E.g., Revised Model Business Corp. Act ss 6.22, 2.02(b)(2)(v) (1994)  .  See also Del. Code Ann. tit. 
8, s 102(b)(6) (1992); C S Krendl J R Krendl, Piercing The Corporate Veil: Focusing the Inquiry, 
(1978) 55 Denver  Law Journal. 1- 59, 2 
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 Interestingly Bratton Jr. notes that: 
‘theorists aspire to provide objective answers to all questions and 
their theories tend to pose clear-cut, determinant aspirations…legal 
decision-makers share the theorist’s aspirations but in the end tend 
to mediate between alternatives’31   
For the most part, debates about these theories have been used to opposing and 
sometimes conflicting ends32 but this does not detract from the value that have been 
derived from such theories over the years. As Millon argues that in specific settings 
in history legal theory has been used to influence the direction of legal 
understanding.33Historically human pursuit is carried out in co-operative ventures. 
Corporation is not peculiar simply as a cooperative venture. There is evidence of 
long-distance partnership contract known as ‘naruqqum’ used in conducting long-
distance caravan trade in the Old Assyrian state at about 19th Century BC.34 
 The ancient Romans set up a number of partnerships for their maritime trade and 
these and other forms of collective business appear common to the pre-modern 
commercial worlds.35 It appears to be the case that ‘men are social beings” in the 
sense that no large business undertaking is carried out without social co-operation.36 
However the peculiarity begins with the conception of the corporation as a separate 
legal person. 37Thus theories about the nature and origin of corporation are vital to 
understanding corporate law’s approach to the issue of legitimacy. 
 
                                                 
31 W W Bratton ‘Public Values, Private Business and  US Corporate Fiduciary Law’  in J McCahery, 
S Picciotto and C Scott (eds.) Corporate Control and Accountability: changing structures and the 
dynamics of regulation ( Claredon Press, Oxford 1993) 23 
32 Dewey (n 14) 671 
33 Horwitz (n 9)  Millon (n 9) 
34 Iwai  (n 14) 583  
35 Ibid 
36 Vinogradoff  (n 14)  He was quoting Aristotle 
37 Villiers describes the combination of the separate legal personality and limited liability as a ‘lethal 
cocktail’ for attempts to pursue parent corporations for liability of the subsidiaries. p.95 C Villiers, 
‘Corporate law, corporate power and corporate social responsibility’ in N Boeger, R Murray and C 
Villiers (eds.), Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2008) 
85- 112 
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5.3 Theories about the nature and origin of the corporation 
 
 
 
The origin of the corporation is linked (at least in Anglo-American tradition) to the 
tradition of concessions by the crown in form of charters or grants creating a body 
separate. This right, first extended to religious orders, local authorities and guild of 
merchants, evolved to a point where incorporation by registration and limited 
liability was introduced in England in 1844.38 In America at least until the 19th 
Century incorporation for private business objectives was rare. Corporations were 
usually charitable or municipal corporations as well as privately owned banks, 
insurance or public utilities.39 
With the expansion of communication networks and travels creating newer markets, 
the scale and scope of business increased.40 In that sense the transition from earlier 
forms of the corporations to the multinational corporations seems to have come 
initially via the Dutch and English trading companies of the 16th and 17th century 
chartered by government in long-distance trade and colonial management.41 In 
recent history however the origin of multinational corporations is placed firmly 
within the mid- late nineteenth century with the renewed boost of international 
commerce and links.42  
                                                 
38  Joint Stock Companies Act 1844; Limited Liability Act 1855 
39 Millon (n 9) 
40  A D Chandler, Scale and Scope: the Dynamics of  Industrial Capitalism (Bleknap/Harvard 
University press, 1990) 
41 A M Carlos and S Nicholas ‘Giants of an earlier capitalism: the chartered trading companies as 
modern multinationals’ (1988) 62 Business History Review 398 - 419 
42 P Hertner G Jones, Multinationals: Theory and History (Gower, 1986) 
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 While it is not the only factor, corporate personality and limited liability with the 
ability of the corporation to own shares in other corporations has been a major 
trigger for the continued growth and popularity of the modern corporate form.43  
These theories which attempt to explain the nature and origin of corporations are 
important when one seeks to understand fully what the corporate form is and how 
they have been shaped by the thinking and practice of this time. These theories are 
the fiction theory, real entity theory, concession theory and contract theory. In this 
work, Pettet’s distinction between theories that refer to the nature of the corporation 
such as the fiction theory and the real entity theory and theories that refer to the 
origin of the corporation such as the concession or contract theories has been of 
value in clarifying the use of the arguments within this context. 44 However the 
theories are not incompatible and various writers have linked them in a number of 
ways in past writings45but the analysis reveals how they have been used to justify 
different approaches within corporate law. 
                                                 
43 There are other economic factors. Professor Leslie Hannah is of the view that the availability of the 
joint stock limited liability company is a necessary precondition to the widespread adoption of 
modern industrial organisation. L Hannah, ‘Mergers, Cartels and Concerntration: legal factors in US 
and European experience’ in N Horn and J Kocka (eds.) Law in the Formation of Bog Enterprises in 
the 19th and 20th centuries (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Gottingen 1979) 306-315. New Jersey in 
America was the first American state in 1888 to adopt statute which allowed corporations to own 
shares in other corporations, creating the concept of a holding corporation  Muchlinski (n 130) 40  
44 In the main, a three- fold distinction commonly used between fictional theory, contract theory and 
the real entity theory, See P I Blumberg “The Corporate Entity in an era of Multinational corporation” 
(1990)15 Del. J. Corp. L. 283   putting forward a strong case for the selective utilisation of enterprise 
law (piercing the veil in groups of corporations) to supplement application of entity law on a case by 
case basis. This is three-fold distinction not sacrosanct as other writers use different titles. For 
example (fiction/ corporate realism/ corporate nominalism- Iwai ibid); Creature/group/ person – 
Schane ‘The Corporation is a person: the language of legal fiction’ (1987) 61 Tulane Law  Review 
563 – 595 See Pettet (n 30) 48 
45 Dewey (n 14) argues that each theory has been used to serve opposing ends. See Pettet ibid; see 
also B Pettet ‘Limited Liability: A principle for the 21st Century?’ (1995) 48(2) Current Legal 
Problems 125-159 
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5.3.1 The Fiction Theory 
 
 
This is a theory about the nature of the corporation that can be traced to the 19th 
particularly in France and Germany where there was deep interest in the 
metaphysical nature of the corporation.46 The proponents of this theory firmly 
asserted that the corporation is a legal fiction, existing only in law. Von Savigny is 
seen as the main proponent of the fiction theory. He was a German Romanist, who 
saw the corporation as an ‘artificial subject admitted by means of pure fiction’. 
Therefore this theory asserts that the corporation is a legal fiction only existing in 
law.47 Schane in this regard notes that although a human being as a conscious and 
willing entity possessed inalienable rights and individuals may enter into association, 
but the resulting group does not have independent existence of its own except in the 
contemplation of the law (as a persona ficta).48 
This view had been prominent for centuries past and was expressed as early as the 
17th Century by Coke49 and in later years by Kyd50 and by Blackstone51. This view 
also held sway in the United States at that time as evidenced by Chief Justice 
Marshall’s observation that ‘a corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, 
                                                 
46 Schane (n 14) 
47 See Jurial relations  or the Roman law of persons as subjects of jurial relations: being a translation 
of the second book of Savigny’s System of Modern Roman Law by (W H Rattigan (ed.) Wildy and 
Sons, 1884) at 181 and 204 
48 Schane  (n 14) 
49 Schane (n 14) notes an earlier pronouncement in the rolls of parliament for as early as 1444. – This 
citation from rolls of parliament he notes is recorded under the entry ‘person’ in 7 Oxford English 
Dictionary 724 (1961)Case of Sutton’s Hosp., 10 Coke 23a, 30b-32b, 77 Eng Rep. 960, 970-973 
(1612) – Corporation is “invisible, immortal and rests only in intendment and consideration of the 
law” 
50 S Kyd, A treatise on the law of corporations (1793) 69-70, 103  
51 W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1st ed. , 1765) 475-476  
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and existing only in the contemplation of the law. Being the mere creature of law, it 
possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it’ 
either expressly or as incidental to its very existence.’52 This concept has close links 
with the concession theory of the corporation and this is because at that time the 
charters and grant were the prevalent form of creating a corporation. Savigny in 
propounding this theory believed in the necessity of state sanction for the creation of 
every legal person. Therefore the legal fiction was viewed as a privileged legal 
creation of the state, with the state able to control and regulate the corporation. 
However the fiction theory has more recently been used as a theory of the nature of 
corporation without its corollary state/ concession theory. This is because it simply 
envisages a legal fictional person created by law. Indeed recent agency theorists, 
Jensen and Meckling who see the corporation as a nexus of contracts have also used 
this theory for justification. They define a ‘corporate firm as simply legal fiction 
which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relations among individuals.’53This 
means that emphasis can shift from the ‘law’ aspect of the theory to the ‘fiction’ 
aspect. This is why this theory is linked to the aggregate or group theory which 
emphasises the real persons behind the fiction. 54  Its main advocates were Jhering in 
Germany and Vareilles-Sommieres in France.55 They saw the corporation as a label 
for identifying members of the group and felt that the corporation was really a group 
of individuals who contracted for its formation.56   
                                                 
52 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819) (17 US) 4 Wheat 518 at 636  
53 M Jensen W Meckling ‘The theory of the firm: Managerial behaviour, agency costs and ownership 
structures’ (1976)  3 Journal Of Financial Economics 305-360 at 310  
54 This appears to have drawn on roman legal theory surrounding the roman association, ‘societas’ 
which had legal personality A Dignam & J Lowry Company Law (4th ed.) (OUP, 2006) 354 
55 De Vareilles-Sommieres, Les Personnes Morales (1902) in Schane (n 14), A W Machen ‘Corporate 
Personality’ (1911) 24 HLR 253- 267 at 257-258  
56 Ibid  
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This is the reasoning behind Morawetz’s characterisation of the group theory as 
stating that: 
‘Although a corporation is frequently spoken of as a person or 
unit… the existence of the corporation independently of its 
shareholders is a fiction; and the rights and duties of an 
incorporated association are in reality, the rights and duties of the 
persons who compose it, not an imaginary being.’57 
 
The theoretical conception of the corporation as a legal fiction has been used to 
justify the property rights of the shareholders behind the corporate personality fiction 
and insist that the corporation is really for its shareholders.  However the problematic 
factor for this perspective is the rule of limited liability.58Limited liability does not 
flow automatically from the rights and duties of the persons who compose the 
corporation rather it appears to be a privilege derived as a consequence of 
incorporation. There must be a justification for limiting the liability of the members 
because if the corporation were to be regarded as merely individuals coming together 
under the corporate name, they would be fully liable for debts of that corporation 
under contract law.  
Chief Justice Taney points out that if they were simply members carrying out 
business under a corporate name and entitled to the privileges of contract, they 
would be liable under these contracts for the whole extent of its property and for the 
debts of the corporation like a mere partnership in business corporation.59 The 
counter-position must therefore be that although it is a legal fiction when it is 
                                                 
57 V Morawetz, A treatise on the law of private corporations  (2nd ed.,1886) 
58 Ireland refers to this as ‘the no-obligation, no-responsibility, no-liability nature of corporate shares’ 
and this ‘permits their owners or their institutional representatives to enjoy income rights without 
needing to worry...they are not legally responsible for corporate malfeasance and in the event of 
failure only their initial investments are at risk.’ P Ireland ‘Limited Liability, Shareholder rights and 
the problem of corporate irresponsibility’ (2010) 34 Cambridge Journal of Economics 837-856, 845 
59 Bank of Augusta v Earle 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586 (1839) cited in Horwitz (n 9) 
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incorporated yet by virtue of law it is endowed with several attributes as a result 
which gives it a strange realness and power. 
 In this sense we speak of how corporations invade our lives and acquire 
responsibility for providing and impacting on several necessary goods and services. 
This is even extended to notions of criminality of corporate action, where 
punishment is sought for corporate crimes and criminal conduct.60This notion is 
reflected in the alternative view of the corporation as a real entity. 
 
5.3.2 The Real Entity Theory 
 
 
This theory is the competing theory about the nature of the corporation which in 
contrast to the ‘fiction theory’ views the corporation as a real and living entity. This 
theory is generally regarded as the work of 19th Century German realist, Gierke.61 He 
saw the corporations as a living organism with a separate existence and life of its 
own, distinct for that of its shareholders. He pointed to the notion of human nature to 
form groups and that such groups when formed acquire a life of their own.62  
In the United States of America (USA) the important turning point for the 
corporation towards the real entity theory was the decision in the case of Santa Clara 
County v. Southern Pacific Railroad in 188663, which declared the corporation a 
person for the purposes of the fourteenth amendment. The court decided that the 
provision in the fourteenth amendment to the constitution which forbids the state to 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection applies to corporations. By 
                                                 
60 Legislation on corporate crimes such as the UK Corporate Homicide and Corporate Manslaughter 
Act 2007, UK Bribery Act 2010 
61 Maitland, Introduction to  O Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age at xviii-xliii (1900) 
62 Schane (n 14) 
63 (1886) 118 U. S. 394 although Horwitz (n 9) argues to the contrary that the Santa Clara case has 
only been adapted to suit this view and that they were influenced by thinking on shareholder property 
rights. 
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implication, this equates the corporation with a real person therefore having rights 
and by implication duties and responsibilities.64  
In England the contrast in legal thinking between fiction and real entity theory can be 
illustrated by these two contrasting legal observations. Edward, First Baron Thurlow 
and Lord Chancellor of England in the 18th century remarking: ‘Did you ever expect 
a corporation to have a conscience, when it has no soul to be damned and no body to 
be kicked?’65 
As opposed to, the statement of Denning LJ that:  
‘A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has 
a brain and a nerve centre that which controls what it does. It also 
has hands which hold the tools and act in accordance with the 
directions from the centre. Some of the people in the company are 
mere servants or agents who are nothing more than the hands to do 
the work and cannot be said to represent the mind or will. Others 
are directors and managers who represent the directing mind and 
will of the company and control what it does. The state of mind of 
the managers is the state of mind of the company and is treated by 
the law as such.’66 
 
Notwithstanding the slight absurdity of equating the corporation to a real entity, 
there is an element of practicality which has contributed to this becoming a theory 
that acknowledges practical influence of the expansion of business.  There is a 
distinct legal personality which can be seen in a natural or artificial way. Machen 
argues for a distinction between the entity and the recognition of the entity as a 
person. He points out that in his view ‘a corporation exists as an objectively real 
entity which any well-developed child or normal man must perceive: the law merely 
recognises and gives legal effect to the existence of this entity.’ 67 
                                                 
64 Millon (n 9) 
65 Cited  in Monks and Minow (n 19) 31 
66 Bolton Engineering v. Graham (1957) 1 QB 159 at 172  
67 Machen (n 14) 256 
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Regardless of whether this distinction is accepted, it is the recognition of the real 
entity nature by law that has been the justifiable basis for allowing corporation as 
persons to own shares in other corporations paving the way for larger groups of 
corporations such as MNC. This principle of a separate legal person famously 
enunciated in Salomon v Salomon where Lord MacNaghten expounded that ‘the 
company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to the 
memorandum’.68 This has been extended to MNC in a beneficial way as parent 
corporations can hold shares in subsidiaries just as a separate person.69  The practical 
effect of this distinctness is demonstrated by the US case of People’s Pleasure Park 
Co. v Rohleder70 were the court found that covenants restricting transfer of land to 
‘colored persons’ in the early twentieth century did not apply to a company whose 
entire shareholders were African American. It found that the corporation was legally 
distinct and separate and could hold land in its own name.  
This theory which allows for extension of rights to the separate legal personality of 
the corporation can by analogy be extended to that of responsibilities. This will 
permit a personality that demands rights but also acquire responsibilities. This can be 
gleaned from Lord Halsbury’s statement in Salomon v Salomon that ‘once the 
company is legally incorporated it must be treated like any other independent person 
with its rights and liabilities appropriate to itself.’ 71  
                                                 
68 (1897) AC 22 (HL)  
69 Ireland (n 8) 
70 61 SE 794 (Va 1908) Case in Virginia USA, Facts given in L E Talbot Critical Company Law 
(Routledge 2008) 
71 (1897) AC 22 
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There is direct analogy between this reasoning of corporations as distinct legal 
persons and cajoling the corporations to become better ‘citizens’.72Furthermore 
Millon identifies that the entity theory could be used a theoretical basis for corporate 
social responsibility.73 He relies on Dodd’s analysis to indicate that corporation as its 
own entity can owe responsibilities to society. But there is still some doubt as to how 
far this analogy can be extended because Keay also puts forward an entity 
maximisation and sustainability model based on the company being regarded as a 
distinct legal entity and argues for a core objective of the corporation that is centred 
on maximising the entity for its sustainable survival. 74This is a reflection of a self-
interested entity. Nevertheless the question of range of interests that this entity 
should have is inter-mingled with questions of its origin as well. 
   
5.3.3 Concession Theory 
 
The concession theory pertains to the origin of the corporation. It perceives the 
source of the corporation’s legal personality as emerging from the states. This 
proposition may have arisen in response to the state’s desire to regulate groups 
within it thereby creating a validation process through a grant system or registration 
system. The state through this process grants the corporate status and its advantages 
to groups who wish to carry on certain business. 
 This theory on initial consideration appears outmoded better suited to the times 
when the state was directly involved in grants by royal charter and so on. However 
on deeper consideration, there is a fundamental fact which rings true from this theory 
                                                 
72 J Androif & M McIntosh (eds.) Perspectives on Corporate Citizenship (Sheffield, Greenleaf 
Publishing, 2001) 
73 Millon (n 9) 219 
74 A Keay ‘Ascertaining the Corporate Objective: An Entity Maximisation and Sustainability Model’ 
(2008) 71(5)The Modern Law Review 663-698, 665 
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which some now see as defunct. That is that corporate personality can only be 
acceptable where the society sees fit to give and recognise it. The idea of corporate 
personality has been politically and legally constructed on the premise of the utility 
of the corporation. 75 Corporate personality is recognition accorded by state law. 
 It is not inherent in any group to be a body corporate except it complies with 
outlined steps (albeit simple steps) listed in statute. These steps may have been 
modified and eased to enable the growth of entrepreneurship and commerce (hence 
emphasising the utility aspect of corporate legitimacy) but it still remains a privilege 
accorded to a group in society by government. 
 If the government is taken to be the expression of the people through a democratic 
process76this thereby fulfils Dodd’s expression that corporations exist because they 
are beneficial to society.77 Although the trend may be to ease restrictions, there is no 
denying the inherent power of society through government or other means to 
regulate monitor or change the conditions and basis under which such corporate 
status should be acquired and how it should operate.78  
This is exemplified in the UK by the extensive company law review process that 
culminated in the Companies Act 2006. There will always be a prescription of legal 
formalities for registering corporations and even where people come together to do 
business, they are not automatically recognised as corporations because they think 
they are.   
                                                 
75 Millon (n 9) This is seen as defunct because of the change in corporate formation and the death of 
the ultra vires rule. 
76 Not always the case but issues of public governance are outside the scope of this work. For an 
overview of current and new thinking in this area, see J Lenoble M Maesschalck Democracy, Law 
and Governance (Ashgate, England 2010) 
77 E M Dodd, ’For whom are corporate managers trustees?’ (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review  1145-
1163 
78 Horrigan (n 11) 
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It is rather acceptable to assert that:  
‘A business corporation is able to act as an independent owner of 
its own property capable of making a contractual relation directly 
with others, not because the inside shareholders will it to be so, but 
because, and in so far as, the outside parties recognise it to be so. 
Such social recognition is indispensable and the law formalizes and 
reinforces the social recognition in the form of legal personality’79 
 
This possibility of the formalisation of social recognition is what pushes Blumberg 
to request for the recognition of the new reality of MNC in law with an enterprise 
personality model. 80 This model he suggests will recognise the modern enterprise 
and go beyond the limited entity legal personality now present in national legal 
systems. He points out that over the last hundred years in which the law has eased 
permissions of the formation of groups the reality that has emerged is that some large 
corporations operate under common control as a multinational enterprise.81 
Nonetheless there is reluctance to recognise such an entity because of the decreasing 
emphasis on the role of the state which is linked to the predominant liberal legal 
order and the emphasis on privatisation and de-regulation.82This is also what drives 
the alternative contract theory on the origin of the corporation. 
                                                 
79 Iwai  (n 14) 
80 P I Blumberg ‘The Corporate Entity in an era of Multinational Corporations’ 15(2) Delaware 
Journal of Corporate Law 283-276 
81 Ibid 
82 G J Ikenberry ‘Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order’ 
(2009) 7(1) Perspectives on Politics 71-87. 
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5.3.4 Contract Theory 
 
The contract theory is also about origin of the corporation. It views the origin of the 
corporation as rooted in contract. This is more attuned to the individualistic view of 
the human person and his inherent right to enter into contracts which has thrived in 
the current liberal legal order.  The contract theory views the corporation as based on 
private contract therefore the role of the state is limited to enforcing contracts.83 The 
focus is on freedom of contract and the freedom to structure contracts between 
private persons.84 More recently this theory has been refreshed not just as contract 
but as a ‘nexus of contracts’ and this revival is most evident in the development of 
economic theories of the corporation.85 The proponents of this theory restate the 
corporation as a complex set of explicit and implicit contracts. For example: 
Easterbrook and Fishcel state that: 
 ‘The corporate structure is a set of contracts through which 
managers and certain other participants exercise a great deal of 
discretion that is ‘reviewed’ by interactions with other self-
interested actors. The interaction often occurs in markets and we 
shall sometimes call the pressures these interactions produce 
‘market forces’.86  
 
The underlying basis of the contract theory is that the individuals who make up the 
corporation contract to do so and in essence the corporation is a contract agreed 
among its members. In deference to the incomplete picture this paints, the nexus of 
                                                 
83 H N Butler ‘Contractual theory of the corporation’ 11(4) George Mason University Law Review 
99-123 
84 Ibid at 100 
85 See works such as R H Coase ‘The Nature of a firm’ (1937) 4 Economica 13-16, M Jensen and W 
Meckling ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’  
(1976) 3 Journal Of Financial Economics 305-360 at 310, O E Williamson, ‘Corporate Governance’ 
(1984) 93 Yale Law Journal  1197-1230 
86 F H Easterbrook D R Fischel ‘The Corporate Contract’ 89 Columbia Law Review 1416-1448, 1418 
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contracts theorists simply add more layers of contracts which define the role of 
owners and the managers seen as their agents.  
This theory underlies most of the current writing about the corporations, however in 
spite of its success it is disputable that the corporation as a legal person can be 
reduced to a bundle of contracts. Yet this has been useful to justify the limited focus 
on the internal participants. Nevertheless Parkinson points out that even where one 
accepts the contractual basis of corporations, this does not absolve corporate law 
from the issue of state intervention especially where such corporate power is 
contrary to public or societal interest. He however recognises that the concentration 
of power in private hands has come partly as a result of their existence. 87   
It has become one of the main vehicles of capitalism and forms the basis for 
corporate governance models in Anglo-American states.88 The contractual 
theoretical underpinnings of corporate governance are the reason for the limited 
focus on issues of CSR within corporate law. Its impact is also significant globally as 
the evidence of convergence of corporate governance models increases.89 
Overall the nature of these well-established disputes about corporations is that they 
help us understand perhaps the ‘fluctuating reality of corporations’90 Teubner 
suggests that the social reality of the legal person can be found in the collectivity of 
the socially binding self-description of an organised action system of cyclical linkage 
of identity and action. He cites Weber as perhaps justified in treating collectivities as 
                                                 
87 J E Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the theory of Company Law 
(Claredon Press, Oxford 1995) 30 
88 Butler (n 83) 
89 Hansmann and Kraakman (n 20) 
90 See G Teubner ‘Enterprise Corporatism: New Industrial Policy and the “ Essence” of the legal 
person (1988) 36 American Journal of Comparative Law 130, at 138  citing Weber Economy and 
Society (1978)13 , This is also examined in Blumberg ( n 80) 
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ideas in the heads of judges and yet assigning them a powerful and decisive 
influence on the course of action of real people91 
Therefore corporations can be perceived as creature of law yet real and powerful. 
Perhaps the idea of the corporation as real helps enhance its power but more 
importantly it makes it possible to assert  that there are two sides to this coin, that is, 
that the corporation is a creature of law and therefore can be regulated by law  even 
though within the corporation there lies a contractual arrangement for its members.  
However it can apparent that the influence and interpretations of these theories is 
what drives the direction of the governing of the corporation and the range of 
interests which the corporation will take into account. These are key issues for 
legitimacy and accountability of corporate power within the corporate law 
framework. 
                                                 
91 Teubner Ibid 
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5.4 Corporate Governance models and theories 
 
 
 
Corporate governance theories are derived from theories of corporate personality. It 
has been pointed out that ‘the problems of “corporate” governance are literally the 
problems of governing the “corporate” form of business firms.’ 92Therefore 
corporate governance debates also reflect the lack of clarity over the corporate 
objective and this lack of clarity are predicated on debates about the nature and 
origin of the corporation.93Questions such as: is the corporation ultimately for its 
owners and their profit or is it for society and its benefit? 
These questions relate to the purpose of the corporation as well as to issues of 
control or governing and in whose interest. Therefore corporate governance covers 
how a corporation is run and how it behaves.94 The problem of control becomes even 
more extended in large MNC’s where the managers are distinct from the owners and 
there is a lack of control because ownership is dispersed and weak.   
This problem was identified as early as 1838 in the work of Adam Smith where he 
identified a problem with joint stock companies having managers of other people’s 
money and questioned the vigilance with which they would watch over it.95 
However it is given a full analysis in the seminal work of Berle and Means.96 
                                                 
92 K Iwai ‘What is a Corporation? – the corporate personality controversy and the fiduciary principle 
in corporate governance’ in F Cafaggi, A Nicita and U Pagano (eds.) Legal orderings and Economic 
Institutions (London: Routledge, 2007) 243-267 
93  Jensen asserts that ‘current global governance debate is a remarkable division of opinion about the 
fundamental purpose of the corporation.  M C Jensen ‘Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory and 
the Corporate Objective Function.’ (2001) 4 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 8-21, 8 Keay 
points out that establishing the objective of the corporation is critical to the formulation of its 
governance mechanisms Keay (n 74) 
94 Horrigan (n 11) 69 
95 M Blowfield A Murray Corporate Responsibility: A Critical Introduction (OUP, Oxford 2008) 41 
96 A A Berle  G C Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property (with a new introduction by 
 233 
Although the focus of the analysis is on large corporations in the USA, it is a 
problem that can be extended to large multinational corporations around the world.97 
Though there is doubt that there is such pronounced separation between ownership 
and control in nations such as France, Germany, Japan and South Korea where 
ownership is not so dispersed, but corporate governance is still relevant to issues of 
how these variant corporate organisations are governed.98  
There are two major types of corporate system in capitalist states globally namely 
the shareholder and the block-holder systems99 but there are forceful arguments for 
the emergence of a convergence on a system of corporate governance that prioritises 
the shareholder.100 The shareholder model in practice in the US and the UK is 
characterised by dispersed equity holding, delegation to management to run 
corporation, supervision via single supervisory boards, deep trading markets and 
market regulations and the possibility of hostile take-overs.101 
Block-holder or stakeholder models are of two major variants the first kind is that 
found in Germany characterised by large banks as main investors102and a two-tier 
supervisory board structure and employees represented on the boards in line with the 
co-determination principle.103The second kind is peculiar to Japan and involves a 
                                                                                                                                          
M. Weidenbaum & M. Jensen)(Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick (USA) 1968, 1991) 
97 M S Mizruchi ‘Berle and Means Revisited: The governance and power of large U.S Corporation’ 
(2004) 33 Theory and Society 579-613 
98 This was highlighted by the work of R La Porta and others ‘Corporate Ownership around the 
world’(1999) 54(2) Journal of Finance 471- 517 which found that the most common ownership 
around the globe is family or controlling shareholders 
99 W W Bratton and J A McCahery “Barriers to Global Cross- Reference”  in (J. McCahery ed.) 
Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity (New York, Oxford University Press 
2002) This may mask national differences. 
100 Most forceful advocates H Hansmann & R Kraakman, “ The end of history for corporate law” in ( 
J  N Gordon M J Roe eds.) Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance (Cambridge 
University Press, 2004)  
101 See Bratton and McCahery  (n 99) at 26-27 Where they make a comparism of the elements of 
market and block-holder systems 
102 Although La Porta et al in their study find that other countries in Europe and the world are 
dominated by family or even state owned corporations. See La Porta (n 98) 
103 V D Dinh “ Codetermination and Corporate Governance in a Multinational Business Enterprise 
(1999) 24 Journal of Corporate  Law 975-999 
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network of cross-shareholdings resulting in a very complex network of interwoven 
groups. Iwai states that Japan has six major corporate groups – Mitsubishi, Mitsui, 
Sumitomo, Fuyo (Fuji), Sanwa and Dauchi-Kangin (DK). Each group is clustered 
around a main bank and extended over the whole industry104 connected through 
intricate cross-shareholdings. 105 The shares held by the banks in each corporation by 
virtue of anti-monopoly laws cannot surpass five percent but these network of cross-
shareholdings and lunch-club meetings of presidents of members of each group 
result in a substantial element of internal monitoring and control.106 
However there are theoretical issues at the heart of the analysis of Berle and Means 
which are now relevant to virtually all industrialised capitalist nations regardless of 
the extent to which they have experienced a separation of ownership from control’107 
These issues go beyond a mere lack of accountability to shareholders and a loss of 
control to point out questions of accountability to society in general.  
As Mizruchi put it 
 ‘Berle & Means concern about separation of ownership from 
control was not only about managers’ lack of accountability to 
investors. It was also a concern about managers’ lack of 
accountability to society in general. Berle and Means thus wrote of 
a small group, sitting at the head of enormous organizations with 
the power to build, and destroy communities, to generate great 
productivity and wealth but also to control the distribution of that 
wealth, without regard to those who elected them (stockholders) or 
those who depended on them (the larger public).’108  
 
Although this assertion of Berle and Means concern for the accountability to the 
public is somewhat expanded, Mizruchi raises a valid point about the applicability of 
                                                 
104 Ramsweyer gives the example of Mitsui group which includes two banks , two insurance 
companies, a trading company, a construction firm, a paper company, an oil company, a steel 
company, Toshiba, Toyota and a real estate firm. See M. Ramsweyer ‘Cross-shareholdings in 
Japanese keiretsu ”  in (J McCahery ed.) Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity 
[New York, Oxford University Press 2002) 
105 Iwai (n 92) 
106 Ibid 
107 Mizruchi (n 97)  580 
108 Ibid at 581 
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Berle and Means governance issues to countries beyond their scope of study which 
was the USA.  This tentative conclusion of the Berle and Mean’s work109 that the 
loss of control by shareholders may have resulted in a surrendering of rights that the 
corporation be operated in their sole interests and opened up the way firm wider 
claims that demand that the corporation should serve all society is the basis for a lot 
of debate within corporate governance. It is not as far-reaching as Dodd’s assertions 
that society’s interests are paramount in the first instance it only acknowledges that 
there has been significant change in the history of the corporations and that the 
share-holder oriented model based on the contract theory is failing to capture this 
change. 
Therefore it is possible to derive from the Berle and Means conclusion two 
theoretical implications. On the one hand, theories repudiating the loss of control by 
shareholding and re-emphasising mechanisms to achieve shareholder primacy 
through the agent-principal framework (agency theory)110 or on the other hand those 
theories taking on  the larger challenge of positing an opening up of corporations to 
wider interests by attempting the challenge to fashion out a more representative 
system (stakeholder theories).111  
                                                 
109 Berle & Means (n 96) at 312 
110  Jensen and Meckling (n 85) 
111 T Donaldson L Preston ‘The stakeholder theory of the corporation: Concepts, evidence and 
implications’ (1995)20 Academy Of Management Review 65- 91 
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On their own, Berle and Means as a result of this separation suggest that ‘a purely 
neutral technocracy balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the 
community and assigning to each a portion of income stream on the basis of public 
policy rather than private cupidity’.112Therefore the theories will be analysed in 
further detail as they are riddled with questions of accountability to diverse interests. 
The examination will be to examine the potential range of interests and this will help 
the conclusions on how relevant corporate governance theories can be to the newer 
set of legitimacy problems posed by multinational corporate power.  
                                                 
112 Berle & Means (n 96) 
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5.4.1 Separation of Ownership from Control 
 
This theory of separation of ownership from control is sometimes called 
‘managerialism’. It originated from the seminal work of Berle and Means titled “The 
modern corporation and private property” published in 1932.113  The work examined 
large corporations in the USA but has since then become of significance to large 
multinational corporations more generally. Its most enduring theme is that of 
concentration of power within the ‘managerial’114 class of large corporation and the 
consequential separation of ownership from control in the large modern 
corporation.115  
Berle and Means studied 200 of the largest US non-financial corporations in 1929 
and found that 44 percent by number and 58 percent by wealth were management –
controlled.116By management control they described corporations where the control 
lay not with the shareholders but with the management because it had become 
virtually a self-perpetuating body because ownership was sufficiently and 
significantly sub-divided117. 
 This was only part of the full picture. They discovered that on full examination of 
the five major types of control examined; that is, control through almost complete 
                                                 
113 Berle & Means (n 96) originally published in 1932 by Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 
114 Interestingly they defined management to include both the senior officers of the corporation and 
the board of directors; this is dissimilar to contemporary usage of the word which refers to senior 
officers of the corporation only. Berle & Means ibid at 196 “ Management may be defined as that 
body of men who in law, have formally assumed the duties of exercising domination over the 
corporate business and assets …under the American system of law, managers consist of a board of 
directors and the senior officers of the corporation.” 
115 There are several themes raised by Berle and Means in their book because it was written at the 
depth of the great depression in the United States. 
116 Berle & Means (n 96) 109 
117 Berle & Means (n 96)  81 
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ownership, majority control, control through a legal device [such as pyramiding, a 
special class of voting stock or voting trust], minority control and, management 
control; 65 percent of the corporations and 80 percent of their combined wealth were 
controlled by management or by a legal device involving a small proportion of 
ownership. 118  
This had resulted from a dispersal of stock ownership which had resulted in passive 
property ownership. They found several changes in the manner of property 
ownership119, key for them were the changes from an active to a passive agent120; the 
separation of the spiritual values that formerly went with ownership; the value of 
wealth is no longer dependant on personal efforts; the value of wealth fluctuates and 
is constantly appraised; individual wealth had become liquid through organised 
markets; wealth is less in a form that can be employed directly by owner and the 
stockholders are left with mere symbols of ownership while the power, the 
responsibility and the substance, integral to ownership is now transferred to a 
separate controlling group. These findings strengthened their conclusion that 
ownership and control had become separable factors.121 
While there have been some criticism of the Berle and Means study, it has been 
fundamental to the development of corporate governance.122 La Porta and others 
attempted to show that outside of the US and UK, other developed countries because 
of poor shareholder protection had controlling or block shareholders such as the state 
                                                 
118 Berle and Means (n 96) 110 They concluded that “only 11 percent of the companies and 6 per cent 
of their wealth involved control by group of individuals owning half or more of the stock interest 
outstanding” 
119 Berle and Means (n 96) 64-65 
120 They note especially that in place of actual physical properties over which the owner could 
exercise direction and for which the owner is responsible, the owner now holds a piece of paper 
representing a set of rights and expectations with respect to an enterprise 
121 In their words, “formerly assumed to be merely a function of ownership, control now appears to be 
a separate and separable factor” Berle and Means (n 96) 111 
122 See Introduction by Murray L. Weidenbaum and Mark Jensen in new re-publication of Berle and 
Means (n 96) 
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or the family in their largest firms.123 However this is not very relevant for MNC 
which make full use of the equity markets in the UK and US as well as other large 
world economies. The crucial issue is not the existence or non-existence of the 
separation but that the ‘separation implies shortfalls of competence and 
responsibility.’124 
 An important factor is that the Berle and Means study deals with the corporation 
from essentially a property rights perspective. This is important because as earlier 
noted, there appears to be a basic theoretical divide in approaches to analysis of large 
corporations. The divide between the contractarians and the communitarians125; the 
divide between those who emphasise private property rights as justification for 
corporations and those who insist that corporations are in essence necessary to the 
extent that society deems it so. Berle and Means approach their analysis from the 
private property and contractual rights perspective, only allowing for the possibility 
of societal demands in the face of weakened passive property rights owners. This 
means that the Berle and Means analysis begins from a contractual theoretical stand-
point. 
 In their study they trace the evolution of the modern corporate structure within 
American law from its starting point as inherited from English jurisprudence at the 
close of the 18th century. At this point they accept that the corporation was seen as a 
‘franchise’ with its very existence conditional on a grant from the state. This grant 
set up a legal person distinct from its associates.126However they note that at the 
                                                 
123 La Porta & others (n 98) 
124 WW Bratton ‘Berle and Means re-considered at the century’s turn’ (2001) 26 Journal of Corporate 
Law 737-770 
125Allen (n 23) 
126 Berle and Means ( n 96) 120 The real privilege which the state grants is that of the corporate 
entity-the right to maintain business in its own name, to sue and be sued on its behalf irrespective of 
individuals, to have perpetual succession and from this flowed limited liability” In their view limited 
liability was not a state granted privilege because a clause could be written into every contract by 
which the opposite party limited his right to recovery to the common fund. 
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same time the document of grant, (that is, the charter or its more recent form, the 
certificate of incorporation) embodied the outline arrangement among associates and 
therefore was a result of three-fold negotiations involving the state and the combined 
associates and between the associates as for themselves. Here they conclude it was 
recognised as a “contract” and has been consistently dealt with as such under the 
American law.127 They remark that although the state enacted protections in the 19th 
century, many of these protections could have been qualified by contract.128  But that 
the state’s insistence on protecting and supervising the contract resulted in their view 
to a picture where a group of owners necessarily delegated certain powers of 
management, were protected by a series of fixed rules under which the management 
had a relatively limited sphere (an owner-agent situation). 
The breakdown in property rights comes into existence with the revolution of the 
general incorporation laws at the end of the 19th century and what they terms ‘the 
vanishing of the checks from the general incorporation laws’, with all rigid 
requirements broken down and in effect letting the originating group able to write its 
own contract on the broadest terms. Here although every stockholder is bound by the 
contract, modifications and changes in practice they never even see the documents 
giving management wide latitude to arrange participation in its own interests.  This 
decline results in a position where they have surrendered a set of definite rights for 
                                                 
127 Berle & Means (n 96) 121 They cite Cook on Corporations- “ The charter of a corporation having 
a capital stock is a contract between 3 parties and form the basis of 3 distinct contracts. The charter is 
a contract between the state and the corporation, between the corporation and the stockholders and 
between stockholders and the state 2 cook on corporations, 5th edition, section 492; I clark & 
marshall, “ Private Corporations” section 271f 
128 They list the protections as: a. The enterprise was required to be defined and carefully limited in 
scope [“ultra-vires” doctrine]; b. contributions of capital were rigidly supervised- the corporation was 
not allowed to commence business until certain shares were paid up. c. a rigid capital structure was 
set up –with preferred and common stock. They also note common law added further safeguards a. 
residual control lay in the shareholder or in a specified proportion. b. shareholders had sole rights to 
invest new monies in the enterprise – foundations of the present “law of pre-emptive rights” c. In 
general dividends were permitted only out of surplus profits. (ibid) 
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indefinite expectations129 and may thereby have surrendered the right that the 
corporation be run in their sole interest, probably opening up the claim that wider 
interests of the society be served.130 
The Berle and Means proposition seen from this angle can give rise to any variant of 
two suggestions. Firstly this proposition could mean that a strengthening of the role 
of shareholders, could correct the imbalance in the power and control relationship 
and redress the problem of inadequate control of corporate power in the hands of 
managers. This has given rise to the agency theories which have fought to use 
market and structural mechanisms that re-instate shareholder primacy or in contrast, 
where there continues to remain a separation of ownership and management interests 
then these wider claims may have validity and this is the ground occupied by the 
stakeholder theories.  
Although the argument appears to be shareholder versus other stakeholders, the 
implication from the conception of separation of ownership and control is that these 
other interests only gain legitimacy when there is passive property ownership.  This 
is not a satisfactory basis for the question of corporate control. For the multinational 
corporate power under analysis has much wider implications for the exercise of 
power than that for shareholders. It is very weak to base the possibility of wider 
societal claims that the corporation be run in the best interest of society on the very 
narrow basis of separation of ownership from control and the resulting passive 
                                                 
129 By this they refer to the limited reliance on director’s duties –a decent amount of attention to the 
business; fidelity to the interests of the corporation; at least reasonable business prudence see Berle & 
Means (n 96) at 197 
130 Berle & Means (n 96) This oft quoted statement is located in p.311 They state that “the owners of 
private property by surrendering control and responsibility over the active property, have surrendered 
the right that the corporation should be operated in the sole interest – they have released the 
community from the obligation to protect them to the full extent implied in the doctrine of strict 
property rights…the control groups have cleared the way for claims of a group far wider than either 
the owners or the control. They have placed the community in a position to demand that the modern 
corporation serve not alone the owners or the control but all society.” 
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property ownership. There is a wider legitimacy question which is not fully address 
by corporate governance. 
Berle and Means are not totally unaware of this because they accept that: 
 ‘the rise of the modern corporation has brought a concentration of 
economic power which can compete on equal terms with the 
modern state –economic power versus political power each strong 
in its own fields, the state seeks in some respect to regulate the 
corporation while the corporation, steadily becoming more 
powerful makes every effort to avoid such regulation’.131  
 
This is even more so in the present time. The difficulty has become how to 
demonstrate a legitimacy of corporate power to society beyond that owed to the 
shareholders.  
This is captured in the stark contrast that still remains between the Berle and Means 
tentative possibility that separation of ownership and control may have opened up 
wider demands that the modern corporation serve society’s interests and Dodd’s bold 
statement that business is permitted and encouraged by law because of it is of service 
to the community rather than because it is a source of profit to its owners.132This 
difference is crucial and is affecting our approach to regulation for social 
responsibility with corporate law.133  
Yet within the scope that the Berle and Means debate affords, relevant theories have 
arisen which will be analysed. This is because corporate governance is still 
advocated as covering wider ground. For instance when it is defined as: 
 ‘the whole set of legal, cultural and institutional arrangements that 
determine what publicly traded corporations can do, who controls 
them, how that control is exercised and how risks and returns from 
the activities they undertake are allocated’.134 
                                                 
131 Berle and Means (n 96) at 313 
132 Dodd (n 77) 
133 Voluntary or mandatory 
134 M M Blair, Ownership and Control, Rethinking corporate governance for the twenty-first century 
(Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. 1995) 3 contrast this with the definition of corporate 
governance as ‘the way suppliers of finance assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.’ 
A Shleifer R W Vishny ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’ (1997) 52(2) The Journal of Finance 
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5.4.2 Agency Theory 
 
This theory covers a body of work that follow on from the first implication of Berle 
and Means separation of ownership from control thesis which is that owner and 
control interests can be reconciled in this agency relationship. It has both law and 
economic origins. It is the focus of the work of Jensen and Meckling135 and the latter 
work of Fama and Jensen.136 The focus is purely a (property rights) contractual view 
and follows logically from the Berle and Means statement of the problem.137  
For agency theorists, the relationship between stockholders and managers of the 
corporation fits the description of a pure agency therefore the issues related to the 
separation of ownership from control are associated with the general problem of 
agency costs.138For Jensen and Meckling, the private corporation is seen simply as a 
legal fiction which serves as ‘a nexus for contractual relationships and which is also 
characterised by the existence of divisible residual claims on assets and cash flows of 
the organisation, which can generally be sold without permission of other contracting 
individuals.’139 This notion of stockholders as residual risk bearers is introduced by 
Fama and Jensen,140  who argue that the separation of decision and risk-bearing 
functions observed in large corporations are common and generally indicative of 
agency problems which arise because contracts are not costlessly written and 
                                                                                                                                          
737-783 
135 C Jensen W H Meckling: ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and 
Ownership structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305 -360 
136 E F Fama M C Jensen ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’ (1983) 26(2) Journal of Law and 
Economics  301 - 325 
137 This covers even more recent areas of advocacy for institutional shareholders such as pension 
voice to become more active within corporations.  Monks and Minow (n 19) 
138 Jensen & Meckling (n 135) 
139  Ibid 
140 Fama and Jensen (n 136) The residual risk – is seen as the the risk of the difference between the 
stochastic inflows of resources and the promised payments to agents – is borne by those who contract 
for the rights to net cash flows . the “agents”  are called residual risk-bearers 
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enforced. Agency costs therefore include the cost of structuring, monitoring and 
bonding a set of contracts among agents with conflicting interests. 
 Under the Fama and Jensen scheme, a modern multinational will be classed as an 
open corporation, in this sense the common residual claims of such organisations are 
unrestricted so that stockholders are not required to have any other role in the 
organisation and their residual claims are freely alienable. As a result of the 
unrestricted nature of the residual claims of open corporations, there is almost 
complete specialisation of decision-management and residual risk bearing.141The 
solutions proffered to the problem of agency costs are extremely popular in current 
corporate governance circles, they include the use of the stock market as visible 
signals for implications of internal decisions for current and future cash flows; 
external monitoring through the take-over market and an expert board of directors 
with inside and outside ‘independent’ members that can effectively limit the decision 
discretion of management.142Therefore the focus is on controls that re-align the 
interests of the managers (controllers) with the interests of the shareholders or 
stockholders (owners). 
The agency theory is also closely related to a body of work classed as ‘transaction 
cost economics’. This is mainly based on the economic analysis of Coase in 1937 
where he examined the theory of the firm from within.143 He saw the rationale for a 
firm (corporation) to be simply a means of saving market transaction costs. “The 
operation of the market costs something and by forming an organisation and 
allowing some authority (an entrepreneur) to direct the resources, certain marketing 
                                                 
141 Fama and Jensen (n 136) 
142 Fama and Jensen (n 136) 
143 R H Coase The Nature of the Firm (1937) 4 Economica 386- 405 at 392  Prior to this neo-classical 
economists viewed the firm as a black box. 
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costs are saved.”144 Therefore for him the firm becomes bigger when additional 
transactions are organised by the entrepreneur.145 The transactions they increase 
would tend to be of different kinds or in different places and this is the reason why 
efficiency seems to decrease as firms get larger. He therefore suggests that all 
changes which improve managerial technique will tend to increase the size of the 
firm”.146   
His work did not dwell on governance but the work of another proponent did. 
Williamson analysed transaction cost economics as assigning transactions to 
governance structures in such a way as to accomplish an economising result. 147 For 
him ‘any issue that can be posed as a contracting problem is usefully addressed in 
transaction cost economising terms.148 In his analysis of corporate governance he 
studies a contractual schema couched in terms of relation to the corporation in node 
A, B or C position. He then argues that in certain relationships representations on the 
board are unnecessary. Stockholders are located in node B while the atypical lender 
is usually node C. Customers are mainly located in node A, workers with general 
knowledge and skill would fall into node A unless they had firm specific investment, 
suppliers usually in node C and community, a specially grafted node C  
protection.149 He concludes that: 
‘Representation is unwarranted for constituencies at node A 
because of negligible exposure to their transaction-specific assets. 
Moreover their legitimate interests are adequately safeguarded 
through neo-classical market contracting. Such constituencies have 
neither informational nor decisional needs to be served through 
board membership. Constituencies located at node B have exposed 
assets and will charge a higher price unless safeguards can be 
                                                 
144  Ibid at 392 
145 Coase (n 143) 393 
146 Coase (n 143) 397-This he actually states in terms of invention to bring the factors of production 
closer together such as telephone, telegraph and so on 
147 O Williamson, ‘Corporate Governance’ (1984) 93 (7) Yale law Journal 1197-1230 at 1203  
148 Ibid  
149 Williamson (n 147) 
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devised therefore generalised safeguards through voting board 
memberships may be warranted and finally those constituencies 
located in node C have devised a structure of bilateral governance 
and do not need membership on the boards..’150 
 
This constitutes a highly fascinating economic analytical response to corporate 
governance but it indicates that both agency and transaction cost economics regard 
the board of directors, alongside stock markets for the public and specialised 
contracting for lenders and suppliers as instruments of control for shareholders and 
investors. The attractiveness of these theories lies in the rather simplistic analysis of 
relationships within the corporation in terms of contracts, it appears faultless in the 
picture it paints and is immensely popular. The problem however is not that of a 
wrong picture but rather an incomplete one. The push for responsibility is coming 
from society because of the impact which corporate power is having and the focus of 
this theory is internal and self-interested. The safeguards need to be re-examined and 
alternative structures suggested. 
                                                 
150 See Williamson (n 147)  at 1205-1215 
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5.4.3 Stakeholder Theories 
 
In contrast to the position of the agency theory the stakeholder theories cover a body 
of work that attempts to capture the idea that a corporation should have some social 
purpose beyond maximising returns to shareholders. In spite of the significant 
amount of literature on this subject, the theory is not as bold or revolutionary as it 
first appears.151 In this vein Elhauge suggests that:  
‘Managerial discretion to sacrifice profits is both inevitable and 
affirmatively desirable however one cannot expect too much from 
such discretion. Corporate managers may rarely choose to sacrifice 
profits given product market competition, future job prospects, 
stock options and other rewards for making corporate profits. It 
may also be true that shareholders would rarely allow (or to only a 
limited degree) allow managers to pursue unprofitable public 
interest objectives.’152 
 
 
This theory follows from the second implication that may be made from the Berle 
and Means theory.  Therefore the possibility of the consideration of other interests in 
the face of continued separation of ownership from control. This theme is reflected 
in the view of the corporation as an institutional arrangement for governing 
relationships between all parties that contribute firm-specific assets.153This self-
imposed limitation on stakeholder theories to try to fashion out a workable 
mechanism of control in all affected parties interests from within the corporation has 
                                                 
151 Such list of articles would include Blair  (n 134), M M Blair and L A Stout ‘A team production 
theory of company law’ (1999)24 Journal of Corporate Law 751-806 , K E Goodpaster ‘Business 
Ethics and the Stakeholder Analysis’ (1991) 1(1) Business Ethics Quarterly  53- 73, M Jensen “Value 
Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate Objective Function (2001) 7 European 
Financial Management. 297- 317, T Donaldson L Preston ‘The stakeholder theory of the corporation: 
Concepts, evidence and implications’ (1995)20 Academy Of Management Review 65- 91 
152 E Elhauge ‘Sacrificing corporate profits in the Public Interest’ (2005) 80(3) New York University 
Law Review 733-869 at  868 
153 T Clarke Introduction to Theories of Corporate Governance: the philosophical foundations of 
corporate governance (Routledge, London 2004)  11 (quoting Blair) 
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been its undoing. It has become largely an exercise to appeal to the corporate 
conscience.154 
This is evident in such statements by stakeholder advocates accepting that “clearly 
trying to run corporations in the interest of ‘society at large... is an impossible end 
and in practice a vacuous objective.’155However there are different strands of the 
stakeholder arguments: one strand sees stakeholder theories in terms of manager’s 
discretion to sacrifice shareholders interests in the short-term for other vital interests 
that may be justified in the shareholder’s long term interests156  
While other strands are more practically focused on conceiving a workable model 
that shifts management control from a shareholder to a stakeholder focus. An 
example of this is the Blair and Stout team-production theory157, which conceive of a 
model where rational individuals who hope to profit from team production overcome 
shirking and rent-seeking by opting out of an internal governance structure and opt 
instead for a ‘mediating hierarchy’ solution which requires that the team members 
give up important rights (including property rights over the teams joint outputs and 
over team inputs such as financial capital and firm-specific human capital to a legal 
entity created by act of incorporation so corporate assets belong the  corporation 
itself.  
The Blair and Stout position of the stakeholder theory is distinctly appealing to a 
communitarian spirit that may lie within this ‘contractual entity’ and perhaps finding 
legal ground in the interpretation of director’s duties as being owed to the 
                                                 
154 To adopt a ‘real entity’ phraseology 
155 Blair (n 134) 14  She however adds that the least we can hope for is that the goals of corporation is 
in the interests of the larger society. 
156 Allen (n 23) states ‘that the long-term short term distinction preserves a form of stock-holder 
oriented property theory while permitting in fact a considerable degree of behaviour consistent with 
the view that sees public corporations as owing social responsibilities …” the only problem with this 
is that it is subject to managerial discretion and the companies’ behest hence entirely voluntary and 
arbitrary. 
157 Blair (n 134), Blair & Stout (n 151) 
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corporation.158 It undoubtedly reflective of co-determination in Germany and the 
‘collective’ focus of Japan but in no way implies direct liability to society.159 Indeed 
Clarke points out that the stakeholder represents an important step towards corporate 
citizenship as a mature appreciation of by the corporation of its rights and 
responsibilities.160This could form a persuasive basis for acknowledging other 
interests 
In spite of the excellent aspects of this theory, there is a flaw. The focus of the 
stakeholder theory is ultimately internal to the corporation; it exemplifies corporate 
response to other stakeholders and therefore largely depends on identifying actors 
which have a stake in the corporation. There is a more compelling case for identified, 
efficient and enforceable solutions to the problem posed by large multinational 
corporate power. This solutions are required by wider society though it may be 
desirable to have this reflected in corporate law, it seems corporate law has become 
more oriented with its own internal focus on corporations. It reflects the utilitarian 
perspective that ‘what’s good for business is good for society.’ 
                                                 
158 See Re Smith and Fawcett Limited (1942) where Lord Greene said that directors must exercise 
their discretion bona fide in what they consider –not what the court may consider- is in the interests of 
the company”. Statute expressly preserves this consideration of other interests in s. 306, 309 
Company Act 1985 United Kingdom. In America see the raft of other constituency statutes –see Blair 
Ibid, but this only serve to deepen and preserve managerial discretionary power. Indeed in this sense a 
duty owed to everyone & yet unaccountable to everyone. 
159 Clarke sees this conception of the corporation a a set of relationships rather than a series of 
transaction in which managers adopt an inclusive concern for all stakeholders as much closer to 
established European and Asian business values. Clark (n 153) There are two major types of corporate 
system in capitalist states globally, namely the shareholder and the block-holder systems, although 
this may mask national differences. Bratton and McCahery (n 99) 23-55. Yet there are forceful 
arguments for the emergence of a convergence on a system of corporate governance that prioritises 
the shareholder. Hansmann & Kraakman (n 100) The OECD Corporate governance code also 
emphasises share-holder primacy with the discretion to consider other interests 
160 Clark (n 153) 
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The desire to see corporate governance ‘as the design of institutions that induce or 
force management to internalise the welfare of stakeholders’161 is still some way off, 
there needs to be a radical re-think of corporate law and structures for this to be done 
in a fundamental way. It may be necessary for CSR as a more urgent agenda to 
explore a wider framework of its own.   
However this challenge to integrate external facing concerns within company law 
was addressed in the recent reform of the UK Company law. This reform has been 
referred to as the best example of an attempt to face the contemporary challenges.162  
The next section analyses this reform as an example to further illustrate the potential 
and limitations of this traditional corporate law approach to embracing notions of 
responsibility and accountability to society as an aspect of corporate legitimacy and 
control. 
                                                 
161 J Tirole ‘Corporate Governance’ (2001) 69(1) Econometrica 1-35 
162 Horrigan (n 11) 
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5.5 UK Corporate Law Reform as example 
 
The UK in 1998 embarked on a fundamental review of its company law which 
culminated in the Companies Act 2006. The incentive for this move was stated as 
follows: 
‘The last significant review of company law in the UK took place 
more than forty years ago. Since then, relevant statute and case law 
have changed, and there have been major developments in 
recognised ‘best practice’ in corporate governance, with the result 
that it is now difficult and time consuming for directors and other 
interested parties to discover exactly what the law relating to 
companies is.’163 
 
When the company law review was instituted in 1998, it was charged with a 
framework of company law that ‘encouraged competitiveness as well as improving 
accountability’.164This reflects Hurst’s assertion of the drive for utility and 
responsibility as the two elements of corporate legitimacy found within corporate 
law.165 
The opportunity to broaden the agenda of CSR and debate issues proposed by the 
Company Law Review led to the formation of the non-governmental organisation 
Corporate Responsibility Coalition (CORE).166 The aim was to use this as an 
opportunity to frame the debate of CSR within corporate law. The hope was perhaps 
                                                 
163 House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee The White Paper in Modernising Company 
Law  Sixth Report of Sessions 2002-03 HC439 (Stationery Office London 2003) 4 
164 Company Law Review Consultative Meeting Note for Record, 21 July 1998, <www.dti.gov.uk> 
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166 J Sabapathy, ‘In the dark all cats are grey: corporate responsibility and legal responsibility’ in S 
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to achieve a binding definition of corporate responsibility.167 The resulting 
Companies Act 2006 came into force in stages with the final sections fully in force 
by 1st October 2009. While the resulting act was a much larger one, it did not 
radically depart from the agency theoretical view of the corporation. The relevant 
aspects which highlight relevant changes made in the reform include: director’s 
duties, company reporting and corporate governance structures. 
 
5.5.1 Director’s Duties 
 
The notion of director’s duties which was at the heart of the historical debate 
between Berle and Dodd was also an issue of substantial focus in the reform of UK 
corporate law.168 The question of director’s duties is at the heart of the debate in 
corporate law about the role of the corporation and the notion of control towards the 
interests of affected parties. The purpose of the corporation (corporate objective) will 
affect the range of interests that the directors need to protect and the persons to 
whom the directors owe these duties.169 
 In the Ministerial statements about the bill prior to the passage of the Companies 
Act 2006, Darling (then Minister) notes that: 
“For the first time, the Bill includes a statutory statement of 
directors’ general duties. It provides a code of conduct that sets out 
how directors are expected to behave. That enshrines in statue what 
the law review called “enlightened shareholder value”. It 
recognises that directors will be more likely to achieve long term 
sustainable success for the benefit of their shareholders if their 
companies pay attention to a wider range of matters…Directors 
will be required to promote the success of the company in the 
collective best interest of the shareholders, but in doing so they 
                                                 
167 Ibid 
168 Horrigan  (n 11) 
169 A Keay ‘Tackling the Issue of the Corporate Objective: An Analysis of the United Kingdom’s 
‘Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach’’ 29 Sydney Law Review 577-612 
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will have to have regard to a wider range of factors, including 
the interests of employees and the environment”.170 
 
 This codification of director’s or managers fiduciary duties is contained in s.170-
177 but the relevant section which adopted this approach is s.172 Companies Act 
2006. This section states as follows: s. 172 Duty to promote the success of the 
company 
(1)A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in 
good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so 
have regard (amongst other matters) to— 
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, 
(b ) the interests of the company's employees, 
(c) the need to foster the company's business relationships with 
suppliers, customers and others, 
(d) the impact of the company's operations on the community and 
the environment, 
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for 
high standards of business conduct, and 
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company. 
(2)Where or to the extent that the purposes of the company consist 
of or include purposes other than the benefit of its members, 
subsection (1) has effect as if the reference to promoting the 
success of the company for the benefit of its members were to 
achieving those purposes. 
(3)The duty imposed by this section has effect subject to any 
enactment or rule of law requiring directors, in certain 
circumstances, to consider or act in the interests of creditors of the 
company 
 
This section has been heralded as innovative and novel because it incorporates 
elements of the stakeholder approach171 however on closer scrutiny it represents a 
mediated position quite similar to the position advocated by ‘enlightened self-
interest’ models. This is an attempt to integrate wider considerations within a 
shareholder wealth maximisation focused model.  It does not alter the basic focus of 
the corporation from a contractual one. It is still self-interested. 
                                                 
170 Companies Act 2006 Duties of company directors: Ministerial Statements DTI June 2007 p.7 
(Alistair Darling, Commons Second Reading, 6 June 2006, column 12) 
 <http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file40139.pdf > accessed 10 March 2010 
171 Horrigan (n 11) 
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However within the Consultation document of the Company Law Steering Group 
another approach termed the ‘pluralist approach’ was considered. This pluralist 
approach would involve the notion that: ‘company law should be modified to include 
other objectives so that a company is required to serve a wider range of interests not 
subordinate to, or as a means of achieving shareholder value (as envisaged in the 
enlightened shareholder view) but as valid in their own rights.’172This would have 
involved a radical re-think of director’s duties. It would have endorsed Dodd’s view 
of the corporation owing duties and serving wider interests in society than that of 
shareholders as a fuller interpretation of the entity and modified concession theories 
of the corporation. However this was not adopted.  
Yet an extension of director’s duties in this way could have a significant point that 
would substantially alter the focus of corporations from strict profit-making motive 
geared towards shareholders and increasing immediate share price to other tangible 
goals which society deems fit for the corporation. Parkinson had pointed out that: 
‘...broadening directors’ discretion to permit them to depart from 
the requirements of profit maximisation would be a necessary 
adjustment to create an appropriate legal setting for changes in 
management behaviour that are the intended consequence of other 
methods of inducing responsibility. A reformed fiduciary duty 
might accordingly stipulate that the directors are under an 
obligation to conduct the business for profit, but that in so doing 
they must take account of affected interests (which might be 
specified.)’173 
 
The 2006 Act endorsed this limited approach which it termed the ‘enlightened 
shareholder value’ approach. This approach adopts a shareholder focused model that 
allows for consideration of other factors which may affect that shareholder value in 
the long term. It permits the consideration of other ‘stakeholders’ interests but only 
                                                 
172  Modern Company Law For a Competitive Economy The Strategic Framework February 1999 
<http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file23279.pdf> accessed 10 December 2011 at 37; This document 
expressly cites Blair (n 134) 
173 Parkinson (n 87) 371 
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as it affects shareholder value and ‘the success of the company’ (profit).  
Nevertheless it is evident from the ministerial statements about the bill that even this 
section could have multiple interpretations:  
‘There are two ways of looking at the statutory statement of 
directors’ duties: on the one the hand it simply codifies the existing 
common law obligations of company directors; on the other – 
especially in section 172: the duty to act in the interests of the 
company – it marks a radical departure in articulating the 
connection between what is good for a company and what is good 
for society at large.’174 
 
 
The effect of this section on the use of corporate power in relation to interests in 
society will be explored in relevant legal cases that follow but it offers up an 
example of reform geared at extending directors’ duties. 
 Recently Arden LJ in Rolls-Royce Plc v Unite the Union  pointed out in obiter while 
examining a provision under the Employment Age (Equality) Regulations  and 
comparing to s.172 Companies Act 2006 that ‘the reasonable employer ...might well 
be expected to be motivated not simply by its narrow financial interest but also by 
enlightened self-interest and take into account the interests of employees generally as 
one of the factors to which it should have regard in determining the business need of 
the undertaking.’175  
 The test for corporate law will also be in cross-national comparative reform and the 
willingness of other states to follow even this limited example. It creates a type of 
law- tool which can be applied in context. In the 2008 report, the UN Secretary 
General’s Special Representative on Business and Human Rights cites the new 
requirement under UK Company Law for directors to take account of such matters as 
                                                 
174 M Hodge Ministerial statements (n 170)1 
175 (2009) EWCA Civ 387 para.169 
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community and environmental impact as an example of how countries might engage 
‘in re-defining fiduciary duties.’176 
Nevertheless it is important to stress that for many analysts this is a limited 
approach. Villiers points out that ‘such provisions tend to increase the discretion of 
the directors and managers, thus giving them a potential defence against challenges 
from shareholders rather than protecting the non-shareholders.’177Others critics also 
remark on problems in corporate law’s approach to corporate power and 
responsibility. They point out that in adopting a strict contractual approach to 
corporate personality that privileges shareholder interests, its fundamental structures 
permit irresponsibility.178 
The necessity for shareholder focus is not integral to corporate law but has emerged 
due to political interests utilising influential theories. Hurst again indicates that it is 
the utilitarian emphasis which politics privileges that holds us back from the demand 
for corporate power to be structured as to be responsible.179 Therefore the mediated 
position of s.172 is unsatisfactory because it does not address this core issue. It falls 
short of Dodd’s more radical view that ‘business is permitted and encouraged by law 
because it is of service to the community rather than because it is a source of profit 
to its owners.’180 Ireland points out that: 
‘While the former entailed important changes to the way in which 
the corporation was conceptualised (and to the constitution of the 
corporate legal form), contemporary CSR, with its emphasis on 
                                                 
176 See comment in Horrigan (n 11) 230 
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179 Hurst (n 5) 59 
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voluntary self-regulation, leaves untouched the shareholder-
oriented model of the corporation and the corporate legal form as 
presently constituted. It is hardly surprising that CSR has been so 
warmly embraced by so many corporations.’181 
 
These critics simply point to the theoretical debates at the heart of corporate legal 
theory stressing that the nature of corporate personality as a legal construct with the 
resultant attribute of limited liability has been explored and utilised in ways which 
privilege the utility aspect of legitimacy and inadvertently advance and strengthen 
corporate power giving room for exploitation and irresponsible use of such power. 
While this section falls short of a radical re-think of the focus of corporate law, it 
leaves room for compelling evidence that the business society balance is changing 
and that other factors affect corporate interests more palpably than would otherwise 
have been admitted in the traditional shareholder focused corporate law.  
 
5.5.2 Company Reporting 
 
The Companies Act also enshrines reporting as a method of evaluating the 
compliance with s.172. This approach is adopted for large corporations. This 
requirement can be found in s.417 Companies Act 2006: Contents of directors' 
report: business review 
(1)Unless the company is entitled to the small companies’ 
exemption, the directors' report must contain a business review. 
(2)The purpose of the business review is to inform members of the 
company and help them assess how the directors have performed 
their duty under section 172 (duty to promote the success of the 
company). 
(3)The business review must contain— 
(a)a fair review of the company's business, and 
(b)a description of the principal risks and uncertainties facing 
the company. 
(4)The review required is a balanced and comprehensive analysis 
of— 
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(a) the development and performance of the company's business 
during the financial year, and 
(b the position of the company's business at the end of that year, 
consistent with the size and complexity of the business. 
(5) In the case of a quoted company the business review must, to 
the extent necessary for an understanding of the development, 
performance or position of the company's business, include— 
(a) the main trends and factors likely to affect the future 
development, performance and position of the company's 
business; and 
(b) information about— 
(i) environmental matters (including the impact of the company's 
business on the environment), 
(ii) the company's employees, and 
(iii ) social and community issues, 
 
The approach falls short of the Operating and Financial Review (OFR) initially 
advocated by the UK government.182 This OFR was to be a detailed report within the 
annual report. This was to be a mandatory endorsed means of social and 
environmental reporting.183 However the government reversed the decision to make 
the OFR mandatory and rather adopted this approach stipulated in s.417. This 
approach is based on the EU Accounts Directive for the adoption of a member-wide 
business review.184  
The primary audience outlined in s. 417 is the ‘members of the company’ therefore 
the shareholders. Therefore the review is shaped to the perceptions of the 
shareholder and what projects the success of the company. The inclusions of social 
and environmental issues are only in so far as it affects ‘the success of the company.’  
Horrigan points out that the emphasis is on reporting how the company’s internal 
and external affairs affect the company and its prospects for the future as distinct 
from reporting on how the company and its affairs affect and otherwise relate to the 
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societal landscape around them.185Therefore the focus is internal and inward looking, 
not external or outward facing. Its focus is on how the corporation and its financial 
position is affected by social or community issues, environmental matters or 
employees. 
In addition, there is a subjectivity in such reporting that may result in anomalies and 
partial disclosures as it rests with the directors to decide what amounts to ‘an 
understanding of the development, performance or position of the company's 
business’. 186  The use of disclosure as a monitoring mechanism can shape corporate 
behaviour but there are other critical issues which may deter from its value. The 
directed users of these reports, the shareholders may not use these reports in the 
intended fashion. There is evidence that the corporate annual reports are not 
effectively utilized by shareholders.187 In addition, the large shareholders, 
institutional investors have mainly chosen inaction on the issues of CSR. They have 
largely opted to remain guided by the economic incentive.188 The drive for socially 
responsible investors is still in its infancy.189 
Finally the subjective nature of the reporting may lead to selective or incomplete 
reporting, so that information is selected and tailored to audience. The emphasis of 
such reporting could then be on the public relations aspect, rather than an integration 
of such considerations into the business model.190  This section represents an 
innovative but limited response incorporated within corporate law.  
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5.5.3 Complementary Corporate Governance reform 
 
Alongside the UK Company review and the Companies Act 2006, the UK has a long 
and established history of corporate governance reform. It is also acknowledged as a 
world leader in corporate governance reform. 191However corporate governance in 
this guise is also focused on structures and the narrow questions of internal control 
and running of the company. 192This may also be for reasons of convenience which 
privilege aspects of utility within legitimacy, aspects which are already accepted 
within the traditional model. Mitchell points out that this narrow focus has been 
more rewarding in terms of scholarly attention. He indicates that:  
‘unlike the CSR debate per se, the corporate governance debate 
does repay scholarly attention as a focus of social responsibility 
defined as it is by the traditional parameters of corporate law and 
articulated within a well-developed framework of fiduciary duties. 
Whereas CSR operates free-form and can seem either superfluous 
or threatening corporate governance issues operate within well-
defined and accepted structures.’193 
 
However that is not to say that even such narrow corporate governance is settled. It 
has external effects or more aptly it has been influenced by external events.  It is 
caught in a cycle of reactionary reform prompted by external corporate financial 
scandals and crisis which reflect the inadequacy of previous reform.  
The OECD confirms that ‘pressure on governments and on the business sector to 
improve corporate governance arrangements has arisen often in the context of the 
failure of large companies and particularly marked instances of corporate fraud.’194  
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The Cadbury report195 which is the UK’s first major attempt to ‘formalise corporate 
governance best practice’196 followed on from the failure of Maxwell publishing 
group and the ensuing scandal after the death of its Chairman and Chief Executive 
Robert Maxwell in 1991.197  
This report investigated the three traditional aspects of control and ownership and 
that is the board of directors, the shareholders and the role of auditors. The FRC 
points out that: 
The Cadbury Report addressed issues such as the relationship 
between the chairman and chief executive, the role of non-
executive directors and reporting on internal control and on the 
company's position. A requirement was added to the Listing Rules 
of the London Stock Exchange that companies should report 
whether they had followed the recommendations or, if not, explain 
why they had not done so (this is known as 'comply or explain').198 
 
The next report, the Greenbury Report 1995 was in response to excessive executive 
remuneration and the ensuing scandals. The objective was to ‘establish a balance 
between director’s salaries and their performance.’199 The Hampel report in 1998 
took on both aspects as well and recommended a bringing together of both the 
financial perspectives of corporate governance and the issues of directors 
remuneration and this led to the combined code 1998. This was followed by the 
Turnbull report in 1999 which set out best practice of internal control systems for 
UK listed companies.200 
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The fall of Enron in the US prompted re-evaluation of corporate governance system 
again in the UK but this was not only a UK response. The OECD pointed out that the 
‘essential difference between now and the past is the international implications of the 
problem which have come to light in the US have been marked.’201 In this case, 
questions of corporate governance were directly raised by the allegations of fraud 
and active cover up and dissimulation by management which precipitated the 
stunning collapse.202  
Nevertheless the focus of the Higgs report that followed was on the role and 
effectiveness of non-executive directors (NED) recommending  among others that 
one non-executive director champion shareholder interests,203 the recurring theme of 
the reports being a strengthening of the accepted model of owner- control analysis in 
corporate law (shareholder focus). This also led to the review of the combined code 
in 2003.  The Financial reporting Council was confirmed as having responsibility for 
publishing and maintaining the code.204  
The Financial Reporting Council which is now the UK’s independent regulator for 
promoting corporate governance and reporting to foster investment adopts a ‘comply 
or explain’ approach which reflects a kind of policed voluntary approach for listed 
companies.205There were some associated reports in 2003 and the include Smith’s 
report on the role of the audit committee and the DTI commissioned Tyson report on 
the recruitment and development of NED.206  
In predictable fashion, the 2008 financial crisis in the banking industry prompted an 
independent review of corporate governance in the UK banking industry. The 
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resulting Walker report was published in 2009. This report led to wider review by 
the FRC. The FRC in 2010 then published the new UK corporate governance code 
replacing the combined code. It also led to the formulation of a stewardship code for 
institutional investors.  
The code adopts the definition of corporate governance given by the Cadbury report: 
‘Corporate governance is the system by which companies are 
directed and controlled. Boards of directors are responsible for the 
governance of their companies. The shareholders’ role in 
governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors and to 
satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance structure is in 
place. The responsibilities of the board include setting the 
company’s strategic aims, providing the leadership to put them into 
effect, supervising the management of the business and reporting to 
shareholders on their stewardship. The board’s actions are subject 
to laws, regulations and the shareholders in general meeting.’207 
 
This area of corporate governance is very active.  However again it is focused on 
narrow internal questions. It falls fully on the side of the contractual agency vision of 
control tackling questions of legitimacy from a limited internal focus of reconciling 
the power of directors (managers) to shareholders. The frequency and reactionary 
nature of the changes leave room for questions on its effectiveness even at the 
narrow level but its failure from a CSR perspective is that it adopts an unadulterated 
shareholder and utility focus. It follows the ideology that ownership (shareholder) 
control and oversight is the primary requirement for governance and accountability, 
while this is an important aspect, it ignores wider questions the impact of corporate 
power, which as a result fall within CSR sphere. 
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5.6  Conclusion 
 
To ensure controls, accountability and responsible use of such corporate power is 
tantamount to devising means by which such power is exercised legitimately, This is 
particularly important because liberal society requires legitimate use of powers 
located within it for its proper functioning. The corporation is a very attractive form 
of business because it is a source of significant wealth but where it becomes a source 
of unaccountable power, this threatens the very existence of liberal society. It is 
therefore important to have constraints on the exercise of such power through 
adequate accountability and regulatory processes.  
This chapter therefore explored the traditional legal perspective of corporate law as a 
potential framework for legitimacy of corporate power. At the onset, it noted the 
desire expressed by several scholars that fundamental change in the law of 
corporations to signal wider responsibilities will create an inclusive framework for 
CSR. However this chapter explored corporate theories and corporate governance 
theories that inform practice as well as recent reform in the UK to discover that 
corporate law has imposed upon itself a narrow focus on the shareholder model. 
The importance placed within corporate theory on privileging contractual and 
fictional origins and nature of the corporation, mean that there is a dominance of the 
shareholder, profit-making model. It strongly adopts a focus on the utility element of 
corporate legitimacy focused wholly on the success of the corporation. 
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 Hurst is right when he suggests that: 
‘Weakness in the demand for responsibility did not derive from the 
immediate context of that demand but from other undesirable by-
products of our utilitarian emphasis. Power continually presented 
new temptations and shifted into new forms. To structure power 
for responsibility called for continuing close attention and an 
investment of resources of mind and energy which we begrudged. 
We begrudged the investment because we felt that it subtracted 
from our primary interest in the economy, which was the main area 
in which we pursued utility.’208 
  
This focus on utility may also be as a result of the nature of traditional state-centred 
law which is always striving for certainty and tangibility and in some ways, equating 
that with effectiveness. This quest which the law never fully achieves bearing in 
mind this is a dynamic ever-changing world. This often leaves legal scholars in a 
mediated position, sometimes trying to fit traditional old concepts to newer problems 
and perhaps failing. Perhaps the law needs to evolve and proffer new and more 
adequate legal solutions to these newer problems. The conclusion therefore seems to 
be that the core agenda of legal legitimacy cannot be suitably carried out within the 
current corporate law agenda.209   
Yet the problem of law’s role in achieving the legitimacy of corporate power within 
CSR is still a crucial one and as Villiers points out CSR cannot be left in the hands 
of the corporation.210 This therefore points to the need for states, international 
organisations, and civil society to explore other frameworks for responsibility. The 
theoretical underpinnings of corporate law reveal a reluctance to tackle the issues 
and contestation that have driven a utilitarian perspective and affected the content of 
corporate law. It also reveals the limitations of the substantive approach. The reform 
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shareholders interests does not imply the interests of stakeholders must and should go unprotected. It 
merely indicates that the most efficacious legal mechanism for protecting the interests of non-
shareholders lie outside corporate law’ Hansmann & Kraakman (n 100) at.43 
210 Villiers (n 37) 87 
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process takes time and is not the most efficient. The contestations often result in little 
change and show the inflexibility and slowness to change sometimes evident in 
traditional law. It is also driven by the state and the issue of political will becomes 
paramount. However as shown in Chapter four, law can be viewed from a different 
perspective. This perspective would ensure that the wider CSR question is addressed 
by law in a different way. It suggests a shift in focus from searching for legal 
legitimacy of CSR within traditional laws like corporate law to conceptualising new 
non-traditional legal perspectives that focus on role-based definitions of legal 
quality, whilst driving for legitimacy in the form of responsibility. 
These newer multi-stakeholder frameworks can still be developed within the law 
especially if a non-traditional pluralistic perspective is taken on.  The next chapter 
will suggest a novel legal theoretical approach that could lead to a framework for 
addressing CSR issues in a non-traditional way. 
 267 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
LEGITIMACY ISSUES II: A SHIFT FROM TRADITIONAL TO NON-
TRADITIONAL PERSPECTIVE: PROPOSING A LAW-JOBS 
APPROACH 
 
‘All three questions- the identification of beneficiaries (fiduciary 
responsibility), the available mechanisms (corporate governance), 
the role of law- led to the same need for identifying the social 
functions of CSR in a broader context...CSR then seems to be one 
of those decentralised integrative device which place restrictions 
on economic action in the interest of other subsystems – trees and 
people included.’1 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter shifts the perspective of law’s legitimating role within CSR to a non-
traditional pluralist legal perspective. It addresses law’s ability to contribute to 
legitimising CSR in a non-traditional pluralist way outside of traditional substantive 
law structures such as corporate law. It examines CSR’s legitimating core from a 
‘role-based’ legal perspective which is not based wholly on one form of law. This 
acknowledges the nature of CSR as a decentralised integrative device which is not 
anchored on substantive state law alone. This also responds to current demands that 
other actors in society such as international institutions and civil society have a 
responsibility within the drive for legitimacy framework that is CSR to create 
structural processes necessary to ensure legally and socially responsible behaviour 
by corporations.2 
                                                 
1 G Teubner ‘Corporate Fiduciary Duties and their beneficiaries: A Functional Approach to the Legal 
Institutionalisation of Corporate Responsibility in  K J Hopt and G Teubner (eds.)  Corporate 
Governance and Directors Liabilities: Legal, Economic and Sociological Analyses of Corporate 
Social Responsibility (De Gruyter, Berlin 1984)149-177, 160 &162 (words in brackets are mine) 
2 C Villiers, ‘Corporate law, corporate power and corporate social responsibility’ in N Boeger, R 
Murray and C Villiers (eds.), Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham 2008) 85- 112, 87 
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This can be seen as a step away from the assessment of law within CSR from a 
traditional state based substantive law perspective towards a more inclusive, 
dynamic and  pluralistic ‘role-based’ legal perspective. Therefore this perspective 
utilises the term ‘law’ in the inclusive pluralist sense as earlier identified in chapter 
four. This application should result in a legal theoretical framework will would allow 
for examination of law’s potential as legitimacy at different levels and in different 
context. This could be local, national, cross-national or industry-specific.  
The legal theoretical perspective chosen in this chapter to represent this non-
traditional view is derived from Llewellyn’s law jobs theory. This theory embodies 
the flexibility and shift that is seen as necessary to gauge law’s role in legitimising 
corporate power.  This chapter uses the five-fold breakdown of Llewellyn’s law-
jobs3 to examine the potential role for law within CSR. The five law-jobs are the 
disposition of trouble cases; the preventative channelling and the re-orientation of 
conduct and expectations so as to avoid trouble; the allocation of authority and the 
arrangement of procedures which legitimise action as authoritative; the net 
organisation of the group or society as a whole so as to provide direction and 
incentive and the use of the juristic method. 4There are two aspects to this 
perspective: a basic one which allows for an evaluation of how the jobs could be 
done and an aspirational one, which allows for how the jobs could be done better.5  
                                                 
3 K Llewellyn ‘The Normative, the Legal and the Law Jobs: The Problem of the Juristic Method 
(1940) 49 Yale Law Journal 1355-1400, 1373 There are actually four law-jobs and an advocated 
method of doing those jobs as a fifth* 
4 Llewellyn(n 3) 1392 It must be noted that the juristic method is not a law-job per se but an 
advocated method for the evaluation, reform and upkeep of the law-jobs. It therefore in essence goes 
to the doing of the law-jobs 
5 S Taekema ‘The point of Law: the interdependent functionality of state and non-state regulation in H 
Van Schooten J Verschuuren (eds.) International governance and Law: state regulation and non-state 
law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2008) 56-73, 59 Llewellyn also noted that the law-jobs have a 
‘questing’ aspect and a ‘better’ aspect, in other words, an aspect that simply enquires into how these 
jobs are done and another aspect that examines how they could be done better. Llewellyn (n 3) 1375 
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In other words, this chapter frames the law’s legitimating role in CSR around 
questions of how the corporate and society relationship in a given CSR context, 
handles the disposition of trouble cases; the preventative channelling and the re-
orientation of conduct and expectations so as to avoid trouble; the allocation of 
authority and the arrangement of procedures which legitimise action as authoritative; 
the net organisation of the group or society as a whole so as to provide direction and 
incentive and its use of the juristic method for the amendment and re-evaluation of 
processes.  The aim is to illustrate that this can be a framework that promotes the use 
of varied tools, legal structures and processes utilising both traditional and non-
traditional law and regulation towards the legitimacy objective. The law-jobs legal 
theoretical perspective is relevant for the question of assessing CSR’s ability to be a 
legitimizing force for corporate power and indicates the necessity of legal structures 
in the net organisation and evaluation of CSR. This perspective therefore indicates 
that law is an important aspect of legitimacy.  
 Law irrespective of form can be a legitimising force especially where such rules are 
geared towards performing important legal roles within society. Therefore such a 
framework should involve open and transparent application, with adequate 
provisions for re-evaluation. This perspective may not find all the instruments in one 
document or law, but it takes a holistic view of that context, searching for rules, 
standards-‘law tools’ that may be fulfilling these roles. 
This chapter will set out its suggested approach and the applicability of law-jobs to 
CSR but it does not seek to demonstrate whether the law-jobs are currently done 
adequately or inadequately. It purely seeks to identify that such perspective holds 
enormous potential for CSR. This leaves room for further research in future to assess 
and measure the doing of the law-jobs in given CSR contexts. 
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Consequently the outline of the chapter is as follows: The next section will outline 
the background to Llewellyn’s Law-jobs thesis. This will be followed by an analysis 
of law-jobs potential application within CSR using Llewellyn’s five-fold framework. 
Finally the conclusion draws out the unique potential which this shift in focus of 
perspective of law may afford the drive for legitimacy within CSR in general. 
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6.2 The Law-Jobs Theoretical perspective 
 
The wider debates about law in chapter four drew our attention to the limited nature 
in which traditional legal perspectives relate to new phenomenon. Law is often 
regarded in the formal sense of mandatory legal rules backed by sanctions and this 
has resulted in almost relegating the significance of law in the study of contemporary 
concepts arising against the background of globalization such as CSR.  
However the law or ‘legal’ does not consist of only formal legal rules, it can and 
should be perceived from the perspective of the role it fulfils in society. This is a 
view shared by the eminent jurisprudential scholar, Llewellyn. 
He points out that 
‘…the formal legal, the law stuff and the law ways, travel paths 
of their own once they specialise into recognisability, upon 
them in conflicting sense of particular parts and of the whole, 
play human interests and normative generalisations which are 
thrown and followed into the ring by men. All this takes shape, 
takes body under the eye, if it be set against those law-jobs 
whose sufficient doing goes to the very continued existence of 
society as society; of a group as a group.’6 
 
Llewellyn proposed the law-jobs perspective as a process of stripping away to the 
bare bones and conceiving or discovering law from the point of the necessary roles 
that law can and does perform in society or groups.7 This perspective can also be 
adapted to allow the examination of the law-jobs within the corporate –society 
relationship. In particular providing a framework for analysing how these law-jobs 
                                                 
6 His position was that law or the legal must be set against law-jobs which are essential for the 
continued functioning of society as society.  Llewellyn (n 3) 1373 
7 Llewellyn (n 3) 1373 
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could be performed to achieve CSR aims. This will also give the capability for 
suggestions in future about how these law-jobs could be performed differently. This 
perspective endorses the view that where one finds (as is currently the case in CSR) 
a conundrum-the existence of significant societal problems and corresponding 
activity to demand for social responsibility of corporations, it may be necessary to 
take a basic skeletal view that seeks out law and law tools from the roles which they 
can perform in context.  
The legal theoretical perspective of law jobs initially propounded by Llewellyn in the 
1930’s initially to provide a framework for sociological enquiry in the law-ways of 
the Cheyenne.8 Yet it finds relevance today because of its adaptability to global 
questions asked of law.9 Twining points out the strengths of the law-jobs as its 
inherent simplicity and flexibility. He stresses that it brings together ideas about 
rules, processes, institutions, arenas, actors, decisions, techniques, co-ordination and 
conflict10 
The law-jobs can also be used in a sense which renders it devoid of empirical claims 
in itself and yet useful for analytical purposes.11 The law-jobs perspective identifies 
law from very crucial angle, which is that of its role, point and purpose but however 
makes no empirical or functionalist assumptions. It simple provides a tool that can 
be used to create a framework for analysis of concepts through a law-based lens. 
 
  
 
                                                 
8 Llewellyn (n 3) 1355 
9 W Twining, General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective (CUP, 
Cambridge 2009); W Twining Globalisation and Legal Theory (Cambridge, CUP, 2000) 
10 Twining rightly points out that this inter-dependence is a relative matter  W Twining Globalisation 
and Legal Scholarship Montesquieu Lecture Tilburg University 2009 
11 Twining 2009 (n 9) 107; CSR is already loaded with initiatives in various context – this will be a 
useful analytical tool to gauge for roles. 
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However there are certain limitations to the law-jobs perspectives, some of which are 
acknowledged by Llewellyn himself. Firstly the proposition is that the law-jobs are 
performed by law but they are not exclusively jobs for law. There is interplay 
between law and other social disciplines. Llewellyn points out that: 
 ‘the legal cannot exhaust the whole nature of a culture...those 
same ways also involve governance, and can be studied with profit, 
from that angle alone ...there is  almost no part of culture which is 
not also legal in nature, (whatever else it is as well).’12 
 
This is the multidisciplinary dimension present in many phenomena on a global 
scale. Contemporary studies in CSR will have a multidisciplinary elements drawing 
on notions from various fields with the social sciences and law. They can be studied 
from a chosen perspective but this does not make it mutually exclusive to that 
perspective although different perspectives may serve different parts.  
Secondly, the only claim made with regard to these jobs is that law can and does do 
this in society. This is because some of these jobs are also pertinent issues in the 
social sciences.  The validity of this approach is that it will allow for the 
identification of law-like phenomena and the ability to suggest novel ways to handle 
the development of these nascent forms of law within CSR.  This would also permit 
law to show its dynamism and relevance when faced with newer challenges. 
Therefore as Llewellyn puts it ‘so the social disciplines ...discover that modern work 
in the legal field is not only a market for their product but a rich productive area.’13 
Llewellyn points out those law-jobs apply to and go to the essence of any group; 
therefore it can apply to units within society such as the corporations and the local 
communities in which they operate and this may be seen as a ‘functional’ approach, 
                                                 
12 Llewellyn (n 3) 1377 
13 Llewellyn (n 3) 1357 
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but it is important to highlight that this does not propose that law does these jobs best 
or even that these jobs are the exclusive preserve of law14. It only points out that law 
does fulfil these roles in society, so seeking out how these jobs are done will lead to 
the discovery of law, law-tools and rules relevant to that context.  
This position is also defended by Ehrenberg15, who argues for methodological space 
for a functional theory of law that does not commit to a view about the value of that 
function for society, nor whether law is the best means of accomplishing it but rather 
provides a conceptual framework for understanding the nature of law. He points out 
that there is some agreement that law performs some social functions and that the 
disagreements often lie in description of these social functions and the extent to 
which law is the best or only tool useful for such functioning.16 
 It may be better to replace the word function with ‘role’ or ‘job’ or even ‘point’ as 
suggested by Twining.17 This is in an effort to get away from functionalist debates 
and focus on the utility of the emerging conceptual framework in analysing relevant 
phenomena.  
                                                 
14 Twining 2009 (n 9) for an analysis of such criticism; also see K M Ehrenberg ‘Defending the 
Possibility of a Neutral Functional Theory of Law (2009) 29(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 91-
113 
15 Ehrenberg Ibid 
16 Ehrenberg (n 14) 
17 Twining 2009 (n 9) 110 
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6.3 Applying the Law-jobs perspective to CSR  
 
 
The next task is to discover if this can be a heuristic device for law within CSR. This 
section therefore adopts the five-fold law-jobs framework for CSR and examines 
how law tools in CSR respond to these five law-jobs. These law tools are used in the 
pluralistic sense to include law and regulation as earlier defined in the broad sense. 
Taekema points out that the law-jobs have two aspects – basic and aspirational- and 
that this makes room for judgements of variable achievements of law jobs.18 
Llewellyn himself points out that the law-jobs have a ‘questing’ aspect and a ‘better’ 
aspect, in other words, an aspect that simply enquires into how these jobs are done 
and another aspect that examines how they could be done better.19 The focus here is 
on setting out an organising framework of how these jobs could be done in CSR, 
therefore it only tackles the ‘questing’ or basic aspect. 
 
To perform the first ‘law-job’ the CSR law-tool, instrument or mechanism will have 
to play a role in the adjustment of trouble cases, in the sense of having the ability to 
eliminate conflict or grievance which has broken out. This ability must be such as to 
allow for the diffusion of tensions, trouble or potential trouble as well as provide 
means of handling the trouble cases or CSR violations. This is a job traditionally 
carried out by the judiciary and the courts but the law-jobs mechanism can also be 
extended to dispute resolution mechanisms of other kinds. Therefore it could be seen 
as inclusive of judicial and non-judicial dispute resolution. It could then be applied 
                                                 
18 Taekema (n 5) 
19 Llewellyn (n 3)  1375 
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to dispute resolution in the corporate – community context at different levels or even 
among corporation. This use of alternative dispute resolution would also have to 
factor in resolution of deviant behaviour of corporations as well as grievances from 
different interest groups in society. 
 The next law-job which CSR law-tools should do is the job of channelling 
preventively people’s attitudes and conduct towards the corporation as well as 
channelling and re-orientating the corporation’s attitude towards society. In that 
sense not only ‘channelling overt behaviour, but also channelling of expectations, 
norms and claims’20. This is an area of central concern already expressed through the 
proliferation of CSR codes and reports. Some of these codes and other forms of 
communication such as social and environmental reports attempt to put forward a 
new ideology for the corporation, defining what it sees as social issues within its 
sphere. They acquire the status of a law tools as they begin to guide behaviour of 
both the corporation and the society. 
However this law-job of channelling conduct in CSR is not exclusively focused on 
voluntary codes because substantive environmental, labour, human rights and health 
and safety laws would have an impact here. It is even probable that certain contexts 
may desire to draft laws with explicit focus on CSR. There are examples in 
Mauritius and Denmark of law explicitly focused on CSR.21 Some states like UK 
and Nigeria have debated a CSR bill.22  
                                                 
20 Llewellyn (n 3) 
21 Finance Bill (Mauritius) sub-part AD. S. 50k-l <http://www.nef.mu/csr/finance_bill.php> accessed 
10 December 2011.  The Danish Financial Statements Act ("Årsregnskabsloven"), cf. Consolidated 
Act no. 647of 15 June 2006, as amended by section 5 of Act no. 108 of 7 February 2007, section 63 
of Act no. 468 of 17 June 2008 and Act no. 516 of 17 June 2008 <http://www.csrgov.dk/> accessed 
10 December 2011 
22 UK CR bill Copy available online : 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmbills/129/03129.i.html > 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmbills/129/2003129.pdf > accessed 10 
December 2011 , Nigeria CSR bill online <http://www.femiamao.com/files/CSR_BILL.pdf > 
accessed 10 December 2011 
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The third law-job is the allocation of authority and the arrangement of procedures 
which legitimise action as authoritative. This is a constitutive function and this refers 
to the role of allocation of power and to the indication of authoritative persons and 
procedures. In corporate and society relations, this will deal with identifying 
responsibility for exercise of power by corporations, identifying forms, procedures 
and ideologies that limit or direct the exercise of power as well as specifying those 
responsible for CSR action, policies and procedures. It will also involve the creation 
of processes that provide for consultation, participation and CSR rule creation. This 
identifies the stakeholders and the rules of engagement.  However this role may be 
carried out at different levels of society, such as the company level, industry level or 
even state level. It is necessary that such procedures are identified and that they 
operate transparently and accountably.  
In several ways, CSR action has involved an implicit acknowledgement of spheres of 
power and therefore the next logical step is the clear allocation of responsibility. 
Connolly points out that ‘to acknowledge power over others is to implicate oneself in 
responsibility for certain events and to put oneself in a position where justification 
for the limits placed on others is expected.’23 Llewellyn also points out that ‘ It is at 
this point that an imperative system and the net effect and intent of its authoritative 
staff make necessary contact with justification of themselves’24 For his purposes this 
was evident in his application to the juristic method and its institutions but for global 
society. In the context of CSR, the picture is more complex. It is an emerging picture 
where those who have the ‘say’, the states are no longer sole speakers or power 
holders and therefore, new entities are emerging large corporations, non-
governmental organizations and so on.  
                                                 
23 W Connolly The Terms of Political discourse (3rd ed.) (Blackwell, Oxford 1993) 97 
24 Llewellyn (n 3)  1385 
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Therefore in law-job, CSR instruments should provide for responsibility for exercise 
of procedures outlined within it. If it is a CSR law then it should spell out all relevant 
actors including departments with CSR responsibility, Corporations should provide 
clear lines of responsibility within their departments and relevant non-governmental 
stakeholders and their responsibilities should also be clearly identified.  
 Taekama in examining this law-job admits that ‘the law-job of allocating authority 
is certainly not by definition the state’s prerogative or task. Private institutions are 
quite capable of making such decisions under the right conditions: the institutions 
represent multiple interests, be open to public scrutiny and prevent self-interested 
and lax monitoring.’25Therefore the key issue becomes could CSR law-tools 
developed by multi-stakeholders be fulfilling that role of identifying and re-defining 
who is responsible for what and how such responsibility should be exercised at both 
micro and macro levels.  The role or job becomes one of identifying who has the say 
and authority and placing limits (explicit or tacitly) on the exercise of that power. 
These limits and allocation of responsibility go to the crux issue of legitimacy. 
The fourth law-job of net organization is a result of the previous three law –jobs and 
therefore this law-job will involve incentivising, integrating and directing society as 
a whole. CSR law-tools could be able to play a pivotal role in providing direction 
and organization on the issues arising from the relationship between society and 
business. CSR is already developing as a specialist area and may yet develop its own 
specialist area of law.  The application of law-jobs theory to any existing CSR 
mechanisms permits analysis to consider what these mechanisms currently achieve 
as well as what they could potentially achieve. 
                                                 
25 Taekema (n 5) 66 
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 Llewellyn stresses that the ‘official-legal and the official political are not the only 
mechanisms for doing law-jobs.26 While net organising framework could be CSR 
law or instruments that allow for an overview. It is important that even where it is 
not, it is a multi-stakeholder initiative that provides for public scrutiny and future 
reform. This overall framework should therefore occur in the given context.   
Finally CSR should be able to evolve mechanisms that perform the evaluative job of 
the juristic method. For Llewellyn, these are the ways of handling ‘legal tools for law 
job ends, and the on-going upkeep and improvement of both the tools and ways.’27 
In other words it is possible to decide on a method for achieving the law-jobs and 
then review to see if this method can be improved upon. The current way for 
achieving the law-jobs may be ad-hoc and informal but that is not only way. This 
law-job could be done through monitoring and certification or through regulatory 
inspections. This final law-job embodies the review and reform element. The inter-
linkages between the law jobs mean that re-evaluation may cause changes in the 
style of law mechanisms or tools used to channel behaviour especially in the face of 
persistent irresponsibility. 
The law-jobs framework is devoid of its own content, so the content can be analysed 
in context. In this sense it provides an invaluable heuristic device that also allows for 
re-evaluation, reform and re-organisation. Each of these law-jobs will be examined 
in more detail in the following sections. 
                                                 
26 Llewellyn (n 3) 1389 
27 Llewellyn (n 3) 1392 
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6.3.1 The Disposition of Trouble Cases 
 
 
Llewellyn refers to the first part of the law-jobs as the adjustment of the trouble-case 
that is, offense, grievance, and dispute.   This reference is a generic one, which 
addresses the role of law or law-like phenomena in handling of conflicts or 
grievances that arise in any social group. This often involves the creation of rules 
and legal institutions to handle such conflict.   
Within the CSR scenario, the major trigger for CSR has been public scandals about 
corporate action taken on social and environmental issues, therefore  one of the 
objectives of CSR actions, has been to create a means of managing and handling 
grievances.  In our chosen example of the oil industry, the triggers for active 
engagement with CSR would include the Exxon Valdez oil spill off the coast of 
Alaska, the Shell Brent Spar incident with Green Peace and the Shell and Ogoni 
social and human rights crisis in Nigeria.28 
These problems have stemmed from environmental and social issues, where blame 
has been fully or partially apportioned to the multinational corporations.  From a 
legal perspective, there have been two major developments: The attempted use of 
traditional dispute resolution through the courts in the home states of the MNC and 
the development of non-judicial dispute resolution mechanisms. These are the 
specific developments which will be examined below. 
                                                 
28 P Utting K Ives ‘The Politics of Corporate Responsibility and the Oil Industry’ (2006) 2(1) St 
Anthony’s International Review (STAIR) 11-34 
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i. Traditional Dispute Resolution (Litigation) 
 
On the one hand, there have been several attempts to use traditional legal instruments 
to seek redress from grievance. This has been done by recourse to courts in the home 
states of the MNC, where liability is alleged to lie with the corporations for torts or 
wrongs, but there have been limitations with the use of this method. They can be 
found in the notion of the corporate veil and forum non conveniens.  
In the case of the MNC, recourse to the parent company is severely restricted by the 
doctrine of corporate personality and limited liability29. These principles appear to 
cast a veil over the corporation and place the parent corporation the position of a 
shareholder. However the veil can be lifted where the parent corporation has 
sufficient involvement and control in the affairs of the subsidiary. The position in the 
UK has been recently outlined in the case of Lubbe v Cape Plc.30 Lord Bingham 
states thus: 
‘The first segment concerns the responsibility of the defendant as a 
parent company for ensuring the observance of proper standards of 
health and safety by its overseas subsidiaries. Resolution of this 
issue will be likely to involve an inquiry into what part the 
defendant played in controlling the operations of the group, what 
its directors and employees knew or ought to have known, what 
action was taken and not taken, whether the defendant owed a duty 
of care to employees of group companies overseas and whether, if 
so, that duty was broken. Much of the evidence material to this 
inquiry would, in the ordinary way, be documentary and much of it 
would be found in the offices of the parent company, including 
minutes of meetings, reports by directors and employees on visits 
overseas and correspondence.’31 
 
 This endorses a position that where sufficient involvement in the control of the 
subsidiary is indicated via shareholding and also through other mechanisms of 
control which show significant involvement in the activities of the subsidiary, then 
                                                 
29 For a summary of problematic issues see:  P Muchlinski ‘Limited Liability and Multinational 
Enterprises: a case for reform?’ (2010) Cambridge Journal of Economics 915 -928 
30 (2000) UKHL 41 
31 At para.20 
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lifting of the corporate veil is possible with the parent –subsidiary relationship.32The 
position in the US is similar as Blumberg points out that the issue of control is 
crucial but additionally in the US, it is necessary to show that the parent corporation 
is using the subsidiary as a shelter to accomplish unjust, inequitable or fraudulent 
behaviour that has caused injury to plaintiff (claimant).33 
Nevertheless even where this link between the parent and subsidiary corporations is 
shown then other jurisdictional limitations have come sharply into focus. These 
jurisdictional questions ask if the foreign forum is the proper forum for such 
litigation. This has become a significant limitation because as Blumberg points out 
‘jurisdiction continues to be one of the most litigated areas involving the clash of 
enterprise and entity’.34  
In view of the nature of MNC operating in multiple locations, the litigants have often 
sought to sue these MNC in their home states. These attempts to access courts in the 
home states of the MNC have met with limited success. One of the main obstacles 
has been the notions of ‘forum non conveniens’ (FNC) prevalent in many common-
law countries such as the US and the UK which are home states for a major portion 
of the large MNC.35 This FNC concept raises the question of a better and more 
convenient forum and often results in remitting the matter back to the courts of the 
state (country) where the alleged incident occurred.36 This is often not desirable for 
the litigants as the incidents occur in developing countries, where the legal regime 
may lack adequate legal mechanisms, penalties or even political will and there may 
                                                 
32 R Meeran ‘The Unveiling of Transnational Corporations: a direct approach’ in M Addo (ed.) 
Human Rights Standards and the responsibility of Transnationals (Kluwer International,1999) 161-
170 
33 P I Blumberg ‘Accountability of Multinational Corporations: the barriers presented by the corporate 
juridical entity’ (2001) 24(3)  Hastings International  and Comparative Law Review 297-320 
34 P I Blumberg The Multinational Challenge to corporations (Oxford, OUP, 1993) 117 
35 Home countries for some of the largest Multinational Corporations such as Exxon and BP 
36 Spiliada Maritime Corporation –v- Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460; Adams v Cape Industries plc 
[1990] Ch 433; Lubbe v Cape Plc (2000) UKHL 41; see also S Joseph Corporations and 
Transnational Human Rights Litigation  (Hart Publishing, 2004) 
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also be considerable limitations in funding of such litigation on the part of the 
injured party which may be an individual or a community.37 
In the United Kingdom, the doctrine of FNC is established by the case of Spiliada 
Maritime Corporation v Cansulex.38The Spiliada test involved two-parts:  it is for 
the defendant claiming there is an alternative forum to make out a case that the 
natural foreign form is better and then the plaintiff (claimant) can show special 
circumstances that substantial justice cannot be obtained there, to rebut this claim. 
However the scope of this doctrine has been significantly eroded by the signing of 
the Brussels convention.39 The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act (1982) as 
amended by the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act (1991)) which adopts this 
convention specifies in s.49 that ‘Nothing in this Act shall prevent any court in the 
United Kingdom from staying, sisting, striking out or dismissing any proceedings 
before it, on the ground of forum non conveniens or otherwise, where to do so is not 
inconsistent with the 1968 Convention.’  
This EU position rather adopts the notion of ‘Lis alibi pendens’ which is more 
prevalent in civil law countries in which states that: 40 
‘(1)Where proceedings involving the same cause of action and 
between the same parties are brought in the courts of different 
Member States, any court other than the court first seised shall of 
its own motion stay its proceedings until such time as the 
jurisdiction of the court first seised is established. 
(2)Where the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established, 
any court other than the court first seised shall decline jurisdiction 
in favour of that court.  
                                                 
37 Joseph (n 36) 11 
38 (1972) 3WLR 972 
39 This is affirmed by the case of the ECJ  cases of Group Josi Reinsurance Company SA v 
Compaigne d’Assurances Universal General Insurance Company (2000) Case C-412/98 & Owusu v 
Jackson (2005) Case C-128/01 
40 Article 27 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
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The ECJ in Owusu v Jackson41 then interpreted the Brussels convention in a way 
which effectively curtailed the use of FNC in the UK by holding that: 
 ‘the Brussels Convention precludes a court of a Contracting State 
from declining the jurisdiction conferred on it by Article 2 of that 
convention on the ground that a court of a non-Contracting State 
would be a more appropriate forum for the trial of the action even 
if the jurisdiction of no other Contracting State is in issue or the 
proceedings have no connecting factors to any other Contracting 
State.’42 
 
While this may end up creating a good weapon for litigation against MNC domiciled 
in EU countries including England, it has been badly received in England. It was 
perceived as ‘forcing litigation to take place in inappropriate jurisdiction with greater 
inconvenience and expense.’43The courts have already begun limiting the impact of 
the case as it did not exclude the discretion of the courts to stay proceedings in 
favour of proceedings in a foreign forum.44 
In the US (which is the home of a significant number of MNC) the instructive case 
on FNC is the case of Piper Alpha v Reyno45. This prescribes a more restricted 
approach on the basis of FNC. The courts at the outset determine whether there 
exists an alternative forum and then consider issues of private and public interest. 
The private interest factors include relative ease of access to evidence and all other 
practical problems that make the trail expeditious and inexpensive. The public 
interest factor considers congestion of courts in the US as against the courts in the 
alternative forum. Therefore the result is often that the US approach is more 
restrictive on the basis of FNC.  
                                                 
41 (2005) Case C-128/01; 2 WLR 942 (2005) 
42 At para.46 
43 J Harris ‘The Brussels I Regulation and the Re-emergence of English Common Law ‘(2008) 4 
European Legal Forum 181-189, 185 
44 Konkola Copper Mines plc v Coromin (2005) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 555 
45 (1981) 454 US 235 
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  An instructive example is the Bhopal Union Carbide disaster of 1984 which was 
unsuccessfully litigated in the US. The Bhopal gas plant, where the gas leak occurred 
was operated by Union Carbide India Limited, a fifty-one percent affiliate of the 
parent corporation, Union Carbide Corporation. The US courts concluded that India 
would be a better forum as it has a stronger regulatory interest.46 The MNC Union 
Carbide Corporation paid a settlement figure to the Indian Government in 1989 of 
about 470 million dollars47 but it was only in 2010 that the Indian courts finally 
found some Indian ex –executives of Union carbide liable for causing death by 
negligence and sentenced to two years imprisonment. This may not even spell the 
end of it as the Indian Supreme court has been asked to re-open the case due to the 
leniency of the sentences.48 
Nonetheless in the US, another controversial traditional legal instrument that has 
emerged to attempt to give access to justice for the victims of wrongful corporate 
action is the Alien Tort Statutes49 The Act gives ‘district courts the power to hear 
civil claims from foreign citizens for injuries caused by action in violation of the law 
of nations or a treaty of the USA’50. The term the ‘law of nations’ can be construed 
in several ways, for in a literal sense it refers to other sources of international law 
outside treaty law. However this will include customary international law.  
Joseph therefore points out that ‘generally it seems that the US courts are satisfied 
that Alien Torts Claims Act (ATCA) is activated if the human rights violation at 
issue breaches customary international law’51. This casts a wide net and therefore 
                                                 
46 In re Union Carbide Corporation Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India, 634 F.Supp. 842, 844 
(SDNY, 1986), aff'd, 809 Fed. Rptr. 2d 195 (2nd Cir., 1987) 
47 Monks & Minow (n 33) 19 
48 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/aug/31/india-reopens-bhopal-case> accessed 10 
September 2011 
49 28 U S C § 1350 ATS includes the Aliens Torts Claims Act (ATCA) and the Torture Victim 
Prevention Act (TVPA). This ATCA was part of the Judiciary Act of 1789 
50 Ch. 20, §9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789) 
51 Joseph (n 36) 
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several issues may trigger ATS claims. They include torture, genocide, forced 
labour, peaceful assembly and association, freedom of political belief opinion and 
expressions among others, although controversially environmental abuses may not 
ground a claim52.  
The important ATS decision was made in the case of Filartiga v Pena-Irala53 where 
the court accepted the extension of universally accepted norms of international 
human rights law (as a violation of International law) as constituting a violation of 
domestic law of the United States. Since then there have been several attempts to 
litigate oil multinational corporations but very few have reached substantive hearing. 
Cases have been brought against oil multinational corporations for their actions in 
several countries. Examples include Shell in Nigeria54, Chevron in Nigeria55, Texaco 
in Ecuador56, and Exxon Mobil in Aceh57.  
In spite of FNC as a procedural obstacle, ATS remains a major factor as the potential 
for litigation for human rights violation remains.58 The US Supreme Court in the 
case of Sosa v Alvarez- Machian59 accepted the use of the Alien Tort Statute in 
application of ACTA to binding norms of customary international human rights 
law.60 However more recently in September 2010, some doubt was re-introduced 
with the decision of the second circuit (appeals) US court in the case of Kiobel v 
                                                 
52 Ibid 
53 630 F.2d 876(2d Cir 1980) 
54 Wiwa v Shell Petroleum Development Co.532 US 941(2001); Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum 
No.06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, 2010WL 3611392 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2010) 
55 Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. 09-15641, 2010 WL 3516437 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 2010); 
56 Aguinda v Texaco303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir 2002) 
57 Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 09-7125 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
58 One of the major procedural obstacles however is the Forum Non Conveniens (FNC) doctrine 
which allows the courts to dismiss the case if there is a more suitable alternative foreign forum. 
59 (2004) 542 U.S. 692 
60 R G Steinhardt, ‘Laying one Bankrupt Critique to rest: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the Future of 
International Human Rights Litigation in U. S. Courts’ (2004) 57(6) Vanderbilt Law Review 2241-
2301 
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Royal Dutch Shell61 which found that the Aliens Torts Statute did not apply to 
corporations. The court’s reasoning was that ‘corporations are liable as juridical 
persons under domestic law, (but that) does not mean they are liable under 
international law’62This case is now scheduled as a landmark case to be decided by 
the US Supreme Court to settle the question of corporate liability for human rights 
violations in the US.63 Therefore there is still a lot of uncertainty surrounding this 
legal mechanism. 
A further limitation of this type of dispute resolution is that even where litigation is 
within jurisdiction and successful, there can be extreme delay as a result of appeals 
by either party and this is evidenced by the fact that the 2010 US Kiobel case refers 
to alleged violations of human violations by Shell that occurred in the Niger-Delta 
region of Nigeria in the period between 1992-1995. 
                                                 
61 No.06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, 2010WL 3611392 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2010) 
62 Ibid; see also  C I Keitner ‘Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum:  Another Round in the Fight Over 
Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute’ 14(30) American Society of International Law 
(ASIL) Insight September 30, 2010. These are cases arising from alleged Shell complicity in the 
execution of the Nigerian ‘Ogoni nine’. 
63 Esther Kiobel (individually and on behalf of her husband) v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. et al  
June 13, 2011 No. 10-491 Supreme Court of the US Substantial amount of amicus curiae has been 
filed for the case. This involves legal scholars, universities, NGOs, corporations. The case is now set 
for arguments October 1, 2012. 
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ii. Non-traditional Dispute Resolution 
 
On the other hand, there is an increasing development of alternative dispute 
resolution and grievance mechanisms. Ruggie in his role as the special representative 
of the secretary general on issues of business and human rights has suggested that 
these mechanisms could be extended to address certain community – company 
disputes.64In his April 2008 Report, he outlined a three part global framework for 
allocating human rights responsibilities between States and business: (a) States have 
the duty to protect individuals and communities from human rights abuses from all 
sources, including business; (b) business has the responsibility to respect human 
rights; and (c) those who suffer harm from business activities should have access to 
remedy, both judicial and non- judicial.”65   
The reference to the non-judicial method of dispute resolution is an 
acknowledgement of another way of carrying out this law job that is present within 
CSR. Some the existing CSR codes of conduct already contain provisions and 
standards which pertain to the handling of complaints and grievance mechanisms.  
 A report by the CSR Initiative at the Harvard University examining how integrated 
conflict management programs can be extended to external stakeholders such as the 
community, gives an overview of these mechanisms.66  
                                                 
64 See J Ruggie Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights Report 
of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises (April 2008) at 22 He points out with regards to human 
rights, a major aspect of corporate social responsibility, that ‘effective grievance mechanisms play an 
important role ...in the corporate responsibility to respect.’ He adds that ‘equally, the corporate 
responsibility to respect requires a means for those who believe they have been harmed to bring this 
to the attention of the company and seek remediation....providing access to remedy does not presume 
that all allegations represent real abuses of bona fide complaints.’ This position is adopted in his final 
report 2011 
65 Ibid 
66 C Rees D Vermijis ‘Mapping Grievance Mechanisms in the Business and Human Rights Arena’ 
Corporate Social responsibility Initiative Report no 28 Cambridge MA Harvard Kennedy School; 
Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School of Government Governance and 
Accountability Program: <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/prog_ga.html> accessed 25 
October 2010; see also the BASES wiki platform (Business and Society Exploring Solutions- a 
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This report from the CSR initiative maps out the grievance mechanisms that are in 
place in the business and human right area outside of the traditional legal. This 
analysis of mechanisms was done with three key themes: Institutional levels, key 
functions and types of processes.  The different institutional levels analysed were 
company, industry, multi-industry, national, regional or international. The key 
functions referred to included standards, access, agents, process, enforcement, 
outcomes and transparency. The types of processes range from information 
facilitation, negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, investigation to even 
adjudication. 
 This investigation is novel in many ways but it underpins Llewellyn’s point that law 
can be perceived from the perspective of the jobs .Although these activities are non-
judicial; they are capable of handling significant amount of grievance remediation in 
the absence of other effective remedies. It is however important that recognition of 
the capabilities of these frameworks must also be coupled with issues of 
accountability and legitimacy.   
To understand how this system works at the company level.67 The CSR Initiative 
study gives the example of the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline by 
an oil consortium led by BP.  The process of grievance remediation on this project 
allowed for affected individuals in the communities to register grievances with 
community liaison officers appointed by the company. The first level of dispute 
resolution would involve seeking a negotiated settlement within a short period of 
time however where this settlement could not be achieved or the matter related to a 
land dispute, compensation or other primary non-technical issue.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
dispute resolution community) <http://baseswiki.org/en/Main_Page> accessed 25 October 2010 
67 See Rees & Vermijis Ibid at 10 
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The matter could then be taken to a local NGO, Center for Legal and Economic 
Education (CLEE) engaged by BP to provide a form of arbitration. This process did 
not exempt the right to redress in the courts where such rights exist. This was a rights 
–based approach, with rights derived from domestic law, or voluntary standards 
adopted by BTC including BP’s code of conduct, standards of the IFC and the 
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. The process was published on 
the web as a means of accountability and transparency. These mechanisms have 
evolved as means of dealing with persistent problems that are thrown up by 
regulatory gaps.   
Another example at a national level can be derived from the use of national contact 
points under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.68 The Guidelines 
cover employment and industrial relations, human rights, environment, information 
disclosure, combating bribery, consumer interests, competition, taxation and science 
and technology.69 The guidelines have been highlighted as having one of the best 
coverage of CSR issues.70  
The national contact points handle complaints against MNC about violations of the 
guidelines. These violations must however have taken place in an OECD country or 
a non-OECD adhering country. Any ‘interested party’ has standing to bring a 
complaint and this cover a multitude of stakeholders such as individuals, 
communities, trade unions or other non-governmental organisations. It uses 
investigation, mediation and conciliation which may result in remediation and 
conciliation. The national contact points can also produce a publicised statement 
with recommendations.  
                                                 
68 (2000) 40 ILM 237 (2001)  
69 Ibid 
70 D Leipziger The Corporate Responsibility code book (2nd ed. Greenleaf, Sheffield  2010) 55 
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There is no formal appeals process however OECD member states or OECD 
business or trade union advisory bodies (Business and Industry Advisory Committee 
(BIAC)  and Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC)) can request the OECD 
Investment Committee’s views on whether an NCP has correctly interpreted the 
Guidelines’ text and implementation procedures.71 However there have been 
recommendations that this be extended to a larger role of specific 
recommendations.72 
The OECD also reviews NCP as different states adopt varying mechanisms of 
compliance. This review allows for comparative analysis of mechanisms towards the 
the core criteria of visibility, accessibility, transparency and accountability i.e. 
‘functional equivalence’.73 The 2008 review report points out ‘The flexibility 
embedded in the “functional equivalence” principle constitutes a recognition that the 
conditions and circumstances upon which various corporate responsibility actors 
operate may vary from one adherent country to another.’74 
This analysis suggests that in enhancing a CSR legitimacy framework, this sort of 
non-judicial mechanisms are newer regulatory tools which can be harnessed in the 
doing of law-jobs. These mechanisms are also the legitimate concern of law 
especially because they are an emerging type of law and dispute-resolving 
mechanism which may in future acquire more relevance to certain communities than 
                                                 
71 BASES (Business and Society Exploring Solutions) established as part of the Corporate Social 
Responsibility Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School of Government Governance and Accountability 
Program < http://baseswiki.org/en/OECD_National_Contact_Points,_General_Information> accessed 
10 December 2011  
72 OECD Watch 2008 review of NCP and the implementation of OECD Guidelines June 2008 
<http://baseswiki.org/w/images/en/7/7d/OECD_Watch_2008_Review_of_National_Contact_Points_a
nd_the_Implementation_of_the_OECD_Guidelines.pdf > accessed 10 December 2011 
73 Review of the NCP Performance: Key findings of the Investment Committee: Background paper 
for the OECD-ILO Conference on CSR June 2008, OECD, Paris (p.15) 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/15/40807797.pdf>  accessed 10 December 2011 
74 Ibid; the OECD also has annual reports on the Guidelines which review the activity of the past 12 
months. The 2010 report is OECD, Annual report on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises 2010: Corporate Responsibility: reinforcing a Unique Instrument (OECD, Paris 2010) 
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traditional legal instruments. Frameworks for non-judicial or alternative dispute 
mechanisms are often in built within CSR instruments. Where this is studied from 
the legal perspective, it can also be criticised from that perspective. 
 
6.3.2 Channelling and Re-channelling 
 
 
The next law-job within this perspective of the CSR legitimacy framework is the 
channelling and re-channelling of behaviour. This would refer to channelling of 
overt behaviour as well as the channelling of expectations, norms and claims. In a 
traditional legal sense, this would refer to law’s ability to define expected conduct 
from actors within the applicable community through legislation and regulation. 
However within CSR the most visible means of channelling conduct is through the 
use of non-traditional codes of conduct.  This aspect therefore tackles the situation 
within CSR, where preventative channelling of corporate behaviour towards 
responsible action is desirable. This can be done in a traditional or non-traditional 
way. 
i. Traditional  
 
Some states have attempted to use traditional laws to reinforce the channelling of 
corporate behaviour but this attempt has been largely unsuccessful. Two examples 
are the 2003 UK Corporate Responsibility bill75 and the 2008 Nigerian CSR bill76. 
There appears to be a lack of political will, to regulate for CSR especially with the 
                                                 
75 Copy available online : 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmbills/129/03129.i.html > 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmbills/129/2003129.pdf > accessed 10 
December 2011 
76 Copy available online <http://www.femiamao.com/files/CSR_BILL.pdf > accessed 10 December 
2011 
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ideological dominance of the voluntaristic perspective. In addition the push for 
deregulation and the reduction of state capacity have dominated global discourse on 
the role of the state.77  
Jenkins points out that although critics of this rather voluntaristic turn raise the 
objection that such regulation serves as a substitute for statutory legislation and at 
the same time legitimises the absence of statutory regulations by governments and 
international bodies but in historical context for globalisation, he accepts there is at 
present no clear platform for re-regulation.78  
Notwithstanding this, there is emerging new set of CSR regulation in developing 
countries that are attempting to link CSR spending with developmental objectives. 
Mauritius government has instituted a policy that mandates a 2% of profits spend 
towards CSR programmes.79 In Indonesia, a modification to their corporate law was 
made in 2007 to include a mandatory obligation for corporations in the field of 
and/or related to natural resources to carry out social and environmental 
responsibility (SER).80 This obligation to carry out CSR is also extended to 
investors.81 
 There are also examples of regulation geared at fostering and facilitating the 
voluntary framework. The Denmark Law mandating CSR reporting for its large 
                                                 
77 World Bank World Development Report 1997  The State in a changing world ( World Bank/OUP, 
Washington DC/New York 1997) 
78 He focuses on labour but the same can be said for other aspects of CSR- social,  human rights, 
environment R Jenkins, R Pearson G Seyfang  Corporate Responsibility and Labour Rights- Codes of 
Conduct in the Global Economy (Earthscan, London  2002) 5 
79 Finance Bill sub-part AD. S. 50k-l http://www.nef.mu/csr/finance_bill.php This was attempted 
unsuccessfully in India http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/2-csr-spend-not-mandatory-for-
companies-moily/152054/on  
80 Article 74 of Limited Liability Company Law 2007 Article 1 defines SER as ‘the company’s 
commitment to participate in sustainable economic development in order to improve the quality of life 
and beneficial environment both for the company itself , the local community and society in general.’ 
This obligation for CSR is extended to investors see Article 5b of the Investors Investment Law no.25 
2007  see details in O Amao CSR, HR and Law: Multinational Corporations in Developing Countries 
(Routledge 2011) 
81 Ibid 
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corporations82, however there is a limitation which is that it remains the prerogative 
of the corporations to decide if they want to engage with CSR. This Act specifies 
that ‘CSR shall mean businesses voluntarily include considerations for human rights, 
societal, environmental and climate conditions as well as combating corruption in 
their business strategy and corporate activities. Businesses without policies on social 
responsibility shall disclose this information in their management’s review.’83 This is 
not dissimilar to the reporting requirement of the UK Companies Act 200684  
 
ii. Non-Traditional  
 
The more prevalent instrument within CSR for channelling conduct is the codes of 
conduct. These codes of conduct could be classified into five categories: company 
codes, trade association codes, multi-stakeholder codes, model codes and inter-
governmental codes.85 Codes of conduct have been defined as ‘written policy or 
statement of principles intended to serve as a basis of commitment to a particular 
conduct’86 and they have emerged to prescribe expected conduct or behaviour of 
corporation as well as to channel society’s expectation of corporate action. 
 This has a two-edged effect. First affecting what society expects of corporations and 
secondly spelling out the change in the corporate attitudes and behaviour. CSR is the 
result of changes in societal expectation but also a result of the increasing 
                                                 
82 the Danish Financial Statements Act ("Årsregnskabsloven"), cf. Consolidated Act no. 647 
of 15 June 2006, as amended by section 5 of Act no. 108 of 7 February 2007, section 63 of Act 
no. 468 of 17 June 2008 and Act no. 516 of 17 June 2008 http://www.csrgov.dk/  
83 S. 99(a) Danish Financial Statements Act 
84 S.417 Companies Act 2006 (UK) 
85 R Jenkins ‘Corporate Codes of Conduct: Self-Regulation in a Global Economy’ Technology, 
Business and Society Programme Paper No. 2 (UNRISD, 2001) 
86 L Dubin ‘ The Direct Application of Human Rights Standards to and by Transnational Corporations 
(1999) 61 Review of the International Commission of Jurists 35-66, 42 cited in A Wawryk 
‘Regulating Transnational Corporations through Corporate Codes of Conduct’ in J G Frynas S Pegg 
Transnational Corporations and Human Rights (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) 53-78 
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acknowledgment that business significantly affects society. The codes of conduct are 
playing a legal role by prescribing areas of corporate responsibility and concern not 
defined in traditional law but now expected from corporations as required conduct. 
They play an effective channelling role as they prescribe standards of accepted 
conduct in the relevant areas. This is why Wawyck points out that a code of conduct 
should not only set out the principles to guide behaviour; it should also establish 
mechanisms for implementation, monitoring enforcement and review.87 This can 
also be facilitated or reinforced by traditional legislation. 
An example of such innovative connexions within codes can be seen in the 
extractive industries transparency initiative (EITI) which has created a global 
standard for transparency and publication of oil revenues between oil corporations 
and governments. This is reinforced in the adopting country by legislation. 
Candidate countries within this initiative need to develop a work plan for 
implementation in consultation with stakeholders.  
This notion of inter-relationship between self-regulatory instruments and law is not 
new. Galanter reminds us that: 
‘the drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code was a self-
conscious attempt  (by Karl Llewellyn) to synthesise formal law 
and commercial usage: the formal law would incorporate the best 
commercial practice and would in turn serve as a model for 
refinement and development of that practice. The code‘s broadly 
drafted rules would be accessible to businessmen and would 
provide a framework for self-regulation which would in turn 
furnish attentive courts with content for the code’s categories. Thus 
the code would serve as a vehicle for business communities to 
evolve law for themselves in dialogues with courts operating not as 
interpreters of imposed law but as articulators and critics of 
business usage.’88 
 
                                                 
87 Wawryk ibid at 53 
88 M Galanter ‘Justice in Many Rooms’ (1981) 19 Journal of Legal pluralism 1 - 47, 29-30 
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In addition, the code of conducts can also offer up standards by which these 
companies can be held to account in a traditional legal sense.89 An instructive case is 
the US case of Kasky v Nike90. The case captured the attention of many corporations 
as Microsoft, Exxon Mobil and Pfizer are among the corporations that filed amicus 
curiae briefs. The case hinged on the claims made by Nike in a series of publications 
about the labour conditions in overseas factories. Kasky alleged that these claims 
were misleading and sued under California’s unfair competition and false advertising 
law; In 2002 Kasky won the case at the California Supreme Court but Nike appealed 
to the US Supreme Court. The US Supreme Court failed to give a definitive ruling 
and instead sent the case down to the trial court. The case was however settled 
without addressing the issue of whether Nike’s assertions could be classed as 
political speech protected by first amendment or commercial speech which is less 
protected.  
There are two vital points here. This case highlighted the potential for voluntary 
speech and assertions on social responsibility to have legal and financial 
consequences and also illustrated rather disappointingly that corporations were 
making assertions which could be open to attack as false perhaps for marketing and 
branding reasons.   
The potential of such statements to have a legal effect is not limited to the United 
States. Glinski also highlights this potential from German and EU law especially 
where the objective is to increase one’s sales.91 She points out that German courts 
already have a body of case law on environmental advertising.  Advertising would 
include longer texts such as codes of conduct and environmental reports.  The EC 
                                                 
89 C Glinski ‘Corporate codes of conduct: moral or legal obligation’ in D McBarnet A Voiculescu & 
T Campbell (eds.) The new corporate accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the law 
(Cambridge University Press (CUP), Cambridge 2007) 119 - 147 
90 Kasky v Nike, Inc 45 P 3d 243 (Cal..2002) 
91 Glinski (n 89)  126 
 297 
Directive on unfair commercial practices requires firm commitments which can be 
verified with regard to commercial communication directly connected to promotion, 
sale or supply of a product to consumers but this is not a right that can be derived by 
the consumer or individual. They are for application within the member state area 
and then these states provide mechanisms which may be through public authorities 
or consumer associations. However the EC in its renewed Strategy for CSR 2011 
confirms that this issue of misleading marketing (green washing) will be addressed 
in the report on the application of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive in 2012 
and it will consider the need for possible specific measures.92 
Nevertheless the basic aspect of this law-job is that it transcends the traditional legal 
perspective and it allows for the examination of the accountability perspective from 
traditional and non-traditional perspectives. It permits codes of conduct as simple 
rules channelling conduct to be examined as legal instruments. It allows the 
examination of such instruments for standards and mechanisms for accountability 
within those standards. It will also allow for complementary schemes where non-
traditional standards can give rise to traditional legal consequences such as litigation 
or be reinforced by traditional legislation. It is also possible to fashion out effective 
and transparent reporting mechanisms complemented by legislation. Again form is 
less relevant, what is crucial is that conduct is channelled effectively.    
Therefore within the corporate and society relationship, where CSR performs this 
channelling and re-channelling function, it is doing a law-job. It can be examined 
from this perspective and this will allow for more innovative ways of channelling 
conduct. 
 
                                                 
92 EC A Renewed Strategy 2011-14 for CSR Brussels Com (2011) 681 Final p.9 
 
 298 
6.3.3 The Say 
 
 
This aspect of the law- jobs is viewed as a constitutive function. It has been seen as 
‘the constitution of groups, concerning the establishment and allocation of 
authority...establishes the location of legitimate institutional power...’93This is an 
aspect which needs to be discovered and developed within CSR.  In prescribing the 
processes and procedures within CSR; the initiative and influence driving CSR 
appears to move from the corporations to co-opting non-governmental organisations. 
However it is neither the preserve of corporations, nor the preserve of states and non-
governmental actors. It should be a multi-stakeholder process. This is why it has 
been suggested that: 
‘The law-job of allocating authority is certainly not by definition 
the state’s prerogative or task. Private institutions are quite capable 
of making such decisions under the right conditions: the 
institutions represent multiple interests, be open to public scrutiny 
and prevent self-interested and lax monitoring.’94 
 
Llewellyn admits that this area more than any other points to the question of the 
allocation of power rather than rights.95 It goes to the question of who defines the 
CSR rules. He prescribes that ‘to get these matters settled in advance and to get 
settled also what procedures must be done in order to legitimise a decision and give 
it standing and what limits are on any person’s authority is a matter of peculiar 
importance.96However this law-job especially in the CSR context should also be 
about choosing or allocating who has the say. It should also be about establishing 
mechanisms that allow for the decisions on ‘who has the say’. This may be the sense 
                                                 
93 M Feintuck M Varney Media Regulation ,Public Interest and the Law (2nd ed. Edinburgh 
University Press, Edinburgh 2006) 34 
94 Taekema (n 5) 66-67 
95  Llewellyn (n 3) at 1383 
96 Ibid 
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in which structures are being advocated for taking cognisance of ‘stakeholders’ in 
decision-making with regards to CSR.97  
In the EITI example above, one of the challenges has been multi-stakeholder groups 
defining the process in context, this has created flexibility but it is also novel and 
each candidate country will work out its own process towards achieving compliance 
with the general principles, although there is also an independent assessment which 
reviews the country’s progress and delineates which steps can be taken to improve 
the process.98 The EC Renewed Strategy is also planning to act in this manner by 
creating a multi-stakeholder CSR platform in a number of relevant industrial sectors 
to make public commitments relevant to the sector and to be jointly monitored.99 
 The primary task of creating a CSR strategy and ensuring compliance with CSR 
procedures currently lies with CSR departments and their managers. CSR is 
becoming a distinct field with its own specialists charged with integrating CSR 
processes into management. Other key actors are the non-governmental organisation 
involved in this aspect and the auditors which verify these processes. However this 
raises larger questions of power, legitimacy and authority and redressing such 
relationships under the CSR framework.  
A first step is to identify this as a key law-job within the relationship. The centrality 
of power to CSR means that the law-job of the say is very important. The ability to 
develop participative publicised processes that shape the direction and decision-
making processes within CSR in a multi-stakeholder fashion is essential. This would 
imply the import of principles of participation, transparency and publicity. The legal 
                                                 
97 T Donaldson and L Preston ‘The stakeholder theory of the corporation: concepts, evidence and 
implications’ (1995) 20(1) Academy of Management Review 65-91 
98 Rainbow Insight, Evaluating the EITI’s Impact on the Transparency of Natural Resource Revenues 
2009 <http://eiti.org/files/Rainbow%20Insight%20Report.pdf > accessed 10 December 2011 
99 This is planned for 2013 see EC Renewed Strategy (n 92) p.9 
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environment also has to be made conducive and facilitative to the organic 
development of identified allocation of authority and responsibility. 
These debates could also be internal to the company where issues of employee 
participation in decision-making are raised100 or external where issues of corporate 
power and its impact on social responsibility are addressed.101 It is only with the 
recognition of the allocative function, that there can be a re-allocative function to 
change ‘who has the say’. This law-job is at its most relevant where no one has any 
idea whose say is to go, as a legal perspective can and should begin to define, direct 
and limit the exercise of authority. It forms the basis of a relevant legal enquiry.  
                                                 
100 P Maclagan ‘Corporate Social Responsibility as a participative process.’ (1999) 8(1) Business 
Ethics: A European Review 43-49 
101 D Lewis S MacLeod ‘Transnational Corporations –power, responsibility and influence’ (2004) 4 
(1) Global Social Policy 77-98 
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6.3.4 Net Drive 
 
 
There are many drivers of CSR practice102; they include civil society, the consumers, 
the investment climate or government and the workplace (internal company 
management or employees).103 The civil society104 especially the non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) played a major role in the promotion and popularisation of 
CSR.105  NGOs especially international NGOs arose out of the desire to fill the 
regulatory gap or vacuum left by the uncoordinated regulation by states at both state 
and international level. They sought to forge alliances with local communities, 
employees and aggrieved persons in order to publicise their grievances on the global 
stage.106 They excelled in the use of media to disseminate information especially 
through the internet. This is demonstrated by the Greenpeace and Brent Spar 
campaign which galvanised media and consumer focus on Shell and prompted a 
change of tactics by the oil corporation.107  
                                                 
102 M Haigh M T Jones ‘The drivers of corporate social responsibility: a critical review’ (2006) 5(2) 
The Business Review Cambridge 1-9, Haigh and Jones identify six sets of influences: ‘internal 
pressures on business managers, pressure from business competitors, investors and consumers and 
regulatory pressures coming from governments and non-governmental organisations.’  
103 DFID; DFID and Corporate Social Responsibility issues paper 
<http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/corporate-social-resp.pdf> accessed 10 December 2011. These are 
all factors counter- influenced by globalisation to varying degrees. 
104 LSE Centre for Civil Society defines civil society as referring ‘to the arena of un-coerced 
collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are 
distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, 
civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly 
embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, 
autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organisations such as registered 
charities, development non-governmental organisations, community groups, women's organisations, 
faith-based organisations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help groups, social 
movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy group especially the non-governmental 
organisations.’ < http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/what_is_civil_society.htm> last accessed 10 
September 2010  
105 A Lindblom Non-governmental organisations in International Law (CUP, Cambridge 2006) 
106 P Newell ‘Managing multinationals: The governance of investment for the environment’ 13 
Journal of International Development 907-919; 910 
107 G Jordan Shell, Greenpeace and Brent Spar (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2001) 
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These NGOs began to attack corporations directly because of the perception of an 
inability to govern multinational corporate conduct at an international level. The 
effectiveness of the NGO attack on transnational corporations was greatly assisted 
by the speedy and widely available communication networks that now exist under 
globalisation. There is huge variation in tactics adopted by NGOs: with some NGOs 
adopting a co-operative stance and forming partnerships with corporations in 
carrying out and monitoring CSR activities, and others remaining critical and 
actively advocate for mandatory regulation with support for international initiatives 
like the UN Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises with regard to human rights.108 The key question for them is a 
net drive for CSR on an international level. 
The government can also be a driver of CSR either through its action or inaction, 
through its inaction or omission to provide regulation or laws regarding socially 
irresponsible conduct thus creating a vacuum which had to be filled by other actors 
or by actively encouraging CSR practice through the creation of codes and standards. 
The former is evident in some developing countries where there is inadequate 
environmental, health safety and torts laws and a lack of enforcement juxtaposed 
with pressing social needs and requirements the local community which must be 
addressed by the corporation so as to create a stable and sustainable environment for 
it to carry out its operations.109 Conversely, however the government can positively 
drive the direction of CSR practice through policies, incentives and establishing non 
codes and systems. Examples can be found in the UK and Australia.110This may 
                                                 
108 P Muchlinski ‘Multinational Enterprises as Actors in International Law : creating ‘soft law’ 
obligations and ‘hard law’ rights’ in M Noortmann, C Ryngaert Non-State Actor Dynamics in 
International Law  (Ashgate, England, 2010) 9- 41, 20 
109 W Visser ‘Corporate social responsibility in developing countries’ in in A Crane, A McWilliams 
and others (eds) The Oxford Handbook of CSR (New York, OUP, 2008) 473-502 
110 J Moon Government as a driver of Corporate social responsibility: The UK in comparative 
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arise as an additional scheme within an existing regulatory framework or as an 
alternative to direct regulation. 
Another major driver of corporate social responsibility is the consumer. In this sense 
it is the perceived consumer effect which may occur as a result of damage to 
corporate reputation and brand or as a result of adoption of responsible initiatives 
and strategies. It is often assumed that the result of the increased awareness is an 
increase in vulnerability of the corporations to consumers and consumer reaction111. 
Consumers may choose to reward a corporation positively by use of a particular 
brand seen as ‘responsible’ or negatively by the boycott of a brand seen as 
‘irresponsible’. 
 However the specific reaction of consumers to corporate acts is not an exact science 
because in deep similarity to any analysis of other aspects of human behaviour; the 
reaction of consumers to behaviour of corporations is largely unpredictable, varying 
across sectors and changes over time. The vulnerability of corporations in the retail 
sector may be different from the exposure of corporations in the manufacturing 
sector. Personal choices may also vary from boom periods in the economy to 
recession times. For example the choice of buying free trade products or perhaps free 
range eggs in everyday commodities may vary.  Smith points out that 
 ‘for any given company-or at any given issue, to take a campaign 
group perspective- the likelihood of corporate responsibility 
affecting consumer behaviour vary tremendously. Academic 
research findings of positive and negative ethical consumerism 
highlight the heterogeneity and complexity of consumer 
response.’112  
 
                                                                                                                                          
perspective (2004) No. 20 ICCSR Working Papers Nottingham 
111 Y Fan Ethical branding and corporate reputation (2005) 10(4) Corporate communications: An 
international journal 341-50 
112 N C Smith ‘Consumers as Drivers of CSR’ in A Crane and others (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of 
CSR (OUP, New York 2008) 281 - 302 
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Occasionally classed in this group is a slightly different set of consumers. Such 
consumers are the investors who choose to invest on the basis of CSR. This refers to 
ethical or socially responsible investors who in theory seek to reward responsible 
behaviour by investing in corporations with high ethical rating. Swanson points out 
that  
‘Investors and the financial community care about these issues. 
Share value is much more than just the value of tangible assets. 
Reputation forms a large part of it, thus companies must respond to 
these challenges, if for no other reason than to protect their 
reputation and the financial implication this has.’113  
 
However ethical investment forms only a low share of all investments114 and this 
affects their ability to significantly affect the market in favour of social 
responsibility. Such ethical investment can take varied forms, which include 
negatively screening out corporations according to an ethical criteria or positively 
screening for corporations which adopt the best socially responsible performance or 
using rights as shareholders to encourage corporations to improve their 
performance.115 
 Finally managers are important in the implementation of CSR in practice. They have 
practical control of the resources and can determine the strategy of utilising such 
resources.116 However this raises a few problems, firstly most managers will 
examine CSR and its activities through economic notions of competitive advantage 
or an increase to the financial performance and it is inconclusive that all CSR 
activities yield higher financial performance.117If on the other hand, they simply 
                                                 
113 P I Swanson ‘CSR and the Oil Sector’ (2002) 11(1) CEPMLP Internet Journal  
< http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/journal/html/vol11/article11-1.html > accessed 10 September 
2010 
114 M Haigh and J Hazelton Financial markets: a tool for social responsibility (2004) 52(1) Journal of 
Business Ethics 59-71 
115 Ibid 
116 L Swanson ‘Top Managers a drivers for corporate social responsibility’ in  A Crane and others 
(eds.) The Oxford Handbook of CSR (OUP, New York 2008) 227-248 
117 C A Adams ‘Internal organizational factors influencing corporate social and ethical reporting: 
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drive for CSR on the basis of personal values certain agency issues may arise as they 
are deemed to be acting on behalf of the principal the corporation with primary focus 
to its interests.118 
The nature of CSR with its multiplicity of drivers in any given context means that 
this law-job of the development of the net effect or overall picture is a crucial one. 
From a legal perspective therefore this can be seen in the development and 
organisation of policies and laws pertaining to CSR. This could mean in a given 
context drafting an explicit CSR law or CSR policy which draws out the overall 
picture of the interaction of CSR tools to achieve outlined aims or it could evolve in 
an organic way.119  
Llewellyn makes an important point in this area which is relevant to newer concepts 
like CSR, he points out that ‘in an aspect where from the overall picture not all 
traditional law is visible then that is a law choice at least...’120It therefore becomes a 
legal choice to continue in CSR in a non-traditional format. It is pertinent at this 
point to re-iterate that history of CSR debates can be traced to the Berle-Dodd debate 
and the fundamental question of society’s view of the role of the corporation.121This 
debate is valid to the choices made in doing this law-job. 
 It affects the way in which CSR engages with law. This job also contains the 
overarching effect of ‘goal orientation’. It speaks about the direction that CSR is to 
take and that law has a role in shaping the future direction of CSR but this remains 
                                                                                                                                          
beyond current theorising’ (2002) 15(2) Accounting, Auditing and Accountability 223-250 
118 J Salazar and B W Husted ‘Principals and Agents: Further thoughts on the friedmanite critique of 
CSR’ in A Crane and others (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of CSR (OUP, New York 2008) 137-155 
119 The legal notion of written or unwritten constitutions comes to mind. see for example the EC 
Renewed Strategy (n 92) seeks to promote its own international CSR policy while encouraging 
policies at the national, regional and local level with a peer review mechanism for national CSR 
policies see EC Renewed Strategy (n 92) 12 
120 Llewellyn (n 3) 1388 
121 A A Berle Jr., ‘Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust’ (1931) 44 Harvard Law Review1049-1074 ; 
E M Dodd, ’For whom are corporate managers trustees?’ (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review  1145-1163;   
A A  Berle Jr.,, ‘For whom Corporate managers are Trustees: A Note’ (1932) 45 Harvard Law 
Review 1365- 1372 
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its choice. It change choose to engage more visibly in traditional forms or pluralistic 
forms. It can also choose to become more facilitative and less visible but that 
remains a law choice. It can choose to engage with CSR at different levels: local, 
national, regional or international or it can also do this engagement in variety of 
forms. This choice for law is expressed through the law-makers who react to given 
contextual circumstances however this law-job is what informs debates on the future 
of CSR, its role and importance. It is an important step to acknowledge that this is a 
relevant law-job, relevant for CSR’s core which is legitimising corporate power. 
This perspective adapted to a given context will allow for dialogue and goal 
orientation between the many identified drivers of CSR.   
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6.3.5 Juristic Method 
 
 
The juristic method may be best described as a law method. The first four jobs need 
doing and the juristic method refers to the chosen means for the doing of the law-
jobs. Llewellyn calls the problem of the juristic method, ‘that of the ways of 
handling “legal” tools to law-job ends and of the on-going upkeep and improvement 
of both ways and tools’.122 For him, as a legal realist this points to the creation of 
institutional machinery. However for CSR purposes the focus is on the tools used to 
achieve law-jobs ends. The relevant point being that within CSR more legal tools 
may need to be examined or developed in line with the on-going review and 
improvement which is required of both ways and tools. 
With the doing of this law-job, it is important to acknowledge the context of CSR as 
a struggle for the legitimacy of corporate power, a site for hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic struggles at various levels.123 Therefore the on-going review of the ways 
of handling tools geared at the doing of these law-jobs within the corporate-society 
relationship is of utmost importance. Rajagopal points out that there is an increasing 
sensibility that law is a terrain of contestation between different actors including 
social movements and states and that a theory of law or adjudication that ignores this 
fact is inadequate. 124It may be that there needs to be an established non-judicial 
remedial system as advocated by some researchers125 but on the other hand, it could 
                                                 
122 Llewellyn (n 3) 1392 
123 B D Santos, Towards a new legal common sense: Law, Globalization and Emancipation 
(Butterworths, London 2002),  R Shamir ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: A case of hegemony and 
counter-hegemony’ in B De Sousa Santos C A Rodriguez-Garavito (eds.), Law and Globalisation 
from below – towards a cosmopolitan legality (CUP, Cambridge 2005) 92-117,95 
124 B Rajagopal ‘Limits of law in Counter-Hegemonic Globalisation: the Indian Supreme Court and 
the Narmada Valley Struggle’in B De Sousa Santos C A Rodriguez-Garavito (eds.), Law and 
Globalisation from below – towards a cosmopolitan legality (CUP, Cambridge 2005) 183 -217 183 
125 Rees & Vermijis (n 66) 
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also be that there is the need for the development of a relevant legal framework for 
CSR. However it remains paramount that there should be the on-going improvement 
and re-examination of the current tools used in CSR. Where there is strong evidence 
that the juristic method used is not furthering the doing of the law-jobs, then this 
becomes the basis for reform and improvement. Therefore if law in CSR appears 
invisible or if the law-jobs are not being adequately handled, rather than abandon 
CSR or assert law has little to do with CSR, CSR in that context may need some 
system type reform.126 
This often results in the pluralisation of normative opportunities and the earlier 
analysis of law and regulation is relevant in this regards. Law tools will include the 
varied use of regulation for social control. It will allow the use of both traditional 
state law and non-state law towards law-job objectives. In other words regulation is a 
‘law-tool’ in the Llewellyn sense. It is not the only ‘law-tool’ as there can also be 
‘juristic’ tools but this allows for the examination of self-regulation and regulatory 
instruments proposed by International organisations, associations and corporations. 
Such dynamism is necessary for an extended and relevant role for law within CSR 
regulation and globalisation. It opens up the possibility for various permutations of 
law, regulation and CSR. Yet its end result is uncertain and unpredictable but 
necessary in view of the changing and complex context of globalisation. 127 
 
 
 
                                                 
126 This is not the immediate goal of this thesis but reflects a suggestion borne out from the evaluation 
of the law jobs. The new EC Renewed Strategy (n 92) reflects this point. 
127 ‘The pluralisation of normative opportunities for contestation, the outcomes of social movements 
engagements with law are highly uncertain in terms of their impact either on law or on the movements 
themselves...the outcome of the dialectic between law and social movements seem to depend on a 
number of scripts that are both internal and external to law and seem to depend on particular local and 
national contexts. These scripts need to be unearthed and examined to properly appreciate the role of 
law...’ Rajagopal  (n 124) 183 
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6.4 Conclusion 
 
The chapter finalises the work of the thesis by revealing the relevance of a novel 
law-jobs perspective to CSR’s core.  The law-jobs perspective allows for a neutral 
framework which can be applied to different context to discover and examine how 
the role of law in legitimising corporate power is being performed. Therefore an 
adaptation of the law-jobs perspective can provide that legal theoretical basis that 
allows for the broad overview of law’s potential roles within CSR.   
The chosen perspective of law-jobs presents a neutral legal perspective that will 
allow for flexibility in the form of law used but certainty in the roles which it can 
play in corporate-society relationships. The law-jobs framework will therefore allow 
for further analysis and research into areas of trouble disposition or dispute 
resolution in CSR, where there are instruments existing or in need of being drafted, 
to handle channelling or orientation of behaviour. The law-jobs perspective will also 
engender analysis and debate over the allocation of authority in matters pertaining to 
the relationships within CSR. It can provide an umbrella for the net direction which 
CSR so desperately needs. Finally it also provides for the examination and re-
evaluation of law’s tools for doing the jobs. This will lead to aspirational 
perspectives that raise questions of how they could be done better. 
This perspective provides a general universal CSR legal framework focused towards 
the legitimacy objective which gains content and expression in context. This context 
can then be industry, geographic or even between specific parties in the corporate –
society relationship. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
 
‘What is emerging in the arena of CSR is a complex interaction 
between government, business, civil society, private, state 
regulation , at national and international levels, with social, legal, 
ethical and market pressures all being brought to bear in ways that 
cut across traditional  pigeon-holes.’1 
 
7.1  Introduction 
 
 
 This concluding chapter provides a summative assessment of the extent to which 
law and the law-jobs perspective can contribute to CSR. The thesis demonstrates that 
traditional pigeon-holes need not apply in deciphering a necessary and novel legal 
approach to CSR especially in view of its core which is centred on legitimacy of 
corporate power. The justification for this research can be found in the contestations 
about CSR’s meaning and value as well as the contestation about the role of law 
within CSR. This must then be set against a background of critical incidents that 
have shown corporate irresponsibility and raised doubts about the value of an 
undefined concept. Horrigan points out that: 
‘A grand CSR is unfolding world-wide...this grand global CSR 
project remains a 21st work-in-progress. Constructing tools for this 
grand CSR project at its highest levels of philosophical abstraction 
(e.g. theorising about corporate legitimacy) and collective effort 
(e.g. undertaking CSR-sensitive law reform across jurisdictions) is 
as important as discovering what works on the ground to embed 
CSR within individual companies and industry sectors (e.g. 
integrating CSR within standards business models).’2 
 
                                                 
1 D McBarnet ‘Corporate social responsibility beyond law, through law, for law: the new corporate 
accountability’ in D McBarnet  et al (eds.)The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social 
Responsibility and the Law ( Cambridge  CUP, 2007) 45- 56, 55 
2 B Horrigan, Corporate Social Responsibility in the 21st Century: Debates, Models and Practices 
Across Government, Law and Business (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2010)  339 
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The aspiration of this research is that it will have contributed to constructing tools 
that contribute to both theorising about corporate legitimacy and framing legal 
perspectives that may shape future collective effort within CSR. The analysis within 
the research revealed the complexity within CSR.  
Yet by analysing from the perspective of an essentially contested concept, the thesis 
was able to identify a core for CSR which lies in drive for legitimacy of corporate 
power in the face of the changing relationship between corporations and society in 
the context of globalisation.  This globalised context is characterised by the 
emergence of various actors such as civil society, business groups, and local 
communities. This pluralisation of actors within the CSR area also appeared coupled 
with a de-emphasis on the role of law within CSR because of the fluidity of the 
concept. However the question after CSR’s core is revealed becomes do law and 
legal perspectives hold any potential for this core?   
The research revealed that the meaning of CSR centred on increasing corporate 
power and the consequential search for its legitimacy would lead to an exploration 
for legal perspectives capable of addressing this core.  The relevance of law to 
contemporary concepts such as this would depend on law’s ability to adapt to 
concepts which cut across ‘traditional pigeon-holes’.3 
Therefore the examination of legal perspectives contrasted a traditional legal 
perspective from corporate law with non-traditional legal theoretical perspective of 
law in ‘law-jobs’, to indicate that law can be viewed from both traditional and non-
traditional perspectives and to propose that the law-jobs perspective would allow for 
broader overview of the role that law is capable of playing in the CSR relationship in 
order to legitimise power.  
                                                 
3 McBarnet (n 1) 55 
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Through this the thesis has been able to gain novel insights into the relevant 
relationship between CSR and law. In this regard the thesis discovered two 
underlying premises. Firstly, that the extensions of law and its role are best and 
firstly conceived theoretically and secondly, that this shift to a role based pluralistic 
perspective will allow for pluralisation of normative opportunities and the proper 
appreciation of the role of law under globalisation conditions. This thesis therefore 
suggests the law-jobs perspective can provide such a view of law that could help 
address CSR’s core which is the legitimacy of corporate power by addressing the 
key areas of dispute resolution, channelling conduct, allocating authority and net 
organisation. 
This concluding chapter will highlight the key themes of the thesis by drawing out 
and highlighting conclusions made in each chapter towards addressing the research 
issues. It then outlines the key findings and the contextual implications. Finally 
directions for further study are identified. 
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7.2  Key Themes of the Thesis 
 
The thesis addressed the research question, redefining CSR as a legitimising force 
for corporate power: to what extent can law and a law-jobs perspective contribute to 
CSR?  The thesis addressed this question in two parts. Firstly to establish the main 
exemplar of CSR as the legitimacy of power and then secondly to examines what 
contribution law and a law-jobs perspective could bring. The first part covered in 
chapters two and three examined the defining CSR and the notion of corporate 
power, one as a consequence of the other.  
Chapter two explored the meaning of CSR. The chapter explored the various theories 
that have arisen within CSR. This could be broadly divided into five groups: 
instrumental, integrative, ethical, and political and accountability theories. The 
analysis revealed a high level of contestation about its meaning and role that placed 
CSR in the position of being an essentially contested concept (ECC). Gallie proposes 
the ECC as concepts ‘the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes 
about their proper uses on the part of their users.’4 Using Gallie’s criteria this chapter 
revealed that contestations of CSR centred on the role of the corporation in society 
provoked by of perceptions of increasing corporate power.  These were questions of 
responsibility for corporate power, responsibility to whom and for what. Therefore 
its core exemplar is the legitimacy of corporate power. 
Chapter three then explores this central notion of power especially power as applied 
to MNC. Firstly this chapter examines power as a concept using perspectives from 
Lukes’ exposition of power. Power is then identified as the capacity to affect others 
                                                 
4 W B Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’ (1958) 56 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
167-198 reprinted in M. Black(ed.), The Importance of Language (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs 
1962) 121- 146 
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stressing that this may or may not be exercised.5 Secondly when the analysis on 
power is then applied to MNC, it reveals structural power which includes control of 
foreign direct investment, control of trade, influence over states and hegemonic 
ideological influence.  It also reveals agency power such as direct participation and 
action in International affairs and the use of lobbying and funding. To indicate the 
relevance to CSR this chapter examines the example of oil industry MNCs to reveal 
how critical incidents stemming from use, abuse or non-use of corporate power 
triggered the demands for an active CSR agenda.  
The second part of the thesis in chapter four to six examines what law could 
contribute to this identified CSR core (i.e. legitimacy of corporate power). It 
proceeded on the premise that re-conceiving law’s role in addressing CSR’s core was 
necessary. This was a result of the following issues arising from the CSR and law 
relationship: the deliberate attempt to exclude law from the purview of CSR, the 
challenge that concepts resulting from globalisation such as CSR posed for 
traditional conceptions of law and finally the need for novel and coherent ways of 
analysing law’s pluralistic role in CSR. 
On this basis Chapter four examines the notion of legitimacy of corporate power 
from a legal perspective. This examines general debates about role of law in 
legitimacy, the varied perspectives of law itself and its relationship with regulation.  
The chapter endorses Beetham’s view of legitimacy as limited power. 6 This view of 
legitimacy focuses not just on people’s beliefs but on such power being ‘justified in 
terms of their beliefs.’7 The focus is therefore justification which implies 
accountability and responsibility. Therefore the search for legitimacy of corporate 
power is a valid subject of law as law can contribute to accountability. 
                                                 
5 S. Lukes Power: A Radical View (2nd ed.)(Palgrave Macmillan Great Britain 2005) 
6 D Beetham The Legitimation of Power’ (Palgrave, Hampshire, 1991) 35 
7 Ibid at 11 
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However law itself also has to be better nuanced when engaging in this legitimacy 
objective of CSR because it is a concept occurring at some many levels in global 
society. Therefore if law is defined as only state-centred and traditional it becomes 
self-limiting in its relevance.  There are many perspectives of law that could have 
relevance to global concepts such as CSR and chapter four addresses the general 
classifications of traditional state-centred law and the emerging pluralist non-
traditional view of law, hard law and soft law and law and regulation. 
The thesis then in chapters five and six examines two such perspectives of law that 
are relevant to legitimacy of corporate power. A  traditional view of law from 
corporate law which is the basic law that frames and forms the corporation and then 
a non-traditional extended ‘law-jobs’ perspective which does not prescribe a 
particular substance or form but identifies key inter-relational roles for law which 
can then be borne out in context. 
Chapter five focuses on the traditional corporate law perspective. Initially this 
chapter examines corporate legal theory as influential to the way in which corporate 
law regulates corporate power. It finds a focus on utility as a legitimising concept to 
the detriment of responsibility. This results in concepts within corporate law and 
corporate governance, that are share-holder oriented and there is only limited 
recognition of stakeholders. The chapter then examines the UK Company law as the 
best example of corporate reform geared at CSR but discovers that there is still an 
internal focus. The limitations which are placed by separate legal personality and 
limited liability as concepts for the benefit of the share-holder still remain. The 
acknowledgement of the ‘enlightened shareholder value’ is a symbolic step but still 
prioritises the shareholder. The chapter also reveals the limitations of this type of 
state law as reform processes take a long time and require political will. 
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This chapter concludes that to examine law relevant to CSR and to capture its full 
potential, another perspective of law allowing for pluralist viewpoints may be able to 
form an embryonic framework for identifying law’s role in CSR beyond traditional 
substantive law including corporate law. 
Chapter six proposes such a potential framework derived from an extension of 
Llewellyn’s law-jobs theory.8 These spells out a potential framework for CSR that 
addresses  jobs of dispute resolution, channelling and re-channelling of conduct, the 
allocation of authority (the say), the net organisation and the use of law tools in 
achieving these law-jobs (the juristic method). Twining supports the adaptability of 
this theory to concepts emerging from globalisation. This would also provide a 
useful frame of enquiry on broader conceptions of the role of law embracing state 
law and non-state law focused around the doing of the law-jobs.9 
This shifts the focus of law’s role in CSR from a substantive to a role-based one. 
This better captures the role law can play. It does not stress that only law can fulfil 
these roles but that laws of various kinds are arising and should be developed within 
CSR to achieve these roles. This would also allow for flexibility and 
contextualisation necessary in CSR as the law-jobs have a questing element and an 
aspirational element that is one aspect that asks how they can be done and another 
that pushes for how they could be done better. 
 Kerr points out that CSR is not a fixed concept because it is based on changing 
perceptions and attitudes and this also means that it is unsuited to a stagnant 
perspective of law.10 In the extended conceptual sense from a law-jobs perspective, 
                                                 
8 K Llewellyn, ‘The Normative, the Legal and the Law Jobs: The Problem of the Juristic Method 
(1940) 49 Yale Law Journal 1355-1400 
9 W Twining, General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective (CUP, 
Cambridge 2009) 
10 M Kerr, R Janda and C Pitts, Corporate Social Responsibility –A Legal Analysis (LexisNexis, 
Canada 2009)5 
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law reveals the potential to play a broader role in legitimising corporate power by 
developing a variety of accountability mechanisms in context to do relevant jobs. 
 
7.3 Key Findings of the Thesis 
 
The research from the thesis makes some of the following significant and original 
contributions. 
Firstly that CSR can be re-defined around its core which is identified as legitimacy 
of corporate power. This should be seen in light of changing relationships between 
corporations and society in the context of globalisation. The issues of legitimacy of 
corporate power raise questions about accountability and limitations on abuse of 
power as well as beneficial uses of corporate power. With the unearthing of this core 
the necessity for legal perspectives within CSR becomes more obvious as law is 
relevant when analysing issues of legitimacy of corporate power.  
However there are various ways of conceiving law therefore another key finding of 
the thesis is that the relevance of law can be conceived more broadly when pluralistic 
forms of law emerging under globalisation are taken into account. This pushes for a 
perspective of law that is less focused on ‘form’ but rather focuses on ‘roles’ or 
‘jobs’. Therefore in the relationship between law and CSR, the limitations placed on 
the role of law are not inherent to law or CSR, they are reflections of narrow and 
limited definitions of both concepts.  
Nevertheless even within the narrow confines of traditional state centred law, 
corporate law exemplifies law’s relevance to legitimising corporate power but it also 
reveals the limitations of this traditional perspective. Legal theory allows us to apply 
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broader conceptions and shift focus from substantive law to broader ‘role-based’ 
perspectives. This perspective of law as exemplified by law-jobs will help us capture 
and visualise wider role for law within CSR. This change in the view of law can lead 
to a framework that prompts key questions to be asked in a CSR relationship. These 
questions include issues of dispute resolution, channelling conduct, allocating the 
authority or say, providing a net framework or organisation as well as widening the 
range of law tools that can be used in the ‘juristic method’. The answers and the 
ability for change and reform through the juristic method will contribute towards 
accountability aspect of legitimacy.  
This novel legal perspective of the law- jobs CSR framework opens up potential for 
legal analysis in context between multi-stakeholders about the extent to which their 
current CSR instruments achieve the law jobs roles towards the legitimising goal. It 
will allows the actors to engage in questions of dispute resolution and the adequacy 
of mechanisms, channelling conduct, the allocation of authority, net organisation and 
review. The potential is that where they discover that the existing CSR instruments 
are not suitable for these roles it will lead to the choice of alternative instruments 
(traditional or non-traditional legal tools). This frame will allow for future tools in 
CSR to be developed in context and this does not exclude the future development of 
CSR law. 
Importantly the findings here suggest that law has a major role in legitimising 
corporate power from a responsibility and accountability perspective. It can provide 
crucial frameworks even at this embryonic stage of law in CSR that utilise varied 
legal forms.  This suggested perspective of law reveals that law can throw up crucial 
questions that constrain the use of corporate power and throw up fundamental 
questions which must be answered in the corporate society relationship. 
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7.4 Contextual Implications 
 
 
The thesis in proposing an exemplar for CSR as legitimacy of power seeks to 
provide a platform to frame and analyse the debates which have shaped CSR so far. 
This exemplar is also the platform that identifies the necessity for legal perspectives 
and the   suggestion of the law-jobs framework as a preferred legal perspective. 
The CSR law-jobs framework provides systems based analysis for anyone 
contemplating CSR law in context. It is inclusive of traditional law perspectives but 
transforms the questions to a ‘role-based one.’ Therefore it is possible to examine in 
a local context, how these roles in the corporate- society relationship under CSR are 
being carried out and then whether they could be done better. This is the sense in 
which Llewellyn comments that there is a questing aspect and a bettering aspect.11 It 
responds to the need for a framework that is capable of giving structure to the role of 
law within CSR but it also gives flexibility because of the absence of its own content 
only allowing for roles which should be performed. 
The substantive topics within CSR such as human rights, environment, labour and 
social issues can then be flexibly identified in each context towards adopted goals in 
that context so that if more categories are identified then the structure of law-jobs is 
still unaltered. This also does not detract from attempts to set universal standards on 
specific topics such as human rights because these rules will not affect the 
framework. They will only go to clarify the desired conduct for orientation. 
In a way the law-jobs analysis may force the question of standards to the fore when 
an analysis is carried out and it is discovered that in channelling conduct, the tools 
and instruments are weak or inadequate. It may also reveal that where the standards 
                                                 
11  Llewellyn (n 8) 
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(for example: codes of conduct) are not re-orienting conduct of corporations then 
perhaps other tools (such as regulation) can be explored. The juristic method will 
allow for reform, re-evaluation and the potential for development of other law tools 
that could do the law-jobs in a better way. 
This perspective provides a platform for more contextual examination of CSR law. It 
allows a country, community or corporation to assess how the law-jobs in CSR are 
being done and to explore other law tools that could be used to achieve better doing 
of the law-jobs which then contribute to ensuring that such corporate power is 
exercised in an accountable and legitimate manner. This responds to on-going issues 
of legitimacy and accountability by proposing a more nuanced role for law beyond 
the ‘traditional legal’ role. This inter-relational perspective allows room for stock-
taking and review. 
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7.5  Conclusion and Further research opportunities 
This thesis establishes that CSR is centred on the legitimacy of corporate power and 
that this drive for legitimacy indicates the relevance of law.  
It examines the potential contribution of law from two perspectives: firstly a 
traditional corporate law perspective because corporate law is seen as home of laws 
for the corporations and reflect some universal legal notions about the corporate 
form. It discovers important limitations from corporate theory that prevent corporate 
law from achieving the responsibility element of legitimacy.  It then suggests a shift 
in focus within law from ‘form’ that is traditional substantive state law to broader 
perspective that address questions of ‘role’. The law-jobs perspective is then 
suggested as a heuristic device that throws up fundamental question within CSR 
relevant to the responsibility and accountability element of legitimacy. 
The analysis within the thesis represents a chosen perspective of examining law’s 
role in CSR there are other perspectives which could continue to explore the 
desirability of International or global laws or to push for even more radical reform of 
corporate laws or even propose the irrelevance of law. This work does not detract 
from these legitimate research aims which could be carried out in future. Rather by 
re-defining CSR and exploring the law-jobs it also provides a platform and wider 
framework for enquiries of law within CSR 
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This research will therefore provide a useful framework for further analysis in 
contextual circumstances. For example exploring how these law-jobs are currently 
handled in the CSR sphere within specific countries or sectors. This type of research 
can be validly carried out from a legal CSR perspective applying the law-jobs 
framework. This would highlight if and how the relationship is currently handling 
such jobs within CSR and could then go further to suggest a different or better way 
of handling the jobs. Finally future research building on the work in the thesis, could 
examine if the ‘law-jobs’ framework is a heuristic step that will  ultimately lead to a 
body of CSR law that involves a mixture of state and non-state law linked through an 
enabling CSR framework. 
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